Revision

High Court has the powers to reevaluate the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower courts in appropriate cases but cannot upset such crystalized findings if the same are based on relevant evidence or without any misreading or non-reading of evidence

If the facts have been justly tried by two courts and the same conclusion has been reached by both the courts concurrently then it would not be judicious to revisit it for drawing some other conclusion or interpretation of evidence in a second appeal under Section 100 or under revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C., because any such attempt would also be against the doctrine of finality.

No vested right to file a revision is available under Section 17 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 and Rule 12 of Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975

Powers of revision in both the aforesaid provisions are suo motu i.e. on its own motion and not on application 'of any aggrieved person'

However, one thing is common in both the aforesaid provisions that in the case of any enhancement of sentence or punishment intended in exercise of revisional powers, the said authority may provide opportunity of showing cause to such person as to why the punishment should not be enhanced

In case of any adverse findings or punishment or enhancement of punishment imposed in exercise of suo motu powers of revision within the time frame, the aggrieved person may approach the service tribunal for redress but the fact remains that revision cannot be filed as a matter of right and in case of rejection or dismissal of departmental appeal, the aggrieved employee should file the appeal before the Tribunal rather than filing revision petition or waiting for the decision of revision by the competent authority which is in fact detrimental and prejudicial to the own interest of such person who despite having in hand an adverse order passed against him in the departmental appeal, prefers to file revision petition which is not a vested right but such provision is provided to exercise suo motu powers and is not based on the condition of application 'of any aggrieved person'

In case any adverse order is passed under suo motu powers of revision against any person then obviously, he can approach the Tribunal against the adverse order being an original one but it is not meant as a remedy to cure the orders passed by the competent authority in the departmental appeal to hear it as a second appeal for which the direct remedy in the form of appeal is already provided before the concerned Service Tribunal.

No vested right to file a revision is available under Section 17 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 and Rule 12 of Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975

Powers of revision in both the aforesaid provisions are suo motu i.e. on its own motion and not on application 'of any aggrieved person'

However, one thing is common in both the aforesaid provisions that in the case of any enhancement of sentence or punishment intended in exercise of revisional powers, the said authority may provide opportunity of showing cause to such person as to why the punishment should not be enhanced

In case of any adverse findings or punishment or enhancement of punishment imposed in exercise of suo motu powers of revision within the time frame, the aggrieved person may approach the service tribunal for redress but the fact remains that revision cannot be filed as a matter of right and in case of rejection or dismissal of departmental appeal, the aggrieved employee should file the appeal before the Tribunal rather than filing revision petition or waiting for the decision of revision by the competent authority which is in fact detrimental and prejudicial to the own interest of such person who despite having in hand an adverse order passed against him in the departmental appeal, prefers to file revision petition which is not a vested right but such provision is provided to exercise suo motu powers and is not based on the condition of application 'of any aggrieved person'

In case any adverse order is passed under suo motu powers of revision against any person then obviously, he can approach the Tribunal against the adverse order being an original one but it is not meant as a remedy to cure the orders passed by the competent authority in the departmental appeal to hear it as a second appeal for which the direct remedy in the form of appeal is already provided before the concerned Service Tribunal.

Judgment meant judicial decision of judge; it need not necessarily deal with all matters in issue in a suit but only those issues, decision of which has the effect either of adjudication of all matters in controversy or results in a final disposal of the suit

As per record the defendants agreed to the contention of the plaintiff under terms of O. XV, R.1, C.P.C.

Court was under legal obligation to implement the judgment in letter and spirit

Court decided the suit in favour of the plaintiff with direction to defendant not to interfere in the case property

In case of interference the plaintiffs had no option other than to knock the door of Court for implementation of the judgment

Under the Code of Civil Procedure there was no distinction between the judgment on admission or judgment on merit

Judgment did not mean only disposal of the matter but also determining the rights of a party

Petition was allowed and the case was remanded to the Trial Court with direction to decide the application afresh.

Subsidy was granted by the Federal government to reimburse losses suffered by the Taxpayer (M/s. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.)

