Jurisdiction

Civil courts are not to conduct a fresh trial to re-determine factual controversies already adjudicated by statutory authorities, unless order assailed is shown to be without lawful authority or is based on no evidence or suffers from jurisdictional defect or is a result of mala fide.

The concept of jurisdiction has its genesis in the physical power of a Court to issue process to persons within the reach of the Court

The jurisdiction of a legal forum/Court includes its (i) territorial jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) subject matter jurisdiction

The jurisdiction is always conferred upon the Courts by a law and it cannot be decided by the parties inter se

The territorial jurisdiction refers to a Court's power over actions and parties within the bounds of a particular territory

If a Court does not have territorial jurisdiction over the events or persons within it, then the Court cannot give a binding decision regarding the rights of the parties.

Party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a court must demonstrate a vested right or legal interest in the subject matter of the dispute at the relevant time.

Held: Arbitrator had no power and authority to grant interest on the amount of damages/compensation from the year 2014 till its realization

Such power was only with Trial Court under S. 29 of Arbitration Act, 1940 and the interest should be granted if Court desired, from the date of order or decree

Generally in absence of express or implied contract to pay interest, it could not be allowed on damages for breach of contract

Arbitrator could not award interest, on his own on the amount of compensation

Interest and sum of award as damages could not be allowed for period prior to the date of award under S. 29 of Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Court was empowered/competent to allow interest of award from the date of decree till payment

Trial Court rightly modified the order in respect of interest awarded by the arbitrator as such order of arbitrator in respect of interest was without jurisdiction

High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court, as the appellants failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity in the same

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

It is well settled that jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter; therefore, the issue of jurisdiction is to be determined prior to entering upon or expressing any opinion on merits of the controversy between the parties.

Where the ultimate relief relates to an act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, no other High Court can assume jurisdiction merely because one of the reliefs touches upon an act of a federal body.

Sugar Factories Control Act (XXII of 1950), Ss. 13-A & 21(b) [as amended by Sugar Factories (Control) (Amendment) Act(XV of 2021)]

Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199

Constitutional petition

Non-payment of cane price, wrongful confinement and criminal intimidation

Report of Deputy Commissioner, absence of

Cane Commissioner

Jurisdiction

Liability of occupier of factory

Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace directing police to register case against petitioners after recording statement of respondent / complainant

Validity

A formal report by any of the officers mentioned in S.21(b) of Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 [as amended]to the police is required to make the reported act or offence cognizable and being so

First Information Report could not to be registered upon report of an individual as the provision had excluded everyone including the grower

Comments received by Ex-officio Justice of Peace from Deputy Commissioner were not to be taken as a report in terms of S.21(b) of Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 [as amended]

Order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, to the extent of registration of case against petitioners under the provisions of Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 [as amended], was set asideas the same was not maintainable

High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace to the extent of allegation of Ss.342 & 506 P.P.C., which offences were cognizable in nature

High Court directed police to record statement of respondent / complainant and proceed in accordance with law

Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

In the present matter, both the Courts below non-suited the petitioner while holding that the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable in view of the bar contained in S.26 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 , language of which (section) unequivocally bars Civil Courts jurisdiction

There is no cavil to the proposition that the civil court possesses broad authority to review actions of any tribunal or authority that exceed jurisdiction or are ultra vires

However, where a special law provides a specific forum and expressly excludes the civil court's jurisdiction, the court's role becomes limited

Mere allegations of fraud or misrepresentation do not, by themselves, confer jurisdiction upon the civil court; to attract its jurisdiction, the alleged fraud must go to the root of the matter affecting the very decision-making authority and not be of a merely procedural or incidental nature

Bare or unsupported claims of fraud are insufficient to invoke civil court's jurisdiction

Petitioner had challenged the order having been passed in the year 1992, alleging that respondent by fraud, concealing the proceedings from the petitioner obtained an ex-parte order, however, the record indicated otherwise; which was passed in petitioner's presence at the time of its pronouncement

Accordingly, the challenge to the said order now taken by the petitioner appeared to be an afterthought aimed at depriving respondent of the fruits of that order

Petitioner failed to point out any irregularity or illegality in the decisions rendered by the Courts below nor this/High Court found any misinterpretation of law or non-appreciation of material available on file to call for interference in its revisional jurisdiction and the fora below had correctly non-suited the petitioner while relying on provisions of West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960

Revision, being merit-less , was dismissed in limine.

