Forum

Even if there is jurisdiction error it is to be objected to/redressed and/or agitated before the concerned authority and none else.

Accused assailed his conviction and sentence on the plea that dispute was of civil nature pertaining to non-fulfilment of contractual obligations

Validity

Sufficient evidence or material was not available on record so as to establish that offence of criminal breach of trust as contemplated in S. 409, P.P.C. was committed by accused

When primary offence of criminal breach of trust under S. 405, P.P.C. was not made out, charge for the offences under S. 9(a)(x) & (xi) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, could not sustain

Prosecution alleged that offence committed by accused was act of cheating, as defined in S. 415, P.P.C. and in such case provisions of S. 9(a)(x) or (xi) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 could not be attracted

Cheating and criminal breach of trust were two distinct offences and both could not allege simultaneously

Commitment could not be honoured by accused due to increase in prices of basic raw materials, then in such circumstances there was no dishonest intention on the part of accused, so as to treat his act as criminal

Such was a civil dispute based upon alleged breach of agreement for which remedies were somewhere else other than in criminal Courts

High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to the accused as Trial Court failed to appreciate evidence which was not convincing and accused was acquitted of the charge

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Recourse under S. 383 of Succession Act, 1925, was independent of an appeal which could otherwise be filed under S. 384 of Succession Act, 1925, against the grant or refusal of a certificate

Application for revocation would lie to the Court that made the grant and in the event such application was accepted and certificate was revoked, appeal would then also lie to High Court

High Court declined to interfere in the matter

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Jurisdictional value fixed by the plaintiff-petitioner in its suit was Rs.10,000 which was never changed, therefore, in accordance with the jurisdictional value of the lis, the forum of appeal was to be determined

Admittedly, when the jurisdictional value of the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner was Rs. 10,000, the appeal was competent before the District Judge and not before the High Court though both the suits were consolidated

Value for the purposes of jurisdiction in the suit filed by the respondents was Rs. 4,94,82,480, therefore, against that decree an appeal was competent before the High Court and said appeal was filed rightly

When two suits were consolidated, the judgment could be consolidated but in each suit a separate decree was passed and an appeal was against a decree and not the judgment, therefore, the Regular First Appeal (RFA) filed against the consolidated judgment could be presumed only against the decree in the suit filed by the respondents for recovery of money in which the jurisdictional value was Rs. 4,94,82,480

Hence, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal against a decree whereby the jurisdictional value was fixed as Rs.10,000 when the jurisdiction was with the District Judge to hear and decide the appeal

When the High Court was having no pecuniary jurisdiction and the District Judge was having jurisdiction, wrong filing of appeal before the High Court did not give the High Court the jurisdiction if in a consolidated judgment appeal against a decree in the other suit was competent before the High Court

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Customs Appellate Tribunal was the last fact finding authority, which had opined that respondent company submitted all required commercial documents including commercial invoice, packing list and bill of lading to customs authorities

Documents presented and relied upon by respondent company were admissible in terms of S.2(kka) of Customs Act, 1969

Customs Appellate Tribunal had given factual finding that examination report furnished by Examination Staff of Customs Department did not object to quantity of the items imported

Difference between authorities and respondent company was only with regard to the fact that whether parts imported were genuine or non-genuine

Such aspect according to the Tribunal was satisfactorily explained by respondent company

Price of items, as determined by Directorate General Valuation, was in consonance with rates as declared by respondent company in various documents furnished by them and in Good Declaration as well pertaining to non-genuine parts

High Court declined to interfere in findings of Customs Appellate Tribunal, as while exercising advisory jurisdiction, points of facts determined by Customs Appellate Tribunal could not be interfered with

Reference was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner was medical practitioner and respondent filed complaint against him before Consumer Court alleging medical negligence

Consumer Court declined to reject the complainant

Petitioner's contention was that Consumer Court lacked necessary expertise and it was Healthcare Commission that was to make assessment in that regard in view of standards envisaged under Sindh Healthcare Commission Act, 2013, and for the jurisdiction of Consumer Court to be triggered/attracted there had to be a prior determination of culpability on the part of the practitioner by that quarter

Validity

Ouster of jurisdiction in terms of a provision in special law could at the best operate to the extent of a subject co-extensive to powers of forum under that enactment

Scope of S.29 of Sindh Healthcare Commission Act, 2013, was to be construed accordingly with reference to the powers of the Commission

For a claim for medical/clinical negligence to be established, a medical practitioner was to be found to have breached a duty of care to a patient, who in turn had suffered injury as a result of that breach

Demonstrating that a doctor breached duty of care was the first major hurdle in any negligence case but such was not always clear cut

