Requirement

Section 5(1) of the 2007 Ordinance mandated that a landlord shall not rent out a premises to a tenant except by a tenancy agreement, whereas Section 5(2) required a landlord to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar

Additionally, Section 5(3) required the rent registrar to enter the particulars of the tenancy in a register, affix his official seal on the tenancy agreement, retain a copy thereof and return the original tenancy agreement to the landlord

It is the entry of the tenancy agreement in the office of the rent registrar which Section 5(5) of the said Ordinance treated as proof of the relationship of landlord and tenant.

If a document / agreement purports to create or extinguish rights in immoveable property then same is compulsorily registrable and in absence of registration it cannot affect immoveable property nor create or extinguish ay right in immoveable property.

Party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a court must demonstrate a vested right or legal interest in the subject matter of the dispute at the relevant time.

Section 38 empowers the authorized officer to access business premises, registered offices, stocks, accounts, and records of registered persons or those liable for registration

This power is exercisable even when no adjudicatory or penal proceedings are pending, and is intended to verify declarations, ascertain factual positions, examine stock levels, and review records maintained under federal, provincial, or local laws

In contrast, S.40 contemplates search and seizure, but only where the officer has reason to believe that documents or things relevant to proceedings exist at a place, and then only after obtaining a magistrate's warrant

The two provisions thus operate independently: Section 38 allows routine inspections for verification and transparency, while S. 40 regulates coercive searches linked to pending or contemplated proceedings

Section 38 expressly authorizes Inland Revenue officers to access any business premises, manufacturing facility, registered office or any other place where stocks, business records or documents relevant under the Act, 1990 are kept

The authority extends not only to registered persons but also to persons liable for registration, and further, to any person whose business activities may be required to be examined for any inquiry or investigation in any tax fraud committed by him, his agent or any other person

This wide yet purpose-linked statutory mandate enables revenue authorities to identify tax evasion, detect fraudulent input adjustments, uncover unreported supplies, and generally ensure that the flow of tax to the exchequer is not impeded through concealment or manipulation

However, under S. 38, the officer may access the premises, inspect records, and obtain material voluntarily produced or found in plain sight, but cannot compel production of concealed documents or seize property byforce.

Any breach of duty, default or negligence by a director in contravention of the articles of the company or any of its policy may be ratified by the company through a special resolution and the Commission may impose any restriction as may be specified

The requirements of special resolution have been spelt out in S.2(66)

A special resolution can only be passed by a majority of not less than three-fourths of such members of the company entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy at a general meeting

The connotation is that past acts of default of a director may be ratified by a company if it chooses to do so and by a special resolution only.

Briefly, petitioner (vendee) instituted a suit seeking possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell, claiming that the full sale consideration was paid and possession of the suit property was delivered, and that he later paid dues on behalf of the defendant leading to execution of a proprietary deed in the defendant's

Trial Court dismissed the suit and plaintiff's appeal was subsequently dismissed by district court, whereafter the plaintiff filed the present civil revision petition before the High Court challenging the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the courts below

Held: There was a clear alteration/ modification/interpolation/ addition in the text of disputed agreement to sell and the unauthorized material altered/ modified/added part of disputed agreement by one party without the consent of other party was not only illegal, unlawful, void but also unenforceable by law because the consensus ad idem was considered the most essential part of an agreement

Even the material changes in the disputed agreement without the consent of seller made disputed agreement to sell unenforceable by law rather it was a fraudulent transaction

Courts below rightly refused relief of specific performance by considering the conduct of the parties, the principles of equity, fairness and good conscious by appreciating the pleadings of the parties as well as oral and documentary evidence of the parties

Plaintiff/ petitioner failed to prove execution of the agreement to sell as well as payment of sale consideration

Neither any misreading or non-reading of evidence on record nor any infirmity, legal or factual, had been pointed out in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below

Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Attorney does not enjoy absolute power to sale/exchange/dispose of the property of his principal to his own close relative rather the exercise of such power is covenanted to obtain explicit and unequivocal permission from the principal to alienate the property to his blood relation/close relative.

