Competency

Respondent/employee, after being served with a charge-sheet and inquiry notice on the allegations of spreading false information, avoided participating in the disciplinary proceedings and instead filed a civil suit seeking declaration and injunctions, where ad interim injunction was confirmed in her favour through impugned order

Appellant/employer challenged such order on the ground that the suit itself was not maintainable, as the relationship between the parties was that of master and servant governed by a non-statutory service contract and contract of personal service being not specifically enforceable in law

Plea of protection under whistle blowing policy being immune from inquiry was taken by the respondent

Validity

Respondent herself had admitted that she was not a whistle blower and she had admitted that she aired her grievance against the appellant before eight other persons (including the Chairman), which established that no element of anonymity or whistleblowing was left

If respondent's plea was accepted, that would create complete chaos when companies wanted to investigate into misappropriations or wrongdoings and if respondent's logic was adopted, then anytime an inquiry was to be conducted against an employee, all he would have to do was claim to be a whistle blower and seek immunity on such basis, thereby halting any inquiry/investigation into wrongdoing and the matter would end there and no final outcome would ever be reached

Plea of respondent was found to be unfathomable and baseless, as issue of whistleblower immunity had absolutely no applicability

No employee (servant) can be forced upon an unwilling employer (master)

A company incorporated under company law not being governed by statutory rules for terms and conditions of service (e.g. the appellant), would fall within the confinement of the principle of master and servant

Such an employee could not seek a declaratory decree for forcing an unwilling employer to keep his employment, nor could an injunction in that regard be granted

Contract of service in any event cannot be specifically enforced, as per S. 21 (a & b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 ("SRA"), which would also then invoke S. 56 (f) SRA, under which an injunction itself cannot be granted, meaning thereby that the suit was itself on legally weak footing and impugned injunctive orders were not tenable

If the respondent had any grievance about being removed from her employment, a suit for damages would be the legally accurate remedy and not through a declaratory suit for reinstatement along with prayers for permanent injunctions against removal

High Court did not find any legal justification in granting injunctions in the matter or curtailing the appellant from carrying out inquiry against respondent under the law

High Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Objection of the respondents (insurance company) was that the petitioners , being a general store, had filed(present) petition as a firm, which was not registered as no certificate of registration had been produced, therefore, under S. 69 of the Partnership Act present petition was incompetent

Validity

Apart from petitioner No. 1 (M/s Ijaz Brothers) General Store, the petitioners Nos.2 & 3 had also sued in their private capacity, therefore, present petition was not barred under S. 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932, as petitioners had joined the petition as petitioners Nos.2 & 3 as private persons

Present petition was not hit by the provisions of S. 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

Argument of the petitioner was that Show-Cause Notice had been issued by the Secretary, ECP whereas under S.6 of the Elections Act, 2017, which provides for delegation of powers, there was no authorization in favour of Secretary, ECP

Validity

Amendment had been made in Election Rules, 2017 by incorporating sub-rule(8) of R.4 through SRO No.2271(I)/2022 dated 16.12.2022, which empowered the Secretary of the Commission to issue notice or Show Cause Notice for that matter

As specific delegation had been made to the Secretary of the Commission to issue notice or Show-Cause Notice, hence, there did not seem to be any violation of S.6 or the Elections Act, 2017

Election Commission of Pakistan did elaborately deal with the objections raised by the petitioner in reply to the notice and passed a well-reasoned order, which did not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional defect

Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Section 10 of the Elections Act, 2017 does empower ECP to exercise contempt powers as are available to any High Court to call for any person in contempt of court

In this behalf, by reference, in place of the words 'Court' and 'Judge' as provided in Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 and/or any other law, reference is to be made to the 'Commission' or the 'Commissioner', as the case may be.

