Review of Supreme Court judgment

Case of petitioners was that the proviso to R.8(1)(b) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977, provided that if the date of continuous appointment in the case of two or more persons appointed to the grade was the same, the older, if not junior to the younger in the next below grade, shall rank senior to the younger person

According to petitioners, the word "grade" had been used and not the "cadre", hence, Supreme Court had erred while recording findings

Validity

Petitioners were not allowed to argue the case like an appeal in the review petition

In the next below rank the seniority of the contesting parties were not common, hence, the question of seniority in the next below grade did not arise

Supreme Court after detailed discussion held that the criteria provided in R. 8 that in case of continuous appointment of two or more persons in the same grade the older shall rank senior to the younger

No error or mistake apparent on the fact of record was pointed out by the parties

Review petition was dismissed.

Petition had been filed for review of the judgment whereby application for initiation of contempt proceedings had been consigned to record for the reason that the judgment of the Court had been implemented

Scope

Petitioner had himself filed the review petition, whereas, under R. 6, O. XLVI of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, except with the special leave of the Court, no advocate other than the advocate, who appeared and argued the case at the time of hearing in which the judgment or order sought to be reviewed had been delivered, could draw the application for review

Under R. 4, O. XLVI, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978 filing of the certificate in support of the review petition was also mandatory

Petitioner had failed to fulfil the mandatory requirements of law, hence, that review petition entailed dismissal

Review petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Whether such finding qualified as a declaration given by a court of law in the year 2013 within the terms of Art. 62(1)(f) of the Constitution (as amended by the 18th Amendment to the Constitution)

Held, that amended provision of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution was effective prospectively and governed all disqualification claims that arose after its promulgation in the year 2010

In the present case, disqualification of the petitioner under Art. 62(1)(f) was sought in the general election held in 2013 when a declaration by a court of law was necessary to attract the disqualification, whereas the finding given by the Returning Officer was rendered in 2007 prior to the amendment in Art. 62(1)(f)

Such a finding was not a verdict given after a trial by a court of law

Forum of the Returning Officer lacked the attributes of a court of law therefore the electoral disqualification imposed on the petitioner in 2007 under Art. 62(1)(f) of the Constitution ceased to be effective after the 18th Amendment

Observation in the judgment under review that the petitioner was disqualified under Art. 62(1)(f) of the Constitution was recalled

Review petition was allowed.

Petitioner and the respondent were candidates in the contest for a seat for National Assembly in the General Election of 2008

Petitioner was the candidate returned by the constituency

Respondent challenged petitioner's election by means of an election petition alleging that the petitioner did not have a graduate degree, which was at that time a mandatory requirement for all candidates, and that degree presented by the petitioner along with her nomination papers was fake as she had obtained it by impersonation, i.e., that some person other than the petitioner had sat for the examination

By means of the judgment under review the Supreme Court held that the degree was indeed obtained by impersonation

Supreme Court itself examined and compared the two photographs that formed part of the University's record with the petitioner's photographs on her Computerized National Identity Card

On such visual comparison, the Court concluded that the photographs in the University record were different from those on the CNIC and the election poster; secondly, the Supreme Court itself examined and compared the signatures appearing in the University record with the petitioner's signature on her identity card as well as with a sample of the petitioner's handwriting

Again on a visual comparison, the Court concluded that they were discrepant

Resultantly the petitioner's election was set aside and it was also declared that she was disqualified from being elected as a member of Parliament

Held, that had the Court been properly assisted in the judgment under review, and the record examined in the perspective of the requisite standard of proof, the matter of photographs and signatures would have been referred for expert consideration and analysis

Keeping in mind the requisite standard of proof it was unsafe for the Court/Election Tribunal to itself carry out a visual examination and comparison of the election record

In election matters, if at all such an exercise had to be carried out, it must be referred to expert opinion (which would include the opinion of any relevant regulatory body or authority)

Totality of the evidence must be considered only while taking such report into account and applying the requisite standard of proof