Hearsay evidence has a narrow scope of intrinsic value until and unless the said asserted fact has been proved through other corroborative and independent evidence, whereas Art.71 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 also requires direct oral evidence and ousts the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

Any breach of duty, default or negligence by a director in contravention of the articles of the company or any of its policy may be ratified by the company through a special resolution and the Commission may impose any restriction as may be specified

The requirements of special resolution have been spelt out in S.2(66)

A special resolution can only be passed by a majority of not less than three-fourths of such members of the company entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy at a general meeting

The connotation is that past acts of default of a director may be ratified by a company if it chooses to do so and by a special resolution only.

Brief facts were that the appellant filed an appeal under S. 63 of the Elections Act, 2017 challenging the Returning Officer's order rejecting his nomination papers on grounds of concealment of facts

The record showed that an FIR existed against him; that he obtained pre-arrest bail after learning of the case; that his name was placed in the 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and his CNIC and bank accounts were consequently frozen; that under S. 60(2)(b) of the Elections Act, maintaining an active bank account for election expenses was mandatory, but due to the freezing order the appellant could not operate his account; and that he had also been declared a proclaimed offender in criminal proceedings which he did not disclose in his nomination papers

Pivotal question requiring determination in the present election appeal was as to "whether the Returning Officer rightly rejected the appellant's nomination papers on the basis of concealment of material facts, specifically the pending criminal cases; his status as a proclaimed offender; and his inclusion in the 4th Schedule which resulted in frozen bank accounts, and whether these circumstances legally disqualified him from contesting the election due to failure to meet mandatory requirements under the Elections Act, 2017"?

Held: Appellant's name had been included in the list of 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, firstly, in the year 2018, secondly in 2021 when it was excluded, however, keeping in view appellant's activities his name had again been included in the said list in 2023

Consequently, according to the order passed against the appellant, movables or any other property owned or controlled wholly or partly, directly or indirectly stood frozen

According to S. 60(2)(b) of the Elections Act, 2017, opening of a dedicated account for the purpose of election expenses was essential for every candidate

Since, during the existence of aforesaid order, appellant's account remained frozen and he was unable to utilize the same for the purpose of election expenses, therefore, this fact alone was sufficient to preclude him from contesting the forthcoming elections

Moreover, a criminal case was pending against the appellant in which he was a proclaimed offender and same was not disclosed by him in his affidavit

Furthermore, it was revealed that appellant was also a proclaimed offender in another criminal case for the last many years in which admittedly the appellant had not surrendered before the court of law

Appellant had also concealed that case in his affidavit which amounted to concealment of facts, rendering the appellant ineligible to contest the elections

Impugned order passed by the returning officer being within four corners of law needed to intervention in appeal before the High Court

Present appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery.

The central issue in the present case was whether the suit filed by the appellant, seeking enforcement of exclusive ownership and copyright over a song and restraining the defendants from its unauthorized use, was liable to be rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.

Held: The impugned order was beyond the permissible scope of O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C. as set out in the case reported as PLD 2012 SC 247

Tribunal did not give any consideration to the scope of O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C. and embarked upon adjudicating disputed questions in a summary manner, without recording evidence

The “awareness” of the appellant and the alleged “concealment” could not conceivably be ground for rejection of plaint

Therefore, impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for deciding the same on merits after recording of evidence

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Even if the parties do not enter into a written rent agreement, then it was incumbent upon parties to get a written acknowledgement of monthly rent

Section 5 of SRPO envisages that rent agreement if registerable be registered otherwise it be acknowledged in writing and attested by concerned Rent Controller in whose jurisdiction the premises are situated or by the Magistrate

The law requires doing the things in a particular manner, this provision of law benefits both Landlord and Tenant and preserves their rights of ownership and tenancy and helps resolve any ambiguity

Though this provision of law is directory in nature and in no manner bans tenancy through oral agreement, but in case of any dispute between the parties it will require high standards of proof through oral evidence in absence of written rent agreement.

