Libel

2024 MLD 1729 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

Ss.2, 3, 4 & 5Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96Suit for recovery of damagesLibel

Defamation of respondent and his son in the form of libel by publishing serious malicious allegations on Facebook and TV News Channel causing harm to their reputation, dignity and honour in the society and respondent's department

Admission on part of the appellants as to libel

Lack of counter evidence in support of defamatory acts

Effect

Contention of the appellants was that suit had been filed by respondent as a counterblast of a decree for recovery of dowry articles in favour of the appellants

Validity

Contents of the statement or interview that was subsequently broadcast on a news channel and posted on a social media account (specifically, a Facebook ID), was deemed sufficient to prove defamation

Defamatory substance had not been refuted by the opposing party

Actions of the appellants constituted an actionable wrong under the Ordinance, 2002

Violation of the Ordinance had been proved especially when the appellants had failed to present any defence plea stipulated in S.5 of the Ordinance, therefore, no formal or additional proof of the defamatory material was required

Appellants did not identify any discrepancies in the record

Upon the establishment of libel, the presumption of injury or damage to one's reputation and goodwill was an axiom of jurisprudence, now codified within S.4 of Ordinance

Once defamation is substantiated, the law invariably infers detriment, injury and diminution to the reputation, goodwill or standing of an individual, their profession, or products, as applicable

High Court dismissed the appeal accordingly.

2020 SCMR 1073 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

LibelDefence'Responsible journalism'

'Public interest' defence under common law (as developed in the judgment Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127) and that under S. 4 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (UK)

Scope and distinction.

2019 SCMR 1397 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

DefamationLibelHarm to the reputation of a body that traded for profit

'Serious harm' that had caused or was likely to cause the body serious 'financial loss' [section 1(2) of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom)]

Scope and meaning

Financial loss was not the same as special damage, in the sense in which that term was used in the law of defamation

Section 1 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) was concerned with harm to reputation, whereas special damage represented pecuniary loss to interests other than reputation

Section 1(2) must refer not to the harm done to the claimant's reputation, but to the loss which that harm had caused or was likely to cause

Financial loss was the measure of the harm and must exceed the threshold of seriousness

As applied to harm which the defamatory statement "had caused", this necessarily called for an investigation of the actual impact of the statement

Given statement said to be defamatory may cause greater or lesser financial loss to the claimant, depending on his or her particular circumstances and the reaction of those to whom it was published

Whether that financial loss had occurred and whether it was "serious" were questions which could not be answered by reference only to the inherent tendency of the words.

2019 SCMR 1397 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

DefamationLibelRepeating a libelous statement

'Repetition rule' or the 'Dingle rule' [as stated in the case reported as Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1964] AC 371)]

Scope

'Dingle rule' or 'repetition rule' provided that a defendant could not rely in mitigation of damages on the fact that similar defamatory statements had been published about the same claimant by other persons

Statement that someone else had made a defamatory statement about the claimant, although literally true, was treated as equivalent to a direct statement to the same effect

Policy was that repeating someone else's libellous statement was just as bad as making the statement directly

Repetition rule had nothing to do with the threshold of seriousness, and nothing in the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) could be taken as implicitly abolishing the said rule or limiting its application

Repetition rule was criticised, but it was well established; it had the pragmatic advantage of making it unnecessary to determine which of multiple publications of substantially the same statement occurred first, something which in the case of a newspaper would often be impossible to ascertain and might differ from one reader to the next.

2019 SCMR 1397 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

DefamationLibelNewspaper publication

Requirement that statement "had caused or was likely to cause 'serious harm' to the reputation of the claimant" [section 1(1) of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom)]

Scope and meaning

Whether tendency to cause serious harm was sufficient to bring a claim for defamation

Held, that in addition to the common law presumption of damage to reputation, S. 1 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) imposed a new threshold that the harm caused had to be serious

Such higher threshold of serious harm was a clear departure from the previous common law position

Application of the new threshold of serious harm to reputation must be determined by reference to the actual facts about its impact, and not just the meaning of the words

Establishing whether there was a cause of action depended on an assessment of the actual consequences resulting from the publication of the defamatory statement, which may include the size, and characteristics of the relevant audience, the quality of the publication and whether the claimant had any reputation to begin with

Serious harm to reputation could not be established solely by reference to the inherent tendency of words to cause harm to reputation

"Likely" to be caused referred to probable future harm and not merely to the tendency of the words

As a consequence, claimants were now required to show through a combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact that serious harm had or was likely to be caused to the claimant's reputation.