Such principle was however subject to one exception, namely that if the result of the Court's own examination and comparison would be in favour of the returned candidate then such an exercise may be permissible

Such exception was consistent with and indeed an aspect and application of the requisite standard of proof which, operated strongly in favour of the returned candidate

In the present case the report of Provincial Forensic Science Agency was available on record which unequivocally revealed that all the photographs were those of the petitioner

Most crucially, that included the photographs taken from the University record in relation to the petitioner's degree

Recourse had by the Court to Art. 84 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 for visual examination of photographs and signatures was contrary to the dictates of the requisite standard of proof

Even if such error could be regarded as being sub silentio it was nonetheless so fundamental and had effect at such a basic level in, and on, the facts and circumstances of the case that it amounted, within the meaning of law, to an error apparent on the face of the record

Supreme Court set aside the judgment under review and directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to file her nomination papers, if she intended to contest in any of the future elections

Review petition was allowed accordingly.

Members of National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies and Senate ('the petitioners') disqualified for failing to disclose their citizenship of foreign countries in their nomination papers and other documents filed with the competent authorities

Supreme Court by way of judgment under review directed the Election Commission to institute legal proceedings against such members under S. 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 read with Ss. 193, 196, 197, 198 & 199, P.P.C. in accordance with law, and ordered them to refund all monetary benefits drawn by them for the period during which they occupied the public offices and had drawn their emoluments, etc from the public exchequer including monthly remunerations, TA/DA, facilities of accommodation along with other perks

Held, that at the time of the relevant elections no specific provision/column existed in the nomination papers that required the petitioners to disclose their foreign nationality/dual citizenship or to state details of the same

Record showed that there was no mens rea or intent on the part of the petitioners to defraud or deceive the authorities at the time of filing of nomination papers

At the time of submission of nomination papers, the petitioners genuinely thought that they were qualified to contest elections to the Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora)/Provincial Assemblies/Senate and did not suffer from any legal or constitutional disqualification

Prima facie there was inadequate material on the record to merit a finding of guilt regarding corrupt practices in terms of S. 78 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 or other offences under Pakistan Penal Code as had been held in the judgment under review

After their election the petitioners also took part in the legislative business during the legislative process, and performed the services that they were required to perform, therefore, it could not be lightly stated that they had unjustly been enriched or got ill gotten gains or received financial benefits by exercising fraud or deception

Furthermore the petitioners had been burdened with the liability and culpability without following due process provided by the Representation of the People Act, 1976

Directions given by the Supreme Court in the judgment under review in positive terms would not leave much scope for the Trial Court to inquire into the petitioners' guilt or otherwise and decide the cases independently

Such directions may become the basis for action against the petitioners which would undoubtedly prejudice their Constitutional rights

No sooner did the petitioners hear about the initiation of proceedings and the legal position as enunciated by the Supreme Court most of them tendered their resignations and approached the Supreme Court with such information

Supreme Court in such circumstances recalled the findings in the judgment under review that the petitioners appeared to be guilty of corrupt practices in terms of S. 78 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and the direction to the Election Commission to institute proceedings against them under S. 82 of the said Act read with Ss. 193, 196, 197, 198 & 199, P.P.C.

Supreme Court directed that any proceedings against the petitioners at whatever stage and any convictions whether or not implemented shall immediately and forthwith stand quashed, recalled and rendered null and void for all intents and purposes as if the same had never been initiated/passed/implemented; that the direction in the judgment under review to the extent of refund of monetary benefits drawn by the petitioners for the periods during which they occupied public offices and had drawn their emoluments from the public exchequer including monthly remunerations, TA/DA, facilities of accommodation along with other perks should be modified to the extent that each petitioner notwithstanding the amount actually received by him/her shall deposit a token sum of Rs.500,000/- within a period of 30 days from the date of present order with the Secretaries of the Senate of Pakistan, National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies as the case may be, and that except the modifications made by present judgment, the judgment under review shall remain intact and in full force for all intents and purposes.

