Appeal to High Court

Defendant impugned the order of Banking Court whereby its application for leave to defend was dismissed and suit was decreed

Contention of the defendant inter alia was that its various objections to the suit filed by plaintiff Bank were not considered in the impugned order

Validity

Objection regarding competency of person filing suit on behalf of plaintiff Bank was not valid as persons filing the suit mentioned therein that they had been duly constituted attorneys and authorized signatories on behalf of plaintiff Bank

Defendant's objection as to statement of accounts being incorrect was also not valid as defendant had not challenged any entry therein and defendant could also not show any entry where markup on markup had been charged

Impugned order however, calculated markup beyond date of expiry of facility, which could not be upheld

High Court, while upholding the impugned order, modified the decree to the extent of deleting markup beyond expiry period of facility

Appeal was disposed of, accordingly.

Question before the High Court was whether Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that charge of penalty could not be imposed on taxpayer for reason of uncertainty

Validity

Held, that perusal of order of Appellate Tribunal revealed that no question of law had arisen, and the question of law framed in the present appeal under S. 27 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963 by the Department was not substantive

Impugned order had been passed after scrutinizing relevant record and on the basis of valid reasons and did not suffer from legal or factual infirmity

Appeal was decided against the Department, accordingly.

Use of the words "whether or not" would not serve the purpose, if answered in "yes" or "no".

Appellant impugned order of Authority passed in a review before it, on the ground that same was coram non judice as it had been passed by two members of the Authority excluding the Chairman, which was a violation of S.4(1) of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002

Contention of OGRA on the other hand was that impugned order was valid under protection available by virtue of S.4(4) of the Ordinance and that since the Chairman OGRA was on forced leave, therefore, two members of the Authority sat on the review

Held, that no vacancy was in existence at the relevant time when the impugned order was passed and the Chairman OGRA was on forced leave, therefore, OGRA could not take benefit of S.4(4) of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 in order to justify its decision

Record showed that three members of the Authority had rejected the appeal of the appellants, by a majority decision of two members, and in such a scenario, propriety demanded that review arising therefrom must also be heard and decided by three members of the Authority

Impugned order was therefore passed by an incompetent authority and was in violation of S.4(1) of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 and was set aside.

Jurisdiction conferred by S.7 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was confined to the matters which were expressly covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 itself, such as winding up proceedings, etc. and not the matters, which were not expressly covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984

Remedy of appeal before High Court under S.34 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 therefore, could be availed only in the cause provided under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and no other grievance or cause could be agitated before High Court

Employment of the appellants was not covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and therefore, appeal would not lie before High Court in respect of any grievance regarding employment of officers of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Appeals were dismissed.

Jurisdiction conferred by S.7 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 was confined to the matters which were expressly covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 itself, such as winding up proceedings, etc. and not the matters, which were not expressly covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984

Remedy of appeal before High Court under S.34 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Act, 1997 therefore, could be availed only in the cause provided under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and no other grievance or cause could be agitated before High Court

Employment of the appellants was not covered by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and therefore, appeal would not lie before High Court in respect of any grievance regarding employment of officers of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan

Appeals were dismissed.

Only an aggrieved person or the Collector may file an appeal in the High Court in respect of any question of law arising out of an order under S. 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944

Reference/Appeal, in the present case, was filed by Collector Sales Tax and Federal Excise and the Additional Director Intelligence and Investigation

Memorandum of reference was not signed by the said functionaries thus only by mentioning designation of said persons in the title, it could not be ascertained that the Reference/Appeal had been filed by the Collector

Power of attorney had not been signed by the Collector but by an unknown person from the Collectorate of Sales Tax

Such person could not be considered aggrieved person under S. 36C of the Central Excise Act, 1944

Term "aggrieved person", if it was referable to any officer of Sales Tax, then the word "Collector" would be a sheer addition to the statute and would make it redundant

Legislature had purposely used and signified two different expressions, which were "Collector" and "aggrieved person"

Redundancy could not be attributed to the legislature

Appeal to High Court was not main-tainable in circumstances.

Provisions of S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 had been excluded from application to cases covered by special laws and therefore, cases instituted under Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005,which was a special law, could not be governed by provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908

Benefits available for seeking condoation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 therefore, could not be extended in such cases

Appellate Court, under S.33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 did not have suo motu powers in respect of condoning delay.

Provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 had been excluded from application to cases covered by special laws and therefore, cases instituted under Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005,which was a special law, could not be governed by provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908

Benefits available for seeking condoation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 therefore, could not be extended in such cases

Appellate Court, under S.33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 did not have suo motu powers in respect of condoning delay.

Defaulting party would be bound to seek condonation of delay by making an application explaining each's delay with plausible reasons duly supported by affidavit.

Impugned order dated 21-5-1998 alleged by appellant received by him on 14-12-1999, whereas appeal was filed on 12-2-2000

Validity

Appellant had filed appeal without application for condonation of such delay

Law would favour vigilant and not indolent

Delay in filing appeal had occurred due to indolence and negligence on part of appellant, for which opposite party would not be penalized

High Court dismissed appeal for being time barred.

Contention of the tax-payer/respondent was that departmental appeal was not maintainable as it was filed in the name of the Collector but was signed by the Law Officer

Contention of the department was that present appeal would have not been maintainable under the old law but said defect had been cured by way of amendment whereby S. 47(11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was promulgated

Validity

No provision of law or any guideline through any notification had been introduced whereby Law Officer was entitled to institute or file an appeal before the High Court under S. 47 of the Act as it stood in the year 2002

Appeal before the High Court could only be filed on behalf of Revenue or by the Collector himself and no one else, however, the Collector or any of the authorized officer not below rank of Additional Collector could institute or file such appeal

Contention that S. 47(11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was retrospective in nature and was applicable to all pending cases before the High Court was untenable as statutory provisions, ever relating to fiscal laws, were assumed to be prospective in nature unless specifically manifested to be retrospective

Newly promulgated S. 47(11) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by itself did not manifest itself as having retrospective effect, either directly or impliedly, and S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also protected such legal analogy

Law Officer, was therefore, not competent to file the present appeal, which was accordingly dismissed.

Questions arising in case not appreciated in their correct perspective and decided with due application mind by the Appellate Tribunal

Effect

Such finding could not be maintained

High Court remanded case to the Tribunal for its decision afresh in accordance with law.

Limitation for present appeal was prescribed by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, thus, by virtue of S. 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908, provision of S. 5 thereof would not attract thereto

High Court dismissed appeal for being time barred.

Limitation for present appeal was prescribed by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, thus, by virtue of S.29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908, provision of S.5 thereof would not attract thereto

High Court dismissed appeal for being time-barred.

Office had returned appeal for removing objections within three days, but appellant had re filed appeal after about twenty days of expiry of limitation period

Appellant in appeal had mentioned that limitation period had expired on 14-2-2000, but had not filed application for its condonation

Such inordinate delay could not be condoned

High Court dismissed appeal in limine.

Appellant after receiving impugned order on 24-6-1997 sat over his own rights and did not file appeal, thus, he was not entitled to claimed relief, for which procedural law did not provide any favour

Office had initially returned appeal for removing objections within three days, but appellant had re filed the same after about 2-1/2 years of expiry of period of limitation

Appellant had mentioned in the appeal that limitation had expired on 22-8-1997, but had not filed application for condonation of delay

Such inordinate delay in filing appeal could not be condoned

High Court dismissed appeal in limine.

Period of limitation for filing appeal as prescribed under S. 23(1) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, was thirty days

Period of limitation prescribed by the special law would prevail over the Limitation Act, 1908

Application made under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay, thus, was not competent in view of the bar contained in S. 29(2)(a)(b) thereof:

Even otherwise, reason of delay as stated in the petition had not been supported by any documents like medical certificate etc.

Neither any cogent reason had been given for condonation of delay, nor the delay of each day had been explained

Application was dismissed in circumstances.

Trial Court while passing order of conviction and sentence against respondent/accused had mentioned that assets/properties of accused were forfeited as set off against the amount of fine, however, in case of non-recovery/non-payment of the amount/fine, accused would undergo for further terms of two years

Accused in his application filed before the Trial Court had requested that since he had already completed his conviction period and also served additional sentence in default of payment of fine, his properties which were subject matter of the main reference be released

Trial Court accepted application of accused and directed Executive District Officer to release the properties of accused as mentioned in the judgment and in the order

Feeling aggrieved from said order of the Trial Court, NAB Authorities had filed instant appeal

Since the properties of accused were forfeited as set off against the amount of fine, intention of the Trial Court was that properties/assets, subject-matter of reference were forfeited only to recover the amount of fine