2019 SCMR 885 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

DefamationLibelSocial media postsApproach to be adopted by court for determining whether words used in social media posts were libelousJustification, defence ofScope

Defendant posted on a social media platform that the claimant (defendant's ex-husband) "tried to strangle" her; that he had been removed from their home following a number of threats that he had made, and that the police felt that he had broken the terms of a non-molestation order

Claimant, who did not deny that he had grasped the defendant by the neck and had also breached a non-molestation order, brought an action for defamation (libel) against the defendant, alleging that the words "tried to strangle" meant "tried to kill" and were defamatory

Defendant denied that the words had such meaning and pleaded justification by contending that words "tried to strangle" would be understood to mean that the claimant had grasped her by the neck and inhibited her breathing so as to put her in fear of being killed

Trial judge relied on dictionary definition of the word "strangle" and found defendant's words defamatory on the basis that claimant's intention was to silence and not to kill the defendant, and that the social media post was a distorting overstatement of what had in fact occurred and had the meaning that the claimant was a man who was dangerous to any woman with whom he lived

Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal

Held, that a critical circumstance in the present case was that the court was dealing with a social media post which was read by a certain type of reader; the social media user

In deciding how a social media post would be interpreted by such a reader the judge had to keep in mind how such postings were made and read, and it was imperative to ascertain how a typical, ordinary, reasonable social media user would interpret the message

In such a situation it would be wrong to engage in an elaborate analysis of a social media post or its theoretically or logically deducible meaning

Meaning ascribed to the post should reflect the circumstance that the social media platform in question (Facebook) was a casual medium in the nature of a conversation rather than carefully chosen expression, and it was pre-eminently one in which the reader read and passed on

People scrolled through social media platforms (such as Facebook) quickly; they did not pause and reflect; they did not ponder on what meaning the statement might possibly bear, and their reaction to a post was impressionistic and fleeting

Once the verb, "strangle" was removed from its context and given only two possible (dictionary) meanings before it was reconnected to the word, "tried" the chances of a strained meaning were increased

Words must be taken together so as to determine what the ordinary reasonable reader would understand them to mean

Judge had fallen into legal error in relying on the dictionary definition as dictating the meaning of the defendant's social media post and had failed to conduct a realistic exploration of how the ordinary reader of the post would have understood it

Ordinary reader of the social media platform (Facebook) would not have spliced the defendant's post into separate clauses or isolated individual words and contemplated their possible significance, but would unquestionably have interpreted the post as meaning that the claimant had grasped his wife (the defendant) by the throat and applied force to her neck rather than trying deliberately to kill her

If the defendant had meant to convey that her husband/claimant had attempted to kill her, why would she not say so explicitly

In view of the trial judge's error of law, his decision as to the meaning of the social media post could not stand

In such circumstances the Court of Appeal should have considered afresh the meaning of the post but it had not done so

In the present case, it was not disputed that the claimant grasped his wife (defendant) by the throat so tightly as to leave red marks on her neck visible to police officers two hours after the attack on her took place

Claimant further did not dispute that he breached a non-molestation order, nor had it been asserted that he did not utter threats to the defendant

Many would consider such circumstances to be sufficient to establish that the claimant was a dangerous and disreputable man, which was the justification which the defendant sought to establish

Defendant was entitled to succeed on the defence of justification.

2019 MLD 1882 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

DefamationLibelSuit for damagesIssuance of public noticeWrong impression about plaintiffQuantum of compensationScope

Plaintiff filed suit for damages and claimed that the defendants published and got published defamatory allegations (public notice) against him without verification of the facts

Validity

Public notice got issued by defendant prima facie had a reason of its publication i.e.the claim of land

Public notice was issued to put public onto notice about claims of the defendant and its intended action was to protect every inch of its property, hence to such extent public notice was within its object and purpose

Deliberate use of the name of plaintiff in public notice seemed to allow general public to have wrong impression about the plaintiff that he had illegally allotted its lands

Mere claim of bona fide or to have acted in the interest of defendant did not absolve the defendants from establishing bona fide

