Locus Standi

Record showed that judgment was passed against six respondents, yet only the Education Department filed the (present) appeal

Notably, the Agriculture Department, which claimed to be the allottee of the disputed land, had not challenged the High Court's judgment that declared it not a valid allottee

It was perplexing that the alleged allottee (Agricultural Department) had chosen not to dispute the High Court's conclusion, while a third party, the Education Department, was asserting the Agriculture Department's status as the allottee, which was a very strange aspect of the matter

Thus, in the present case , the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents

The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference

Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed.

Appellant challenged, before the Service Tribunal, a notification vide which the respondent was granted time (notification-in-question), however, the same was dismissed

Validity

Admittedly, after issuance of notification-in-question, the appellant was also granted time scale (BS-20), vide notification dated 24.12.2020, w.e.f. 21.10.2019, after completion of the required length of service

Appellant accepted the said notification and appended the same with the concise statement

In case, the appellant was not satisfied with the date he was granted the time scale, then he should have challenged the said notification by way of appeal

Appellant did not challenge the same for modification, hence he was legally estopped to challenge the notification-in-question

Under the provisions of S. 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act, 1975, a civil servant/appellant has to satisfy the Court that his/her terms and conditions of service have adversely been affected

If a civil servant/appellant fails to point out any violation of the terms and conditions of his/her service, then legally he/she has got no cause of action to file the appeal

In the present case, after completion of the required length of service, the appellant had been granted time scale (BS-20), vide relevant notification (dated 24.12.2020, w.e.f. 21.10.2019) and he accepted the said notification, therefore, he had got no locus standi to challenge the notification-in-question, whereby, the private-respondent was granted time scale (BS-20)

Under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1975, a civil servant is competent to prefer an appeal only if he is found to be an aggrieved person

Thus, Service Tribunal had committed no illegality while dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant

Appeal, being merit-less, was dismissed with costs.

Applicants invoked S.12(2) of C.P.C. to assail the High Court judgment which had attained finality and declared the general power of attorney as fictitious and bogus, thereby invalidating subsequent mutations executed on its strength

The original defendants (respondents Nos. 8 to 13) had actively contested the suit through trial, appeal, and revision but failed

Applicants claiming to be subsequent purchasers of the suit property through those very defective mutations argued that they were not parties to the earlier proceedings and had been denied the opportunity to defend their rights

However, as their alleged title stemmed entirely from a void and fraudulent power of attorney, their claim remained tainted by the same foundational defect, leaving them without any independent or superior right

Therefore, the pivotal question arisen for determination before the High Court as to "whether the application under S.12(2) of C.P.C. was maintainable by subsequent purchasers who acquired interest in the suit property only through mutations rooted in a general power of attorney already declared fictitious and void, when importantly, such applicants neither held title nor had any subsisting legal interest at the time of the original litigation and final judgment which had attained finality?"

Held: Admittedly, respondents Nos.8 to 13 (original defendants) actively contested the suit at all three stages; trial, appellate, and revisional

However, the general power of attorney allegedly executed in favour of respondent No. 13 was conclusively held to be fictitious and bogus

Consequently, the land transfers effected through mutations, attested on 31.10.1970, on the strength of the said power of attorney, were declared defective

It was undisputed that the applicants derived their title from those very mutations

Therefore, their claim was tainted by the same foundational defect

The legal maxim "nemo dat quod non habet" i.e. one cannot transfer what one does not possess, squarely applied to the present case

Since the original defendants had no valid title to convey, the applicants, having derived title through them, acquired no better or independent right

Having stepped into the shoes of the original defendants, the applicants were bound by the same fate; both must sail or sink together

Position of the applicants was devoid of legal sanctity

The judgment of the High Court dated 27.02.2006, having attained finality, conclusively held the general power of attorney to be fictitious and the consequent mutations based thereon as defective

Any subsequent transactions flowing from such a defective title stood vitiated in the eyes of law

The applicants, having derived their title from respondents Nos. 8 to 13, who themselves held no valid title, could not claim any superior or independent right

Action taken by the revenue authorities, whereby they cancelled all subsequent mutations rooted in the defective mutations in question, including those in favour of the applicants, was not only in accordance with law but also a necessary consequence to uphold the sanctity of the final judicial determination passed by the High Court