It was held in the judgment that in case of non-recovery of amount of fine, the convict/accused would further undergo for two years

Accused having also served a sentence for non-payment of fine, legally speaking the judgment of the Trial Court had fully been acted upon and accused could not be punished twice, because the period he served against the payment of fine could not be returned to him

Law did not provide double punishment to accused

Accused had since completed his entire sentence, including the additional sentence of two years in lieu of amount of fine

Properties of accused, in circumstances were no more subject-matter of the judgment and the Trial Court had rightly released the same

Further the Trial Court being the original court, was the best forum to interpret its own judgment

Appeal against judgment and order of the Trial Court, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Plaint had revealed that the Trial Court had not followed the procedure visualized by O.XXXIII, C.P.C., wherein a complete scheme was provided for institution and disposal of pauper suit

Under R.2 of O.XXXIII, C.P.C., it was obligatory for the plaintiff to seek permission to sue as a pauper; application in that respect must contain the particulars required in regard to plaint in suit; a schedule of any movable or immovable properly belonging to the plaintiffs; estimated value thereof was to be annexed thereto and such statement would be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for signing and verification of the pleadings

Under R.4 of O. XXXIII, C.P.C. the court had to examine the applicant; and if it did not satisfy the requirement of Rr.2 & 3 of O. XXXIII, C.P.C., same would be rejected under R.5 of O.XXXIII, C.P.C.

In the present case, the Trial Court had not gone through the provisions of O.XXXIII, C.P.C. and proceedings had been conducted without application of judicial mind, which was duty of every Judicial Officer

Provisions of R.2 of O.XXXIII, C.P.C. were mandatory and departure from the same was not condonable

Failure of the Trial Court to adopt the relevant procedure had rendered the whole proceedings a nullity in the eyes of law

Where special procedure was provided for performance of an act, the same should be performed in the prescribed manner or not at all

Appeal filed by the defendants though was time barred, but High Court was vested with the powers of superintendence and control over the subordinate judiciary under S.46 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 and could not shut its eyes when some illegality was otherwise noticed while pursuing the record of the subordinate court

High Court was duty bound to rectify the wrongs

Appeal in circumstances was treated as revision and was accepted

Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, were set aside and case was remanded with the direction to proceed with the case in accordance with the procedure provided for the purpose.

Appeals filed by appellants under S.15 of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 were dismissed on the ground that those were filed beyond period of thirty days provided for filing of appeals

Period of thirty days prescribed for filing of appeal expired on the Ist of May which was a holiday and next day was Sunday

Appeal filed on the first opening day of the court after the expiry of thirty days, would be within time

Appeals filed on the first opening day being within time, High Court was not justified to dismiss them on ground of limitation

Impugned judgments of the High Court were set aside and cases were remanded to the High Court to be decided on merits after allowing opportunity of hearing to both the parties.

Order which disposes of an appeal by the Appellate Tribunal and served on the parties thereof under S.35C(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is the one which can be challenged under S.36C of the said Act before the High Court

Appeals directed against the order passed under S.35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are incompetent in terms of S.36C of the said Act

Principles detailed.

Husband of the appellant applied for Life Insurance Policy and on which provisional receipt was issued and on presentation of cheque, Policy was finalized

On death of husband of appellant in road accident, appellant lodged her claim for insurance amount

Claim of appellant was repudiated whereupon appellant filed a complaint before Federal. Ombudsman, which was allowed, but on representation by the Insurance Company said order was upset by the President

Order of the President, however was set aside by the High Court and case was remanded to the President for reconsideration

Subsequently when Insurance Tribunals were constituted, appellant withdrew her complaint and filed the application before Insurance Tribunal, which having been dismissed by the Tribunal, appellant had filed appeal before High Court

Validity-Appellant was non-suited on two counts; firstly that application of appellant was time barred; secondly that since the matter had already been adjudicated before Ombudsman, same was hit by res judicata

High Court had already resolved in its two judgments

Limitation provided under Art.86-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 was with reference to the suits filed by the claimants under the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court before establishment of Insurance Tribunals

Application brought by the appellant was within time and was not barred by time

High Court while dealing with constitutional petition filed by the appellant had not finally decided the issue involved, but had simply remanded the case to the President, without final adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction

Principle of res judicata could not be made applicable in circumstances

Defence taken up by the Insurance Company could not be established on record

Allowing appeal, order passed by the Insurance Tribunal, was set aside and application filed by the appellant was allowed.