Filing of an eviction petition itself constitutes sufficient notice to the tenant of the landlord's intention to terminate the tenancy

The institution of eviction proceedings, by necessary implication, serves as an express manifestation of the landlord's desire not to continue the tenancy any further.

Onus on beneficiary of the transaction to prove that transaction was made without any duress and with free consent of the owner

Scope

Contract procured under duress would be void

The present case was about a house that originally belonged to the respondents' family and was inherited by them through an inheritance mutation in 2001

Years later, some financial dealings between the petitioners and respondents went sour after a failed investment project

During this dispute, the respondents' predecessor was arrested and kept in police custody

While in custody, he was made to sign an agreement that transferred the family/inherited house to the petitioners, and a fresh mutation was recorded in their (petitioners') names

The respondents argued that the agreement was forced and had no legal value since it was signed under duress

The legal question before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the agreement for transfer of property, executed by the respondents' predecessor while in police custody, could be treated as a valid transaction reflecting free consent, or whether it stood vitiated by duress and coercion, rendering the subsequent mutation in favor of the petitioners void"?

Held: Since the respondents' predecessor (vendor) was arrested and was in custody, the complainant of the FIR was obviously in a position to dominate the will of accused, and therefore, the burden was upon the petitioner (vendee) to prove that he had not exerted any influence to strike a bargain/deal

The transaction so made was made on the basis of the agreement which was void

The suit of the respondents was filed within time and the petitioner was under heavy burden to prove that transaction made was without any duress and was made with free consent

No evidence was on record which could support the case of the petitioner and that was the reason the High Court dealt with the question extensively and had held rightly that the transaction made consequent to the agreement in police custody was void

No ground was present warranting interference of the Supreme Court in findings given by the High Court

Civil appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Suit seeking compensation against such act is not hit by the provision of S. 273 of Cantonments Act, 1924.

The central issue in the present case was whether the suit filed by the appellant, seeking enforcement of exclusive ownership and copyright over a song and restraining the defendants from its unauthorized use, was liable to be rejected under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.

Held: The impugned order was beyond the permissible scope of O. VII, R. 11 of C.P.C. as set out in the case reported as PLD 2012 SC 247

Tribunal did not give any consideration to the scope of O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C. and embarked upon adjudicating disputed questions in a summary manner, without recording evidence

The "awareness" of the appellant and the alleged "concealment" could not conceivably be ground for rejection of plaint

Therefore, impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for deciding the same on merits after recording of evidence

Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

In a scheme of amalgamation, the requirements of Ss. 281 & 282(2) of the Companies Act, 2017 must be fulfilled by convening meetings of the shareholders and secured creditors of the companies involved, to enable them to vote on the proposed scheme.

Customers filed appeal as the Banking Court, after dismissing their application to leave to defend, decreed suit against them, relying on submitted documents

Validity

Pertinently, S. 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') provides that the plaint shall be "supported" by a "Statement of Account" which shall be duly certified under S. 2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1891 ('the Act 1891')

The "Statement of Account" is a continuous daily posted record showing in detail all debits , credits and balance as on the close of the period , giving dates and description, permitting customer to verify the Bank's record with his own

Therefore, the "statement of account" is a basic document that is filed by a financial institution before the Court in discharge of its mandatory duty under S. 9(2) of Ordinance, 2001

If such "statement of account" is not filed along with the plaint, a customer will obviously remain totally unaware of the record

In the present case, the Statement of Account filed by the Respondent-Bank with plaint in the suit, being incomplete and unsubscribed by the principal accountant or manager, did not fulfill the mandatory requirement of the provisions of S. 9(2) of the Ordinance 2001 and Ss. 2(8) & 4 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1891 ('the Act 1891'), therefore, the same did not qualify as a "Statement of Account" duly certified under the Act 1891, as it did not contain the details of entire transactions between the respondent /Bank and appellants/customers during finance limit period

