Terrorism

To constitute an offence of a terrorism, it is necessary that; firstly, the action must fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ('ATA of 1997'); and secondly, the intent, motivation, object, design and purpose behind the said act has any nexus with the ingredients of clauses (b) and (c) of section 6(1) of the ATA of 1997

To formulate an opinion whether or not such offence is an act of terrorism, the allegations made in the FIR, material collected during the investigation and the evidence available on the record have to be considered on the touchstone of section 6 of the ATA of 1997, as a whole

In the absence of any of the ingredients of section 6 of the ATA of 1997, any action, irrespective of its heinousness, causing terror or creating sense of fear and insecurity in the society, does not fall within the ambit of terrorism.

In criminal law, mens rea i.e. guilts mind which refers to criminal intent carries vital importance to determine the nature as well as gravity of the alleged act or omission subject matter of the crime and resultantly deciding the question of jurisdiction also

Almost every crime spreads feelings of insecurity, harassment and fear however quantum of said effect i.e. feelings varies from person to person and area to area

Sometime even a pellet fired from air gun hitting bird or animal resulting into oozing of the blood, can cause fear to the person who has never seen such episode earlier in his life and is not acquainted with firearm weapons as well as their use, whereas a person familiar with such events would not take any serious note of it even if assault rifle like Kalashnikov has been used for committing the occurrence

Thus, merely due to magnitude of the effects of the crime, it can not be termed as "terrorism" falling in the ambit of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and punishable under S.7 of the Act ibid, if it has been committed due to personal enmity/vendetta.

If prima-facie, intention to cause firing in or at a Court premises is not reflected from the act constituting the crime, rather it appears that occurrence is orchestrated to target opponents due to personal enmity outside the Court and as a bye product incidentally some bullets hit the outer wall of the Court premises or outer wall of Court room from distance, then there is absolutely no intention to cause firing in the Court

In such state of affairs, act constituting the offence/crime irrespective of the huge loss of lives or other things, will not be triable by Anti-Terrorism Court under its Third Schedule

Firing in the Court has been mentioned in Third Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for making the case triable by Anti-Terrorism Court whereas firing near or around i.e. in the surrounding of the Court is not mentioned in Clause 4(iii) of Third Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and same cannot be added therein by the Court.

Accused persons were alleged to have launched two terrorist attacks on a religious leader, in which many persons lost their lives due to suicidal bomb blast

No cogent evidence was available on record that the confessions were not made voluntarily i.e. by threat or inducement

Object of confessions was to tell the truth as it was to fit in with prosecution case and to corroborate other evidence on record

Though there were some irregularities in recording of confessions by Judicial Magistrate before whom the same were recorded but such irregularities had neither affected voluntariness nor truthfulness of the confessions

Such confessions were admissible and could form basis of convicting accused persons who made them

Accused persons were arrested together in the house of one accused where a huge quantity of Potassium used for making explosives (which quantity was too large to be foisted) and other explosive making equipment was recovered

Accused took police to suicide bomber's house which only he had known and not the police where a CD was recovered of a suicide bomber who was identified by his mother

Police recovered from accused a CD containing suicide bomber's death statement which fitted in with the confession of filming the suicide bomber

Attack was based on sectarian grounds and there was sufficient evidence on record to prove the same

Object, design and intention of conspiracy was to murder deceased and create fear, insecurity and terror amongst a specific sect, which the accused persons did

High Court maintained death sentence awarded to accused persons by Trial Court as the offence squarely fell within Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Only evidence against accused was his identification where the prosecution witness gave no role at the identification parade

As such the same had made identification evidence against accused weak

Prosecution witnesses had not seen the accused before the incident and identification parade was carried out over two years after the incident

Accused was not picked at a different identification parade by prosecution witness, who was a member of security of deceased and took the deceased to the hospital

Insufficient evidence was available to corroborate confessions of co-accused persons to come to the conclusion that prosecution had proved case against accused beyond reasonable doubt

High Court extended benefit of doubt to accused, set aside conviction and sentence awarded to him by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge

Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

For determining the issue whether the offence fell within the realm of Anti-Terrorism Act or not, the nature of offence was to be seen in the light of mode of occurrence

In the present case, a specific motive resulting into occurrence had been alleged, which was private and of personalized nature and had no nexus with S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; it could not be said that the same fell within the ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Motive for the occurrence in case was personal enmity inter-se the parties, as such S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 did not attract

Convictions and sentences of the accused under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were set-aside, in circumstances.