Scope exists for genuine differences of opinion when it had come to diagnosis and treatment

Liability claims for defective services, as envisaged under S.13 of Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014, would similarly entail a breach of a duty to be determined with reference to the parameters laid down in S.14 of Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014, where quantum of damages, if any, would be circumscribed by restriction imposed in terms of S.15 of Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014

Provision of S.14 Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014, did not require prior determination to that effect be made by Commission for Consumer Court to be able to proceed on a medical negligence claim

High Court declined to interfere in the matter

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Revenue officer not exercising the jurisdiction under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tenancy Act, 1950, was not a Revenue Court but he exercised limited powers within the contemplation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was not applicable to partition proceedings under the Land Revenue Act, 1967

High Court observed that Civil Court could entertain a suit for partition with regard to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue wherein rights of joint owners should be ascertained and Court should direct such partition or separation to be made by the Collector

Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for partition if joint property to be partitioned consisted of construction and landed property

Only forum for entertaining a suit for landed as well as constructed property jointly owned by the parties which had not been yet partitioned was the Civil Court

Civil Court could transmit a decree to the Collector for execution

Parties in the present suit, were joint owners

When parties were joint owners and only a single joint owner wanted to separate his share through official partition then his suit could not be dismissed

Preliminary decree should be passed after determining the shares of joint owners

If certain joint property was not included in a suit for partition then Court should permit a plaintiff through amendment in the plaint to include the remaining joint property in the same

Appellate Court while passing the impugned judgment and decree had committed material illegality and irregularity

Impugned judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court were set aside and those of Trial Court were restored

Revision was allowed, accordingly.

Forum of appeal is determined on the basis of valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction, as given in the plaint

Only exception to such rule is that if the court re-determine the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction, during the proceedings.

Application under S.12(2), C.P.C was to be filed before a court which was last in series except where an appeal, revision or leave to appeal was dismissed on any ground except merit

Where decree/order of a forum below had been affirmed by the higher forum on merit both on point of fact and law then same would merge into the decree of higher forum

Said decree/order of higher forum would be final for the purpose of S.12(2), C.P.C.

If Supreme Court had merely affirmed the judgment or order of High Court by refusing leave to appeal then final judgment in terms of S.12(2), C.P.C. would be that of the High Court and not of Supreme Court

If Supreme Court had reversed the judgment of High Court and recorded findings on question of fact or law contrary to what was held by the High Court then final judgment or order would be of Supreme Court for the purpose of S.12(2), C.P.C.

Impugned judgment and decree was assailed in appeal and appellate Court had affirmed the same on merits both of fact and law involved therein

Judgment and decree which attained the status of final decree/order in terms of S.12(2), C.P.C. was that of appellate Court

Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. should have been filed before the appellate Court

No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner-University challenged the demand notice for contribution issued by the Employees Old Age Benefit Institution under Employees' Old Age Benefit Act, 1976

Petitioner-University contended that the University being a statutory body being the creation of Abasyn University Act, 2009, no contribution could have been demanded from the University under S.47 of the Employees' Old Age Benefit Act, 1976 and the recovery of certain amount effected from the University were in fact dues of a company, a distinct person, with no concern with the petitioner-University; therefore, said payment had been illegally extracted through coercive measures

Institution raised the objection that the University had the alternate remedy before the Institution under Ss.33, 34 & 35 of the Act and contended that the University, being a profit earning establishment, did not fall within the purview of statutory body as provided under S.47(f) of the Act, and that a case for contribution was made out as the Chancellor of the University was also the Chief Executive of the company that owned and controlled all the assets of the petitioner-University and was being run on profit basis and sought that the Court was to pierce the veil of incorporation of the University and the said Company to see the will and mind behind the legal facade created by establishing the Company and the University, which was meant to circumvent the spirit of the regime provided for paying contribution under Employees' Old Age Benefit Act, 1976

High Court, declaring the petitioner-University as statutory body in terms of S.47(f) of Employees' Old Age Benefit Act, 1976 and as such not liable to any contribution, declared the impugned demand notice as having been issued without lawful authority

Principles.

In consolidated suits wherein (separate) decrees passed had different valuations i.e. the one falling within the jurisdiction of the High Court and the other in the jurisdiction of the District Court, obviously no consolidated appeal could be filed

In such a situation the appellants were required in law to file two appeals according to the value of the original suit i.e. one before the District Judge and the other before the High Court

High Court, however, while exercising its power under S.24 of the C.P.C., if a case was made out within the purview of the said section, may, in order to avoid delay in the disposal of the matter and conflicting decisions, transfer the appeal filed before the District Judge to the High Court and decide the same along with the appeal which had been competently filed before the High Court.