Question as to whether the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a Revenue receipt or a Capital receipt

Argument being that 100% shares of the Taxpayer are owned by the Federal Government

Validity

It is of relevance to note that as a matter of fact the Federal Government's policy in respect of purchase of cotton requires the taxpayer to purchase it from the grower on fixed notified prices

A times, the cotton is purchased at a higher price as against the price on which it is exported, resulting in losses, and the Federal Government on regular basis, was making payments to the taxpayer to run its affairs smoothly and efficiently

It was also an admitted position that these subsidies given year after year, were not refundable to the Federal Government, whereas, any capital induction was always a liability and it was to be repaid to the contributor

As to the argument that 100% shares were owned by the Federal Government and it was a case, wherein, doctrine of mutuality would apply; it may be of relevance to observe that such doctrine was only applicable when the participants were earning the profits and the beneficiaries were the same

Here it was not so, inasmuch as mere ownership of 100% in the taxpayer /company would not make it a Federal Government

Admittedly, the taxpayer was a company incorporated by way of some law having its own identity, different to that of the Federal Government

Undisputedly, the taxpayer was a Company paying taxes all along on its profits and losses

In the present case, the intent and purpose behind paying subsidy to taxpayer was to reduce its losses

High Court viewed that the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a revenue receipt and was liable to income tax

Thus, the relevant question of law was answered against the Taxpayer and in favour of the Department

All the cases/References filed by the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) stood dismissed, whereas, the reference filed by the department was allowed.

Subsidy was granted by the Federal government to reimburse losses suffered by the Taxpayer (M/s. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.), a Corporation created by law and owned by the Government

Question was whether the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a Revenue receipt or a Capital receipt

Argument of the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) was that subsidy paid by the Federal Government year after year to cover up the losses sustained by the taxpayer was a capital receipt and at most a gift but not a Revenue receipt ; and that if at all it is so then the subsidy received is a capital receipt on the ground that 100% shares of the taxpayer were held by the Federal Government and was kind of a subsidiary created by the Federal Government

Held, that if that was so, then induction of this subsidy as a capital would have resulted in the increase of shareholding by way of extra capital, but this is not the case of the taxpayer

By merely arguing that this subsidy was never shown in profit and loss account, but in the appropriation account, hence it was not a Revenue receipt, would not ipso facto make it so

Question has to be decided by a consideration of the true nature and purpose of the payment and the facts and circumstances of the case as there is no single or infallible test which can be applied to resolve the question

Neither the form of the transaction giving rise to the payment, nor the name, which is given to it is relevant in determining the liability of tax

In general, it may be said that what is received for loss of capital is a capital receipt and what is received as profit in trading transaction, is taxable income

As per accounting practice(s) the appropriation account contains both, capital receipts and unappropriated profits usually based on accumulated profits already subjected to tax or untaxed capital gains remaining undistributed during the preceding years till the date of preparation of the appropriation accounts

These could be capital receipts or Revenue receipts and the nature of such receipts has to be looked into

Appropriation is primarily an act of setting aside money for a specific purpose

In the present case, it is not the Government itself who is the taxpayer, rather a Corporation created by law, which is owned by the Government

Taxpayer was a concern which operated to make profits, and if any amount was shown as an appropriation, then it had to come from its profits, or as retained earnings, or from its reserves or something which had been kept for debt repayment and to finance capital expenditures

None of these were present in this case

Here, an amount had been received, and when questioned as to its treatment, an argument was being made that it was an item in the appropriation account; hence, cannot be taxed

Said analogy of the taxpayer appeared to be incorrect and against the settled accounting principles even if it was to be shown as an item in the appropriation account

In the present case, the intent and purpose behind paying subsidy to taxpayer was to reduce its losses

High Court viewed that the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a revenue receipt and was liable to income tax

Thus, the relevant question of law was answered against the Taxpayer and in favour of the Department

All the cases/References filed by the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) stood dismissed, whereas, the only reference filed by the department was allowed.

Subsidy was granted by the Federal government to reimburse losses suffered by the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.)