Employees of Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) were penalized for violating Standing Instructions of State Bank of Pakistan

Employees filed their appeals against the penalty but they were not decided on the ground that meeting of Board of Directors could not be convened to consider the appeals

Meanwhile employees filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the penalty imposed by ZTBL

Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) filed two miscellaneous applications under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. and under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. for dismissal of the suit on the basis that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as employees were governed under the rule of master and servant

Said applications were dismissed upto the High Court

Held, that ZTBL failed to point out any specific regulation which impliedly or expressly barred the jurisdiction of civil Court

Nothing had been placed on record to show whether the penalty was imposed after issuing any show cause notice and holding any regular inquiry against the employees to establish their guilt

Being in a relationship of master and servant the only course left for the employees was to file a suit for redress of their grievances

Employees had not approached the civil Court for any declaratory decree against the termination or dismissal of service or damages but were only seeking declaratory decree and injunctive relief against the imposition of penalty and its recovery from them

Issue of imposition of penalty whether rightly imposed or wrongly, or whether it was imposed after providing any opportunity of hearing to the private respondents/employees or not, or whether any regular inquiry was conducted or not to fix the responsibility, required full-fledged trial and evidence

Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited and the other defendants in the suit had already filed their written statements and obviously after providing fair opportunity of adducing evidence and hearing, the Trial Court would decide the suit on its own merits

On one hand ZTBL filed an application under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. for return of plaint which means that the proceedings were attacked on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but on the other hand, another application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. was moved for the rejection of the plaint

No justification was placed before the court of moving two applications simultaneously having different rudiments in C.P.C. but the grounds in both applications were absolutely alike

Civil petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Employees of Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) were penalized for violating Standing Instructions of State Bank of Pakistan

Employees filed their appeals against the penalty but they were not decided on the ground that meeting of Board of Directors could not be convened to consider the appeals

Meanwhile employees filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the penalty imposed by ZTBL

Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) filed two miscellaneous applications under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. and under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. for dismissal of the suit on the basis that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as employees were governed under the rule of master and servant

Said applications were dismissed upto the High Court

Held, that ZTBL failed to point out any specific regulation which impliedly or expressly barred the jurisdiction of civil Court

Nothing had been placed on record to show whether the penalty was imposed after issuing any show cause notice and holding any regular inquiry against the employees to establish their guilt

Being in a relationship of master and servant the only course left for the employees was to file a suit for redress of their grievances

Employees had not approached the civil Court for any declaratory decree against the termination or dismissal of service or damages but were only seeking declaratory decree and injunctive relief against the imposition of penalty and its recovery from them

Issue of imposition of penalty whether rightly imposed or wrongly, or whether it was imposed after providing any opportunity of hearing to the private respondents/employees or not, or whether any regular inquiry was conducted or not to fix the responsibility, required full-fledged trial and evidence

Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited and the other defendants in the suit had already filed their written statements and obviously after providing fair opportunity of adducing evidence and hearing, the Trial Court would decide the suit on its own merits

On one hand ZTBL filed an application under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. for return of plaint which means that the proceedings were attacked on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but on the other hand, another application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. was moved for the rejection of the plaint

No justification was placed before the court of moving two applications simultaneously having different rudiments in C.P.C. but the grounds in both applications were absolutely alike

Civil petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Service Appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal without waiting for the prescribed 90 days period to expire after filing of departmental appeals

Competency

Such Service Appeal would be incompetent in view of the specific bar contained in S. 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.

While adjudging the competency to testify in terms of Art. 3 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, a distinction is to be drawn between a child witness and a child victim

So far as, a child who witnessed a crime committed against some other person, his power to observe the incident and ability to transform it in deposition called for a vigilant judicial observance

Such child witness could on occasions be influenced through tutoring for narrating a false account of the incident, thus his evidence was to be subjected to a strict scrutiny of appraisal

On the other hand, a child who himself fell victim to a crime more so of sexual assault and successfully narrated his sufferings, beside competently standing the test of cross-examination by responding rationally to the questions put to him, his deposition was to be generally accepted

Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the accused without any shadow of doubt

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Service Appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal without waiting for the prescribed 90 days period to expire after filing of departmental appeals

Competency

Such Service Appeal would be incompetent in view of the specific bar contained in S. 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973.

Grievance petition would only be competent if the grievance was with regard to a 'right guaranteed under law, settlement, or award'

Word law used in S. 37(1) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010 meant that it had to be a legal right guaranteed by the statute and not a policy of the organization.

Grievance petition would only be competent if the grievance was with regard to a 'right guaranteed under law, settlement, or award'

Word law used in S. 37(1) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010 meant that it had to be a legal right guaranteed by the statute and not a policy of the organization.

Grievance petition would only be competent if the grievance was with regard to a 'right guaranteed under law, settlement, or award'

Word law used in S. 37(1) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Industrial Relations Act, 2010 meant that it had to be a legal right guaranteed by the statute and not a policy of the organization.