Besides, Statement of Account was undated and had been subscribed allegedly by an attorney of the Respondent-Bank instead of being subscribed by its principal accountant or the manager, as required under S. 2(8) of the Act 1891

It was only the principal accountant or the manager of the financial institution who alone could certify the statement

Hence, a Statement of Account signed/subscribed by the Attorney of the bank cannot be treated as a duly certified copy within the meaning of S. 2(8) of the Act 1891

It appeared that the Trial/Banking Court had ignored the mandatory provisions of S. 9(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 and Ss. 2(8) and 4 of the Act, 1891 while decreeing the suit of the Respondent and had wrongly treated the Break-up of Account as Statement of Account which did not contain the requisite information and detail as required under proper statement of account; hence, the impugned judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court was not sustainable in law

Appellate / High Court set-aside the judgment and decree as well as dismissal order of application for leave to defend the suit and remanded the case to the Banking Court to decide the application of the appellants for leave to defend as well as the suit afresh, while the respondent-Bank would be at liberty to file proper Statement of Account in terms of S. 9(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 and Ss. 2(8) & 4 of the Act 1891, and in such case, the appellants may raise/file such objections thereon as they may deem fit

Appeal, filed by customer, was allowed accordingly.

Section 17(8) of the Ordinance 2001 expressly empowers the rent controller at the outset of rent proceedings to direct the tenant to deposit all rent due and to continue depositing monthly rent regularly during the pendency of the matter

The purpose of this provision is to ensure the deposition of rent amount to the landlord before the specified date and time during prolonged litigation and to discourage frivolous or dilatory tactics by tenants

Moreover, S.17(9) of the Ordinance provides that if the tenant fails to comply with such direction, his defence may be struck off and the landlord may be placed in possession of the property without further proceedings

These provisions reflect the legislative intent to maintain the balance of rights and obligations between landlords and tenants, and to avoid unnecessary prejudice to either party during litigation.

Contention of the appellants was that with the rescheduling of elections with the approval of Federal Government they had become eligible for contesting the election for the reason that their term of office of members had expired, thus, being no more members of the NCH, they had become eligible to contest the elections

Validity

Election schedule initially issued, under which the last date for the filing of the nomination papers was 27.08.2023, was sacrosanct and could not have been undone or replaced by an altogether new schedule by NCH

Requirement under R. 18 of the Unani Ayurvedic and Homeopathy System Medicine Rules, 1980 (Rules), for the elections of the Council to be held "not less than three months preceding the date on which the term of the members of the Council is due to expire" was reinforced by the insertion of S. 9(5) through Ordinance No. LXI of 2002, which was required to be enforced strictly

Appellants filed their nomination papers when they were indeed members of the Council as the term for which they were elected had not expired, thus, in terms of Ss. 9(3) and (5) of the Unani Ayurvedic and Homeopathy Practitioners Act,1965 (Act), they were not eligible to contest the elections and the Single Judge-in Chambers correctly held that their nomination papers were wrongly accepted by the Returning Officer

Issuance of a new election schedule was not just a clear violation of R. 18 of the Rules and Ss. 9(3) and 9(5) of the Act but would have the effect of making the appellants (who were ineligible to be candidates in the election on the date when they first filed their nomination papers) to become eligible

Under the new schedule, the last date for the filing of the nomination papers was 09.10.2024 and by that date, the term for which the members of the Council were elected, had expired and on the basis of such expiry the erstwhile members of the Council asserted their eligibility for participation in the elections under the new schedule

There was no provision in the Act or the Rules made thereunder which either empowered the Federal Government or NCH to annul the election process after the candidates had filed their nomination papers and issue a new election schedule

Ineligibility of the appellants when they first filed their nomination papers could not be cured by the issuance of a new election schedule