Question as to whether the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a Revenue receipt or a Capital receipt

Held, that in essence, the law is that if the payments received are voluntary without there being any legal obligation upon them to do so, or without there being any liability or obligation to that effect, then in a certain set of facts, it can be held to be anything other than an income

It could be a capital receipt or against any share consideration

In the present case, it was not so

In judging the nature of a receipt, the Courts have to take into account all the circumstances under which the taxpayer may have received the money particularly the purpose for which it was given to the taxpayer

In the present matter, the payment by the Government was thus specifically for the purpose of covering losses and it was for that very purpose that the subsidy had been demanded by the taxpayer; consequently, this amount received was a trading receipt and must be held to be income arising from the business of the taxpayer so that it was taxable as such

The payment was no doubt called a subsidy, but it was clear that it was made specifically with the object of compensating the taxpayer for the loss of certain profits which might have arisen if the cotton was not purchased on the price as directed by the Government

This was, therefore , an income or receipt by the company which was inseparably connected with the conduct of the business of the company and it arose from that business

In the present case, the intent and purpose behind paying subsidy to taxpayer was to reduce its losses

High Court viewed that the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a revenue receipt and was liable to income tax

Thus, the relevant question of law was answered against the Taxpayer and in favour of the Department

All the cases/References filed by the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) stood dismissed, whereas, the reference filed by the department was allowed.

Subsidy was granted by the Federal government to reimburse losses suffered by the Taxpayer (M/s. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.)

Question was whether the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a Revenue receipt or a Capital receipt

Held, that record revealed that the dispute firstly arose in assessment years 1978-1979 to 1980-1981 when the then Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ('the Tribunal') came to the conclusion that the subsidy-in-question was paid by the Federal Government due to losses suffered by the taxpayer and in the public interest to reimburse those losses, which in no way could be treated as trading receipt ; it was further observed by the Tribunal that the taxpayer has purchased cotton at a certain price fixed by the Government and since the export price is generally lower than the purchase price, the taxpayer necessarily suffered losses, whereas, it is 100% owned by the Federal Government and therefore re-imbursement of such losses to the taxpayer could not be considered as a trading receipt; it was further observed that all receipts, which are not capital receipts are not necessarily income within the meaning of the Ordinance 1979 ; lastly, it was also observed that all receipts are not always capital receipts or Revenue receipts as some receipts may be neither, but at the same time it may not be income either

Tribunal in the impugned order made some reference to the cases of West Pakistan Road Transport Lahore (reported as PLD 1974 Note 9) and Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (reported as PLD 1975 Kar. 128), however, said judgments had no relevance with the controversy in hand

Thus, the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the dissimilarity in the facts, therefore, impugned order passed by the Tribunal in respect of these assessment years cannot be sustained

In the present case, the intent and purpose behind paying subsidy to taxpayer was to reduce its losses

High Court viewed that the subsidy paid by the Federal Government to the taxpayer was a revenue receipt and was liable to income tax

Thus, the relevant question of law was answered against the Taxpayer and in favour of the Department

Reference filed by the Taxpayer ( M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. ) stood dismissed, whereas, the reference filed by the department was allowed.

Whether Inspecting Additional Commissioner (IAC) had any jurisdiction to exercise powers under S. 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 ('the Ordinance, 1979')

Case of the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) was that after passing of the original assessment order under S. 62 of the Ordinance, 1979, it could not have been revised under S. 66-A of the Ordinance, 1979 , as the original assessment order under S.62 was passed with the approval and consent of IAC, and therefore, he could not have reopened the said order

Validity

From perusal of the finding of facts, in the impugned order by the Tribunal, it was reflected that though, initially the Income Tax Officer had sent a draft order to the Commissioner Income Tax (ITO) through IAC for approval; but, admittedly, the same was retuned back with the comments that ITO should decide the case on its own responsibility

Resultantly, when the original assessment order was passed under S. 62 of the Ordinance, 1979 by the concerned ITO, it could not be assumed that it was passed with the approval of the IAC, rather was done by him without involvement of his superior officer

In fact, even if some assistance had been sought by an assessing officer from the IAC, this was not in itself sufficient to preclude the IAC from invoking S. 66-A of the Ordinance, 1979 in relation to that particular case

It would also further have to be shown, as a matter of fact, that the degree of involvement was of such intensity that it would make subsequent recourse to S. 66-A impermissible

This is so because the mere fact of consultation or even approval was not enough

Degree and intensity of the consultation was also to be established and shown to have been of such level that it would preclude the subsequent exercise of powers under S. 66-A of the Ordinance, 1979

Therefore, if subsequently, the IAC had revised the order by exercising his powers under S. 66-A of Ordinance, 1979, it cannot be presumed that he had no jurisdiction to do so and that it was an illegality on this ground alone

Thus, the relevant question of law was answered against the Taxpayer and in favour of the Department

All the cases /References filed by the Taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) stood dismissed, whereas, the reference filed by the department was allowed.

