Delay in conclusion of trial

It was still to be determined at the trial as to whether accused had shared common intention with nominated co-accused in committing murder of deceased and causing firearm injuries to two others and he was vicariously liable for the occurrence

Challan had already been submitted but for the last 9 months the prosecution had not examined any witness at the trial

Accused was in judicial custody and was no more required for any further investigation or probe

Allegations levelled in FIR by complainant against accused were to be proved at trial and bail could not be withheld as mere punishment

Case of accused fell within the ambit of further inquiry

Bail was allowed.

Relief on the basis of such right so accrued in favour of accused could not be refused to him unless he was found to be hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, a previous convict for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life, but no such exception was found against accused

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

In the instant case petitioner was arrested on 13-07-2024 and remained incarcerated at sub-jail and then at Central Prison, Rawalpindi for more than three months

Investigating officer did not want to question or interrogate the petitioner ever since the case was marked to him

Reference against petitioner had earlier been filed before Accountability Court-I, Islamabad, which meant that investigation in instant case was complete

Charge against petitioner had not been framed as yet and conclusion of trial was not in sight

Evidence was largely documentary in nature which was already in prosecution's possession

There was no chance of petitioner tampering with such evidence

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Principles stated.

Petitioners could not be detained for indefinite period in a case where the investigation up to extent of the petitioners had already been completed and they were no more required for the purpose of investigation

Mere detention of the petitioners prior to conviction amounted to punishment before conviction

Bail was allowed to the petitioner, in circumstances.

From perusal of record it transpired that the occurrence took place on 16-04-2019 and FIR was registered on the same day

However, despite lapse of more than 4½ years the prosecution had failed to conclude the trial

Earlier, the petitioner had filed an application for grant of bail before the High Court which was disposed of with direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the case of the petitioner/accused within 10 days by conducting day to day hearing as case was at concluding stage but the prosecution failed to produce remaining witnesses before the Trial Court, hence, bail petition was filed

Prosecution had failed to conclude the case of the petitioner despite lapse of more than 4½ years of the registration of FIR and despite clear direction of the High Court

Accused could not be kept in jail for indefinite period as punishment on the ground that he was directly charged for an offence falling under the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.

Moreover, co-accused of the present petitioner had been released on bail by the High Court as such the petitioner was also entitled for the same on the principle of rule of consistency

Petitioner/accused was behind bars for last more than four years and he was no more required for purpose of investigation

No useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period

Thus, petitioner was entitled for concession of bail

Petitioner was admitted to post arrest bail, in circumstances.

As per the contents of the crime report, the allegation against the accused persons was that they while armed with firearms launched a murderous assault on the complainant party and made fire shots, which hit the complainant and the witness Mashal Khan on left rib and left knee respectively

However, it was stance of the accused persons that in-fact the complainant party was aggressor and committed murder of two persons from accused's side

One of the accused had also got registered an FIR under sections 302, 324 & 34, P.P.C. against the complainant party

In the present case only a general role had been ascribed to the accused persons and no details had been given as to which accused fired at which injured

Admittedly, the accused persons did not repeat the fire, which prima facie showed that they had no intention to kill the victims

Accused persons were behind the bars and despite lapse of more than 22 months, the conclusion of trial was not insight in near future

Such delay was not attributable to the accused persons, as admitted by the prosecution

Co-accused, who was ascribed a role similar to that of accused persons, had been granted post-arrest bail by the Supreme Court, therefore, the accused persons were entitled for the concession of post-arrest bail on such score alone

Case of the accused persons squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into their guilt

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused persons were admitted to bail.

Section 6 of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 clearly indicates that like third proviso to S. 497, Cr.P.C., the same is not controlled by any other factors like proviso four to S. 497, Cr.P.C., and as such it is statutory duty of the prosecution to complete the trial by all possible means within six months, otherwise a juvenile offender shall have the right to be released on bail.