Division Bench of High Court did not suspend the operation of the judgment passed by the Single Judge in Chambers, and NCH was bound to show compliance with the said judgment by initiating the process of the elections "from the stage from which the process was suspended" by the Judge-in-Chambers

By issuing an altogether new schedule, NCH showed contumacious disregard to the directions in the said judgment

Intra Court appeals were dismissed declaring the issuance of an altogether new schedule to be unlawful and in violation of Ss. 9(3) and 9(5) of the Act read with R. 18 of the Rules, and NCH was bound to proceed with the election process from the stage it was halted.

In suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of permission granted to respondents/plaintiffs to lead secondary evidence with regard to legal notice in question without filing application in such regard

Validity

Party may furnish secondary evidence and filing of application seeking permission to lead secondary evidence is not mandatory in every case

Application for leading secondary evidence by a party is not precluded

As filing of a formal application for leading secondary evidence is not mandatory, the stage at which such application is filed becomes irrelevant

Respondents/plaintiffs filed application for the reason that legal notice issued by their counsel, duly referred (by name) in plaint of their suit and copies of postal receipts were appended with plaint and petitioner/ defendant had denied the same, therefore, respondents/plaintiff sought to lead secondary evidence of legal notice

Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction correctly upheld the decision of Trial Court, with independent and cogent reasons

Respondents/plaintiffs made out a prima facie case to lead secondary evidence and prior notice in terms of Art. 77 (1) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was not required, as document intended to be produced itself was a notice

High Court declined to interfere in orders passed by two Courts below

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Court may require the accused to furnish a bond with or without sureties for his future appearance before the Court during trial or commit him to custody as per S.351 of the Cr.P.C. if evidence is available against the accused

Such detention shall then be regulated under S.344 of the Cr.P.C., in order to remand him to custody from time to time and at an appropriate stage his request for bail under S.497, Cr.P.C. can be entertained

When a bond is taken under S. 91 of Cr.P.C. question of bail does not arise because "bail is only for continued appearance of a person and not to prevent him from committing certain acts".

For accepting a confession, two essential requirements must be fulfilled, i.e. the confession was made voluntarily, it was based on true account of facts, leading to the crime and the same was proved at the trial.

Prosecution case was that the accused official Sub-Sale Inspector during his posting at depot, misappropriated the government fertilizer and seed/cotton

Mandatory ingredients to constitute offence under S.409, P.P.C. was entrustment and breach of trust

Bunch of documents though had been adduced in evidence, not a single paper showing the availability of alleged stock had been specifically brought on record to prove the same

Fertilizer as well as seeds of different grain was the items which could not be retained for over years and same being the commodity of particular season was to be sold out/supplied and brought for the purpose

No offence had been constituted in circumstances

Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court.

Two essential requirements must be fulfilled for accepting confession i.e. the confession was made voluntarily, it was based on true account of facts leading to the crime and the same was proved at trial.

For taking admission in a public or private medical college, students from all over the country were to undertake and get through necessary requirement of MDCAT

Mandatory restriction was cast upon under S.18(2) of Pakistan Medical Commission Act, 2020 that a student who did not fulfill requirement of S.18(1) of Pakistan Medical Commission Act, 2020, could not be awarded degree

Requirement of MDCAT was mandatory requirement for admission into medical colleges as well as for awarding degree

Pakistan Medical Commission was created as a regulatory authority, for regulation and control of medical profession and to establish a uniform minimum standard of basic and higher medical education in medicine and dentistry

Functions of a Regulator were comprehensive and exhaustive ranging from formulation of policies, regulations etc. in furtherance of the cause of legislation to administratively govern and oversee implementation of those polices/rules/regulations to ensure that the same were observed in very spirit in which law intended it

If Regulator was barred from exercising any of such functions, the purpose of law would not only be compromised but the intent behind making such law was also jeopardized

High Court declined to interfere in the matter

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Adopting line of questioning on character of victim has effectively been prohibited under Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences Relating to Rape) Act, 2016 by deleting Art. 151(4) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

Past history of victim with reference to her sexual intercourse or her being of easy virtue or habitual to sex is totally unnecessary

Fact regarding past history degrades concerned victim.