Petitioner was arrested for assaulting Chief Justice of Islamabad High Court, detaining him in his chamber and obstructing him from performing his functions

Validity

Petitioner was in judicial custody and investigation to his extent stood concluded

Petitioner was senior member of bar and he was a candidate for election as President, Islamabad High Court Bar Association

Nothing was to be recovered from petitioner and his continuous incarceration would not serve any purpose

Bail was a discretionary matter and such discretion was to be exercised with caution and in accordance with law

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Constitutional petition was disposed of.

Accused persons started firing in a mosque, chased the victims in a street and then followed them inside the complainant party's house and throughout they kept on firing and murdered three persons and injured another

Mere firing at one's personal enemy in the backdrop of a private vendetta or design did not ipso facto bring the case within the purview of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 so as to brand the action as terrorism

In the present case there was no 'design' or 'object' contemplated by S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

By virtue of Item No.4(ii) of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 a case became triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court if use of firearms or explosives, etc. in a mosque, imambargah, church, temple or any other place of worship was involved in the case

Said entry in the Third Schedule only made such a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but such a case did not ipso facto become a case of terrorism for the purposes of recording convictions and sentences under S.6 read with S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Present case had, thus, rightly been tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court but the said Court could not have convicted and sentenced the accused persons for an offence under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as it had separately convicted and sentenced the accused persons (under S.302(b), P.P.C) for the offences of murder, etc. committed as ordinary crime

Appeal was partly allowed and the accused persons' convictions and sentences recorded for the offence under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were set aside.

Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, hurt, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, rioting armed with deadly weapon, common intention, act of terrorism, possessing unlicensed arms

Appreciation of evidence

Terrorism

Accused and co-accused had made firing at police raiding party at a time when they felt apprehension of their arrest and they had taken law into their hands

Exchange of firing continued between the accused party and police raiding party for one hour

One police official had received firearm injury on his left shoulder at the hands of the accused for which a sense of panic and fear prevailed on vicinity especially on the inhabitants of locality and on their children

Accused had acted in a desperate manner at the spot by firing and had tried to commit murder of police officials

Circumstances suggested that provisions of S.6(m) & (n) punishable under S.7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were fully attracted in the present case

Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

Accused impugned order of Trial Court whereby application for transfer of his case from Anti-Terrorism Court to Sessions Court was rejected

Contention of accused was that he had been involved in a false case by police and provision of S. 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had also been included in FIR to drag accused in criminal case, in spite of the fact that no ingredient of S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was attracted

Validity

Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a special law which had been promulgated to prevent crimes of such nature which would create terror and sense of insecurity in public-at-large and also to prevent an act relating to sectarian violence or ethnic cause, kidnapping for ransom, extortion of money and similar acts which fell within the ambit of terrorism as defined in S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

In the present case, it had come on record that alleged police encounter continued for 20 minutes but no one either from the accused party or police had sustained any injury, and police mobile had not received any grevious damage

Trial Court while passing impugned order had failed to examine as to whether ingredients of alleged offence had any nexus with the object of "case" as contemplated under Ss. 6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Order of Trial Court not containing any valid reasons was set aside

Application was allowed, accordingly.

Anti-Terrorism Court dismissed the application under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. on the ground that the points raised therein, being related to factual aspects of the case, required evidence

Accused had simply pleaded that the charge against him was false and in support of his contention had referred to certain contradictions in the complaint and the statements of the witnesses

Accused was not able to show any material discrepancy in the contents of the complaint and the statements of witnesses to establish that the allegations against them were prima facie false and fabricated and that those allegations even if proved would not end in their conviction

Accused could not be acquitted under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. on basis of any alleged contradictions in the statements of the witnesses

Object of S. 265-K was to satisfy the court about prima facie occurrence of the incident

Benefit of the provision of S. 265-K, Cr.P.C could only be extended to the accused, when once he was able to establish that the charge of the offence against him was groundless and no probability of his conviction on basis of the such charge existed

Delay in filing of the complaint also could not be considered valid ground for acquittal of the accused under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.