Record unequivocally reflected that at the time when the original suit was instituted, contested, and ultimately decided, culminating in the judgment passed by the High Court, the present applicants neither held title nor had any demonstrable connection with the suit property or the litigation arising therefrom

No mutation stood attested in their favor during the pendency of the earlier proceedings, and their alleged interest in the property only materialized through subsequent mutations executed by respondents Nos. 8 to 13, post-finality of the said judgment

The applicants were complete strangers to the prior litigation and could not claim to have been prejudiced by a judgment rendered at a time when they held no legal or proprietary interest in the property

The mere fact of acquiring property at a later stage through a chain of title already declared defective did not confer upon them the right to challenge the judgment collaterally through an application under S.12(2) C.P.C.

Such an application could be maintainable only where the applicant had a direct and existing legal interest therein at the relevant time

The applicants, therefore, lacked the requisite locus standi to maintain the present proceedings, and their claim amounted to an impermissible attempt to reopen settled issues by way of indirect challenge, which the law did not recognize

Application under S.12(2) of C.P.C. was without merit and same was dismissed, in circumstances.

The intention of the legislature to legislate subsection 2 of S.12 of C.P.C. was to curtail litigation and not to enhance the same

The expression "any person" in S.12(2) of C.P.C. does not imply an unqualified right of audience to any outsider; it must be understood to mean a person who is genuinely aggrieved, i.e., one whose rights were directly affected by the impugned judgments at the time it was passed

This necessarily presupposes that such person had a subsisting legal interest in the subject matter of the lis when the judgment was rendered

Absent such an interest, no grievance can be legitimately raised, for the principle "ubi jus ibi remedium" (where there is a right, there is a remedy)only operates where a corresponding legal right is first established.

Petitioner/Company, claiming itself as creditor of respondents/Company, filed petition for winding-up of respondents / Company while a civil suit filed by the petitioner (plaintiff) for recovery against the respondents remained pending adjudication

Validity

Petitioner failed to cite exact provision or circumstance of the Companies Act, 2017 ('the Act, 2017') which had been ignored or violated, due to which the instant petition was instituted

Petitioner also remained unable to provide any cogent document / reason to establish that the petitioner was indeed a creditor of the Company, and/or that they definitively owed monies by the respondent / Company, which the said Company was unable to pay

Company jurisdiction is founded under S. 5 of the Act, 2017, and S. 301 of the Act, 2017 deals with matters pertaining to winding-up of companies

Per S. 301 of the Act, 2017, there are several requirements provided under which a company may be wound up

In the present matter, none of such/those obligations had been legitimately argued or established by the petitioner

Ergo, since none of those circumstances had been established, the requirements to invoke jurisdiction of this Court remained unfulfilled, and hence, present petition was non-maintainable as at the best it was a commercial dispute between the petitioner and respondents, which was already in the process of adjudication before the civil court

Whilst there is no bar on winding-up proceedings commencing when there is a civil suit pending, but the jurisdiction under S. 5 of the Act, 2017 must still be first formed, showing that some violation or incurrence, creating a causation under the Companies Act, 2017, has occurred

The requirements for winding-up a company are entirely separate from a commercial dispute / claim

A claim for commercial recovery cannot be equated with a demand for winding-up, both of which follow separate conditions and constraints

Petition for winding-up, being entertain able, was dismissed, in circumstances.

A foreign accused who was in custody of Pakistani authorities on the charges of espionage and terrorism, for his release of whom, International Court of Justice was approached, could invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199, against death sentence handed down against him by the Field General Court martial, appeal against which was rejected by the appellate court.

Whether such application could be maintained only by the arbitrator or also by any of the parties to the arbitration agreement

Powers and discretion of court to enlarge time for making an award

Scope

The petitioner's application under S. 28 of Arbitration Act, 1940 (the Act) was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that it was only the arbitrator who could seek such extension, giving rise to the present petition

Core legal question for determination before the High Court was as to "Whether under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, application for enlargement of time for making an arbitral award could only be filed by the arbitrator, or whether any party to the arbitration agreement also had the legal standing (locus standi) to move the court for such extension" ?