Remand order passed by the High Court was set aside and matter was remanded to the High Court with the direction to decide the case itself on the basis of available evidence

Appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Plaint should not be rejected on account of deficiency of Court fee unless plaintiff was afforded a chance to make up the said deficiency.

Publication in newspaper should be made when Court was satisfied that defendant was avoiding service or there was some reason to believe that summons could not be served in ordinary manner

Substituted service should be adopted when ordinary modes of service had been exhausted

Applicant was residing abroad and no summons was sent abroad as required under O.V, R.25, C.P.C.

Nothing was on record that the dispatched summons were delivered or tendered within the meaning of O.V, R.10, C.P.C.

No presumption of service did attach to the summons sent by a private courier service

Prior to publication neither available modes of service had been exhausted nor there was a verification that the modes of service so used had failed

Nothing was on record that applicant was aware with regard to the suit

Summons, in the present case, had not been published under the authority of Trial Court and even publication was not in the prescribed form

Applicant had not been served in the case, in circumstances

Ex parte judgment and decree were set aside and suit was restored.

First requirement of S. 200, Cr.P.C. is to approach the police for lodging FIR and in case of refusal by police to register the case, remedy of direct complaint can be availed.

Issuance of notice in writing under S.14 (1) of Arbitration Act, 1940, to parties as to making of award is considered to be mandatory.

Talb-i-Muwathibat was the first demand through which pre-emptor on coming to know the sale immediately declared his intention to exercise right of pre-emption

Talb-i-Ishhad was performed by sending a notice to vendee in writing attested by two truthful witnesses under registered cover

Right of pre-emption extinguished if pre-emptor failed to perform Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad, in circumstances

Date, time and place of information of sale of suit property were to be mentioned in the plaint to perform Talb-i-Muwathibat, which the pre-emptor had failed to mention in the plaint

Pre-emptor, therefore, had failed to perform Talb-i-Muwathibat properly, in circumstances

Plaintiff had failed to send a notice to the defendant in writing attested by two truthful witnesses under registered cover acknowledgment-due

Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad had not been performed by the pre-emptor, in circumstances

Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit of pre-emptor

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Right of pre-emption is not activated unless Talb-i-Muwathibat is performed, which should not be dubbed as mere technicality, but at times it acquires such dimension that it becomes more important than the superior right because it essentially is a sine qua non of the right of the pre-emption

Talb-i-Muwathibat is termed as immediate demand and must be performed as early as possible on receiving the information about the sale and its immediate performance is, in fact, its beauty and if such fact is not proved, then definitely it can safely be held that demand was not performed in its true spirit.

Where existence and execution of a document had been questioned on the plea of fraud and misrepresentation then onus to prove the transaction and execution of said document with free will and volition would rest upon its beneficiary

Defendant being beneficiary did not recollect the names of witnesses nor did he mention the time of alleged gift in the written statement

Testimony of a person who had allegedly acted as identifier could not be considered to be that of an attesting witness

Donor being an illiterate Pardanasheen lady executed alleged gift without any independent advice and in absence of any of her nears and dears

Defendant was required to prove the alleged gift by independent and credible evidence and also the execution of document

Donee had failed to prove the alleged gift in his favour through any independent evidence

Suit property should have been inherited from the mother-donor to all the siblings as per their Islamic shares

Nothing was on record as to why other legal heirs had been deprived from the suit property through gift deed in favour of defendant

Admission of co-defendant or co-plaintiff could not non-suit the plaintiff or defendant in the suit

No mis-reading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below

Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Distinction existed between "material facts" and "full particulars/material particulars" used in S.144(1) of the Elections Act, 2017 and the same was important because different consequences may flow from deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleadings

Failure to plead even a single material fact led to an incomplete cause of action and if the election petition was based solely on those allegations which were vague and general in nature or lacking in material facts, such petition was liable to be summarily rejected for want of cause of action

Petition which suffered from a deficiency of material particulars, Election Tribunal had discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation.