Whether any adverse consequence was to follow or not due to the delay was essentially a factual question, which had to be appreciated only in the light of the evidence

Delay in lodging the complaint, even otherwise, appeared to have been reasonably explained

Accused, in the given circumstances were not entitled to be acquitted under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.

Revision was dismissed accordingly.

Components and constituents of terrorism detailed. The 'purpose', the motivation, the 'actus reus' and the 'mens rea' constitute the components of terrorism or an act of terrorism. An action designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government or the public or section of public or community or sect or, if such an action is designed to create a sense of fear or insecurity in society in the backdrop of religious, sectarian or ethnic cause, shall constitute an act of terrorism or a terrorist act. To create fear or insecurity in the society through a crime is not by itself terrorism unless the motive or the design or the actus reus or mens rea pre-exists for creating such fear or insecurity in the society. A private crime resulting into fear or insecurity as a by-product, a fall out or an unintended consequence of fright etc. cannot be termed as an act of terrorism. Mere gravity, heinousness, gruesomeness or shocking nature of any offence, committed in pursuance of personal enmity or in settlement of personal vendetta is not by itself sufficient to brand such crime as a terrorist act or an act of terrorism.

Whether particular act was act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design and purpose behind the said act was to be seen and it was also to be seen as to whether the said act had created sense of fear and insecurity in the public or in section of the public or community or in any sect and where action resulted in striking terror or creating fear, panic, sensation, helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in particular area it amounted to "terror" and such action fell within the ambit of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and shall be triable by Special Court constituted for such purpose.

Accused was convicted and sentenced to death by Trial Court but High Court converted the sentence into imprisonment for life

Plea raised by accused was that it was night time occurrence and identity of assailant was not proved on record

Validity

Allegation that accused was already known to complainant and prosecution witnesses remained unproved and unsubstantiated, as accused had neither criminal background nor involvement of accused was proved on the record

Question as to how could the complainant and prosecution witnesses identify the accused, was unanswered

Delay of more than one hour in lodging report had also given rise to the inference that occurrence did not take place in the manner projected by prosecution and time was consumed in making effort to give a coherent attire to prosecution case, which hardly proved successful

Such delay was all the more fatal when police station, besides being connected with the scene of occurrence through a metalled road, was at a distance of 11 kilometers from the latter

Supreme Court observed that standard of proof should have been far higher as compared to any other criminal case, when according to prosecution, it was a case of police encounter and it was desirable and even imperative that such case should have been investigated by some other agency, as police in such case, could not have been investigators of their own cause

Such investigation which was woefully lacking independent character could not be made basis for conviction in a charge involving capital sentence, that too when it was riddled with many lacunas and loopholes, quite apart from the after-thoughts and improvements

To maintain conviction and sentence of accused in such circumstances would not be in accord with safe administration of justice

Supreme Court extended benefit of doubt to accused and acquitted him of the charge

Appeal was allowed.

Accused were convicted by Trial Court under S. 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and were sentenced to death on four counts

Validity

Availability of heavy layer of smoke caused by two strong explosions between prosecution witnesses on one side of place of explosions and accused on the other and finally chaos, panic and pandemonium resulting from explosions and vague and general kind of description of three accused given through F.I.R., made possibility of prosecution witnesses having registered faces and identity of accused open to serious exception and to the resultant doubts