Every court prior to taking cognizance of and adjudicating upon an issue should first resort to the question of assumption of jurisdiction of the Court

If it comes to the conclusion that jurisdiction can be assumed only then it can adjudicate upon the issue.

Jurisdiction lies at the foundation of all legal proceedings and if it is not present, the proceeding is void.

Gas Utility Court declined to adjudicate civil dispute under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 ('the Act, 2016') in suit filed by Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (Gas Company) and rejected plaints under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., filed by Suit Southern Gas Company Limited (Gas Company/Appellants)

Validity

The District Judge rejected the plaint under O. VII, R. 11(c), C.P.C. as being barred by law

Nothing in the Act, 2016 bars the appellants from filing a claim under the Act, 2016

The entire mechanism of the Act, 2016 provides explicitly for filing such suits

Hence, the District Judge erred in holding that the suit was legally barred as the reasoning directly conflicts with the Act, 2016; if he believed that he did not have requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter, he could, at best, have ordered for the return of the plaint under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C., and not rejected the plaint

Thus, the Gas Utility Courts established under the Notification hold the jurisdiction to adjudicate civil and criminal matters per the mandate of Ss. 3, 4 & 5 of the Act, 2016

Appellate/High Court set-aside the impugned order directing the Gas Utility Courts to proceed with adjudicating civil cases under the Act, 2016 and ensuing Notification

Appeal, filed by Gas Company, was allowed accordingly.

Gas Utility Court declined to adjudicate civil dispute under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 ('the Act, 2016') and rejected plaints filed by Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (Gas Company/Appellants)

Argument of the consumers/respondents was that the Gas Utility Court(s) for adjudicating civil disputes under the Act, 2016 had not been notified vide Notification No. SO No. 293(1)/2017 dated 02.05.2017 ('the Notification')

Held, that the District and Sessions Judges have been notified as Gas Utility Courts

If, for the sake of assumption, it is argued that these were elected only for the criminal trial, then the question arises as to why the term District was also included

A District is defined in S. 2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, as "...the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction ('District Court']

At the same time, a Court of Session is established under S. 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, for criminal cases

The term "District and Sessions Judge" is used cumulatively in the Notification

Had the intent been to only notify for criminal trials, then the correct phrase employed would have been Sessions Judge only and not District and Sessions Judge

Even if that were the case, the same would not have been valid as the Notification cannot revoke/withhold jurisdiction expressly granted by the statute under S. 4 of the Act, 2016

The powers of issuing the Notification must fall squarely within the mandate of the principal statute

Thus, the Gas Utility Courts established under the Notification hold the jurisdiction to adjudicate civil and criminal matters per the mandate of Ss. 3, 4 & 5 of the Act, 2016

Appellate/High Court set-aside the impugned order directing the Gas Utility Courts to proceed with adjudicating civil cases under the Act, 2016 and ensuing Notification

Appeal, filed by Gas Company, was allowed accordingly.

Gas Utility Court declined to adjudicate civil dispute under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 ('the Act, 2016') and rejected plaints filed by Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (Gas Company/Appellants)

Argument of the consumers/respondents was that the Gas Utility Court(s) for adjudicating civil disputes under the Act, 2016 had not been notified vide Notification No. SO No. 293(1)/2017 dated 02.05.2017, ('the Notification')

Validity

Via the Notification, having been passed under S. 3 of the Act, 2016, the courts of certain District and Sessions Judges were notified as Gas Utility Courts to operate within defined territorial jurisdictions

Unfortunately, an ambiguity crept in due to the wording of the Notification as the same mentioned that the Courts so established will "exercise the powers for the trial of offences under the said Act..."; no mention was made explicitly for also adjudicating civil disputes falling within the purview of the Act, 2016; which was the basis for the consumers/respondents wrongly making their argument

The Notification mentions S. 3 of the Act, 2016 while S. 3 only provides for establishing an all-encompassing Gas Utility Court, which does not bifurcate between a civil or a criminal Gas Utility Court

Further, S. 4, which is the operative section to determine the jurisdiction of a Gas Utility Court, stipulates that the same "shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to all matters covered by this Act"

Hence, since the Act, 2016 does not create a division between a Civil Gas Utility Court and a Criminal Gas Utility Court, delegated legislation. i.e., a notification, cannot create such a distinction for the same will be in contravention of S. 4 of the Act, 2016