Scope of review provided under Art. 188 of the Constitution was very limited as such jurisdiction could only be exercised by the Supreme Court when there was an apparent error on the face of the record having bearing on the fate of the case.

Omission whereby the (Supreme) Court had over-looked important material that would alter the decision in the case constituted a fit ground for the grant of review under Art. 188 of the Constitution.

Acts of gallantry did not justify out-of-turn promotions as they necessarily lead to impingement of the Fundamental Rights of fellow officers in terms of blocking their smooth progression of careers and impinging their respect and honour

Supreme Court directed the concerned officials and authorities to fix the seniority of all the police officers who were given out of turn promotion along with their batch-mates, as if they were never given out of turn promotion

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Employee filed review petition that she wanted to withdraw the appeal only to the extent of notification of her transfer but her counsel made statement that she had retired and appeal had become infructuous

Contention of employee was that she wanted to continue the appeal to the extent of remarks passed by the Service Tribunal

Validity

Every review petition should be filed by the counsel who appeared at the hearing of the case in which judgment or order sought to be reviewed was made

Review petition might be drawn by any other counsel with special leave of the Court

Counsel who appeared in the original case should remain present in the Court in such circumstances unless his appearance was dispensed with

Counsel signing the application should specify in brief the points upon which prayer for review was based and should add a certificate with regard to consistency with law and practice of the Court that a review would be justified in the case

Such certificate should be in the form of a reasoned opinion

Review petition could not be filed without a certificate of the counsel who had signed the same

Review petition on legal question was maintainable on the basis of certificate in the form of reasoned opinion by the counsel who appeared in the original case

Employee had herself filed present review petition

Present review petition had not been competently filed

Matter before the Service Tribunal was with regard to notification for transfer of an employee

Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal but at the same time made observations which had adversely affected the service of employee

Supreme Court quashed the observations made by the Service Tribunal to the extent that "employee was not an officer of grade BS-19"

Such observations would not form part of judgment of Service Tribunal

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Power of review stemmed from the possibility of judicial fallibility and was exercised in exceptional circumstances in the aid of justice to avoid gross injustice and in view of the necessity to avoid perpetuating such illegality, which could not be allowed to remain on the record

Review was not synonymous with an appeal and did not include rehearing of the matter in issue nor would be warranted merely because the conclusion drawn was wrong or erroneous but was limited to eventualities where something obvious had been overlooked or where there was a glaring omission or patent mistake of fact or law, which was self-evident, manifest and floating on the surface, materially affecting the outcome of the adjudicatory process

Where such material mistake or error had resulted in injustice or an illegality, the Court should not hesitate or be reluctant to make necessary corrections to undo the injury caused thereby.

Scope of a review petition was very narrow and limited and it hardly seemed appropriate to consider a legal objection which had not been taken at any stage of the proceedings on an initiative of the Supreme Court on its own.

Power of review stemmed from the possibility of judicial fallibility and was exercised in exceptional circumstances in the aid of justice to avoid gross injustice and in view of the necessity to avoid perpetuating such illegality, which could not be allowed to remain on the record

Review was not synonymous with an appeal and did not include rehearing of the matter in issue nor would be warranted merely because the conclusion drawn was wrong or erroneous but was limited to eventualities where something obvious had been overlooked or where there was a glaring omission or patent mistake of fact or law, which was self-evident, manifest and floating on the surface, materially affecting the outcome of the adjudicatory process

Where such material mistake or error had resulted in injustice or an illegality, the Court should not hesitate or be reluctant to make necessary corrections to undo the injury caused thereby.

Supreme Court could review its judgment or order if an error of law or fact had materially affected the merits of the case.

Supreme Court could review its judgment or order if an error of law or fact had materially affected the merits of the case.