Defendant filing an application before the court for framing an additional issue regarding whether the suit filed by company/corporation had been competently filed without authorization by its Board of Directors

Held, that if any objection or application of such nature was filed at any stage (i.e., whether in a written statement at the trial stage or in parawise comments or reply filed at the appellate or other similar stage), the court should refrain from straightaway framing an issue or recording an objection in such regard

Experience showed that such objections were, more often than not, frivolous and an abuse of the process of the court, intended only to delay, derail or frustrate consideration of the dispute on the merits

Court should, if at all it considered it necessary, require the Articles of Association to be produced

If an examination of the same, and an application of the doctrine of indoor management as explicated in the judgment reported as Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 685 satisfied the Court that the suit/appeal etc. had been properly instituted then any objection taken in such regard should be regarded as concluded in favour of the company/corporation

Only if, after such examination and consideration, the court was of the view, for reasons to be recorded, that the matter still remained unresolved that an issue should at all be framed (or the objection otherwise entertained for further consideration at the appellate etc. stage) and evidence led or the record summoned (as the case may be) and the parties heard accordingly.

Principles relating to authorization for filing suit laid down in the judgments reported as Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 685 and Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd. PLD 1971 SC 550 were the correct law and were approved by the Supreme Court accordingly, whereas the view taken in the judgment reported as Abdul Rahim and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1997 Kar. 62 was disapproved and declared as not good law, which ought not to be followed or applied.

Defendant filing an application before the court for framing an additional issue regarding whether the suit filed by company/corporation had been competently filed without authorization by its Board of Directors

Held, that if any objection or application of such nature was filed at any stage (i.e., whether in a written statement at the trial stage or in parawise comments or reply filed at the appellate or other similar stage), the court should refrain from straightaway framing an issue or recording an objection in such regard

Experience showed that such objections were, more often than not, frivolous and an abuse of the process of the court, intended only to delay, derail or frustrate consideration of the dispute on the merits

Court should, if at all it considered it necessary, require the Articles of Association to be produced

If an examination of the same, and an application of the doctrine of indoor management as explicated in the judgment reported as Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 685 satisfied the Court that the suit/appeal etc. had been properly instituted then any objection taken in such regard should be regarded as concluded in favour of the company/corporation

Only if, after such examination and consideration, the court was of the view, for reasons to be recorded, that the matter still remained unresolved that an issue should at all be framed (or the objection otherwise entertained for further consideration at the appellate etc. stage) and evidence led or the record summoned (as the case may be) and the parties heard accordingly.

Principles relating to authorization for filing suit laid down in the judgments reported as Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 685 and Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd. PLD 1971 SC 550 were the correct law and were approved by the Supreme Court accordingly, whereas the view taken in the judgment reported as Abdul Rahim and others v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1997 Kar. 62 was disapproved and declared as not good law, which ought not to be followed or applied.

Present case involved matter pertaining to property valued at more than Rs.50,000/- in the Trial Court, however, the High Court had "varied or set side the part of judgment, decree or final order of the court immediately below", as required under Art.185(2)(e) of the Constitution

Appellant had only impugned that part of the judgment of the High Court which dismissed the claim of the appellant in the civil revision,therefore, the present appeal under Art.185(2)(e) of the Constitution was not competent and the appellant was required to file a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal under Art.185(3) of the Constitution, in such eventuality

Portion of the judgment of the High Court which varied the judgment of the lower court was in favour of the appellant and that portion was not challenged by the appellant rather appellant has challenged a portion of the judgment of the High Court as well as the two fora below whereby her claim was concurrently dismissed by all the three fora below, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant was not competent; she was required to file a Petition for Leave to Appeal.

Employee filed direct appeal without availing the remedy of departmental appeal, which was dismissed being not competent

Validity

No appeal would lie to Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Service Tribunal unless civil servant had preferred an appeal or application or review or representation to the departmental authority and a period of ninety days had elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application or representation was preferred

Appellant, in the present case, had filed appeal before Service Tribunal without availing remedy of departmental appeal

Direct appeal filed by the employee against original order was not competent in circumstances

Service Tribunal having dismissed the appeal on the sole ground of competency Supreme Court declined to discuss the merits of the case

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Where petitioner did not implead the Provincial Government as a party in the constitutional petition, despite the fact that the said Government was a necessary and proper party in the case, the constitutional petition was not competent and was liable to be dismissed.