Labour Appellate Tribunal having been constituted in terms of S.55 of Industrial Relations Act, 2008, it was appropriate that employer should approach the relevant forum

High Court, instead of adjourning the case, disposed of the same-with the direction to the employer to file an appeal before Labour Appellate Tribunal within specified period

Operation of the impugned order would remain suspended to enable the employer to approach relevant forum.

Appellants claimed that they were performing their duties as Fire-Fighters, but without taking into consideration their uninterrupted length of service spreading over years and years they were not regularized

Employees, after serving the grievance notices, filed grievance petition under S.46 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002

Appellant had submitted that they were issued duty roster and duty Schedule by employer and after serving more than 15 years they had attained the status of permanent workmen, but due to the inaction of employer they were suffering monetary losses and insecurity in service

Employer had contended that employees were not their employees, however they were performing their duties with it being employees of other departments; and that respondents' four either departments had no concern at all with the employees

In view of said dispute between the employees and employer, controversy could not be resolved until and unless the evidence of both the parties was recorded by the Labour Court

Impugned decision being contrary to law, was set aside by High Court and case was remanded to the Labour Court for decision on merits.

Question proposed for the opinion of the High Court was "whether the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to allow deduction of Zakat against the income including other head of Income"

Said issue having already been settled by the High Court in case 2003 PTD 1309, question was answered in affirmative in favour of assessee and against the department.

Contention was that the fate of the leave to defend the application before the Banking Court needed to be decided by High Court in appeal on merits

Validity

Held, such course if followed by the Appellate Court, unless consented by the parties, may deprive the aggrieved party of his legitimate right to challenge same before the Higher forum

High Court, however, directed the Banking Court to expedite the disposal of suit within specified period.

Appellant's plea was that he was intimated on 7-11-2001 about impugned decision, thus, difference of six days between 7-11-2001 to 13-11-2001 was computable towards counting of two months' time provided under R.84 of Trade Marks Rules, 1963

Validity

Appellant had not filed application for condonation of delay

Limitation Act, 1908 would not apply to present case as specific period for filing appeal was provided under R.84 of Trade Marks Rules, 1963

If time of five days was taken, then appeal should have been filed on 4-9-2002

Appeal was dismissed for being barred by three days.

Appellant, employer of the deceased had approached the High Court as he had received directions from the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for depositing an amount of Rs.200,000 payable as death compensation along with legal dues of deceased, within specified period

Employer/appellant had submitted memorandum of compliance of the order of High Court which had shown that a cheque for Rs.200,000 had been deposited with the Nazir of the High Court

Cheque was ordered by High Court to be forwarded to the court of District Judge who had granted the petition for grant of succession certificate to the respondent

Nazir of the High Court was directed to deposit the cheque of Rs.200,000 submitted before the Nazir of District Court for distributing the same to legal heirs of deceased accordingly.

Principles.

Agreement between three parties including appellant and respondent providing for transfer of such declaration in respondent's name

Respondent's application ' for transfer of such declaration in his name on basis of such agreement

Report of inquiry committee constituted by District Magistrate under old law set aside by High Court in earlier constitutional petition and Supreme Court remanded case to Chief Commissioner for its decision in accordance with new law

Cancellation of such declaration from appellant's name and its transfer in respondent's name by Commissioner in view of such earlier report

Validity

Appellant had been condemned unheard for not having been associating with earlier inquiry

According to such agreement, its third party had to transfer such declaration and pay compensation to respondent

Such third party was neither before Commissioner nor was impleaded in constitutional petition, thus, in his absence such agreement could not be enforced

Commissioner had travelled beyond his jurisdiction by granting declaration not even asked for in such application

Commissioner had issued declaration in respondent's name on same day i.e. before expiry of 60 days of cancellation order

High Court accepted appeal and set aside impugned order in circumstances.

Dismissal of application by High Court holding that reasons advanced for extending period of limitation were not sufficient

Supreme Court refused to grant/leave to appeal against impugned judgment.

Decision of Tribunal neither suffering from any illegality or infirmity nor contrary to or in violation of any provision of Customs Act, 1969 or any other law

No question of law was before Tribunal for adjudication, which was necessary condition for maintainability of appeal under S.196 of the Customs Act, 1969

High Court dismissed appeal in circumstances.