Plea of petitioner that fresh documentary evidence from the revenue record had been dug up by the petitioner and needed to be placed on record

Validity

No such documentary evidence had been placed on file by the petitioner

Such course and conduct could not be allowed because there were other stringent conditions which applied in cases of review

In the absence of documentary evidence sought to be placed on file, court was not at all convinced as to the relevance of such missing documents or that the same were unavailable at the trial stage or at any subsequent stage before the hearing of present review petition

Attempt was made by the petitioner to reargue the entire case, even in respect of questions which had adequately been discussed and decided in the judgment under review

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Award of a project by Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL) to Jamshoro Joint Venture Limited (JJVL) for extraction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)

Undue and illegal favours given to JJVL

Material changes made to the Implementation Agreement to benefit JJVL

Deletion of a certain clause from the Implementation Agreement amounted to giving undue favour to JJVL, putting SSGCL in total disadvantageous position where it lost recourse of acquiring the LPG Plant in the event of default by JJVL

Approval of Board of Directors or the Finance Committee of Directors on deletion of said clause was never sought

Deletion of some other clauses from the Implementation Agreement, being a very material subject and having the consequence of materially changing the nature of the agreement was necessarily required to be placed before the Board of Directors of SSGCL, but the same was not done

Final draft of the Implementation Agreement to be signed between SSGCL and JJVL was neither approved by the Board of Directors of SSGCL nor the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources was informed of the same

Term of original Implementation Agreement was restricted only upto 3-2-2011, but changes made therein extended it beyond such date upto the currency of the Gas Sales Agreement

Such change put JJVL in total advantageous position and left SSGCL with no opportunity to look for a better and more favourable deal from the one offered by JJVL

Twenty one (21) months after the submission of the bid, JJVL was still unable to raise or firm up its financing and was seeking further indulgence from SSGCL for the comfort of JJVL's lenders

No approval of the Board of Directors of SSGCL was ever obtained for the material change in royalty payments which was the basic source of income for SSGCL

Similarly such change in the royalty payment was not advised to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources

JJVL submitted its Bid Bond late, but the same was still accepted by SSGCL

Minutes of Board meetings of SSGCL showed that there was no express reference to condoning the delay in submission of BID Bond by JJVL

Judgment under review thoroughly dealt with and discussed all the documents on record and there appeared to be no mis-reading or non-reading of record nor was there any error floating on the surface of record

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the High Court praying that "Leucophor" was not classifiable under Entry 04.03 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944; that demand of excise duty by customs and revenue authorities was an afterthought and such belated demand had been raised after the goods had been cleared and sold

High Court allowed said constitutional petition, relying on one of its earlier judgments on the subject passed in Constitution Petition No. D-865 of 1992 and set aside orders of customs and revenue authorities

Customs and revenue authorities preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court, which appeal was allowed and order passed by High Court was set aside on the basis that chemical which was subject matter of Constitution Petition No. D-865 of 1992 was different than the chemical in the present case

Petitioner-company filed present review petition seeking review of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court and contended that the Supreme Court while passing its judgment did not take into consideration some of the judgments passed by the High Court on the subject

Validity

Supreme Court passed its judgment (i.e. judgment under review) after hearing the parties at considerable length, taking into consideration the evidence available on record, and it also took note of the judgment of the High Court on the subject on which High Court had placed reliance i.e. Constitution Petition No. D-865 of 1992

Petitioner-company failed to point out any error floating on record in the judgment under review, which being just, did not call for any interference

Review petition was dismissed accordingly with costs.

Petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the High Court praying that "Leucophor" was not classifiable under Entry 04.03 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944; that demand of excise duty by customs and revenue authorities was an afterthought and such belated demand had been raised after the goods had been cleared and sold

High Court allowed said constitutional petition, relying on one of its earlier judgments on the subject passed in Constitution Petition No. D-865 of 1992 and set aside orders of customs and revenue authorities

Customs and revenue authorities preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court, which appeal was allowed and order passed by High Court was set aside on the basis that chemical which was subject matter of Constitution Petition No. D-865 of 1992 was different than the chemical in the present case

Petitioner-company filed present review petition seeking review of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court and contended that the Supreme Court while passing its judgment did not take into consideration some of the judgments passed by the High Court on the subject

Validity

Supreme Court passed its judgment (i.e. judgment under review) after hearing the parties at considerable length, taking into consideration the evidence available on record, and it also took note of the judgment of the High Court on the subject on which High Court had placed reliance i.e. Constitution Petition No. D-865 of 1992

Petitioner-company failed to point out any error floating on record in the judgment under review, which being just, did not call for any interference

Review petition was dismissed accordingly with costs.