Where petitioner did not implead the Provincial Government as a party in the constitutional petition, despite the fact that the said Government was a necessary and proper party in the case, the constitutional petition was not competent and was liable to be dismissed.

Appellant filed fresh appeal instead of appeal returned to him and no application for condonation of delay was moved with the fresh appeal

Validity

Application for condonation of delay moved with the application for setting aside of ex-parte proceedings before Trial Court which had been dismissed could not serve the purpose and meet the requirement of moving an application for condonation of delay of three years in filing of a fresh appeal

Simply attaching the returned appeal with the fresh appeal could not fulfil the requirement of compliance with the direction of the Court to the appellant for filing the same before proper forum

When appeal was being dismissed for limitation/time-barred then its merits were not necessary to be discussed

Trial Court had properly appreciated evidence available on record while passing the impugned judgment

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Question before the High Court was whether only "sacked employees" as strictly defined in S. 11 of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 could file petition before the Review Board or whether the definition of "sacked employee" given in S. 2(f) would apply to the same

Held, that term sacked employee used in Ss. 11 & 13 of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010, if was considered to mean "sacked employee" as defined in S. 2(f) of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010; then there would be no reason for Legislature to qualify the term "sacked employee" with words "dismissed or removed or terminated from service on account of absence from duty or misconduct or any form of misappropriation of Government money or stock or his unfitness on medical grounds"

Distinction existed between the term "sacked employee" used in S. 11 and the same term as defined in S. 2(f) of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010

Definition per S. 2(f) of Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 included such employee who was "dissociated or discontinued from service on account of closure of his or her employer or office or organization" or whose "contract period had expired or who was given golden hand shake, etc." and since a petition for reinstatement before Review Board was regulated by Ss. 11 & 13 of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010, therefore meaning of term "sacked employee" given in S. 11 of the same would override definition of the same term, "sacked employee"; given in S.2(f) the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 to the extent of inconsistency

High Court observed that only such sacked employee could file petition before Review Board who was dismissed or removed or terminated from service on account of absence from duty or misconduct or any form of misappropriation of Government money or stock or his unfitness on medical grounds.

Family Court directed the judgment debtor to pay entire decretal amount in lump sum and dismissed the objection petition

Validity

Family Court in its judgment directed the judgment debtor for lump sum payment of decretal amount which observation was upheld by the Supreme Court

Observation of Family Court for payment of lump sum decretal amount had attained finality

Executing Court did not commit any illegality while refusing fixation of instalments

Impugned order was passed at the stage of execution proceedings which did not fall within the definition of a "decision" or decree rather it was an interlocutory order

Only a decision or a decree passed by a Family Court was appealable before Shariat Appellate Bench of High Court

Family Court had discretion to fix instalments if it deemed fit

Instalments could not be claimed as a matter of right

No appeal or revision had been provided under Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 against such direction for making payment of decretal amount

No appeal or revision had been provided against an interlocutory order passed by the Family Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner moved application to withdraw election petition with permission to file fresh one and in the meanwhile filed second election petition also

Election Commission dismissed the second election petition being not maintainable

Validity

Section 73 of Representation of the People Act, 1976 did not mention availability of any power with the Election Commission to grant permission to file second election petition but at the same time it did not bar to grant such permission

Representation of the People Act, 1976 was a special statute

When special statute did not bar something then it would be presumed that there was an implied permission

If petitioner had made some errors in the filing of election petition, he could not be stopped from correcting such errors within the applicable law

Election Tribunal while adjudicating upon the election petition had to adopt the procedure of Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Election Tribunal was at liberty to adopt any course of action to regulate the proceedings aimed at to promote the justice instead of following technicalities of C.P.C.

When there was any clash between the provisions of special statute and that of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 the provisions of former would take precedence over that of the latter

Any prohibition provided specifically in the special statute or any express provision thereof would be given preference over Civil Procedure Code, 1908

No bar existed on filing of fresh election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1976

Court had power to grant permission to withdraw the suit with permission to file fresh one

Same principle would apply in the election matters as well

Election Tribunal could allow the petitioner to withdraw the first election petition with permission to file fresh one subject to question of limitation

If Election Commission found that petitioner while filing the election petition had not fulfilled the requirements of Representation of the People Act, 1976 (Ss.52 to 54) then petition could be dismissed forthwith

If no such fault was noted by Election Commission then it would refer the petition to the Election Tribunal for trial

No allegation existed against the petitioner that he failed to fulfil any of the requirements mentioned in Ss. 52 to 54 of Representation of the People Act, 1976