Absence of complete description of dummies at test identification parade without their addresses, their occupation and without any clue whether they were fellow prisoners or outsiders; admitted dis-similarities in height, physique, features, complexion, appearance and dress of dummies and accused persons; absence of any information whether accused persons and dummies were similar in matters of beards or being clean-shaven; absence of disclosure by prosecution about actual date of arrest of three accused persons; declared involvement of three accused in another case and possibility of accused having remained in police custody on account of that another case prior to identification; absence of any finding and decision by Magistrate supervising identification parade contradicting admitted assertion of accused persons being in fetters at the time of identification; mere alleged pointation of three accused persons by three prosecution witnesses without disclosing connection in which they had been identified or role which each or anyone of them had played in the occurrence; non-sealing of report of identification proceedings and other relevant documents after report had been finalized on the day of test identification and providing copy of the same to Investigating Officer before sealing the same on next day; four sheets of identification report being of a kind different from last two sheets of report, were the kind of infirmities in actual proceedings leading to test identification of accused persons which would render the exercise also open to serious doubts

Entire fate of prosecution case hinged exclusively on identification of accused persons by three alleged eye-witnesses

Finding of guilt recorded against three accused was not sustainable in view of established legal principles regulating the subject

Conviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and maintained by High Court were set aside and all accused were acquitted of the charge

Appeal was allowed.

Case was sought to be transferred from the files of Sessions Judge to court of Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, on the grounds that accused were absconding; that the offence had been committed on main road; that incident had created severe fear and panic in the area and that the offence was an act of terrorism and fell within the ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Validity

Offence alleged to have been committed by accused persons, was with the motive to kill the victims by firing with Kalashnikov

Act was committed on a highway on basis of past enmity existed between both the parties as per contents of F.I.R.

Intended action though had caused loss of life and caused hurt, but only that fact would not constitute an offence to bring same within the purview of terrorism and it was to be established, that alleged act created any sense of insecurity in general; or even to a particular section of society; or threat or sense of fear had been created due to the same

In the present case, though one person had lost his life and other sustained serious injuries, but ingredient required for forming an offence under S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which was intimidation or overawe, either the government or section of public, was missing

Application for transfer of case was dismissed, in circumstances.

Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, somehow or the other came to know about the occurrence; and while taking suo motu notice directed the local Police to produce accused along with record of the case before him

No such like provision was available in Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to take suo motu action by the Judge Anti-Terrorism Court

Section 19 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, consisted of 14 subsections, but none of those authorized the court to take such suo motu action

Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court appeared to have assumed the powers which were not available to him by Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Such like powers could be exercised by the High Court, that too in its constitutional jurisdiction, when it would come to the conclusion that the case was the one triable under the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but the Investigating Agency for one reason or the other had not added the provisions of said Act.

Despite the occurrence having taken place in a populated area, no eye-witness or any other witness from the locality had been joined in investigation by the police

Accused had, according to complainant, contacted him on phone for ransom amount, when father of the child was also with him, but neither the father nor the mother of the child went to the police station with him

Prosecution witnesses had only a fleeting glimpse of the accused and that too after sunset and they had never met the accused previously, hence the possibility of erroneous identification of accused in the identification parade could not be ruled out, which even otherwise was not held in accordance with law

Statement of the abducted child did not inspire confidence, as admittedly he had been tutored by the complainant before making the same

Prosecution case was full of doubts, benefit whereof would go to accused

Accused was acquitted in circumstances.

"Terrorism" means the use or threat of "action" where the "action" falls within the meaning of sub-section (2) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevents them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil life.

Manner of the alleged conspiracy as stated by two witnesses, prima facie, was dubious because the same did not appeal to reason that a man of ordinary prudence would conspire with others for the murder of someone in that way while leaving the door open to be heard even by the passersby

Accused had been found innocent during the investigation

Case of accused was open to further inquiry into his guilt attracting mischief of S.497(2), Cr.P.C.

Case for enlargement on bail having been made out, accused was admitted to bail, in circumstances.