Where the remedy of appeal/revision was provided against a judgment etc. or a remedy of writ was availed, the appellate/revisional/ constitutional forum recorded reasons on the consideration of the issues of law and/or fact, the judgment etc. of the subordinate court/forum would merge into the decision of the appellate court etc. irrespective of the fact that such judgment reversed, varied or affirmed the decision of the subordinate court/forum

Decision of appellate court etc. would be operative and capable of enforcement in such a case on the principle of merger

Application under S.12(2) of the C.P.C., in such circumstances, would be maintainable before the appellate/revisional/ constitutional forum (High Court, District Court, Tribunal or Special Court as the case may be).

Where a property was rightly or wrongly treated to be an evacuee property, such treatment of property could only be assailed through proceedings before the Custodian of Evacuee Property or his successor i.e. the Notified Officer.

Mode of correction in the date of birth of a civil servant was provided under R. 12A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, which was part of the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant

Correction in date of birth by a civil servant could not be done through a civil suit (in view of the bar contained under Art. 212 of the Constitution)

Civil servant had to approach the Service Tribunal for alteration in his date of birth.

Judgment and decree passed by Trial Court was maintained by Lower appellate Court as well as High Court and matter was pending before Supreme Court

Petitioners filed application under S.12(2), C.P.C. before Lower Appellate Court for setting aside its judgment maintaining that of Trial Court

Lower Appellate Court dismissed the application on the ground that it has to be filed before the last court affirming judgments of courts below

Validity

Application under section 12(2), C.P.C. was to be filed before the court, which was last in series except where an appeal revision or leave to appeal was dismissed on any ground except merit

High Court did not find any patent infirmity, irregularity or legal flaw in the judgment passed by Lower Appellate Court as the same was based on correct appreciation of law

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Even if the Election Tribunal made a wrong decision either of facts or law at an intermediate stage, it could not be corrected in constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution by exercising the power of appellate authority

High Court could not sit in appeal over the decision/order of the Election Tribunal or statutory authorities and substitute their decision with its own

Where there was effective alternate remedy under the statute, High Court would not exercise its (Constitutional) jurisdiction and decline to interfere in elections matters, especially at the intermediate stage

If the High Court exercised jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution to interfere with the interlocutory order of the Election Tribunal, then it would be encroaching upon the rights of aggrieved person to approach the Supreme Court through a direct appeal

Representation of the People Act, 1976, which excluded a right of appeal from the interim orders of the Election Tribunal, could not be bypassed by bringing under attack such interim orders in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court

Party affected had to wait till a final decision of the Election Tribunal and then it could challenge the same in the proper exclusive forum, that is, the Supreme Court.

Question of validity or otherwise of a gift mutation was not the domain of the revenue hierarchy but fell exclusively within the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court

Disputed questions of fact could not be entertained by revenue hierarchy.

Question as to whether a Provincial Labour Court or National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) would have jurisdiction in relation to such an industrial dispute

Status of employer or group of employers determined as to whether a Provincial Labour Court or National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) would have jurisdiction, and not the nature of the dispute

Once it was established through any means that the employer or group of employers had an establishment, group of establishments, industry, having its branches in more than one Provinces, then the jurisdiction of the NIRC would be exclusive in nature and of over-riding and super imposing effect over the Provincial Labour Court for resolving industrial dispute including unfair labour practice, etc.

When employer had its establishment or branches or industrial units in more than one Province, then recourse had to be made by the aggrieved party to the NIRC and not the Provincial Labour Court.

Question as to whether a Provincial Labour Court or National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) would have jurisdiction in relation to such an industrial dispute

Status of employer or group of employers determined as to whether a Provincial Labour Court or National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) would have jurisdiction, and not the nature of the dispute

Once it was established through any means that the employer or group of employers had an establishment, group of establishments, industry, having its branches in more than one Provinces, then the jurisdiction of the NIRC would be exclusive in nature and of over-riding and super imposing effect over the Provincial Labour Court for resolving industrial dispute including unfair labour practice, etc.

When employer had its establishment or branches or industrial units in more than one Province, then recourse had to be made by the aggrieved party to the NIRC and not the Provincial Labour Court.

Against an interlocutory order of the Election Tribunal no appeal laid to the Supreme Court, however, the appellant would be entitled, to raise all pleas available to him, including any preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the petition which had been overruled by the Election Tribunal. Zahid Sarfaraz v. Nadir Pervaiz Khan 1987 SCMR 1107; Muhammad Iftikhar Mohmand v. Javed Muhammad 1998 SCMR 328 and Muhammad Asim Kurd Alias Gailoo v. Lashkari Khan Raisani 1999 SCMR 689 rel.