Applicable period of limitation was prescribed in terms of S. 115, C.P.C., itself rather than under Limitation Act, 1908

High Court declined to condone delay as revision application filed by applicant was barred by limitation by a period of delay that exceeded well beyond that portrayed for the purpose of condonation

Provision of S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, was inapplicable

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Police, while concluding that the application filed by complainant was not based on facts, started proceedings under S.182, P.P.C., by chalking out a Qalandra against him, however, during the proceedings before the Trial Court his application under S.249-A, Cr.P.C, was accepted

Petitioner (accused of the complaint) filed present constitutional petition as his revision petition filed against the acquittal order was dismissed by Sessions Court

Petitioner, instead of filing appeal against said acquittal order, filed criminal revision under Ss.435 and 439-A, Cr.P.C, which was rightly dismissed by the Sessions Court

Petitioner had failed to point out as to how the concurrent findings of the Courts below were the consequence of error of law or without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction

Constitutional petition , being meritless , was dismissed in limine.

Petitioner was aggrieved of award made rule of the Court and assailed execution proceedings on the plea that those were barred by limitation

Validity

Limitation for filing of first execution petition was governed by Art. 181 of Limitation Act, 1908 and not by S.48, C.P.C.

Respondent had filed execution petition within time from the date of judgment of High Court

High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of two Courts below and petitioner failed to point out any illegality or infirmity committed by the two Courts

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioners / importers got their consignments released on provisional assessments and sought revision of valuation rulings

Validity

Ruling under S. 25A of Customs Act, 1969, was by Directorate of Customs Valuation to determine customs value and category of goods

Ruling so issued was in field and applicable on declared goods for the purpose of Ss. 80 & 81 of Customs Act, 1969, unless changed in exercising powers under S.25D of Customs Act, 1969, by Director General Valuation

Provisions of S.81 of Customs Act, 1969, did not allow, even through implication that during proceedings under S.25D of Customs Act, 1969, provisional assessment could be passed for releasing the goods

High Court depreciated tendency of filing petition for release of goods provisionally after filing a revision under S.25D of Customs Act, 1969, as the same was against scheme of law

High Court declined to interfere in the matter

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Where findings are based on mis-reading and non-reading of material evidence, misinterpretation and misconstruction of oral and documentary evidence and suffer from material illegality and jurisdictional error, exercise in revisional jurisdiction becomes necessary.

Subsection (2) of S. 9 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 clarifies that a husband or wife may in the prescribed manner within the prescribed period and on payment of prescribed fee prefer an application for revision of the certificate before the Collector concerned and his decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court

Words "within the prescribed period" means not beyond the period stipulated under the Rules

In this regard clarification is made under R. 16(1) of the West Pakistan Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.

In the light of S.29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908, provision of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908, is not applicable, as S.115, C.P.C. itself prescribes 90 days for filing a revision petition.

High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction is empowered to convert one proceeding to another.

Mere fact that such court might have taken different view was no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below.

High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction is supposed to make a comparative analysis of both the judgments in order to determine their validity on the touchstone of S.115, C.P.C., but in the matter of giving preference to the judgments of lower courts, while analyzing the same in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the preference and regard is always given to the findings of the appellate court, if those are not suffering from any legal infirmity.

Respondents raised objections in respect of the alternate remedy being available under S. 277 of the Cantonments Act, 1924

Held; petitioner had challenged the very authority of the respondents to issue challans to the petitioner pertaining to property tax, therefore, the rule that the High Court would not entertain Constitutional petition when other appropriate remedy was available was not a rule of law barring jurisdiction but a rule by which the Court regulated its jurisdiction

If the impugned orders/actions were without lawful authority or violative of some law then the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction unless it could do so without any elaborate enquiry into complicated or disputed facts.

Where an illegality is pointed out then in such circumstances, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction provided under S. 115, C.P.C., and has the power to undo the legality.

High Court normally hesitate to invoke its jurisdiction to disturb concurrent judgments of the two Courts below, however, where Courts below committed misreading/non-reading of available evidence in unanimously rendering their concurrent findings or those suffered from jurisdictional defect or misapplication of law, then Court could not shut its eyes, rather visitorial/ revisional jurisdiction was vested to it to check or even reverse such findings.