Only the Commissioner had jurisdiction to dismiss election petition in case of contravention of any provision of Ss.52 to 54 of Representation of the People Act, 1976 but in the present case such power had been exercised by the Election Commission which could not be said 'the Commissioner'

Election Commission had trespassed its powers and dismissed the election petition using the jurisdiction of "Election Commissioner"

Impugned order being against law was set aside

Election Commission was directed to refer the matter to the Election Tribunal for its trial where question of limitation would be looked into

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Decree was passed in favour of predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner by the High Court, but on account of amendments in the relevant Law, the Federal Court (former apex Court in Pakistan) proceeded to set-aside the said decree and held the predecessor-in-interest not entitled to any compensation

Relief which had been prayed for by the petitioner in the present constitutional petition, was in fact a closed and past transaction and the entitlement, which was being claimed by the petitioner, had already been refused to her forefathers on the same issue

Present constitutional petition was, thus, not competent and the same was dismissed.

Police officials were as good witnesses as any other private witness unless it was proved that they had personal grudge against the accused

Evidence of police officials could be relied upon if their testimony remained unshattered during cross-examination

Testimony of police officials could not be discarded simply on the ground that it had come from the police officials.

Appeal was filed before Board of Revenue against fresh mutation sanctioned by the Assistant Collector which was treated as revision

Board of Revenue dismissed the said revision and petitioner instituted civil suit which was also dismissed

Petitioner, after dismissal of suit filed second revision before Full Board of Revenue which was dismissed being time-barred

Validity

Ninety days period had been provided for filing revision petition before Board of Revenue

Petitioner chose wrong forum and after dismissal of suit filed second revision petition before Board of Revenue

If litigant spent time in pursuing a remedy under a mistaken advice, period spent by him would go waste and no consideration could be shown in such a situation

Any person aggrieved by an order made or a decree passed by Member Board of Revenue could apply to the Full Board of Revenue for revision of such order or decree

If Full Board of Revenue considered that there were sufficient reasons then said order or decree could be revised

Second revision before Board of Revenue was not competent

Revision was rightly dismissed by the Full Board of Revenue being time-barred

No illegality or irregularity had been committed by the Board of Revenue dismissing revision petition of the petitioner

Writ petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Accused being of unsound mind and unable to defend himself, appeal filed on behalf of accused through the next friend/mother was maintainable

Trial Court to which case had been remanded in the first instance would decide the application filed by the father of accused for determination of unsoundness of the mind and incapability of accused to defend his case; if the Trial Court would come to the conclusion that accused was of sound mind and capable to defend himself, then it would summon the witnesses and provide an opportunity to accused for cross-examining the witnesses; if after trying the fact of unsoundness of mind and incapability to defend the case, court would draw conclusion that accused was of unsound mind and incapable to defend his case, then all the proceedings in trial conducted by the Trial Court would be deemed to have been quashed and court would postpone the trial till accused was declared of sound mind and capable to defend his case.

Compromise decree passed by the Appellate Court to the extent of the share of principal was nullity and not maintainable

When defendant had alienated land during pendency of suit, he did not remain owner of the property

Defendant after alienating the land could not compromise the matter

Compromise decree on such score was not maintainable

Person who was not party in a compromise could validly challenge the compromise decree

Pro forma respondent had not accepted the compromise which was against his interest

Appeal, in circumstances, was competent before the High Court

Appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court.

Non-compliance of S.30 of Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 did not entail any penal consequences having adverse effect upon competency of ejectment petition.

Plaint was rejected by Trial Court but Appellate Court converted the suit for declaration and permanent injunction into a suit for recovery of possession

Validity

Law had specifically barred an appeal against the dismissal of suit under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Revision against the impugned appellate order was not maintainable as appeal had been barred by law

Revisional Court could not find any jurisdictional defect in the order passed by the appellate court when appeal was barred by law

Revision would lie when no appeal lay

Phrase "no appeal lies" in S.115, C. P. C could not be equated with the phrase "no appeal shall lie" used in S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Right and entitlement of the parties could not be determined in the suit under S.9 of Specific Relief Act, 1877

Lawful claimant could file a civil suit for his title and recovery of possession thereof

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Accused was awarded sentence of simple imprisonment of one month with fine of Rs. 5000/- for contracting second marriage without permission during subsistence of earlier marriage