Petitioner filed present review petition seeking review of judgment of the Supreme Court titled Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 789)

Review petition was barred by 1576 days

Petitioner sought condonation of delay in filing present review petition on the grounds that after resigning from office of President he left for abroad as he was having security threats to his life and he was not in a position to come to Pakistan and file the review petition; that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at that time, who presided over the Bench (which delivered the judgment under review) had personal enmity, bias and grudge against him, thus he did not expect any justice as long as the said former Chief Justice was in office; that after superannuation of said former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court present review petition had been filed without any delay, and as such the delay caused in filing of the review petition was beyond the control of the petitioner

Validity

Grounds pressed by petitioner for condonation of delay were not sufficient because, first he could have appeared during hearing of the case under review and asked that Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at that time, against whom bias was alleged, should not hear the case; second even after the pronouncement of the judgment under review he could file review petition and could have requested the Court that the then Chief Justice who presided over the Bench should not hear the review petition and may recuse himself; and third in the judgment under consideration despite the finding that the imposition of State of Emergency by the petitioner (Chief of Army Staff) was unconstitutional and void, the Court did not direct the trial of the petitioner under Art. 6 of the Constitution; if there was bias there could have been directions to such effect; and fourth the Bench which disposed of the petition(C.P. No. 2255 of 2010 reported at 2013 SCMR 1683) in view of the undertaking given by the Federal Government that it shall proceed against the petitioner under Art. 6 of the Constitution was not presided over by the then Chief Justice against whom bias was alleged

For two to three years, the question of petitioner's trial in the light of the judgment under review remained pending either before the High Court or before the Supreme Court but petitioner never filed any application for review of the judgment

Such conduct was reflective of an element of contumacy which did not warrant indulgence in review jurisdiction

Petitioner had failed to show a cause or reason sufficient in law to condone such an inordinate delay

Present review petition merited dismissal for being barred by time

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Review petition seeking review of judgment of the Supreme Court titled Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 789)

Bias in a judge

Scope

Plea of petitioner that Bench of Supreme Court which delivered the judgment under review was presided over by the then Chief Justice, who had a bias against the petitioner and was inimical towards him; that petitioner had filed a reference against the then Chief Justice, as such the bias and enmity between the then Chief Justice and petitioner was obvious and therefore, the former was disqualified to hear and decide the matter concerning him, as such the judgment under review was a nullity on the basis of bias

Validity

Petitioner never contended that the then Chief Justice had done any overt act which could warrant an inference that he was inimical towards him rather it was petitioner's case that they were on good terms till filing of the reference before the Supreme Judicial Council against the then Chief Justice, which was challenged by him and the same was set aside by a Bench of the Supreme Court, against which petitioner never filed any review application, rather accepted the same

As a matter of fact the petitioner welcomed the said judgment

Subsequently, however a few weeks after the restoration of the former Chief Justice, petitioner imposed state of emergency; issued various presidential orders and after prescribing a new oath those Judges who did not take the oath were stopped from working which included the said former Chief Justice

Judgment sought to be reviewed in such circumstances did not reflect any personal bias on part of the then Chief Justice, first, because admittedly after the setting aside of the reference against the then Chief Justice and his restoration to office, when the case of petitioner's disqualification to contest the Presidential elections while in Army uniform (as Chief of Army Staff) was taken up, the then Chief Justice constituted a Bench and did not include himself as a member of the said Bench; second, petitioner's counsel has not referred to any case in which after his reinstatement for the second time on 24-3-2009 the then Chief Justice passed any adverse order against the person of the petitioner