High Court dismissed appeal being time-barred.

Services of appellants/workers, who were permanent workers of the employer company, were terminated on ground of re-organization of the company-Plea of the company was that the product of the company, known as 'Staple Fiber' was out of demand and the company had to stop its production

Contention of company was that on account of lack of demand of its product, company was facing financial losses and to reorganize the company, it had to remove some of its employees under Standing Order 12(1) of West. Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968

Validity

Company did not produce any record about production of its product (Staple Fiber), its demand and available stock

No evidence was available to show that production of Staple Fiber was stopped

Company did not produce the annual audit report to prove that company was facing financial losses on account of alleged lack of demand of said Staple Fiber

Ground on which appellants/workers were removed thus could not be substantiated by the company

Fact was that appellants being senior workers were removed, but junior workers were retained

Company had not removed/discharged all the employees working in the Factory and no evidence was available to the effect that any section of the Factory was closed or that employees of a particular group performing specified nature of work were removed

Evidence, on the other hand, had shown that some of the employees were picked up and their services were terminated without taking into consideration the seniority of the workers who were removed and workers whose services were retained

Termination of service of appellants on ground of alleged reorganization, was not justified as the company had failed to prove the ground of alleged reorganization

Removal of appellants was also not within purview of Standing . Order 12(1) of the Ordinance as circumstances of the case attracted provisions of Standing Order, 13 of the Ordinance and company had violated principle laid down in Standing Order 13 by removing the senior workers and retaining junior workers

Appellants were ordered to be reinstated with back benefits in circumstances.

Tribunal had rightly found that neither appeal before the Tribunal against recovery notice was competent nor the order of the Tribunal rejecting appeal was further assailable before the High Court under S.47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

After recording of the order-in-original, a demand stood created against assessee and issuance of a notice of recovery was- certainly in continuation of the order-in-original

There being an order-in-original, the recovery notice was mere a step in furtherance thereof, which was not open to challenge before the Tribunal

Order of the Tribunal regarding non-maintainability of appeal against recovery notice, was approved and since no question of law could be said to have arisen out of the order to be considered by the High Court under S.47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, appeal was dismissed by the High Court.

Court Auctioneers filled schedule of auction to which appellant/ guarantor filed objections before Banking Court for exclusion of his property from auction schedule, which objection was dismissed

Validity

Properties belonging to borrowers, could not be auctioned due to non participation of bidders in respect of their properties but property of appellant/guarantor was auctioned and was confirmed in the name of successful bidder

Appellant levelled certain allegations against Court Auctioneers

Record had shown that at the time of auction, Court Auctioneers, Bank Officials and appellant were present at the spot

Satisfaction of decree against customer/borrower should be through sale/auction of properties of borrowers/principal debtors, however if thereafter decree was not satisfied., the properties of the guarantor could be sold

Properties belonging to borrowers which were put to auction could not be auctioned due to non-availability of the bidders, thus property belonging to appellant/guarantor was put to auction, which was legal as liability was co-extensive qua principal debtor/borrowers and the guarantor

Properties belonging to principal debtors having remained un-auctioned, Court Auctioneers were left with no choice but to sell the property of appellant/guarantor

No illegality having been committed by the Court Auctioneers, impugned order of Executing Court, held, was unexceptionable.

Suit for recovery of loan by Bank was decreed and decree-holder/Bank went in execution and successfully obtained sale order of mortgaged property

Court Auctioneers appointed by the executing court conducted auction of mortgaged property and respondent being highest bidder succeeded in purchasing the same

Court Auctioneers submitted their report before the executing court and judgment-debtor filed objection petition to said execution and auction proceedings

Validity

Undisputedly, publicity of the auction allegedly held, was not properly done as its notice was not publicized in any of the newspaper

Court Auctioneers felt satisfied with circulation of few pamphlets which according to their report were only pasted outside the Court Room and at the place of auction

Display of those pamphlets, if were really published, was not shown to have been done at public places of the adjoining villages/towns

Court Auctioneers had referred to publicity by the beat of drums, but nothing was in the report to show as to what places and by whom it was undertaken

Pamphlets published by the Court Auctioneers were also vague

Copy of the pamphlets placed on record had shown that neither the proper specification of land subject of auction nor the place of auction had been mentioned with clarity

All said points were specifically pointed out in the objection petition filed by the appellant, but executing court through sketchy/unreasoned impugned order, dismissed same with a solitary unbased finding that publicity was properly done for the auction conducted for decreed amount

Such determination through the order impugned was not justifiable on the touchstone of any canon known for administration of justice

Judgment of the Banking Court could, in no manner, come within the arena of judicial decisions as no kind of reason had been mentioned therein for throwing the objections of the appellant out of the file

Impugned order being illegal, was set aside with the result that objection petition filed by the appellant would be deemed to be pending before Executing Court which would be decided afresh in accordance with law.