When merits of the case demanded that challenged order be set aside, High Court would not avoid hearing the same under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for which no limitation was provided, merely because the application was filed by somebody who was bound by limitation.

Concurrent findings recorded on facts, when do not suffer from any misreading and non-reading of evidence, howsoever erroneous, cannot be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

Accused was aggrieved of summoning of two prosecution witnesses not included in calendar of witnesses by investigating officer

Validity

Trial Court was authorized under S. 540, Cr.P.C. to use discretion for summoning of any person as witness at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceedings

For stages, the Legislature used the word 'may' which meant that an essential witness whose summoning, the Court had considered was not appropriate at any preliminary or intermediate stage, the Court could decline to issue process for his appearance

Such order could be reviewed at a later stage if evidence of such witness had become essential for just decision of the case and in such case it was imperative on the Court for which the word 'shall' had been used in later part of S.540, Cr.P.C.

Witness called and examined or recalled or re-examined under S.540, Cr.P.C. was to retain his character as a prosecution or defence witness and he would be a Court witness simpliciter if he was cited neither a prosecution witness nor a defence witness

If any given up prosecution witness or defence witness was recalled, Court could allow respective party to put question to their own witnesses under Art. 150 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which was not meant for asking questions only to hostile or resiled witnesses

High Court declined to interfere in order in question as Trial Court adopted right course by summoning related witnesses to decide actual fact in issue

High Court directed that it was duty of Trial Court to supply copies of statements of such witnesses to accused and complainant for the purposes of cross-examination on such witness so as to avoid bring on record any evidence by surprise

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

High Court could interfere, in revisional jurisdiction, only where the subordinate Court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with a material irregularity.

Appellate Court had rightly pointed out the questions with regards to non-discussion of evidence produced by a respondent with regard to his agreement to sell

Trial Court had partially decreed the suit but had not considered and addressed the question of prior agreement to sell

No illegality or irregularity was apparent in the impugned judgment warranting interference by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction

Revision petition was dismissed.

Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, filed a reference under sections 8 and 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, for declaring the land in question as trust property as well as sought cancellation of allotment in favour of the allottee

Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, passed impugned order declaring the land in question as trust property and also cancelled the allotment of the allottee as well as subsequent sale transactions

Revision petition under S.17 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 was also dismissed

Petitioners filed a civil suit against the order passed by Chairman, which was dismissed and appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed

After having lost the civil suit up to the appellate court petitioners filed Constitutional petition which was dismissed as withdrawn

Held, petitioners were well aware about the order of the Chairman but they filed revision petition before the Revisional Authority after a lapse of about 35 years, however, the limitation for challenging the order in revision petition was only 15 days but neither any explanation was furnished regarding such inordinate delay nor any application was filed for condonation of delay

Pursuing the matter at wrong forum due to ill advice of counsel could not be considered as a valid ground for condonation of delay

Moreover, Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board, under S.8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, alone was competent to decide every/any controversy relating to an evacuee property attached to charitable, religious or educational trust/institution or otherwise and any order/proceeding before the Civil Court was coram non judice

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Applicant / plaintiff was aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court dismissing suit for failure to file amended title by joining respondent as defendant

Validity

No one should normally be knocked out on technicalities

Rights of parties needed to be adjudicated on merits

Dismissal of suit solely on account of failure in timely filing amended title was always a little harsh

High Court observed that leniency needed to be shown when default was one relating to procedural formality / requirement and not of grave in nature

For such like situation dismissal was left upon discretion of use of word "may"

Penal consequences needed to be avoided at first occasion

Appeal against main order allowing application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was pending and that if was allowed, it would bring compromise degree to life again and would again bring whole proceedings in question as of no substance

Applicant / plaintiff showed his readiness to part with appeal and to have adjudication of all questions on merits

High Court set aside order in question and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits

Revision was allowed accordingly.

Ordinarily the concurrent findings of facts are not disturbed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction unless the findings of the two courts below are totally perverse and violation of the provisions of law as well as against the material available on file.

Where conclusion of law and fact did not ,in any way, affect the jurisdiction of the Court no matter howsoever erroneous the decision might be

Section 115, C.P.C., could not be invoked unless impugned decision involved matter of jurisdiction.

Revision could be filed within ninety days.