Section 20 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that "where by any Federal Act or Regulation, a power to issue any notification...is conferred...the expressions used in the notification...if it is made after the commencement of this Act, shall unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings as in the Act or Regulation conferring the power"

Even otherwise, it is settled law that delegated legislation cannot contradict the principal statute

And in case of any contravention, the courts shall make all efforts to reconcile the inconsistency

Thus, the Gas Utility Courts established under the Notification hold the jurisdiction to adjudicate civil and criminal matters per the mandate of Ss. 3, 4 & 5 of the Act, 2016

Appellate/High Court set-aside the impugned order directing the Gas Utility Courts to proceed with adjudicating civil cases under the Act, 2016 and ensuing Notification

Appeal, filed by Gas Company, was allowed accordingly.

Appellants / accused persons were aggrieved of blocking of their bank accounts during inquiry proceedings initiated by NCCIA on the basis of its own source report

Validity

Source report did not bifurcate roles of each appellant / accused in the commission of alleged offences, if any

Detailed inquiry was required to be conducted by associating appellants / accused persons in the process, disclosing allegations on the basis whereof NCCIA initiated criminal proceedings under Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016

NCCIA proceeded in haste and directly approached concerned banks for freezing of bank accounts of appellants / accused persons, which could affect their rights to property, livelihood and life guaranteed under the Constitution

Nature of allegations required detailed probe and it was for Trial Court, if a criminal case was subsequently filed, to strike a balance between right of appellants / accused persons protected Art. 19 of the Constitution and the provisions of Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016

Division Bench of High Court set aside the order passed by NCCIA whereby bank accounts of appellants / accused persons were blocked on the basis of its own source report, as the orders were disproportionate, harsh and unreasonable, particularly to the extent of family members of persons regarding whom the allegations were levelled

Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly.

NCCIA is an independent body and no more a subordinate office of Federal Investigation Agency and has thus stripped of the powers under S. 5(5) of Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974

NCCIA derives its existence and authority from Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016

NCCIA can exercise only those powers, which are delegated to it by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) through Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016.

Tribunal under S. 122 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 is empowered to adjudicate claims by policyholders against insurance companies in respect of or arising out of insurance contracts

Jurisdiction on Federal Insurance Ombudsman conferred under S. 127 of Insurance Ordinance, is to entertain complaints from any aggrieved person alleging maladministration by an insurance company.

Petitioner was aggrieved of placing of his name on Exit Control List / Passport Control List due to his involvement in a criminal case, in which petitioner had been granted bail

Validity

Whenever a power is conferred on Federal Government, it is construed as a power given to Prime Minister and Federal Ministers / Cabinet to be exercised in the name of Federal Government

No approval was granted by Federal Government for placing name of petitioner on Exit Control List, as provided by R.22 (1) of Passport Rules, 2021

Inclusion of name of petitioner on Passport Control List violated his fundamental rights to due process, liberty, life and freedom of movement, all of which were guaranteed by the Constitution

High Court directed the authorities to remove name of petitioner from ECL/PNIL/PCL as it was unjustified, illegal, lacked lawful authority and was of no legal effect

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Where two or more forums are otherwise competent to entertain a dispute, the parties may, by mutual agreement, restrict themselves to one such forum for the adjudication of their disputes

Such clauses, when they merely regulate the choice amongst available forums and do not oust the jurisdiction of all courts, are respected in order to uphold the sanctity of contract and the autonomy of the parties

A jurisdiction clause is a contractual stipulation, where the parties to the contract choose or select one particular forum out of two or more available forums, and the same is permissible

Choice of parties regarding jurisdiction clause has been upheld by Supreme Court to maintain the sanctity of the contract

General rule of contract in common law is founded upon the principle of freedom of contract that parties are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and that where they freely and voluntarily enter into a contract the primary function of the courts is to enforce to what has been agreed

However, it has to noted that employment contracts are often marked by unequal bargaining power because the employer generally occupies a dominant position, while employee has little or no real opportunity to negotiate the terms of engagement, and only to sign the dotted line of the contract in order to secure his livelihood

In such circumstances, courts are not confined to formal reading of contractual clauses but are required to examine the fairness and reasonableness of enforcing such clauses

However, it has also to be noted that where enforcement of jurisdiction clause would operate oppressively, unfairly, or inequitably, courts may justifiably decline to give effect to it.

Jurisdiction is not a mere technicality but the very foundation upon which the legality of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings rests.