No requirement existed for filing declaration of assets and liabilities by a candidate who is contestant in a local government election under Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 and Sindh Local Councils (Elections) Rules, 2015

Requirement of disclosure of assets and liabilities as mentioned in Representation of the People Act, 1976 and Conduct of Elections Rules, 1977 could not be read into the scheme of Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 and its provisions, which are specially enacted for local bodies elections.

Even if agreement to sell had been signed on behalf of the co-sharers even then the alleged agreement to sell had not been executed by co-sharers

Agreement to sell could not be enforced legally as the same was not signed by two attesting witnesses

Revision petition was dismissed.

Contention of department was that employee did not render minimum length of service to be entitled to the pensionary benefits

Validity

Employee would be entitled to the benefit of pension if his qualifying service was ten years

Service of employee to qualify for pension would begin when he took charge of the post to which he was first appointed

Employee who had not completed qualifying service period of ten years after being confirmed would not be entitled to the pensionary benefits

Appointment on contract basis was a stopgap arrangement made by the employer to do with day to day affairs of a particular nature of job till either the post of that job was created and filled or till a regular appointment was made thereon

Deceased employee, in the present case, had served on contract basis (from 01-12-1997 to 26-04-2004) against the fixed honorarium which period of service could have been counted or added to his pensionary benefits if he had later on (after being appointed on permanent basis) served for ten years more to qualify for pension

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Respondents raised objection that the appeal was barred by limitation as there was no requirement of appending certified copy of appeal

Plea raised by appellant was that initial filing was within time

Validity

In terms of Chapter 1, R. 4 of Volume V of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders (also applicable to Islamabad High Court), attaching of certified copy of the order or judgment was not required for filing Intra-court appeal

Where initial filing was within period of limitation and objections were raised which subsequently were removed beyond the period prescribed then appeal could not be termed as barred by time

Procedure prescribed under High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders had to be followed

Appeal was not barred by limitation and was filed within time period prescribed

Objection was overruled by High Court in circumstances.

Plaintiff-applicant moved application for production of documents as additional evidence when suit was fixed for final arguments

Trial Court dismissed the said application which was upheld by the revisional court

High Court accepted the writ petition and an opportunity was granted to produce documents

Validity

Plaintiff-applicant only mentioned that he wanted to file copies of jamabandi and khasra girdawari but it was not mentioned as to which year these pertain; what was the effect of non-production and why these documents were necessary to be produced as additional evidence

Documents which came from official custody and were part of official record could be allowed at a subsequent stage if a good cause was shown by the party as to why the documents could not be produced at earlier stage

Where a plaintiff sued upon a document in his possession or power then he should produce the same in the Court when plaint was presented

Plaintiff should file the document or a copy thereof with the plaint and all other documents upon which he relied as evidence in support of his claim

Such document should be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint

Parties should produce at the first hearing of the suit all the documentary evidence in their possession or power which they intended to rely and which had not already been filed in the Court

Plaintiff-applicant had not relied upon the documents to be produced through present application

Present application being ambiguous, could not be accepted

Mere inadvertence could not be a ground for allowing the document at a later stage

Trial Court had not committed any illegality while dismissing the application for production of documents as additional evidence

Revisional Court had rightly refused to exercise revisional powers in circumstances

If High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction reached to the conclusion that Trial Court or Revisional Court had failed to exercise powers and order was against legal provision, writ of mandamus could be issued

High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction could not exercise those powers which were vested in it as an appellate Court

High Court could not sit as an appellate Court on the decision of lower Court in writ jurisdiction

Order impugned before the High Court must be against legal provision for issuance of writ

