P L D 1961 Supreme Court 28 (PLP)

(iii) That the setting of the premises cannot be altered to the advantage and benefit of the applicant." He then averred that on the grounds given, he satisfied the conditions contained in the extract from section 10 of the Act quoted above, namely that reasonably and in good faith he required the premises for the reconstruction of a building and for his own use. The Rent Controller went into the matter, and after inspection of the premises, he made his order, and the decision of this case turns upon the legal validity of that order as a "certificate" within the meaning of section 10 of the Act. The Rent Controller first opined that "From the plans and the evidence it is clear that the existing shop will be retained in its present position being enlarged in length only, and the passage which now exists will continue to remain as it is." The mention of the passage has reference to the plea that the landlord's womenfolk would have to use a passage for reaching the upstairs residential quarter which is also used for the "applicant's office". The finding of the Rent Controller therefore is that in the plans for reconstruction, the situation in this respect was going to remain the same. Moreover the other findings by the Rent Controller seem to make it plain that the occasion for the landlord's ladies to use the residential quarter on the top was not likely to arise. The Rent Controller found that Adam Ali was living in another building on Preedy Street in Karachi which is jointly owned by his wife with other persons, and that he could comfortably carry on his "business in the existing premises with him without having to require any further space". It is interesting to note also that in the evidence which Adam Ali gave before the 1st Additional District Judge of Karachi in the suit brought by Abdullah Baloch to challenge the certificate under section 10 of the Act, he stated as under:- "I had not moved the Rent Controller for residential accommodation but for personal use as office. I need an office and also residential accommodation for my brother in Africa who came here as a guest and has to come here permanently." Requirement for the use of his brother would not satisfy the condition of section 10 (2) (c) (ii) of the Act, in the absence of anything to show that the premises were held by him for the A benefit of his brother. Therefore, it seems plain enough that the suggestion that a new passage was required for the use of womenfolk of Adam Ali's family was incorrect. It was rejected by the Rent Controller, who also negatived in plain words the allegation that Adam Ali required further space in these premises for carrying on his own business. It should be mentioned that in evidence before the 1st Additional District Judge, Adam Ali stated that the upper storey above the shop had already been built by him; in other words, the necessity for further construction of the upper storey was by no means clear. The Rent Controller's order shows that he found on inspection that "the back portion proposed to be built under the new plans had already been constructed" and "what remains to be done is to remodel the disputed shop and construct the upper floor." The order of the Rent Controller is dated the 8th March 1954, and Adam Ali gave his evidence before the 1st Additional District Judge on the 13th April 1957, so that it is possible that the construction had been made in the interval of three years which had elapsed. It seems clear also that the occupation by Abdullah Baloch of his glassware shop on the ground floor did not prevent the construction of the upper storey. Adam Ali did not in his evidence allege that there was no access available to him to the upper storey which he had recently built. Therefore, it would seem to follow from the evidence that the upper storey was in existence at the time when the case came before the 1st Additional District Judge, and that the landlord was not at that time in any difficulty regarding access to those quarters. The findings of the Rent Controller on the alleged requirement for residential and office purposes are contained in the following passage:- "It is clear that he has no `reasonable' and `genuine' requirements for residential purposes. From what I have seen I am satisfied that the applicant can carry on his business quite comfortably in the existing premises with him, without having to require any further space." These findings deal with the first two difficulties cited in his application by the landlord, namely, that he had no proper place for his own business and that it was impossible to gain access to these residential quarters without cutting into his own office. They also negatived the allegation that the applicant reasonably and in good faith required the premises "for his own bona fide use." There remained the question of the reconstruction of the premises, and it was with reference to this that the Rent Controller made his final order in the following words:- "I, therefore, decide that the disputed premises are required to be re-constructed, but they are not required by the applicant for his `personal requirement'." In the light of the requirements of section 10 (2) (c) (ii) of the Act, the order is not free from equivocation. The duty of the Rent Controller was to say not only whether there was a requirement, but also whether the requirement was reasonable and was made in good faith. Upon the words used by the Rent Controller, the requirement for the purposes of reconstruction could be either reasonable and in good faith, or reasonable, but not in good faith, or it could not be reasonable, but in good faith, or finally, it could be lacking both reason as well as good faith. At this point, the course of the litigation after the issue of this certificate by the Rent Controller may be conveniently stated. It was open to Abdullah Baloch to seek revision of the Rent Controller's order before the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Karachi, but he did not do so and we are informed that he deliberately refrained, because in the view which he took the Rent Controller's certificate was not valid in law. Adam Ali sued under the Act for ejectment of Abdullah Baloch and obtained an ex parse decree. On the same date an application was made for setting aside the decree