Petitioner / Capital Development Authority was aggrieved of order passed by Deputy Commissioner, who in exercise of powers of Commissioner had reviewed his earlier order and penalty imposed upon respondent / owner of the property was set aside on the allegation of non-confirming use of property in question

Validity

Scope of review under S.36(3) of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, is narrowly circumscribed and is limited to correcting clerical, arithmetical or patent errors

Deputy Commissioner in exercise of powers of Commissioner re-examined factual controversies already adjudicated upon and by substituting his own findings for those of Deputy Commissioner, transgressed jurisdictional limits of review

Such reasoning suffered from jurisdictional infirmity and amounted to illegal exercise of authority

Order in question passed in review, could not be sustained in the eyes of law, as the same was contrary both to the statutory scheme and to settled judicial principles regulating the scope of review

High Court set aside the order passed in review as the same suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction

High Court remanded the matter to Deputy Commissioner to decide the matter afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to parties

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

It cannot be assumed by equitable interpretation nor conferred through waiver, acquiescence, consent or even the silence of parties.

Appellant was aggrieved of dismissal of her complaint by Consumer Court for lack of jurisdiction in the matter of medical negligence

Validity

Even if Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 provides remedies in consumer transactions, matters specifically involving medical negligence fall exclusively under Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018

Any aggrieved person must first approach Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Authority for redressal and determination of negligence before seeking other remedies

Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018 is a subsequent and special legislation exclusively governing healthcare regulation and medical negligence, and overrides the earlier statute i.e. Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 to the extent of inconsistency

Trial Court rightly held that complaint was not maintainable before Consumer Court

High Court declined to interfere in dismissal of complaint by Consumer Court, as the order did not suffer from any legal infirmity

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner / taxpayer company was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court determining vires of serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022

Validity

Some Constitutional provisions are 'character-conferring' and also 'competence-enumerating' and provision of Article 175E(5) of the Constitution is of such kind

As such the provision of Article 175E(5) of the Constitution is not merely a procedural clause conferring a power to transfer cases before Federal Constitutional Court, rather it encapsulates the very character and raison d'etre of Federal Constitutional Court, namely to adjudicate cases involving substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution

By removing jurisdictional or subject matter limits, Article 175E(5) of the Constitution enables Federal Constitutional Court to intervene wherever substantial Constitution meaning is at stake

Provision of Article 175E(5) of the Constitution authorizes Federal Constitutional Court to call for record of 'any court' and invocation of such provision, by itself, confers jurisdiction upon Federal Constitutional Court to adjudicate a matter in which it might otherwise lack express jurisdiction

Federal Constitutional Court is the ultimate forum for determining vires of Legislation and possesses the authority to entertain cases even in the absence of express jurisdiction, provided substantial question of Constitutional interpretation is involved

Such questions squarely arise in the form of a challenge to vires of law in question

Federal Constitutional Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by High Court maintaining refusal of revenue authorities to implement an old mutation in their favour

Validity

Revenue entries do not by themselves confer title but carry a presumption of correctness until rebutted in accordance with law

Where correctness, validity or enforceability of old mutations is disputed, particularly when such mutations have remained unimplemented for decades, the matter inevitably involves disputed question of facts and title requiring proper adjudication and cannot be determined by revenue authorities

Extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is intended to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy in cases where illegality or impropriety of action in question is apparent on the face of record and can be determined without undertaking an elaborate inquiry or recording evidence

Where controversy involves intricate disputed or contentious questions of fact, the resolution of which necessitates recording an appraisal of evidence by parties, such matters fall within the domain of Court of plenary jurisdiction and High Court in exercise of its Constitution jurisdiction cannot assume the role of fact-finding forum or enter into such factual controversies

Revenue officer is not competent to decide questions of title and Civil Court alone is competent to decide it

Findings recorded by revenue authorities were based on plausible appreciation of record and did not suffer from any legal infirmity

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.

Question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.

Matter pertained to a dispute between an office of Federal Government describing itself as Central Government and between Board of Revenue Punjab, over a piece of land

High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter on the ground that it was a dispute between two Governments

Validity

Original jurisdiction in any "dispute between any two or more Governments" was vested in Supreme Court under Article 184(1) of the Constitution but pursuant to the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 such jurisdiction is now vested to the Federal Constitutional Court under Article 175E(1) of the Constitution

Nature of such jurisdiction had not changed and a dispute between a Federal statutory corporation, such as the Evacuee Trust Property Board, and a Provincial department did not, merely for such reason, become a "dispute between two Governments"

Misdescription of petitioner as "Central Government through Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, etc." and any concession made at the bar could not divest High Court of jurisdiction that otherwise vested in it under Article 199 of the Constitution

Federal Constitutional Court set aside the order and remanded the matter to High Court for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law

Appeal was allowed.