Public notice to the extent of mentioning the name of plaintiff was not in public interest rather was causeless resulting in damage to the reputation of plaintiff

Plaintiff, on establishing defamation, had only become entitled to compensation but quantum thereof was an entirely different thing which had got its own peculiar requirements/ingredients and mere claim of certain amount as a damages did not earn plaintiff a right to insist decree to such extent

Plaintiff had never attempted to differentiate damages with regard to mental torture, agony, defamation and financial loss but had claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 50 million

High Court, in absence of proof of mental shock and bifurcation of claimed damages, found it proper and justified to award an amount of Rs. 80,00,000/-(eighty lac) to the plaintiff

Suit was partially decreed.

2019 MLD 1882 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

DefamationLibelSuit for damagesIssuance of public noticeLiability of initiator of newsLiability of publisherScope

Plaintiff filed suit for damages and claimed that the defendants published and got published defamatory allegations against him without verification of the facts

Validity

Publisher had published an unchanged piece of the press release, therefore, he could not be held responsible for any loss (defamation), particularly when no mala fide had been pleaded on the part of publisher

Press release was issued by an institution which had nothing to do with the defendant

Said institution was not made party nor the plaintiff at later stage had sought joining of it in the suit

Plaintiff had not impleaded the initiator of the news, hence, the claim of plaintiff against the publisher was not legally justified

Suit was dismissed against the said defendant.

2013 MLD 1026 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT Judicial Precedent

Ss. 3, 4 & 12SlanderLibelDefamatory actsStatement or assertion made before courtAppellant had unnecessarily impleaded the respondent in the suitLowering of status of respondent by levelling false allegations about his characterRespondent filed suit for defamation which was decreed against appellantValidity

Action of arraying of respondent in the plaint and disclosure about his character did not amount to defamation actionable as slander

Special or general damages allegedly caused were not proved

Statement or assertion which was made before the court could not give rise to any action for libel or slander in circumstances.

2012 SCMR 1791 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

LibelFair comment, defence ofFacts relied on for making the commentExtent to which such facts had to be referred to in the comment itself and be accurately statedClaimants/respondents were members of a musical groupDefendants/appellant provided entertainment booking services and advertised acts and performances on their website

Claimants' manager entered into an agreement with the defendants to promote the claimants' acts, where after a booking contract was made in relation to a performance at a restaurant ("restaurant booking")

Said booking contract included a re-engagement clause which provided that any further bookings at the restaurant in the following 12 months should be through the defendants

Subsequently claimants' manager arranged a further performance at the restaurant, directly with the venue, without informing or referring to the defendants

Defendants wrote an email to claimants' manager complaining of breach of the re-engagement clause

Claimants' manager replied via email stating that contract was 'mearly(sic) a formality and holds no water in legal terms' and that the claimants were not bound by the re-engagement clause as they had not signed the contract

Defendants thereafter posted a notice on their website ('website notice') announcing that they were no longer representing the claimants as they were 'not professional enough to feature in our portfolio and have not been able to abide by the terms of their contract'; that 'following a breach of contract' claimants' manager had told the defendants that terms and conditions of 'contracts hold no water in legal terms'; that the ' artists' obligations for your booking may also not be met', and that the defendants would 'recommend that you take legal advice before booking this artist to avoid any possible difficulties'

Said website notice also contained a portion of the email reply sent by claimants' manager, but it was partially misquoted

Claimants issued proceedings for libel, contending that the website notice meant that they were unprofessional and unlikely to honour any bookings made for them to perform

Defendants relied on the defence of justification and fair comment but both were struck out in the High Court

Court of Appeal reinstated the defence of justification but declined to reinstate the defence of fair comment

Validity

Issue raised by present appeal was the extent to which, if at all, the defence of fair comment required that the comment should identify the matter or matters to which it related

Comment need not identify the matters on which it was based with sufficient particularity to enable the reader to judge for himself whether it was well founded, however the comment must identify at least in general terms what it was that had led the commentator to make the comment, so that the reader could understand what the comment was about and the commentator could, if challenged, explain by giving particulars of the subject matter of his comment why he expressed the views that he did

To support plea of fair comment defendants relied upon the breach of 'restaurant booking' and the claimants' manager e-mail

