Suit dismissed for non-prosecution
Suit dismissed for non-prosecution legal meaning, translation and judicial precedents.
Meaning & Judicial Interpretation: (اردو مفہوم اور قانونی تشریح)
Alienation of suit property after dismissal of suit for non-prosecution and before its restoration falls within the sphere of lis pendens
Factual background of present case was that appellants / plaintiffs (pre-emptors) filed a suit for possession through pre-emption against respondent No. 5 (vendor) regarding the suit land claiming the sale price was Rs.200,000, while respondent No.5 asserted that it was Rs.250,000
Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and was later on restored
After dismissal of suit and before its restoration, respondent No.5 (vendor) sold the property to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees)
During pendency of the suit, respondent No. 5 (vendor) made a statement before the trial court that the original vendor could be summoned to confirm the actual sale consideration and that whatever amount the vendor admitted to have received could be treated as the sale price for decreeing the suit
The only question before the Trial Court requiring determination was the price of the suit land and respondent No.5 had no objection if the original vendor was summoned for ascertaining the actual amount of sale, but the Trial Court did not accede to the request of the appellant and proceeded to frame the issues
Trial Court dismissed the said request but the revisional court accepted it, decreeing the suit
Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees) challenged the revisional court verdict before the High Court, whereby, the decree was set aside and the matter was remanded for decision on merits, prompting the present appeal by the preemptor concerning the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens
Primary question warranting determination before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of the pre-emption suit despite a stay order, were bound by the statement of their predecessor-in-interest under the rule of lis pendens, and whether the appellant (pre-emptor), who had already deposited the amount of Rs.250,000/- in compliance with that statement, could claim that the transaction was struck by lis pendens and was entitled to have the suit decreed?"
Held: So far as the argument that the property was purchased during the period when the suit was dismissed, therefore, the principle of lis pendens did not apply to the case of the subsequent buyers, the said argument had no force, because if a suit was dismissed and then restored, the restoration order related to back period and a transfer/sale after dismissal and before restoration was subjected to the principle of lis pendens embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
However, in the present case, the petitioners purchased the disputed property through a mutation when the proceedings in the suit were in progress after its restoration after dismissal for non-prosecution
Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had acquired the title to the suit property subject to the final outcome of the lis and as such were bound by the result of the suit stricto sensu in all respects, as their transferor i.e. respondent No.5 was bound
High Court erred in law while passing the impugned order, which suffered from material illegality, therefore, same could not be allowed to sustain further
Resultantly, the impugned order was set aside and appeal was allowed, in circumstances.
Question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to "Whether the revisional court exercising jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. could reverse the discretionary findings reached by the Trial Court in exercise of its lawful jurisdiction while condoning the delay in filing of application for restoration of suit?"
Held: In the impugned orders it was found that the restoration application was barred by time, whereas, it was revealed from perusal of the paper-book that the application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was available which escaped the attention of the revisional court
Supreme Court did not agree with the reasoning assigned by the revisional court which was appreciated by the High Court through the impugned order that such grounds as disclosed in the restoration application could have been considered had it been filed within thirty days of order
Had the application been filed within thirty days, the condonation application was not required
Condonation application was filed when statutory period for filing restoration application had lapsed
Such delay was then required to be explained in the condonation application which the petitioner did and the Trial Court was in consonance with the grounds mentioned therein when it accepted the applications both for restoration and condonation
The impugned orders of the High Court and that of the revisional court were set aside and the order of the Trial Court was restored
Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances.
Within Civil Procedure Code, 1908, time frames are provided to regulate cycle of a dispute that enters adjudicatory process
If such time frames are not abided by, the cost inflicted on public interest is debilitating
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, confers penal powers on Court to enforce prescribed time lines to move along adjudication of suit in order to conclude proceedings within a reasonable period of time
Entire scheme is meant to ensure that justice is delivered according to law within time lines prescribed by law
Order of restoration of suit absolved respondent / plaintiff of his obligation to establish sufficient cause as required under O.IX, R.9, C.P.C.
Trial Court did not bring into consideration the question of whether or not respondent / plaintiff had sufficient cause for his non-appearance while allowing his application
Trial Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction under law
Trial Court was under obligation to apply test of sufficient cause and had documented its reasons as to why its conscience was satisfied that non-appearance of respondent / plaintiff before Trial Court on date fixed was excusable in accordance with law
High Court set aside order restoring the suit and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on application
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Term "sufficient cause" had not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 nor could a specific yardstick be put in place for determining what constituted "sufficient" cause and what did not; it always depended upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and it had to be left to the judicial conscience of the Court to make an informed assessment as to whether the cause disclosed by the plaintiff was a reason good enough to satisfy the Court that it was beyond the reasonable control of the party concerned to appear before the Court on the date fixed for hearing
Party seeking to claim benefit of O. IX, R. 9(1), C.P.C must establish "sufficient" cause, bona fides and due diligence.
Suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed for non-prosecution and was conditionally restored on the basis of a conceding statement of the defendants
However, such restoration was conditional upon payment of costs which were admittedly never paid by the plaintiffs
Further, at no stage was any application moved seeking extension of time for payment of costs
Even if such lapse on part of the plaintiffs as well as the Trial Court, which failed to notice the non-fulfillment of the condition imposed in its order, was ignored, the lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs in pursing their suit was self-evident from the fact that the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution again, for the second time
Although the application for restoration of suit was filed within time but mere filing of a restoration application not sufficient
In the application for restoration of suit the cause for non-appearance of plaintiff and his counsel on date fixed for hearing was mentioned as some important business
Such reason was unspecific, vague and generalized which could not by any stretch of the language be termed as 'sufficient cause' to fulfill requirements of O. IX, R. 9, C.P.C.