Petitioner / taxpayer company was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court determining vires of serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022

Validity

Some Constitutional provisions are 'character-conferring' and also 'competence-enumerating' and provision of Article 175E(5) of the Constitution is of such kind

As such the provision of Article 175E(5) of the Constitution is not merely a procedural clause conferring a power to transfer cases before Federal Constitutional Court, rather it encapsulates the very character and raison d'etre of Federal Constitutional Court, namely to adjudicate cases involving substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution

By removing jurisdictional or subject matter limits, Article 175E(5) of the Constitution enables Federal Constitutional Court to intervene wherever substantial Constitution meaning is at stake

Provision of Article 175E(5) of the Constitution authorizes Federal Constitutional Court to call for record of 'any court' and invocation of such provision, by itself, confers jurisdiction upon Federal Constitutional Court to adjudicate a matter in which it might otherwise lack express jurisdiction

Federal Constitutional Court is the ultimate forum for determining vires of Legislation and possesses the authority to entertain cases even in the absence of express jurisdiction, provided substantial question of Constitutional interpretation is involved

Such questions squarely arise in the form of a challenge to vires of law in question

Federal Constitutional Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Court that is authorized to render a final judgment or order on the lis is the one vested with the competence to adjudicate it

This is because the legitimacy and finality of any judgment depends on whether the Bench delivering it had the lawful authority to do so

Such jurisdictional certainty is essential not only for the validity of judicial decisions but also for safeguarding the right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution and for ensuring due process.

Comparison of the two versions of Article 202A of the Constitution shows that, prior to Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 Constitutional Benches of High Courts were authorized to hear only those matters falling under Article 199(1)(a)(i) and Article 199(1)(c) of the Constitution, which corresponded to the well-known writs of mandamus, prohibition and to enforce fundamental rights envisaged in Part II, Chapter I of the Constitution

After Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, Article 202A of the Constitution has been expanded and Constitutional Benches of the High Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over the full range of matters exercised under Article 199 of the Constitution.

The powers of attorney, in the present case , were valid, registered, and covered the land-in-question; the mutation-in-question was sanctioned based on said documents, which were duly verified before the transaction

Revenue hierarchy erred in overlooking the documentary evidence and instead relied on a misapprehension of facts

Application of the respondents was not only delayed beyond the statutory limitation period but also involved disputed questions of title and allegations of fraud, which fall outside the jurisdiction of the revenue hierarchy

Such matters must be resolved by a civil court

Furthermore, the principle of acquiescence and bar of limitation were clearly applicable

The respondents' silence for over a decade renders their belated challenge unsustainable

Revenue authorities are creatures of statute and are confined strictly to the jurisdiction vested in them under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967; which are not courts of plenary jurisdiction and cannot venture into questions that involve adjudication of civil rights, title, or allegations of fraud, which require framing of issues and recording of evidence

Ironically the respondents never availed themselves of the remedies available under the law by instituting any civil or criminal proceedings

No recourse was taken under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, nor was any action initiated under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860

The District Collector is empowered to effect corrections in the revenue record only where the illegality or irregularity is manifest, apparent on the face of the record, and already established through a recognized legal or investigative process

Where the matter necessitates a detailed appraisal of evidence for the determination of such questions, particularly in matters involving allegations or commission of fraud, the validity or competence under a General Power of Attorney, the enforceability of a decree, the requirement of execution of a decree, or the applicability of limitation, the jurisdiction of not only the District Collector, but all revenue courts stand ousted

In such circumstances, revenue courts lack the lawful competence to venture into adjudication of such complex and inherently civil disputes

Therefore, the respondent had no lawful grounds to seek relief from the revenue courts in a matter which squarely fell within the domain of civil adjudication

Member - Board of Revenue set aside the impugned orders while the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Revenue) was upheld ;the respondents might seek appropriate relief before a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, if so desired

Review petition was allowed.