Appeal against a decision of an Election Tribunal under Ss. 67(1), 63 & 76 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 laid to the Supreme Court. Zahid Sarfaraz v. Nadir Pervaiz Khan 1987 SCMR 1107 rel.

Claimant sought recovery of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim, which claim was allowed by the Insurance Tribunal

Legality

Section 118 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 regarding payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim would not extend to policies issued before the commencement of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, therefore, Insurance Tribunal set up under the said Ordinance would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter

Claimant was permitted to go to the civil court for his claim

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Such power could be invoked by the District judge and also by the High Court.

Final decree/order of the last court in the series, even if such decree was of affirmation, should be considered and treated to be final judgment/decree/order in terms of S.12(2), C.P.C. for approaching the relevant forum

Where the decree/order of a forum below had been affirmed by the higher forum on merits, both on points of fact and law, it should be such decree/order (of higher forum) which attained the status of final decree-order within the purview of S.12(2), C.P.C.

Where a decree/order has been modified or reversed by the Appellate or Revisional Court, it shall be such decree/order (of Appellate or Revisional Court), which will be final in nature for the purpose of S.12(2), C.P.C. and accordingly application could only be initiated before such forum which had altered the verdict.

Judgment of Service Tribunal impugned through Constitutional petition before High Court instead of preferring an appeal before the Supreme Court

Maintainability

Accused/petitioner, who was serving in the Food Department, was alleged to have misappropriated bags of wheat

Departmental proceedings were initiated against accused and an F.I.R. was also lodged against him

Accused was removed from service after departmental proceedings and his departmental appeal was also rejected

Service Tribunal converted dismissal of accused to compulsory retirement

Accused was, however acquitted from the charges levelled against him in the F.I.R., and as a result moved an application before the Department for his reinstatement

Department contented that judgment of Service Tribunal was impugned through present Constitutional petition instead of preferring an appeal before the Supreme Court, and that departmental proceedings were entirely different from criminal proceedings

Validity

Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court could only be invoked if no other adequate remedy was provided in law

Remedy available with accused against the order of Service Tribunal was to file a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court in terms of Art.212(3) of the Constitution

Article 212(3) of the Constitution ousted the jurisdiction of all other courts

Criminal proceedings against the accused, from which he was acquitted were neither co-extensive nor interconnected with departmental proceedings initiated against him

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Order of Departmental authority, even if passed without jurisdiction, could not be challenged before the High Court, as adequate/alternate remedy had been provided under the law.

Concerned department for such dispute would be Auqaf Department, and the dispute would be decided by the Deputy Director, Auqaf.

Accused persons were convicted by Judicial Magistrate under S. 30, Cr.P.C. and sentenced to seven years imprisonment and fine

Accused persons filed appeal against their conviction before the Additional Sessions Judge, which was dismissed being coram non judice and returned for presenting before the High Court in view of S. 408(b), Cr.P.C.

Legality

Section 408(b), Cr.P.C. stated that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding 4 years, passed by Assistant Sessions Judge, shall be appealable to the High Court

Word "Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate" did not find mention in S. 408(b), Cr.P.C., therefore, said section was not applicable in case of a sentence passed by a Magistrate under S. 30, Cr.P.C.

Impugned order was set aside with the direction that appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge should be considered to be pending

Revision petition was allowed accordingly.

Provision of S.31 of Senate (Election) Act, 1975, put bar on filing of election petition before any court or authority, other than Election Tribunal with regard to recounting of votes in election of Senate

To the contrary, Art.225 of the Constitution had assigned power only to Election Tribunal through election petition in respect of election dispute

Provision of Art.225 of the Constitution which started with negative word and phrase "except by an election petition" was purposely used to show intention of legislature, which clearly ousted jurisdiction of any forum, other than Election Tribunal

When Constitution had barred jurisdiction of any forum and directed resolution of any election dispute through election petition through Election Tribunal, then restriction imposed upon filing of election petition by S.31(2) of Senate (Election) Act, 1975, was inconsistent with Art.225 of the Constitution, therefore, bar contained in the section in no way ousted jurisdiction of Election Tribunal

Forum provided by the Constitution alone had jurisdiction to adjudicate election dispute because Constitution would prevail to the extent of conflict

Election Commissioner was administrative head of the Commission having power of appeal with regard to recounting of votes under Senate (Election) Act, 1975

Such power of the Commissioner was not a substitute of Election Tribunal rather it was equivalent to the power assigned to Returning Officer under S.39(6) of Representative of the People Act, 1976

Aggrieved candidate could avail such remedy and his decision in administrative capacity would be final, however it could be challenged before Election Tribunal

Availing and non-availing of remedy under S.32 of Senate (Election) Act, 1975, did not debar a candidate from filing of election petition, nor it excluded jurisdiction of Election Tribunal

Objection was overruled in circumstances.