Accused sought bail on the ground of statutory delay in conclusion of trial under S. 6 of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018

Accused was behind bars for the last 15 months

Order sheets of the Trial Court were indicative of the fact that neither the accused nor his counsel had made any visible and active attempt to delay the conclusion of the trial, therefore, in view of the statutory command the accused had earned a right of bail

Bail application was allowed, in circumstances.

Mere non-compliance of the directions issued to the Trial Court to conclude the trial expeditiously or within some specified time cannot be considered as valid ground for grant of bail to an accused, being alien to the provisions of S. 497, Cr.P.C., as the accused cannot claim bail on this ground as a matter of right but it is certainly a fresh ground to be assessed and examined by the Court for exercise of its discretion in either way, in the overall facts and circumstances of the case.

No delay in conclusion of the trial was found which could solely be attributed to the accused or to the person acting on his behalf reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delaying the conclusion of trial

Trial Court, on the basis of the report of process server, had observed that the complainant and private witnesses had concealed themselves in order to frustrate the legal process and their service seemed impossible through ordinary means

Prosecution had confirmed that there was no record of previous conviction of the accused

Accused had made out a case for his release on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial

Petition for grant of bail was accepted.

As per 3rd proviso to S. 497, Cr.P.C., a person accused of an offence punishable with death, if detained for such an offence for a continuous period exceeding two years shall be released on bail, of course, with the exception contained in the 4th proviso to S. 497, Cr.P.C. that the provisions of third proviso shall not apply to a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to a person, who, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Petitioner was accused facing trial under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and had been in custody since 21.1.2021

Petitioner sought his release on bail on the plea of change in law and absence of forum of trial

Validity

Petitioner was arrested on 21.1.2021 and during such period of more than two years, out of 68 prosecution witnesses only 9 witnesses could be recorded

Petitioner did not play any significant role in causing delay in conclusion of trial in offence under S. 9(a)(ii)(iii)(iv)(iv) & (xii) read with S. 10 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 containing maximum punishment of imprisonment for 14 years and fine

Amendment in S. 5(o) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 brought substantial change in allegation of misappropriation and if misusing public money did not exceed Rs. 500 million or number of persons was less than 100, NAB would not have any jurisdiction and therefore Accountability Court created under S. 5(g) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 shall take its hands off to further proceed in the reference and return it at once to NAB

Report under S. 173, Cr.P.C. was not sent to any Court of competent jurisdiction to take the cognizance

High Court had jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution to enforce individual fundamental right under Arts. 9 & 10 of the Constitution to safeguard security of person and safeguard as to arrest and detention

Petitioner was not aware as to under what law he was under detention

Custody of petitioner was being regulated by Accountability Court on regular basis but that too, due to uncertainty/ ambiguity created by the amending law

Detention of petitioner was an unconscionable delay in conclusion of trial

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

For deciding whether the accused occasioned delay in the trial, it is not necessary to count and consider the entire docket and segregate such dates to calculate the days of delay with mathematical precision, overall act and conduct of the accused persons to frustrate trial through a planned and pre-determined scheme is sufficient to divest them

Although, the statute has given a right under the third proviso of S.497(1), Cr.P.C., but the fourth proviso is a controlling proviso, which prevents from pervasive misuse by zealous judicial vigilance at the time of extending benefit under the third proviso by using a frightening expression as "desperate or dangerous criminal"

Term desperate is itself meaningful.

Bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even if delay is not attributable to the accused.

Period of delay in the conclusion of the trial is to be counted from the date of the detention of the accused in the case.

Juvenile aged more than sixteen years accused of a heinous offence and detained for a continuous period exceeding six months without conclusion of trial

Whether section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 ('the 2018 Act') applied to such a juvenile

Held, that Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act does apply, rather solely applies, to a case involving a "heinous offence", irrespective of the age of the juvenile

Section 6(5) in effect works as a proviso to section 6(4) and appears to have no other purpose under the scheme of the 2018 Act.