Furthermore record showed that suit was filed in 2005, issues were framed in 2006 and for the next ten years not a single witness was produced by the plaintiffs notwithstanding the reasons for such delay which in any event did not furnish any justification for the litigation in question dragging on at a snail's pace
Such delay and lack of progress was largely attributable to the plaintiffs
Application for restoration of suit filed by the plaintiffs had been rightly rejected by the High Court
Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.
Tax Reference/Application filed before the High Court under S.133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance')
Dismissed for non-prosecution
Application for restoration of the Tax Reference/ Application, limitation for
Since Reference/Application under S.133(1) of the Ordinance was in effect an appeal, Art. 168 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908 was fully applicable and provided 30 days as the period of limitation for readmission or restoration of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution.
Where a suit was wholly or partly dismissed under O. IX, R. 8, C.P.C. then plaintiff would be precluded from filing a fresh suit with regard to same cause of action.
Trial Court accepted the petition for restoration of suit but Appellate Court dismissed the same observing that petition was time-barred
High Court set aside the order of Appellate Court and restored the order of Trial Court
Validity
Date of dismissal of suit for non-prosecution was not the date of hearing
Dismissal of suit was unwarranted which was rightly restored by the Trial Court
Order passed by the Appellate Court was not consistent with statutory provision as well as principles of law
Appellate Court while passing the order had not applied the correct law and High Court had rightly exercised the writ jurisdiction and applied the correct law
Suit could be dismissed for non-appearance of plaintiff under O. IX, R. 8, C.P.C. if the date was fixed for hearing
If date was not fixed for hearing then neither suit could be dismissed nor ex-parte order could be passed
If any such order was passed then it would be deemed as without jurisdiction and nullity in the eye of law
If suit was dismissed for non-prosecution when the date was not fixed for hearing then limitation would be governed under Art. 181 and not 163 of Limitation Act, 1908
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Contention of appellant was misconceived as time for readmission of appeal for non-prosecution was 30 days as provided under Art.168 of Limitation Act, 1908
In the present case, after about 14 months, application for restoration was filed and nothing had come on record if the court-fees amount was paid to advocate
Affidavit of counsel for the appellant showed that brothers and sisters of appellant were ready to pay court fee, which legally could not be allowed after a long period of about more than three years from the date of preferring appeal
For seeking condonation of delay sufficient cause was to be shown for default and each day's delay was to be explained before the court which had not been done
High Court declined to condone the delay in filing restoration application and consider application filed by appellant for payment of court-fee
Application was dismissed in circumstances.
Previous default, if any, was not to be taken into consideration while deciding an application under O. IX, R. 9, C.P.C.
Present suit was not to be dismissed for non-prosecution but proper course was to proceed the matter under O. XVII, R. 3, C.P.C.
Impugned order passed by the Trial Court was without jurisdiction and nullity in law
Suit could have been decided on merits after recording evidence of defendant
If suit was not fixed for hearing but was fixed only for hearing of some interlocutory application or for any other miscellaneous proceedings then Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the same for non-prosecution
No ex parte order should be passed in early hour of the day but matter should be kept aside and again be called in second part of the day and ex parte order could be passed at the end of the day
Court was to note the exact time of passing ex-pate order in the diary/order sheet
Impugned order was set aside and Trial Court was directed to decide the matter within two months
Appeal was allowed in circumstances.
Plaintiff would be obliged to show sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance and explain delay of each and every day
Principles.
Plaintiff's plea was that after withdrawal of Vakalatnama by his earlier counsel, no notice was issued to him; and that court was required to issue him notice for each and every date
Validity
Court had given specific date and reasonable time to plaintiff either to engage another counsel or pursue his earlier counsel to proceed with the case
Duty of plaintiff was to pursue his case vigilantly and engage another counsel and not to act recklessly
Court in such circumstances was not bound to send notice to plaintiff for each and every date
Such application was dismissed in circumstances.
Plaintiff's plea was that after withdrawal of Vakalatnama by his earlier counsel, no notice was issued to him; and that court was required to issue him notice for each and every date
Validity
Court had given specific date and reasonable time to plaintiff either to engage another counsel or pusue his earlier counsel to proceed with the case
Duty of plaintiff was to puruse his case vigilantly and engage another counsel and not to act recklessly
Court in such circumstances was not bound to send notice to plaintiff for each and every date
Such application was dismissed in circumstances.
Plaintiff would be obliged to show sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance and explain delay of each and every day
Principles.
Record showed that relevant date had been fixed by Reader of court on a previous date, when Presiding Judge was on leave
Neither presence of plaintiff was required on relevant date nor same was a date of hearing
Suit was restored in circumstances.
"Suit dismissed for non-prosecution", Pakistan Law Portal, available at: https://paklawportal.com/words-terms-maxims/124940303
Precedents & Case Laws citing "Suit dismissed for non-prosecution"
1981 C L C 1326
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IRFANUDDIN — Plaintiff Versus PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. — Defendant
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NAJEEB MEHMOOD — Petitioner Versus CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY through Chairman, C.D.A. — Respondent
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Mst. GOHAR TAJA — Petitioner Versus SAJID and others — Respondents
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