Action which created a serious risk to 'safety of public was terrorism under clause (i) of subsection (2) of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Transportation of a huge quantity of illicit arms and ammunition, could be, by no stretch of imagination, for any lawful activities, peaceful purpose or welfare of the public

Only conclusion which could be drawn was that such transportation involved serious risk to safety of public which was already under wave of extreme terrorism

Occurrence, in the present case, took place at a place where many disinterested persons were present around who were not cited as witnesses of recovery

People did not co-operate and did not consent to be cited as witnesses of recovery; in terrorism and narcotics cases, because it invited annoyance of people relating to drug mafia and terrorists which they could not afford to face

Police witnesses; in such circumstances, were good witnesses, unless mala fide was established against them

In the present case, statements of police witnesses were neither contradictory nor infirm, nor having any inherent flaw

Statements of prosecution witnesses' relating to recovery in the case, were consistent on material points and intrinsically rang true

Said witnesses were rightly relied upon by the Trial Court

Accused was acquitted for offence under Ss.468/471, P.P.C. and S.14 of West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, but conviction of accused under S.7(h) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as well as under S.13 of West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 was maintained.

Case against accused was not a case of terrorism but of police encounter and police had given the occurrence the shape of terrorism

Provisions of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being not applicable, accused were acquitted of the charge under S.7 (c) of the said Act

Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Question as to "what is Terrorism and what is not" abundantly made clear.

If any person or persons commit the offence falling within the scope of subsections (1), (3) & (5) of S.6 of the Anti­-Terrorism Act, 1997, then he or they will be guilty of the act of terrorism by virtue of subsection (6) thereof.

History of terrorism as it is known today traced.

Not every disruption of or interference with the duties of a public servant or every coercion, intimidation or violence against a public servant which attracts the definition of "terrorism" contained in S.6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Provisions of S.6(2)(1), (m) and (n) of the said Act speak of "serious interference"; "serious disruption": "serious coercion or intimidation" or "serious violence" against a public servant

Word "serious" has been defined by S.2(w) of the said Act to mean "dangerous to life or property "

Where facts of the case emerging during the investigation, showed that apparently nothing had been done by the accused which could be termed as dangerous to life or property, application of provisions of S.6(2)(1), (m) & (n) to the case appeared to be quite suspect

Alleged interference with or disruption of the duty of the public servants involved in the present case or coercion or intimidation of or violence against such public servants being not "serious" enough to attract the definition of "terrorism" as contained in S.6 of the Act, Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had no jurisdiction to try the case.

Simpliciter the fact that other foreign countries have also enacted certain Acts to cope with the menace of terrorism, will not warrant enactment of an Act in Pakistan" which may be violative of the Constitution.

Refusal to grant lease having been done under special statute viz. M.L.R. 115, which overrides principles contained in normal laws, no grievance could be made out on any legal plane

Lease of land having come to an end in the year 1982 and Constitutional petition having been filed five years later and that too after the dismissal of similar Constitutional petition, fresh petition suffered from laches which could not be condoned

Petitioner was, thus, not entitled to renewal of lease in question.

Leave to appeal was granted to examine the question, whether the agricultural land which was irrigated through tube well was to be treated as Chahi Nehri or Nul Chahi for purpose of computing the Produce Index value thereof.

Para. 24 [as amended by Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (XLVIII of 1976), S.5 and Land Reforms Regulation (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (V of 1982), S.41???Interpretation of para 24(6), clause (a) (as amended)???"Bona fide requirement" is relatable to the needs of alienee who requires that land bona fide for building purposes.

Suit for eviction of petitioners/tenants had been instituted under para.25(1) of the Regulation and no progress of any significance had been made in the proceedings of the suit

Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court in the meantime declared the relevant provisions of the said Regulation as against the injunctions of Islam and accordingly ejectment proceedings were rendered ineffective

Petitioners filed Constitutional petition without seeking any intermediary remedies provided by the law, with a view to seek annulment of the proceedings

Held,, petitioners should not have approached the High Court without exhausting other remedies provided in law in the hierarchy of the Revenue Forums

Constitutional petition being premature thus could be dismissed on that ground alone

Proper procedure to be followed by petitioners.

Where there was rivalry between the order of Collector decreeing the suit of the tenant and decree of Civil Court of general jurisdiction, order of Collector was to take effect

Order of Collector thus could not be challenged before a Civil Court or in any other proceedings except by riling appeal or revision as provided in para. 25(6) (7) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972

Order/decree therefore would remain intact if not challenged or set aside in the revenue hierarchy.