Even in the judgment under review, the Bench headed by the said Chief Justice did not direct trial of petitioner under Art. 6 of the Constitution

Plea of petitioner regarding bias of the then Chief Justice was misplaced

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Review petition seeking review of judgment of the Supreme Court titled Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 789)

Serving of notice, requirement of

Defendant residing outside Pakistan

Notice sent to defendant's address in Pakistan

Notice widely published and televised

Effect

Plea of petitioner that a notice was sent to him at his residence in Pakistan, whereas it was known to everybody that he was abroad and was being subjected to life threats and could not come to Pakistan; that no step had been taken for proper service of notice to him

Validity

Court had issued a notice to petitioner on his available address in Pakistan and when from there it transpired that he was abroad, the notice was widely published and televised

Judgment under review specifically mentioned that a notice was issued to the petitioner on his available address intimating him about the proceedings; that the Process Serving Officer had gone to the residential place of petitioner in Pakistan, where a person was present but he refused to receive the notice; that the factum of issuance of the said notice was widely televised through national and international television channels, and, it was also widely published in national and international print media

Even otherwise, it had never been the case of the petitioner, not even in the body of present review petition that he was not aware of the pendency of proceedings which culminated in the judgment under review

Plea of petitioner regarding non-serving of proper notice to him was misplaced

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Anti-Terrorism Court sentenced accused to death on two counts, one under S. 302(b), P.P.C and second under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Death sentence awarded to accused was confirmed by the High Court

Petition for leave to appeal filed by accused before Supreme Court was dismissed, against which accused had filed a review petition

During pendency of review petition, accused entered into a compromise with legal heirs of deceased-police official and requested the Supreme Court to accept the said compromise and acquit him

Validity

Merits of the present case pertaining to offence under S.302(b), P.P.C were no more required to be dilated upon because of the compromise

Statements of eye-witnesses (police officials) and recoveries made during investigation established that deceased-police official was murdered when he was on official duty, and such findings were upheld by the High Court and Supreme Court

Offence under S.353, P.P.C stood proved against accused as he fired at and killed a police official, who was performing his official duty, therefore, offence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was also established because murder of a police official without personal enmity amounted to create terror and insecurity in the vicinity

Offence under S.6(2)(n) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 also stood established as act of accused involved serious violence against a member of police force

Regarding first count of death sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C, accused entered into a compromise with legal heirs of deceased and compensation had also been paid, but second count of death under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had its own implications and was not compoundable under Ss.354(5) & (7), Cr.P.C

Compromise between parties was accepted (only) to the extent of conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C and accused was acquitted of said charge

Regarding death sentence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, quantum of said sentence could be examined in the present case due to its peculiar facts

Sentence of death awarded to accused under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted into life imprisonment without extending benefit of S.382-B, P.P.C, as the same was not allowed by Trial Court, High Court and the Supreme Court

Review petition was disposed of accordingly.

Error has to be so apparent and glaring that no court would permit it to remain part of proceedings and such error must have emanated from record on the basis of its own existence and not be result of analytical logic and scrutiny of evidence

Error apparent on the face of record manifestly be of a nature that if ignored, complete justice could not be done

In appropriate and suitable cases Supreme Court exercises its jurisdiction only for the cause of dispensation of justice.

Supreme Court in exercise of its review jurisdiction could not sit as a court of appeal against its own order.

Petitioner-company contended that order in original passed by Department was a void order; that no limitation ran against a void order, and that such aspect was not appreciated by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court and the Supreme Court

Validity

Rule that no limitation ran against a void order was not an inflexible rule

Party could not sleep over to challenge a void order and it was bound to challenge the same within the stipulated/prescribed time period of limitation from the date of knowledge before the proper forum in appropriate proceedings

Appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal was admittedly time-barred, and was rightly dismissed as being hit by limitation and no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was found

High Court agreed with the order of Appellate Tribunal

Supreme Court had affirmed concurrent findings recorded by fora below

Review petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Contention of pre-emptor was that where law permitted amendment in pleadings in view of the provision contained in Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C., a prayer for amendment in plaint could not be declined summarily without attending to the circumstances necessitating same