Period of six months mentioned in section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 is to be counted from the date of arrest of the juvenile, after determination of his age and not from the date of such determination or adjudication by the Court.

Whether grant of bail on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial was permissible under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ('the NAB Ordinance')

Held, that inordinate or long delay in the conclusion of the trial for no fault of the accused and his protracted detention without determination of his guilt, amount to harassment and abuse of the process of law

Such delay can therefore be a valid ground for releasing the accused on bail and restoring his fundamental right to life and liberty

Inordinate delay in conclusion of the trial of an accused, for no fault on his part, being not envisaged by the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ('the NAB Ordinance') would inevitably attract the constitutional protections under Articles 4, 9 & 10A of the Constitution

In such a situation, it is just, fair and equitable that the prosecution (NAB) should not oppose bail, and if it does so, the courts would consider the opposition as unreasonable and grant bail, enforcing the fundamental rights of the accused.

Seven kilograms of charas was recovered from the accused, hence, his case came under Part (a) of the 3rd proviso of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., as the mandatory punishment of death and imprisonment for life pertained to only those cases where the quantity recovered exceeded 10 kgs

For such reason, the accused could claim benefit to be released on statutory ground under S. 497(1)(a) of 3rd proviso that provided entitlement to be released on bail after continuous detention exceeding one year, if delay in conclusion of the trial could not be attributed to him or any person acting on his behalf

Order sheets of the Trial Court indicated that the delay in conclusion of trial was caused on the part of prosecution

Nothing was available on the record that accused was; (i) a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; or (ii) a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, in the opinion of the Court; or (iii) an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life

Petition for grant of bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Even in case where the Court has issued direction to the prosecution to conclude the trial within a particular span of time it will not clothe the accused with a right to ask for bail.

Where a case on statutory delay in conclusion of trial is made out then ordinarily bail should not be refused on hypertechnical grounds.

Accused was alleged to have made straight fire shots with pistol 30 bore upon the son of complainant at different parts of his body, when he was present at cattle shed of his relative

Evidence transpired that one injury mentioned in the FIR was an exit wound, whereas, another injury narrated in the FIR was not found mentioned in the post-mortem report of the deceased

Three other injuries were not available in the autopsy report of the deceased

Accused was declared by Trial Court to be a juvenile

Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, provided that the period of statutory delay for release of a juvenile was six months

Statutory period in the case of accused had already lapsed and he had not contributed towards the delay in the conclusion of his trial

Petition for grant of bail was accepted, in circumstances.

Earlier petition for grant of bail was not pressed while a direction was issued to the Trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of three months

Report of the Trial Court revealed that the defence was not very much interested in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses since 3/4 adjournments were sought by the accused

High Court observed that it was not a case in which direction was violated but a case in which the trial could not be concluded beyond the act on the part of the accused and, therefore, by now instead of three months more than 10 and a half months had passed

Petition for grant of bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Fact that prosecution had not made any material progress was but obvious from its utter inability to adduce evidence of main witnesses thus far

Prosecution had not made a any effort or clamour to counter or offset protraction of the trials by seeking their urgent hearing rather, it had remained hibernated and content conveniently at a snail's pace instead of upping the ante, as required, to engender urgency in the matters

Petitioner, meanwhile, had completed more than 24 months in jail and there was nothing the prosecution could boast of qua its obligation to pursue the matters efficiently, and which, otherwise if done, could have been deemed sufficient to stave off consequences; the delay had since brought about in favour of the petitioner

Configuration divesting the accused of his right to expeditious disposal of the trial had definitely induced a sense calling for a set-up, which of course was temporary in nature and subject to inference to be made at the end of trial regarding accused person's guilt or otherwise, to mitigate the peril he was in for no fault of him

Accused was admitted to bail, in circumstances.