Appeal filed by the accused was dismissed observing that right of appeal had not been provided under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961

Validity

Entire proceedings had been conducted by the Trial Court under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

Proceedings conducted by the Trial Court were judicial proceedings

Complaint under S. 6(5) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was entertained as 'complaint' under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and accused was tried accordingly

Provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 would regulate the proceedings in the complaint under S. 6(5) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961

Appeal under Ss. 408/409 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 could be brought by any convict awarded sentence under S. 6(5) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961

Executive Magistrate empowered to conduct any trial under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was court subordinate to the Sessions Judge

Impugned order passed by the Appellate Court was set aside

Appeal filed by the accused should be deemed to be pending before the Appellate Court for decision on merits

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Plaintiff moved application for restoration of possession which was accepted by the Trial Court and possession was restored but Appellate Court set aside the said order of Trial Court

Validity

Court granting injunctive relief had the jurisdiction to restore the possession of property in case the same was taken away in violation of the injunctive order

No appeal would lie against the order for restoration of possession

Trial Court had ordered for restoration of possession on the assumption that possession was taken over by the defendant on the date of passing of impugned order

Court could order status quo ante under its inherent jurisdiction under S.151, C.P.C., however said provision of law was not appealable

Appeal was a substantive right and could only be exercised if available

Non-availability of such right or invocation of the same when it was not available could not be regarded as a mere technicality

Appeal filed by the defendant was not maintainable

Injunctive order passed by the Court was not operative unless other side against whom the order had been passed was served with the same

Trial Court had deferred the adjudication of issue whether defendant had knowledge of the interim order but proceeded to restore possession

Trial Court had only the jurisdiction to restore the possession if injunctive order had been violated and violation could only be attributed to the other side if it was aware of the same

Grant of restoration of possession could not have been made unless it was first adjudicated whether defendant had knowledge of the status quo order

Impugned order for restoration of possession was not tenable in circumstances

If said order was left intact then same would be unjustified

High Court had suo motu revisional power to correct any illegality/jurisdictional error

High Court set aside order passed by the Appellate Court as well as Trial Court

Application for restoration of possession should be deemed to be pending before the Trial Court and same be decided after determining the fact whether notice of injunctive order was served on the defendant

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Petitioners, who were contractors were awarded contract of transportation of wheat to various Districts and Tehsils as per agreed terms of contract

Contention of the petitioners was that government had paid the escalation amount for the year 2008-2009 in line with the agreement, but had not paid said amount for the years 2009-2010 and onward

Writ petition by the petitioners was dismissed by the Chief Court holding that petitioners should have filed civil suit for claiming escalation amount instead of filing writ petition

Validity

Writ, did not lie where alternate remedy was available to the petitioner

Where factual controversy was involved, writ jurisdiction could not be invoked

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal by the Supreme Appellate Court and dismissed

Order passed in writ petition by the Chief Court was maintained

Supreme Appellate Court observed that petitioners, would be at liberty to seek alternate remedy available to them in accordance with law before the competent court of jurisdiction.

Member Board of Revenue had rightly observed and directed the parties to approach the civil court with regard to the impugned mutations

Impugned order was well reasoned

Civil court was to decide the controversy by a full-fledge trial and after affording the parties to prove their stance

Civil court had the prerogative and privilege to examine the disputed questions of facts

Superior courts should not involve themselves into investigation of disputed questions of facts which necessitated taking of evidence

Constitutional petition was not competent which was dismissed in circumstances.

When a civil servant was deferred for promotion, the case would fall within the ambit of fitness and against that order appeal before Service Tribunal was not competent.

Appellate Court instead of suspending para of the judgment was required to determine some points between the parties for their compliance

Revision was not maintainable as High Court could not pass order acceptable to both the parties as arrangement for interim period

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Order with regard to return of plaint was appealable and revision against the same was not competent.