on the ground that the defendant was busy depositing arrears of rent up to date in the Small Causes Court when. the case was decided, and that he and his Advocate reached the Court only a few minutes late. The application was rejected summarily, and thereafter, as permitted by section 24 of the Karachi Small Causes Court Act, Abdullah Baloch filed the suit out of which this appeal arises, in the form of a suit for compensation for trespass as well as a declaration that the defendant was not entitled to eject him. The case turned upon the question whether the Rent Controller's "certificate" was valid in law. In the plaint, it was sought to interpret this certificate as if the exclusion of a reference to the reasonableness and good faith of the requirement in the order was deliberate. The reply on this point was that the Rent Controller's order was the sole and sufficient proof of its contents, and this view was expressly upheld in the judgment of the 1st Additional District Judge whose finding on the point is contained in the following words :- "The Rent Controller's certificate may not be challenged in a Civil Court. It is in itself a proof of the facts contained in it. The Rent Controller has decided that the defendant had failed to prove personal requirements. He was, however, of the opinion that the premises were validly required for reconstruction. Reconstruction is one of the purposes for which the ejectment certificate may be issued . . . . . The fact that the construction has been undertaken proves the bona fides of the defendant." Upon this principle ground the suit was dismissed and the plaintiff appealed to the High Court where also the same contention was raised, namely, that the "certificate" was not valid. The learned Judges in the High Court dealt with the matter in the following words :- "It is contended before us by learned counsel for the appellant that the certificate does not use the words `reasonably and in good faith' as is required by section 10 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, and, therefore, the certificate is invalid in law. It is true that these words are not used by the learned Rent Controller but this is implied in his order. The application had been submitted to him under section 10 and he knew very well what he was required to decide. We should assume that he decided the matter which he was called upon to decide." They also dealt with a further contention, namely, whether mere reconstruction on the original plan is within the meaning of the word "reconstruction" in the Act, and they found in the landlord's favour on the ground that it was "hardly possible to argue that in case there is no change in the structure there is no reconstruction of a building". This point has not been argued before us and it is therefore unnecessary for us to express any opinion upon it. But as to the other finding, namely, that the Rent Controller's "certificate" should be deemed to certify also that the premises were required for reconstruction "reasonably and in good faith", we do not find that such an assumption can properly be made upon the facts of the present case, and the findings recorded by the Rent Controller, himself. It is arguable that the Rent Controller's "certificate" under section 10 (2) being in the nature of an enabling document in law, must in order to be effective, satisfy all the formal requirements of law. At the same time, if in substance, the finding were one which met those requirements, even though certain words enjoined by the law were not expressly used, the Courts would not easily be moved to avoid such a certificate. But in the present case we find that the landlord had, in his application to the Rent Controller, linked up the requirement of reconstruction with his own personal requirement expressly and in the most specific manner. The findings of the Rent Controller specifically negative each of the personal requirements alleged by the landlord. These findings must therefore necessarily react upon the allegation of reasonable and bona fide requirement for reconstruction. Requirement for reconstruction, for the sake of reconstruction, is not a valid requirement to enable a landlord to obtain ejectment of a tenant under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953. It must be a reasonable and bona fide requirement, and the landlord being conscious of the requisites of law in this respect had specified the reasons which led him to plan and carrying out reconstruction of the building. These reasons were found to be inadequate and insubstantial from the point of view of the Act. They were founded on personal requirements, and the personal requirements specified were individually negatived by the Rent Controller. Therefore, the position arose that while the landlord's desire to reconstruct the premises was apparent, it was not supported by any reason which could be sound in law for the ejectment of his tenant, for the reasons which he gave were found to have no validity and the question whether he put them forward in good faith became immaterial. On the facts in the case, it is possible also to doubt his good faith, for, as has been seen, he admitted that he intended the new accommodation on the upper floor for the use of a brother who was still in Africa and was still to return to Pakistan. That floor, and presumably the access to that floor have actually been constructed without the necessity of having the plaintiff's shop vacated. In these circumstances, we have asked ourselves whether the omission by the Rent Controller to declare that the requirement for reconstruction was made "reasonably and in good faith" was not conscious and deliberate. In the view we take, the absence of these words from the order of the Rent Controller does not merely have the effect of rendering the order defective in the light of the specific requirement of section 10 (2) (c) (ii) of the Act, but it is also founded upon absence of material to justify the belief that the requirement was based on good reason and was made in good faith. For these reasons, we allow this appeal and setting aside the judgments of the Courts below, we grant the plaintiff a decree :- (1) for the sum of Re. 1 as compensation for trespass, and (2) for a declaration as prayed with proportionate costs throughout. A. H.??? Appeal allowed.