Objection petition-Appeal was filed against the order passed by executing court rejecting. the objections by the decree-holder as well as by two other objectors who offered to pay higher price, on the ground that decree-holder's objection was time-barred and other bidders' objections did not disclose substantial injury as required by O.XXI, R.90 C.P.C.

Decree-holder had objected that the terms of auction were to be finalized and approved by the executing court under O.XXI, R.66 C.P.C. and said terms must necessarily contain the reserve price of property under auction

Validity

Only question was whether the sale of the auction property below the reserve price fixed by the executing court was valid or not

Reserve price of a property under auction must be fixed with the approval of the court

Neither the Court Auctioneers nor the parties to the decree had authority to modify a duly fixed reserve price without such approval

In the present case impugned sale was finalized at a price below the reserve price fixed by the executing court without obtaining approval for the reduction of the reserve price of the property under auction

Such auction was illegal and consequently the sale concluded thereby was void

Failure by the Banking Court to consider and deal with the said illegality upon the pretext of technical objections was deprecated

Executing Court, however would sell the property under auction through a fresh auction to be conducted strictly in accordance with law.

Major penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed on employee on allegation that he had committed misconduct by misplacing the file of a consumer seeking installation of a new domestic connection, with ulterior motive

Grievance petition filed by the employee against said penalty was accepted by the Labour Court declaring impugned order as void and directing reinstatement of employee in service with 50% bout-benefit and employers had filed appeal against said orders of the Labour Court

Witnesses produced by the employers, had themselves proved beyond shadow of doubt that neither the prescribed procedure was adopted nor was any inquiry conducted under authority of competent authority

Neither a fair chance of being heard was provided to the employee nor penal order was passed by competent authority

Whole proceedings in circumstances, were unholy, coram non judice and void ab initio

Question of limitation or laches, in circumstances would not arise

Rights of the employee could not be defeated due to receipt of pensionary benefit by him.

Charge-sheet was served upon the employee for misconduct under Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 on allegation that he had interpolated his service record and changed his date of birth

Employee was awarded major penalty of compulsory retirement from service

Said order was challenged by the employee before the Service Tribunal, but proceedings were abated

Employee, thereafter, filed a grievance petition in the Labour Court, which was allowed and impugned order of compulsory retirement from service was set aside and employee was reinstated in service with all back-benefits

Authority had filed appeal against order of the Labour Court

Employee virtually was condemned unheard

No credible inquiry was held against him and was not associated with the proceedings at all

Order of compulsory retirement passed against employee, in circumstances, was patently illegal and could not sustain

To that extent the impugned order was unexceptionable, however, High Court had already declared that any person aggrieved under Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, had a right of redressal of his cause before the Service Tribunal

Proceedings before the Labour Court were without jurisdiction and could not sustain, in circumstances

Appeal was allowed, however, as employee diligently pressed that remedy, but before a wrong forum, he was awarded a period of thirty days to raise grievance before Service Tribunal, by initiating appropriate proceedings.

Employee who served in the Bank for about 20 years as driver, his services were terminated under retrenchment scheme along with other 210 drivers

Grievance petition filed by the employee against order of termination had been dismissed by the Labour Court

Validity

Board of Directors of the Bank (employer) in its meeting approved the separation scheme in respect of retrenchment of drivers and authorized President of the Bank to implement the scheme

According to said separation scheme, drivers having completed 25 years or more in service were given an option with regard to the Post Retirement Benevolent 'Fund Grant and Medical facility

Employees were given an option either to receive Post Retirement Benevolent Fund Grant and Medical facilities as per rules or in the alternative an amount equal to 10 years normal Post-Retirement Medical facility available to retiring employees in the lump-sum in advance at the time of settlement of dues as a final payment

No option was available to the drivers, either to remain in service or to take 10 years Post Retirement Benefits

National Industrial Relations Commission in its order passed in another case, had found that Bank was within its right to reorganize the institution and to retrench the employees

Questions had been rightly resolved by the competent forum and the Labour Court had followed that decision of competent forum in its impugned judgment

Appeal was dismissed.