Accused impugned order made under S. 439, Cr.P.C. whereby his sentence was enhanced from four years to seven years and sought suspension of sentence and release on bail

Contention of accused, inter alia, was that impugned order for enhancement of sentence was made by revisional court under S. 439, Cr.P.C. without issuing notice to accused

Validity

Failure to issue notice to accused meant that order for enhancement of his sentence could not be sustained and same was a glaring illegality which was floating on surface of impugned order

Sentence of accused fell within parameters of "short sentence" and therefore such sentence of accused was suspended and accused was ordered to be released on bail subject to furnishing of surety

Revision was allowed, accordingly.

First proviso to subsection (1) of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not require that a certified copy of the pleadings, documents and orders of subordinate court are to be appended, it simply says that the copies of the said documents should be attached.

Second proviso of subsection (1) of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 clearly provides that when an application for the revision is made by the applicant it is necessary to institute the same within 90 days of the decision of the Subordinate Court, however, no such restriction of time period exists in the subsection (1) of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and this power can be exercised when the subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or has acted illegally or with material irregularity

Applicant has no right to cause a delay and then seek the shelter of the power of the Court to exercise a jurisdiction, at its own.

Neither allotment letter was produced before the Trial Court, nor any extension in the lease after expiry of three years

Counsel for the respondent was reluctant to present any allotment letter/renewal letter or proof of payment of lagan/rent

Respondent failed to establish any lawful authority for possession of State land

Revision petition was allowed accordingly.

Findings of appellate court, in the event of conflict of judgments, are to be preferred and respected, unless it is shown from the record that such findings are not supported by evidence.

Amendment in S.115, C.P.C., and insertion of S.159, C.P.C. vide Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 2020; effect of

Petitioner impugned office objection whereby revision was held not maintainable and contended that on basis of amendment in S.115, C.P.C. by Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, he had been told by the District Court to file same before High Court

Validity

Proceedings instituted prior to enactment of Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 were to be proceeded and dealt with in accordance with provisions of the C.P.C. existing prior to said Ordinance, and in present case, revision would therefore lie before relevant District Judge and not High Court; and petitioner could therefore seek appropriate remedy from District Court

Objection was disposed of, accordingly.

Issue / plea, if not claimed or pressed before courts below, where trial and appeal proceeded, then such issue could not be raised at stage of revision under S.115, C.P.C.

Petitioner is mandatorily to file copies of all documents with revision under S.115 C.P.C., otherwise revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

Right to seek revision by filing application under S.115 of C.P.C. of a case decided in which no appeal lay, on ground of irregular or improper exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction, was a substantive right conferred by the C.P.C.

Where the findings on a question of law arrived at by the courts below are based on conjectures or fallacious appraisal of evidence on record then material irregularity/illegality is committed and High Court can interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

Petitioner, in his application, had averred that although a declaration had been made by the Court but that was in respect of another property and the respondent/decree-holder was occupying the property other than that was decreed

Validity

Question of title was no longer disputed between the parties as the declaration sought by the respondent had been granted

Point raised by the petitioner had already been decided against him in the suit as well as in the first appeal, therefore, the present petition in the present form was not competent

High Court had very limited jurisdiction to disturb the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the courts below, unless it was proved that the same suffered from any jurisdictional defect/error or were based on misreading or non-reading of materials available on file, which elements were conspicuously lacking in the present petition

Revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

No one could raise a question before revisional forum which had not been raised before lower fora.

Revisional Court in absence of any cross revision or objection had powers to examine the propriety and correctness of judgment of Courts below and pass such orders as it deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below could not be set at naught by the revisional Court unless it was proved that same were patently illegal, based on mis-reading, non-reading of evidence, erroneous, fanciful or had resulted in miscarriage of justice.

Order passed by the Court below did not come within the ambit of "a case decided" which was a mandatory requirement for exercising revisional jurisdiction

Court below had exercised its discretionary jurisdiction vested by law to appoint local commission to find out position pertaining at the spot

Petitioner had right to file objections against the report of local commission which, if filed, had to be decided on merits

Revision against the impugned order was premature and not maintainable

Revision was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Concurrent findings of facts did not call for interference by a Court in exercise of jurisdiction of revision under S. 115, C.P.C.

Concurrent findings of facts did not call for interference by a Court in exercise of jurisdiction of revision under S. 115, C.P.C.

Revisional jurisdiction of High Court can be exercised only when there are exceptional circumstances and the order impugned is perverse or suffering from any type of infirmity.