Accused was arrested under the Gas (Theft, Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, on a raid at a restaurant found to be using an unauthorized gas connection of which the accused claimed to be the owner

Third bail application was filed by the accused on the ground that the Trial Court had failed to conclude the trial within four months as directed by the High Court and that he had paid the amount of the gas theft alleged in the challan

Held; direction by a Superior Court to the Trial Court to conclude a trial within a specified period was an administrative direction and non-compliance thereof for whatever reason did not ipso facto entitle an accused to be admitted to bail

Subsequent payment by the accused of the amount of gas theft alleged could not be considered as a fresh ground for bail by itself when bail had already been denied on merits

None of the grounds constituted fresh ground for bail

Petition for grant of bail was dismissed, in circumstances.

Courts while dealing with statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial, are not supposed to blindly grant bail only by doing some mathematical exercise but are required to examine the available material to first form an opinion that such delay is not designed by the accused himself or any other person acting on his behalf

Such being the reason that bail even on ground of statutory delay may well be declined.

Petitioners were arrested by National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and were in judicial custody for more than 15 months while no charge was framed

Validity

Sixty four prosecution witnesses were to be examined, numerous documents to be exhibited and 12 accused each having separate right of cross-examination in respect of each and every witness

Trial was not likely to be concluded in near future which factor also tilted in grant of post arrest bail in favour of accused persons

Case of accused persons was one of further inquiry

Accused persons were not needed for further investigation in reference

Evidence in the reference was mainly of documentary nature

Such was difficult for petitioners to tamper with the documents which had been in the custody of NAB

In cases concerning assets beyond known sources of income it was incumbent upon investigating officer to carry out a thorough and professional inquiry/ investigation and would ensure that all legal ingredients of offence were met with

Perceptions and suspicions could never replace cogent, reliable and admissible evidence

High Court pointed out with regret that investigating officer had carried out most of his investigation while sitting in his office and mainly relied on income tax assets declarations of accused persons whereas he was to take an active and dynamic role in the investigation

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Progress report from the Trial Court revealed that no delay was caused by either of the accused persons or counsel acting on their behalf

Only two out of the proposed 72 prosecution witnesses had given evidence

Accountability Court had been vacant for over 5 months and the delay in filling the vacant posts squarely fell on the shoulders of the Federal Government, who instead of ensuring the right to expeditious trial under Art.10-A of the Constitution and as per the Preamble to the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and S.16(a) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 for reasons best known to itself seemed to be unreasonably delaying the appointment of Accountability Court Judges

Tallat Ishaq's case [PLD 2019 SC 112] had made the grant of bail more stringent on hardship grounds but it had not excluded same and it was allowed in exceptional circumstances at the discretion of the court

Accused persons had made out a case for grant of bail on hardship grounds, which was accordingly granted.

All the accused persons arrested in the case had been released on bail after arrest hence the accused was also entitled for the grant of bail after arrest on the principle of consistency

Entire case depended on documentary evidence which had already been collected by the investigating agency

Prosecution had failed to satisfy the Court that the inordinate delay in conclusion of trial was not partly attributable to it

Writ petition was allowed and the accused was admitted to post-arrest bail, in circumstances.

Nine witnesses had already been examined and the remaining three witnesses were to be produced before the Court so that trial could be concluded

Bail was declined, in circumstances.

Petitioner/plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of agreement to sell and was aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court dismissing his application for comparison of signatures of respondent/defendant

Validity

Report of handwriting expert subject to objections, if any, would have facilitated the Court to formulate its opinion on the question and as such it would have been a judicious exercise of discretion if application was allowed

Delay was not a factor which could have come in the way of exercise of discretion as such course would have advanced cause of justice

High Court allowed application for comparison of signatures and set aside order passed by Trial Court

Constitutional petition was allowed in, circumstances.