Email of claimants' manager arguably, evidenced a contemptuous and cavalier approach to the claimants' contractual obligations to the defendants

Said e-mail as quoted, arguably, evidenced a contemptuous and cavalier approach to contracts in general

Defendants could rely on the said e-mail despite the fact that it was partially misquoted in the website notice

Jury had to decide whether misquoting of said email in the website notice made a significant difference

Jury should be directed that if they thought that the said e-mail as quoted on the website notice differed significantly from the e-mail as sent they should disregard it but otherwise they could have regard to it when considering the defence of fair comment

Statement in the website notice that the claimants had 'not been able to abide by the terms of their contract' and the reference to 'following a breach of contract' were references to the breach of 'restaurant booking'

Website notice sufficiently identified the breach of 'restaurant booking' as part of the subject matter of the comment, albeit that the breach was not particularized

Defendants were entitled to rely upon the breach of 'restaurant booking' to support their defence of fair comment

Appeal was allowed and the defence of fair comment was reinstated.

2012 SCMR 1791 SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK Judicial Precedent

LibelFair comment, defence ofFacts relied on for making the commentExtent to which such facts had to be referred to in the comment itself and be accurately stated

Where an adverse comment was made generally or generically on matters that were in the public domain, it was not a prerequisite of the defence of fair comment that the readers should be in a position to evaluate the comment for themselves

Internet had made it possible for people to make public comments about others and frequently detailed information about the facts that had given rise to the comments was not set out

In such circumstances the defence of fair comment would be robbed of much of its efficacy if readers had to be given detailed information to enable evaluation of the comment

Comment need not identify the matters on which it was based with sufficient particularity to enable the reader to judge for himself whether it was well founded, however the comment must identify at least in general terms what it was that had led the commentator to make the comment, so that the reader could understand what the comment was about and the commentator could, if challenged, explain by giving particulars of the subject matter of his comment why he expressed the views that he did

Five propositions in relation to the defence of fair comment had been set out by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in the case of Cheng Albert v. Tse Wai Chun Paul (2000) 10 BHRC 525, [2001] EMLR 777, which were that, firstly, the comment must be on a matter of public interest; secondly, the comment must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact; thirdly, the comment must be based on facts which are true or protected by privilege; fourthly, the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, what are the facts on which the comment is being made; and fifthly, the comment must be one which could have been made by an honest person, however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views

Supreme Court endorsed the said five propositions, save that the fourth proposition was re-written as 'the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, the facts on which it is based.'

Per curiam: Supreme Court observed that the "defence of fair comment should be renamed 'honest comment'.

2003 CLC 1699 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

Meaning and applicabilityScope

Insinuation expressed and communicated to third person by written word, sign or picture tantamounts to undermining, tarnishing and blotting the goodwill and reputation of a person is libel

To constitute libel, it is necessary that insinuation is communicated to third person

Libel is a defamatory statement or representation, communicated, transmitted or conveyed to a person other than the defamed through any medium of expression may it be in the form of printing, writing, image or other form comprehensible through sight or touch.

1996 PLD 410 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Judicial Precedent

Libel MalicePlea ofLibellous publicationNotional existencePresumptionDefamation

Whureas a plea specially of malice mid motive has not been raised in the pleadings and is not actually or seemingly incorporated in the evidence and is not deducible even circumstantially, it will be going too fat ,to presume its existence nationally

Publication cannot, therefore, be deemed to be malicious merely because it is found to be incorrect unless the relevant circumstances indicate the absence of bona fides.

1981 PLD 515 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Judicial Precedent

LibelLocal jurisdiction of Courts

Publication of libel in newspapers-Action would lie both at places where newspapers published as well as where circulated-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9.[Jurisdiction].

1961 PLD 237 SUPREME-COURT Judicial Precedent

Libel

Publisher of prima facie libellous material-Liable- Sending matter. libellous of High Court Judges, to Registrar of High Court -Equivalent to sending to Judges themselves.

1952 PLD 292 DHAKA-HIGH-COURT Judicial Precedent

Libel Libel

Slander-Distinction-English Common Law-Whether applicable outside limits of ordinary original civil jurisdiction of High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay-English rule of special damage in oral defamation-Not to be adopted

Decision according to justice, equity and good conscience