P L D 1961 Supreme Court 613 (PLP)

B. Z. KAIKAUS, J. ‑This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the Central Industrial Court, Karachi, passed under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959 directing that Ghulam Muhammad Khan respondent be re‑instated in service. Some disputes having arisen between the Management of the Maple Leaf Cement Factory (the appellant in this appeal) and the Maple Leaf Cement Factory Employees' Union, the matter was referred to the Conciliation Officer under section 5 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance. No settlement could be effected and the Conciliation Officer having issued a certificate to that effect the Maple Leaf Factory Employees' Union submitted an application to the Industrial Court under section 5 (4) for adjudication and determination of, the industrial disputes. While proceedings were pending before the Industrial Court Ghulam Muhammad respondent, a temporary employee of the Maple Leaf Cement Factory, was discharged from service. Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance prohibits discharge, of a workman during the pendency of any proceedings before any industrial Court, and section 31 provides that in case there is a violation of section 30 the aggrieved employee can approach the Industrial Court for adjudication of the matter as if it were an industrial dispute. Ghulam Muhammad submitted an application to the Industrial Court complaining against his discharge and seeking re‑instatement. The appellant opposed the application on the ground that Ghulam Muhammad respondent was a temporary employee employed for a specific job which had come to an end. The Industrial Court considered whether Ghulam Muhammad was a "workman" according to the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act and finding that he was such workman it ordered his reinstate ment. The contentions of learned counsel for the appellant before us are : ‑ (i) the termination of the services of a temporary employee by lapse of time in accordance with the conditions of his ser vice or on account of the termination of the work for which he was employed is not a discharge within the meaning of section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Act; (ii) no discharge is a discharge within the meaning of that section unless it is by way of punishment. It will be proper to state here the details of the employment of Ghulam Muhammad respondent. On the 1st of January 1960, sanction was granted by the Manager of the Factory for employment of some coolies at Rs. 2 per day for the erection of second kiln (a temporary construction) for a period of three months which was to expire op the 5th of April 1960. Ghulam Muhammad respondent was one of the persons employed by virtue of this sanction. The work for which he was employed was not finished by the 5th of April 1960, and by another sanction, dated the 5th of April 1960, the period for which lie could be employed was extended upto the 4th of July 1569. The work actually came to an end on the 15th of May 1960 when his services were terminated. Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959, as it stood on the date on which the order under appeal was passed ran :‑ "Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged during pendency of proceedings.‑No employer shall during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Court in respect of any industrial dispute, alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings, nor, save with the express permission in writing of the Conciliation Officer' or Court, as the case may be, shall be during the pendency of such proceedings, discharge, dismiss, or otherwise punish any such workmen." In support of his first contention learned counsel for the appellant refers to the words appearing in this section prohibit ing alteration of the conditions of service, and argues that the section is not intended to apply when there is no change in such conditions. He also relies upon the word `otherwise' used in the last portion of the section which, according to him, supports an inference that only a discharge by way of punishment is within the purview of this section. It appears to us clear that the intention of section 30 could not be to extend the period of employment in case the employ ment is for a specific period or is only for executing a particular job. If, for instance, a person was employed only for five days in a leave vacancy the intention could not be that after the expiry of these five days he should continue to be employed although the incumbent of the post who was on leave has returned, just because during those five days a dispute was submitted to the Industrial Court. Similarly, if a mason was employed for repairing wall of the factory, and the repairs finished in two days the intention could not be that he should continue to be employed, although there is no work for a mason at all in the Factory just because of the reference of some dispute to the Industrial Court within those two days. The intention of the law" is to prohibit interference with the conditions of service of workmen during the pendency of dispute and not to impose fresh periods of service inconsistent with the agreement of parties. , Section 30 is not intended to take away the right of the employer to employ persons for specific periods or specific jobs in cases where there has been reference to the Industrial Court of some dispute, or to force upon the employer persons whose' services are not needed by him. We may observe that Mr. Khurshid Zaman who passed the order under appeal has himself in two later cases as Allah Diwaya v. The General Manager, Pak‑American Fertilizer Factory, Daudkhel (1960 P L C 1229) and Multan son of Ramzan v. Makerwal and Gullokhel Collieries (1961 P L C 1443), held that the discharge of a person employed for a specific period or for a specific job is not a discharge within the meaning of section

30. In view of the fact that we hold on the first contention in favour of the appellant it is not necessary, to decide whether the discharge under section 30 means only a discharge as a punishment. This appeal is allowed and the order of the Industrial Court is set aside, but there is no order as to costs as Ghulam Muhammad respondent has not appeared to oppose this appeal. A. H. Appeal allowed.