Interreference of revisional court and subsequently the High Court against exercise of lawful jurisdiction by the Trial Court

Limits and extent

Indisputably the revisional court has limited jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. which includes, (i) when Trial Court was found to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (ii) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity

However, when a lawful jurisdiction was exercised by the Trial Court then the revisional court followed by High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot reverse it by expressing their own views over and above the lawful discretion exercised by the trial court unless found within frame of section 115 of C.P.C.

It is constitutionally impressible for the Courts to expand and enlarge their jurisdictional domain which is neither allowed by the Constitution nor by the law.

Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal in favour of respondent / importer that time limits imposed by section 179(3) of Customs Act, 1969, were breached and extension in time granted by Federal Board of Revenue under section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969

Validity

There is difference between a power of extension to allow doing of requisite act or thing within an "appropriate" time period on the one hand, and a power to extend a time-limit in "exceptional circumstances" on the other

Latter expression is more restricted than the former term

Power of the Board to grant an extension under section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969, is much narrower and more circumscribed

Provision of section 74 of Customs Act, 1969, is a general provision, applying to "any" act or thing required to be done within a specified timeframe, whereas section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969, moves within a much more circumscribed locus, relatable only to matters of adjudication within the four corners of the section itself

Power to extend a time-limit under section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969, must be understood and applied while keeping in mind that timelines set out in section 179(3) of Customs Act, 1969, are mandatory and not directory

There was nothing on record that could indicate that there was a proper (or, indeed, any) consideration of the factors involved

Extension granted by the Board was an unlawful exercise of power conferred

Supreme Court was not persuaded from involving of large amount of taxes and duties, as if such a large amount was at stake it behooved the Collector to act speedily and had made his order in a timely manner, if that did not happen, then it was for the State to bear the burden and consequences of such tardiness

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

In view of section 5(3) of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the Service Tribunal can execute its own decisions.

Authorities contended that regular bench of Supreme Court could not hear the matter in question as it involved a challenge to Constitutionality of law namely section 221A (2) of Customs Act, 1989

Authorities referred to provisions of Article 191A of the Constitution, which was added to the Constitution through the 26th Constitutional Amendment

Respondents contended that Article 191A of the Constitution, was constitutionally invalid as it had infringed upon the salient features of the Constitution, including independence of judiciary and separation of powers among three organs of the State

Validity

Supreme Court found that it would be necessary to first decide upon the objection raised and reply thereto before proceeding further in the matter at hand

Supreme Court granted time to parties to prepare their arguments and assist Supreme Court on such points

Petition was adjourned.

Not all disputes arising between a society and its members, officers, or employees fall within the ambit of section 54 of Co-operative Societies Act, 1925.

Term jurisdiction in legal parlance refers to authority conferred upon Courts by law and the Constitution to adjudicate matters between parties

Jurisdiction of every Court is delineated and established to ensure adherence to law and issuance of legal orders

Transgressing or exceeding boundaries of its jurisdiction and authority annuls and invalidates judgments and orders.

In view of section 5(3) of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the Service Tribunal can execute its own decisions.

When a tribunal or authority is established by law to exercise jurisdiction over a particular matter, the Legislature defines scope of its power

It may either expressly or by necessary implications tabulate that jurisdiction can only be assumed and exercised if a particular state of facts exists or is shown to exist

In such case, though the Tribunal or authority are obligated to objectively ascertain in the event of a dispute, whether that state of facts exist before exercising jurisdiction over the matter, its decision on the existence of that state of fact i.e. the jurisdictional fact, is not conclusive

Instead, the decision is subject to challenge before and final determination of Civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction, or is subject to correction by Constitutional Courts through judicial review.

It is constitutionally impermissible for the courts to expand and enlarge their jurisdictional domain, which is neither allowed by the Constitution nor by the law.

Dispute pertained to withdrawing a partly heard case from regular Bench of Supreme Court and fixing the same before Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court

Held, that once a case is assigned to a Bench and that Bench has taken seisin (assumed jurisdiction) of the matter and partly heard it, Chief Justice (of Supreme Court) cannot unilaterally withdraw it and reassign it to another Bench except under judicially recognized circumstances

This practice is firmly rooted in high Constitutional value of judicial independence whereby a Bench enjoys freedom and independence to adjudicate upon a lis it has taken cognizance of

When a Bench is seized of a case and has partly heard it, the matter becomes part of judicial proceedings and the Bench hearing the case assumes exclusive jurisdiction over it