Plaintiff filed suit wherein defendants moved an application for rejection of plaint which was accepted by the Trial Court

Validity

Defendants-Customs and Excise Department received information that plaintiff-company which was recorded as closed was in production and was supplying the goods/cigarettes in the market without payment of Central Excise duty and sales tax

Factory of plaintiff was visited by the Customs officials and record was taken into possession which was involved in the production of cigarettes

Plaintiff-company had evaded central excise duty and sales tax and complaint was lodged against the same

Present suit was barred under S.217 of Customs Act, 1969

During pendency of appeal plaintiff had died before getting any decree in his favour and his legal heirs had been impleaded who could not continue to persue the suit after his death as right to sue in such case being personal to the deceased did not survive

Suit for compensation on the basis of wrong done was personal to the person wronged

No mala fide could be alleged in presence of such strong evidence against the official who were bound to protect the interest of the State

Plaint was rightly rejected by the Trial Court

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Plaintiff instituted suit for possession through ejectment claiming to be owner and the defendants' father was tenant of property on 'Khak Shora'

Defendants denied relationship of landlord and their father as tenant but claimed themselves to be co-sharers vide mutation and registered deed

Defendants had acquired title prior to institution of present suit and they could not be precluded to agitate their title before the Court

Format of the suit being defective for ejectment was not sufficient to resolve controversy between the parties when defendants had dual status i.e. legal heir of deceased tenant and purchaser of suit property

Tenancy could not devolve in inheritance, specially where not proved through confidence inspiring evidence nor the payment of Khak Shora had been established

Trial Court decreed the suit but lower appellate Court had set aside the decree

Validity

When plaintiff was unable to establish defendants' father as tenant, no decree of ejectment could be passed and lower appellate Court rightly dismissed the suit, in circumstances.

Contention of wife was that plea of cruelty was not only alleged in the plaint but same had been proved through cogent evidence

Validity

Wife had claimed dissolution of marriage on the basis of cruelty and second marriage of husband etc.

Such pleas were specifically taken in the plaint and issue was also framed

Serious allegations were levelled against the husband in the statement recorded by the wife but husband had failed to record his statement and controvert the said allegations rather his attorney appeared for deposing on his behalf

Spouse could depose with regard to material relations in family cases and no one could be a better substitute

Husband had contracted second marriage which by itself was sufficient ground to dissolve marriage

Decision given or decree passed by Family Court was appealable

Logic behind non-provision of appeal in the dissolution case was to protect wife from costly and prolonged litigation

Wife could file an appeal against judgment or decision of Family Court where her suit was not decreed on the basis of cruelty or other grounds recognized under Family Laws even if marriage was dissolved on the basis of khula

Appeal filed by the wife was competent as she had challenged the condition through appeal

If claim for dower was refused then same was appealable

Family Court had committed wrong while dissolving marriage on the ground of khula despite of availability of grounds alleged by wife

Where decree for dissolution of marriage was passed on the basis of cruelty and court had come to the conclusion that due to husband's machismo attitude and displaying his masculine aggressiveness had compelled the wife to ask for dissolution of marriage even on the ground of khula then court should refuse the return of dower amount or dowered property to husband or relieve him from payment of outstanding dower

Appellate Court had rightly held that wife was entitled to the dowered house while dissolving the marriage on the basis of cruelty

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Any order passed on the back of a party depriving him of its legal right of audience was against natural justice and same could not be legalized on any ground

Impugned review order was also passed without notice to the petitioner

Impugned order passed by the Member Board of Revenue could not be challenged through constitutional petition being interim in nature and no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner by such order

Every party had legal right against other to be heard before any adverse order was passed which might deprive such party from valuable right in immovable property

No jurisdictional infirmity had been pointed out in the impugned orders

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Contention of landlord was that one of the legal heirs/owners of demised premises was competent to file ejectment petition and it was not necessary to implead all the legal heirs as a party in the said petition and pendency of civil suit qua determination of title over the demised premises was no ground to dismiss the eviction petition

Ejectment application was accepted by the Rent Tribunal but same was dismissed by the Appellate Court

Validity

Agreement to sell did not create any right, title or interest in favour of any person and existence of the same was open to doubt

Landlord was one of the legal heirs of the deceased original owner of demised premises

Issue of title of demised premises was under adjudication before the competent forum pendency of which had no effect on the maintainability of ejectment petition

Tenant had denied relationship of landlord and tenant on the basis of an oral agreement to sell

Tenant should have first vacated the demised premises and then pursued his claim before the civil court for determination of his right of ownership

Tenant had no right to occupy the demised premises and refuse to pay rent unless and until he was held owner of said premises by the civil court of competent jurisdiction

Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to decide the title of the parties on the basis of mere assumptions and presumptions

Appellate Court had travelled beyond its jurisdiction while deciding the question of title of demised premises

Landlord being one of the legal heirs of the deceased owner of demised premises had every right to file ejectment petition

Non-impleading of other legal heirs was not fatal to the ejectment petition

Findings recorded by the Appellate Court were based on surmises and conjectures

Tenant had failed to bring on record any solid and cogent evidence to prove his title over the demised premises and his claim was yet to be proved by the civil court

Tenant had not paid due rent since 1999 and Rent Tribunal had rightly passed the eviction order against him

Impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court was set aside and order of Rent Tribunal was restored

Constitutional petition was accepted in circumstances.