High Court had directed the Trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of six months but despite lapse of about seven months the Trial Court had failed to comply with the direction

Perusal of order sheets of the Trial Court revealed that the witnesses had remained absent on seven dates of hearing

Only one adjournment was sought on behalf of the accused as his counsel was not present

Accused was arrested on 11-11-2018 and since then he was in judicial custody and despite framing of charge on 04-05-2019 as yet proceedings had not been concluded nor was there any reasonable probability of concluding trial in near future

Petition for grant of bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Although the Reference against accused had been filed but there were 36 witnesses whose testimony was to be recorded before the Trial Court

Rest of the evidence was in the possession of the prosecution, which was in the documentary form and there was no likelihood of any tampering or manipulation

Accused had already suffered 20 months of incarceration without even commencement of trial, which clearly reflected that the conclusion of the same was not in sight in near future

Even otherwise, there were 27 accused in all and the majority of the same were enjoying their liberty and free life

Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was granted bail with the direction that his passport be impounded before the Trial Court and his name be placed on the Exit Control List till the final conclusion of the trial.

Accused was in continuous detention since his arrest and had been facing trial since Reference was filed against him way back in July, 2014

Over a period of 7 years, only 174 prosecution witnesses were examined out of 513 witnesses mentioned in calendar of witnesses

By such count it would take a few more years, thus, early conclusion of trial was not in sight in the foreseeable future

Accused could not be kept in jail for an indefinite period

Accused was entitled to concession of bail only on the ground of statutory delay in conclusion of trial

Bail was allowed in circumstances.

Accused sought bail on the ground of non-conclusion of trial within a period of three months as stipulated by the High Court

Held, such directions were alien to S.497, Cr.P.C., which was the mother provision governing the grant or refusal of bail to accused charged with various offences

Application being premature was dismissed.

Accused was arrested on 4-4-2019 and out of 110 prosecution witnesses evidence of only 8 prosecution witnesses was recorded

Three co-accused persons had been granted post arrest bail by High Court on the sole ground of statutory delay in conclusion of trial

Validity

Petitioner was behind the bars for about two years

Case against petitioner was exactly identical to that of his co-accused persons, therefore, petitioner was also entitled to the relief claimed for on the basis of rule of consistency

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Vacancy of Accountability Court does not make it a case of incarceration as statutory ground is not available to a person under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.

Petitioners were arrested 2-1/2 years ago on the allegation of causing loss to national exchequer by misusing their authority during acquisition of land for government project

Validity

No prospect of early conclusion of trial and petitioners could not be kept behind the bars for an indefinite period

Investigation process was complete and physical custody of accused persons was no more required to National Accountability Bureau for further investigation

Trial Court required 1-1/2 years more for conclusion of trial subject to full cooperation of prosecution as well as accused persons

No incriminating material was recovered from petitioners, who joined investigation and were no more required for further investigation

Case against petitioners was one of further probe and inquiry into their guilt by Trial Court after recording of evidence

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Prosecution witnesses, in their statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C., had remained consistent, therefore, prima facie the case of accused for the grant of post arrest bail on merits was not made out

High Court observed that 17 adjournments went to the share of accused whereas 9 adjournments were sought from the prosecution side and on 5 occasions joint requests for adjournment were made by both the sides

Conduct of the accused, during trial, showed that he was not entitled for the grant of bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial

Petition for grant of bail was dismissed, in circumstances.

Right of accused to be enlarged on bail under the third proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. is a statutory right which cannot be denied under the discretionary power of the Court to grant bail

Bail under the third proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., can be refused to an accused only on the ground that the delay in the conclusion of trial has been occasioned on account of any act or omission of the accused or any other person acting on his behalf

High Court observed that bail under the third proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., can also be refused to an accused by the Court, if his case falls under the fourth proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., but in all other cases the Court must grant bail.