Any interference, whether through withdrawal or reassignment, without judicial justification undermines the principle of judicial independence

Such practice imposes significant limitation on administrative powers of Chief Justice

While the Chief Justice has the authority to regulate formation of Benches and allocate cases as an administrative function, these powers do not extend to withdrawing or transferring part heard case from a Bench that has already assumed jurisdiction

Withdrawal or reassignment is not merely an administrative act but a judicial one

Any such action must either stem from a judicial order passed by the Bench seized of the matter or be supported by express statutory authority if carried out by another Court or authority

Committees constituted under section 2 of Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 and Article 191A of the Constitution lack authority to withdraw a case that has been partly heard, where cognizance has already been taken by a regular Bench, and transfer it to another Bench unless the Bench itself refers the case to the Committees for its assignment to another Bench for some justifiable reasons

Part heard cases may include those where serious questions of Constitutional law concerning jurisdiction of regular Bench have been framed, some arguments on those questions have been heard and hearing has been adjourned for further arguments

Supreme Court referred the matter to Chief Justice of Pakistan to convene Full Court to deliberate and decide on such serious issue warranting collective and institutional deliberation of all Judges of Supreme Court

Matter was disposed of.

Supreme Court initiated contempt proceedings against contemner/ officer of Supreme Court office who fixed case in question before Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court on the basis of order passed by Committee of Supreme Court constituted under section 2 of Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023

Validity

Contemner/ officer of Supreme Court office did not deliberately avoid fixation of cases before the Bench as directed in the Court order

There was no evidence to suggest that contemner/officer of Supreme Court office had any personal interest in the matter or had connived with any of the parties to the case nor did he act with intention of causing damage to any of the parties to the case

There was no indication of mala fide intent in the actions of contemner/officer of Supreme Court office

In absence of any such factors or elements of contumacy, conduct of contemner/officer of Supreme Court office could not be considered contumacious nor it suffered from mala fides requiring contempt proceedings against him

Supreme Court withdrew show cause notice issued against contemner/officer of Supreme Court office

Contempt proceedings were withdrawn.

Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor (father who contracted two marriages) filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue

Donees/sons (petitioners) challenged said orders

Held: In the present matter, the contents of gift-in-question remained un-disputed

The revenue authority, under clauses (ii), (vi) and (xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 was authorized to exercise its powers, which included compelling the discharge of any duties imposed by the Act 1967, or any other enactment for the time being in force, correcting entries in the record of rights, or addressing any claims to set aside, on grounds other than "fraud"

No illegality had been noticed in the impugned gift-mutation cancelling orders passed by revenue authorities

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Settlement Officer set-aside gift-mutation accepting application of the donor filed by him in his life ('the gift mutation-in-question') which findings were maintained upto the Board of Revenue

Donees (petitioners) challenged said orders

Held: The donor challenged the gift mutation-in-question by seeking its (mutation's) cancellation on the ground of fraud, which was contested by the two petitioners (who were sons of the donor from first wife) thus, resulting in controversial question of facts

Such disputes require adjudication through the presentation of evidence by both parties in support of their respective claims

Importantly, S. 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 ('the Act 1967') assigns certain matters to the jurisdiction of the revenue authority, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of civil court

Revenue authority has a limited scope of inquiry and does not function like a civil court concerning contested matters that necessitate the framing of issues and determination through evidence

Such matters fall solely within the jurisdiction of civil courts

Furthermore, S. 172(2)(xvi) of the Act 1967 leaves the adjudication of plea of fraud to the competence of civil court

In the present case, the revenue authorities (from settlement authority to the Senior Member Board of Revenue) vide impugned orders had decided controversial question of "fraud" in summary proceedings, which was excluded under clause (v) and clause(xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 to the extent of first mutation of gift for which they had no jurisdiction

The revenue authority, under clauses (ii), (vi) and (xvi) of S. 172(2) of the Act 1967 was authorized to exercise its powers, which included compelling the discharge of any duties imposed by the Act 1967, or any other enactment for the time being in force, correcting entries in the record of rights, or addressing any claims to set aside on grounds other than "fraud"

High Court set-aside the impugned orders passed by revenue authorities while aggrieved legal heirs of donor (now deceased) were at liberty to seek their remedy before the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

It is the duty of every court to first determine its jurisdiction then proceed ahead, because any order passed without jurisdiction would be void ab-initio and nullity in the eyes of law

An order without jurisdiction is void and binds nobody

Such order neither creates nor recognizes any right or liability and no legal incidents are attached to it

It is as if it was never made.