Appeal against interim order of Rent Controller was not competent.

WAPDA had delegated powers for engaging counsel on its behalf apart from Chairman, Chief Engineer, Superintending Engineer, Project Director and Directors of circles etc. who were competent to engage counsel for filing a suit on behalf of WAPDA, defending suits, other proceedings, signing, verifying plaints, written statements, other pleadings, applications, appeals and revisions in cases arising out of their respective regions, circles, directorates from approved panel of counsel provided by Law Division, WAPDA and also to sanction their fees in accordance with approved schedule of fee

Said authorities had been conferred powers for engaging counsel in Trial Court and Courts of District Judge but in no other court

Power of attorney was to be strictly construed

Attorney could only exercise such powers which were vested in it expressly or by necessary implications and regard must be had to the recitals of power of attorney

In the present case, revision petition in the High Court and petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court had been filed through Chief Engineer/Project Director who had no power to file the same on behalf of WAPDA

Petition for leave to appeal having been filed without authority was liable to be dismissed

Plaintiffs filed suit against six defendants and appeal before the District Judge was filed against only one defendant and all other defendants were not arrayed as party

Appeal before District Judge was liable to be dismissed on the ground that necessary parties were not impleaded

Plaintiffs again arrayed all the six defendants in the High Court who were party in the Trial Court including five defendants who were not party before the District Judge

Revision petition against the said five defendants was incompetent

Plaintiffs failed to implead one of the defendants in the Trial Court against whom they had requested for grant of stay order without arraying him as a party

Suit and appeal could not proceed in absence of necessary party

No order could be passed in absence of necessary party and without arraying a necessary party appeal was not competent

Appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court (AJ&K) in circumstances.

Constitutional petition was only competent when no other remedy was available to the aggrieved person.

Contention of petitioner was that Government on its own was not authorized to prescribe the limits of wards and union councils

Validity

Government had not only complied with the provisions of Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010 and Balochistan Local Government (Delimitation) Rules, 2011 but petitioner was also on board during the process of delimitation

Section 20 of Electoral Rolls Act, 1974 did not permit alteration, amendment or change in the limits of wards after the announcement of election schedule

Petitioner had not filed an appeal against the recommendations with regard to delimitation of wards which was required to be filed within seven days

Petitioner could not file constitutional petition without availing of the said alternate remedy

Constitutional petition was only competent when no other remedy was available to the aggrieved person

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Order passed on application under S.151, C.P.C. was appealable and revision was not competent.

High Court in exercise of its power under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. was not competent to quash an F.I.R.

Contention of defendant was that no power to compromise was delegated to the attorney and statement recorded on his behalf did not have any legal value

Suit was decreed concurrently on the basis of compromising statement recorded by the agent on behalf of principal

Validity

General power of attorney on the basis of which statement was recorded resulting into impugned judgments and decrees was valid and subsisting at the time when statement was made by the attorney-Plea that defendant was not aware with regard to statement recorded by the attorney was not raised in the pleadings-Party could plead a case if same had been made out by him in its pleadings

No evidence could be-led or looked into in support of plea which had not been taken in pleadings

Variation in pleadings and proof was not permissible in law

Principal could institute a suit to proceed against the delinquent . or through criminal proceedings agitate his grievance if fraud or misrepresentation was committed with him by the agent

Defendant did not append general power of attorney with the appeal and in absence of same no perverse findings could be given

Second appeal was only permissible if impugned decision was contrary to law or same had been rendered without deciding some material issue of law or there had been any error of procedure provided by law

None of such plea had been raised in the second appeal which was not maintainable

Scope of second appeal was limited

Value of 'subject matter was Rs. 5,00,000 only and second appeal was not competent

No un­certainty, vagueness or inconclusiveness was pointed out in the impugned judgments rendered by the courts below

Impugned judgments and decrees were well reasoned and in accordance with law

Second appeal was dismissed in circum­stances.