Under provisions of S.2(xxx) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 an employee, who held a managerial and administerial post was excluded from the definition of 'workman'-Respondent falling beyond the ambit and purview of the term `workman', Labour Court could not assume and exercise its jurisdiction in his case

Allowing appeal, impugned judgment was declared without jurisdiction and was set aside by High Court.

Employees had claimed that they had been working on work charge basis under appellants/employers under different categories continuously for not less than five years without any break with unblemished record

Employees demanded regularization of their services, which was denied and they approached Labour Court

Prayer of the employees was granted by the Labour Court which had been assailed by employer through appeals before the High Court

Validity

No ground specifically was raised in the memo of appeals to show that any finding of Labour Court was against the facts

Grounds urged in the appeal were of stereotype

Government offices maintain full record of employment of the employees working even on work charge basis

Employees discharged the initial onus of proof of employment and continuity of their service and it was for employers to prove that claim of employees was false supported by the relevant law

Identical questions of law being involved regarding the factual position and no specific example had been mentioned in the memo of appeal as to how and what prejudice was caused to employers, their appeals were dismissed.

Appellants, who claimed to be workers, in their grievance petition had alleged that though they were working for years in the Department, but were not being given the benefits admissible to regular employees

Labour Court. allowed grievance petition of employees other than the appellants, but' same was dismissed on the ground that the latter were Chowkidars and not workers

Employers in their written statement did not plead that appellants were not workers

Appellants in their grievance petition had specifically averred that they were performing manual duties and were fully covered under the prevalent Labour Laws

No dispute existed to the effect that appellants were not workers or workmen

Appeal was allowed and consequently the relief granted to other appellants, would also be available to appellants.

Point to be considered in present case was as to from which date the impugned judgment of the Labour Court would take effect, i.e., whether from the date of appointment of the respondents/employees or from the date of filing of the grievance petition

Grievance petition filed jointly by respondents was decided after about 5 years, from its filing, holding that said employees were declared as permanent and were found entitled to benefits with effect from dates of their appointment

Validity

Labour Court could not have given retrospective effect to said judgment

Impugned judgment could have been made effective from the date when grievance procedure was initiated

First Appellate order was accordingly allowed in as much as while upholding the impugned judgment, petitions of employees were accepted, but same was modified declaring that judgment would take effect from the date of grievance notice.

Point of limitation under the provisions of Customs Act, 1969 is a point to probe and investigation in the factual aspect of the matter regarding misdeclaration or the statement filed by the party as such the said question could not be examined being question of fact under S.196 of Customs Act, 1969.

Notice was issued to importer alleging that he, having removed imported consignment without payment of duty and taxes chargeable thereon, was to pay twice the amount under S.86 of the Customs Act, 1969 as per bond furnished by him at the time of importation

Grievance of importer was that despite payment of duty and taxes within the required time given in notice, he was held guilty under Ss.32(1)(2) and 86 of Customs Act, 1969 and was asked to pay additional customs duty in terms of S.83-A of Customs Act, 1969 for his failure to pay duty and taxes within prescribed time and manner

Importer was also held liable to pay additional sales tax

Held, in such circumstances it was clause (62) of S. 156(1) of Customs Act, 1969 which was applicable and not clause (90) of said Section-Under clause (62) of S.156(1) of Customs Act, 1969, if any person illegally would take away goods out of any warehouse without payment of duty, he would be liable to penalty not exceeding twenty five thousand rupees

Counsel for authorities was unable to rebut arguments advanced by counsel for importer

Importer's appeal was allowed by the High Court in circumstances.

Plea that in view of. provisions of S.194-C(3)(4) of Customs Act, 1969 as amended by Finance Act, 2007 w.e.f. 1-7-2007, such matter could be heard by Single Member of Tribunal, who had no jurisdiction to proceed with matter at the time of passing impugned order

Validity

Such amendment had no retrospective applicability so as to rectify such jurisdictional defect in impugned order

By virtue of such amendment, Single Member of Tribunal had jurisdiction to proceed with appeal looking to controversy involved therein

High Court set aside impugned order and remanded case to Tribunal for re-hearing of appeal within specified time.

Such plea would be deemed to have been waived.