Admittedly, appellant was an employee of the Market Committee and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act ('the PEEDA Act, 2006') and the appeal was filed in this Tribunal deeming appellant to be a civil servant

Section 19 of the PEEDA Act, 2006 after incorporation of 2(h)(i) clearly draws a line between the civil servant and employees defined under S. 2(h)(i) of the PEEDA Act, 2006, whereunder such employees if aggrieved by any final order whether original or appellate have been excluded from the definition of a civil servant

In terms of S. 2(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974 appellant was neither in the civil service of the Province nor he was holding a civil post in connection with the affair of the Province

According to S. 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, only a civil servant who does not fall under the ambit of S. 19 read with S.2(h)(i)of the PEEDA Act, 2006 can file appeal before the Service Tribunal

Appeal, being not maintainable, was dismissed.

Concurrent adverse orders were passed by the Department against the Respondent (CNG Filling Station) on the observation that the Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited ('SNGPL') was charging sales tax at the rate more than actual rate of CNG in the Nowshera Region so short charging sales tax by SNGPL was recoverable from CNG stations

Validity

In the present case, the Assessing Officer had relied upon the information provided by the Director General Audit Inland Revenue Receipts ("DGAIRR") through its audit and had not undertaken any independent proceedings/audit and it had been settled that the DGAIRR did not fall within the categories of the officers as provided under S. 30 of the Sales Act, 1990

Since the DGAIRR did not fall within the categories of the officers as provided under S. 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, therefore, on the basis of its audit report unless the revenue conducted an independent audit no assessment order could be passed

Thus, the order of the Assessing Officer was not tenable on the said two premises

Impugned order passed by the Tribunal, accepting the appeal of respondent (CNG station), was according to law

Resultantly, the questions of law were answered against the Department/Applicant

Reference Application, filed by department, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Provincial Government scrapped the result of MDCAT conducted for admissions to Medical and Dental Colleges and had directed for testing afresh

Validity

Provincial Government under S. 17 of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Act, 2023 was empowered alone to conduct MDCAT examination

Provincial Government had the authority to cancel the examination in terms of S. 2l of General Clauses Act, 1897

Provincial Government could not exercise such authority in vacuum unless there was sufficient material before Provincial Government justifying or even requiring for cancellation of examination

Unfair means were used in the examination on a very large scale and there was a racket behind the same

It was evident from report of Joint Investigation Team that it was a premeditated scheme of an organized group who devised scientifically sophisticated equipment for unfair means which were available in the market against a handsome amount

Though, only 219 persons were found involved using such devices, however, keeping in view the character and design of the devices which were not easily visible, there was a strong probability that a good number of students had used the devices

Candidates who were opposing re-testing had no vested right in the examination conducted by authorities

Provincial Government had the locus poenitentiae of re-testing

Re-testing would cause no prejudice to the candidates because if they had confidence in their abilities and intellect, then in the next examination they could again attain a better position

If the examination was not re-conducted, the candidates who were involved in unfair means would be in advantageous position as compared to those students who had worked hard and burnt midnight oil while preparing for the examination

High Court declared that when mass cheating was unearthed by Joint Investigation Team, the Provincial Government rightly cancelled MDCAT and such decision of Provincial Government cancelling the MDCAT and its direction for re-taking of MDCAT was in accordance with its mandate and did not call for any interference

High Court directed Provincial Government to conduct MDCAT within the time period as provided by the cabinet (six weeks) ensuring transparency in the examination

High Court directed Medical and Dental Council to notify to Provincial Government after consulting admitting university as well as Provincial Government a date for MDCAT across the Province within a time period of six-weeks

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

In cases where a woman is deprived of her right relating to a property, when her title is clear and the person depriving her of her rights is not co-owner in suit property, then Ombudsperson, after a preliminary inquiry can pass an order under S. 5 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women's Property Rights Act, 2019 by putting her in possession of the property

When a woman as well as other members of her family are joint owners in the disputed property, then in case of agriculture property which is assessed under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967 the mechanism for partition is provided under S. 135, Chap. XI of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967 read with paragraph No.18 of Land Record Manual

Similarly where any immovable property is outside the scope of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967, then under S. 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, claimant can approach Civil Court for separation of share/partition of the disputed property.