Validity

Necessity of mentioning particulars (date, time and place of making Talbs) had emanated from the statute itself

Supreme Court observed that a plaint in a pre-emption case under the latest dispensation was more like an F.I.R. of a criminal case, therefore, no omission howsoever fatal could be allowed to be supplied by means of an amendment; that if amendments were allowed, it would open room for additions, after-thoughts and improvements which would go ad infinitum, and that neither a pre-emption case nor a criminal case with such modus operandi would admit of an end in the mundane existence of the parties

No error had been committed by the Supreme Court by declining prayer of amendment of plaint

Review petition was dismissed accordingly.

Qatl-e-amd, house-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death, isqat-i-haml, kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to unnatural lust

Review of Supreme Court judgment

Plea for concurrent running of sentences, dismissal of

Two different murders committed at different places

First F.I.R. was registered against accused for the murder of deceased, whom accused suspected of spreading the rumour that he (accused) had committed zina with his own daughter as a result of which she got pregnant and had to carry out an abortion

Second F.I.R. was registered against accused, an hour after the first one, for the murder of his own daughter, with whom he allegedly had developed illicit liaison and got her pregnant

Accused was convicted and sentenced for both the murders

Contentions of accused were that motive for both murders was same and they took place on the same day; that both murders were part of the same transaction, therefore, his sentences should run concurrently

Validity

Two different murders had been committed at two different places; one at the house of the deceased and second at accused's own house

Wife of accused appeared during trial to allege that the accused developed illicit liaison with his own daughter; that abortion of his daughter's pregnancy was carried out at his asking; that when the act became public he not only murdered the deceased, whom he suspected of spreading rumours, but also his own daughter, who had become a symbol of his sin

Son of accused also appeared during trial and corroborated the version of his mother (wife of accused)

Accused not only committed gruesome murder of two persons but his conduct reflected a morbid, perverse and depraved character

Review petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioner-company contended that order-in-original passed by Department was a void order; that no limitation ran against a void order, and that such aspect was not appreciated by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court and the Supreme Court

Validity

Rule that no limitation ran against a void order was not an inflexible rule

Party could not sleep over to challenge a void order and it was bound to challenge the same within the stipulated/prescribed time period of limitation from the date of knowledge before the proper forum in appropriate proceedings

Appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal was admittedly time-barred, and was rightly dismissed as being hit by limitation and no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was found

High Court agreed with the order of Appellate Tribunal

Supreme Court had affirmed concurrent findings recorded by fora below

Review petition was dismissed in circumstances.

In the present case, Bench was constituted to hear review petitions and was not mandated to decide the issue as to whether Short Order in the case under review or reasons enunciated in support of the Short Order were to be implemented, therefore, while allowing the withdrawal of review petitions, petitioners could not be subjected to legal principles enunciated by the Bench

Once the Review Petitions had been unconditionally withdrawn as per the withdrawal applications and submissions of the petitioners and their counsel, then no condition could be attached to withdrawals by the Bench specially without giving any notice of the intention to apply condition to the Review Petitioners and hearing them on the point

When detailed reasons were given and by majority view it was held that the judgment had prospective application then there was no question left to be decided by the Bench as to which of the two (detailed reasons or Short Order) was to be implemented

After withdrawal of the review petitions the dismissal order had become a past and closed transaction and question of implementation of detailed reasons or Short Order in the case under review could only be decided in suo motu review, if such powers were exercised

Review petitions should be dismissed as withdrawn simpliciter.

Petitioner, has every right to withdraw his petition unconditionally and cannot be denied such right.

Such petition was to be dismissed simpliciter as withdrawn.

Petitions deserved to be allowed as withdrawn simpliciter unconditionally and the matter be deemed to be a past and closed transaction.

Right to claim review of any decision of a court of law, like the right of appeal was a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure

Review was not available unless it had been so conferred by law.