High Court had accepted writ petition without assigning any reason

Impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and writ petition was dismissed

Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

If appeal was drawn-up in accordance with R.7 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1976 Registrar should entertain the same and if there was any deficiency, Registrar Service Tribunal was to record an order on the memorandum of appeal while pointing out the deficiency and return the same by specifying the time for resubmitting the appeal

If appellant failed to resubmit the appeal after curing the deficiency within the period specified by the Registrar then appeal should be deemed to be dismissed

Registrar Service Tribunal failed to point out that appeal had been filed without annexing the certified copies of mandatory documents

Litigant, in circumstances, should not be penalized due to fault of Tribunal/Court and appeal could not be dismissed.

Plaintiff was bound to prove mala fide, unwanted criminal prosecution and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favour resulting in his honourable acquittal

When a criminal Court acquitted an accused it passed an order by arriving at a definite conclusion that criminal prosecution was falsely lodged and accused was falsely implicated or given benefit of doubt to the accused

When accused was acquitted on account of benefit of doubt, charge could not be considered as mala fide but failed on account of some defective investigation by the police or for any other reason connected therein

Plaintiff, in the present case, was acquitted because of absence of eye-witness which did not provide a cause for claiming damages for malicious prosecution

Findings recorded by the Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence on record

Impugned judgments and decrees did not suffer from any mis-reading or non-reading of evidence

No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error was pointed out in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Posts of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate were advertised wherein two years experience at the Bar was prescribed for eligibility

Application of candidate for the post in question was rejected on the ground of deficiency of experience

Validity

Candidate was enrolled with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council on 09-12-2013

Last date for submission of application to apply the post in question was 19-11-2015

Candidate was short of nineteen days than two years experience at his credit

Candidate while submitting his application form had given an affidavit that he would be responsible if he contravened the conditions

Candidates himself was sentient of the required shortcoming

Candidate's own conduct had estopped him to seek any remedy before any forum

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Single Judge of High Court under Constitutional jurisdiction directed the Returning Officer to hold recounting of ballot papers

Validity

Section 8(b) of Elections Act, 2017 conferred wide powers on the Election Commission to review any order passed by an 'officer' under Elections Act, 2017 or Rules framed thereunder

Orders visualized by the text of S.8(b) of Elections Act, 2017 would also include an order for rejection of ballot paper which was sole prerogative of Returning Officer

Returning Officer was not required to order recounting of ballot papers of all the polling stations of a constituency rather the losing candidate was bound to pinpoint specific polling stations where recounting of ballot papers was required

Returning Officer while passing order on an application of a defeated candidate which was mandatory for putting into motion the process for recounting of votes, had to apply his mind

Process for recounting of ballot papers was neither mechanical nor automatic rather it could only be triggered by an application of a contesting candidate when the margin of victory was less than five percent of the total votes polled or ten thousand votes whichever was less

Such application was to be made before the commencement of consolidation proceedings

Election Commission had been conferred the power to review the order passed by the Returning Officer under S. 95(5) of Elections Act, 2017

Intra-court appeal was not maintainable, in view of remedy of review available with the Election Commission.

Claim for set-off could only be made in a suit for recovery of money.

Any signatory of a document involving financial obligation could not be treated as its marginal witness, until he had signed it in such capacity

Construing the requirements of Arts. 17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 as being procedural rather than substantive and equating the testimony of an identifier with that of attesting witness would not only defeat philosophy of the said provisions, but it would also be violative of its intent and purpose of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.

Under Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 it was imperative that a required number of persons must attest document being its marginal witnesses

Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat provided that such document could only be used as evidence when two attesting witnesses, at least, had been called for the purpose of proving its contents, execution and construction; nothing short of it could prove the same.

Fact regarding loss of original document was required to be proved before leading secondary evidence and by not doing so even if secondary evidence was produced then it would become valueless vitiating all the proceedings built on such secondary evidence.