Judgments and decrees passed by Trial Court were modified by High Court but petitioner filed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. before Trial Court for setting aside the same

Validity

Applications under S. 12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside judgments and decrees in question should have been filed before High Court as it passed final decrees in view of the modification made by it in its review jurisdiction

Resolution of question arising in judgments in question were interconnected with those raised in applications under S. 12(2), C.P.C.

Supreme Court directed that all matters should be decided finally by High Court together

Only the High Court could entertain application under S.12(2), C.P.C.

Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by High Court and remanded the matter to High Court for decision afresh

Appeal was allowed.

Accused, in compelling circumstances can approach High Court for pre-arrest bail without filing his bail application before the lower judicial forum.

First appeal was allowed by High Court and judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was varied by enhancing the claim of bank along with cost of funds by way of sale of mortgaged properties of defendants

On application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., filed by defendants, Banking Court set aside the judgment passed by High Court in favour of bank

Validity

Judgment and decree passed by High Court attained finality and that of Banking Court merged therein, therefore, proper forum for assailing such decree was High Court and not Banking Court

Judgment and decree passed by High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction was set aside and if defendant would file application under S.12(2), C.P.C. the same was to be decided by High Court

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

First appeal was allowed by High Court and judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was varied by enhancing the claim of bank along with cost of funds by way of sale of mortgaged properties of defendants

On application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., filed by defendants, Banking Court set aside the judgment passed by High Court in favour of bank

Validity

Judgment and decree passed by High Court attained finality and that of Banking Court merged therein, therefore, proper forum for assailing such decree was High Court and not Banking Court

Judgment and decree passed by High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction was set aside and if defendant would file application under S.12(2), C.P.C. the same was to be decided by High Court

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Petitioner was owner of registered trade mark in his name and filed direct application before High Court for revoking trade mark in the name of respondents

Plea raised by respondents was that direct application to High Court was not maintainable

Validity

Remedy provided under law for revocation of trade mark was forum of Registrar of Trade Mark

Direct application for revocation could only be moved to High Court in exceptional circumstances

Applicant had option under S. 116 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, either to make application either before High Court or District Court or the Registrar

If any suit or proceedings concerning trademark were pending before High Court or District Court, application could be made to High Court or as the case may be the District Court

No direct application could be moved in High Court for revocation of any trade mark unless proceedings concerning trademark in question were pending before High Court

Proper mechanism and procedure for applying revocation, invalidation and rectification was provided under R.68 of Trade Mark Rules, 2004, with specific "Form T.M. 26" which was required to be filed by interested person for revocation of trade mark together with statement of grounds on which application was made

Petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Petition was directed against notice received by the petitioner/wife from Chairman Union Council informing her about the notice of divorce served by husband and offering reconciliation proceedings under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961

Both the petitioner/ wife and husband were residing abroad and for foreign resident Pakistanis, the law had created a remedy and forum for reconciliation between the spouses under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 in the Pakistan Mission in the countries of their residence

Husband should avail that remedy and in case such remedy was not available, then any other competent forum could be approached for relief

High Court directed that husband should approach the Pakistan Mission in the country (abroad) to register the divorce pronounced by him upon the wife and for reconciliation proceedings visualized under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 to be undertaken there

Proceedings before Chairman Union Council, in circumstances, were declared to be incompetent.

For all matters arising out of process of privatization, jurisdiction of Service Tribunal had been taken away and the powers to resolve such matters had been vested in the respective High Courts

All types of legal proceedings including proceedings initiated by employees of privatized Banks or against employees of such Banks in respect of terms and conditions of their services had been transferred to High Court by operation of S.31 of Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000

Provisions of S.42 of Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 were overriding and by its implication, S.2-A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, had become ineffective so far as employees of privatized Banks/Institutions were concerned

Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, was competently issued by the President of Pakistan when the National Assembly was not in session and process of privatization was completed under a valid Legislation

Contention that privatization process was completed by any unauthorized Authority, was repelled.

By Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, procedural change had been made and said change would affect appeals before Service Tribunal and after promulgation of said Ordinance, appeals would be no longer competent before the Service Tribunal

Such appeals would stand transferred to the High Court by operation of law

After privatization of the Bank, appeals filed before Service Tribunal, were no longer maintainable in Service Tribunal as Tribunal had ceased to have jurisdiction.