Supreme Court in Tallat Ishaq v. National Accountability Bureau (PLD 2019 SC 112) had, no doubt, made the grant of bail more stringent on hardship grounds but it had not excluded the same and it was allowed in exceptional circumstances at the discretion of the court

Some delay had been caused by the accused persons in conclusion of trials

Delay in the cases of accused persons was not shocking or unconscionable as such their petitions were dismissed

Trial Court was directed to complete the trial within a period of four months

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Delay in trial is not a ground, unless a sheer abuse of process of law is established on record, to acquit an accused under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.

On arrest of petitioner all prosecution witnesses already examined were to be re-examined and it would take time in conclusion

Keeping petitioner in jail for an indefinite period would cause injustice to petitioner

Bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Allegation against accused persons was that on the day of incident, they quarreled with the young boys of complainant party on some issue

Subsequently when compromise negotiations were being carried out regarding the incident, the accused persons emerged at the scene of incident and fired upon the complainant party which resulted in death of one of them

Trial Court had examined six witnesses and five more witnesses were to be examined

Private witnesses had been examined while the remaining witnesses were official witnesses as such there were least chances that the accused persons would succeed in tampering with the prosecution evidence

Nothing was available on record which was sufficient to convince that the accused persons were hardened, dangerous or desperate criminals as such their release during trial would not be against the tranquility and peace of the society

Case of bail for the accused persons was made out on account of delay in conclusion of trial

Petition for grant of bail was allowed, in circumstances.

Constitutional petition against order under S.17-A of Family Courts Act, 1964, was maintainable only if such interim order was coram non judice, wholly or without jurisdiction or based on mala fide

Quantum of interim maintenance could not be made a ground for invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

Trial was not concluded within a period of six months as prescribed by S.12-A of Family Courts Act, 1964

High Court directed Family Court to decide suit for recovery of maintenance within a period of two months so that petitioner could be burdened with interim maintenance for two months only

Order of interim maintenance would subsequently merge into final judgment

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Trial Court in the impugned order had stated that it could not be said that the delay had occurred due to any fault on the part of prosecution

Delay was rarely considered a valid ground for acquittal in such like cases

Section 5-A of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, mandated that no officer below the rank of Inspector shall investigate any offence punishable under any of the sections of P.P.C. mentioned in S. 3, P.P.C. or any offence punishable under S. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 without an order of Magistrate Ist Class or make any arrest thereof without a warrant

Investigating Officer/Sub Inspector had submitted an application before the Special Judge Anti-Corruption and the permission for investigation was granted on the same day

Any irregularity or illegality committed during investigation did not vitiate the trial

Petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., being not maintainable, was dismissed.

Where a case is made out on statutory delay in conclusion of trial then, ordinarily, bail was not refused on hyper technical grounds.

Petitioner was ex-Provincial Minister who was arrested by National Accountability Bureau for misuse of his authority and causing loss to national exchequer

Plea raised by accused was that letter issued by Federal Government had established that payments made during regime of accused were not exorbitant

Validity

During reference period, rates which were paid by Provincial Government as authorized by petitioner to advertising agencies who then engaged concerned television channels, were much lower in each case than those which were being paid by Federal Government Ministry of Information, Broadcasting, National History and Literary Heritage

Such fact raised issue whether rates charged by Provincial Government in reference were in fact exorbitant during reference period as per market rates, especially when Federal Government was paying much more

Letter of Federal Government revealed that there was no regularization or standardization of rates to be paid to advertising agencies during time when reference was filed or thereafter

Such new ground had made case of petitioner one of further inquiry in terms of rates paid by Provincial Government to advertising agencies in terms of their exorbitancy

Conclusion of trial was delayed and its completion was not in sight in foreseeable future

Trial had not reached position where such delay or period spent in custody of petitioner could be regarded as shocking, unconsciousable or inordinate

Such delay also tilted balance in favour of petitioner

Bail was allowed in circumstances.

Such direction was an administrative direction and non-compliance of such direction by the Trial Court for whatever reason may not entitle the accused / person to claim bail as of right.