Held: plain language of S. 28 of the Act made it evident that there was no explicit or implicit requirement that an application for enlargement of time be filed by an arbitrator

The language of S. 28(1) of the Act did not specify as to who would have the standing to move the court for enlargement of time for making an award

In terms of S. 28 of the Act, any party to the arbitration agreement had legal standing to move the court for enlargement of time

Court had wide discretion and jurisdiction to enlarge the time limit for making an award especially where the request for extension of time was not a joint request made by both the parties to the arbitration agreement

Such extension could be sought and granted on more than one occasion

However, discretion vested in the court to grant extension of time ought not to be exercised in favor of a person who had adopted dilatory tactics

It was not for the High Court to determine whether or not extension was to be granted in the present matter as the said question was to be determined in the first instance by the civil court

Impugned order was not sustainable and was therefore set aside

Application filed by the petitioner was to be deemed pending before the civil court

Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Two councilors of the Union Council/UC,as proposer and seconder, moved a resolution of no-confidence against their elected Chairman of UC, which motion of no-confidence was defeated

Chairman-UC sought the Election Commission of Pakistan ('ECP') to de-notify the respondents /councilors as the motion of no-confidence was defeated, and thus, the said councilors ceased to be members of the council in view of S.33 of the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010

Election Appeal was filed by the Chairman-UC (Appellant) against the order passed by the Election Tribunal, whereby the appellant's appeal was dismissed

Validity

There was an inherent defect in the case set up by the appellant, as S.37 of the Act 2010 stipulates that no election under the Act 2010 shall be called in question except by an election petition made by a candidate for the election

Appellant was not a candidate nor any election was challenged; rather, the issue was vote of no confidence which squarely fell within the ambit of S.33(a) of the Act 2010

Thus, the Election Appeal filed by the appellant was rightly dismissed by the Election Tribunal

No case for interference was made out

Appeal, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Husband pleaded that petitioners/parents of his deceased wife had no locus standi to file a family suit for recovery of dowry articles

Validity

Jurisdiction of a Family Court is circumscribed and is restricted to the "matters" mentioned in S. 5, Sched., which shows that it does not empower a Family Court to adjudicate upon a claim of a party qua his/her right of inheritance or Tarka

Petitioners being parents of deceased spouse, who was wife of defendant/respondent, sought share in the dowry articles being Tarka, for which they had approached the Family Court by way of filing a suit for recovery of dowry article and since determination of share in the Tarka of a deceased or its distribution did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Family Court, thus, suit was not maintainable and they had no locus standi to approach the Family Court

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Application, filed by appellant/union, praying that the respondent/union be declared as hearing ceased to exist, was dismissed

Whether the appellant / union had the locus standi to challenge the registration of the other union?

Held: The appellant/union had not proved itself the aggrieved party in the matter

The matter of registration of a union was one between a trade union applying for registration and the Registrar, and other pre-existing trade unions or the employer had no say /concern in the matter

One trade union cannot be an aggrieved party by registration of another union because such action would not violate any of the right granted by the Industrial Relations laws

No other trade union has any concern or say in the matter of another trade union

Appellant / union had no say in the matter and was not an aggrieved party

The member or officer bearer of rival union cannot be permitted to interfere in internal affairs of a union because such like interference if allowed will open a floodgate of litigation and would amount to frustrating the object of the formation of union

No illegality or infirmity had been noticed in the impugned dismissal order

Appeal, filed by rival union, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Public Interest Litigation is an extraordinary jurisdiction enabling the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to address questions of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights of the public at large, particularly where disadvantaged or unorganized segments of society are unable to approach the Court themselves

Such jurisdiction has been exercised in matters of environment, human rights, detention, labour, prisoners, health, education, and transparency in governance

However, it is settled by now that Public Interest Litigation cannot be misused for private motives or publicity and the petitioner must establish bona fide intent supported by credible material to justify judicial intervention

Public Interest Litigation, though entertained with a liberal approach, must be founded upon some credible material demonstrating violation of law or infringement of fundamental rights

Mere bald assertions, unaccompanied by documents or evidence, cannot constitute a valid cause for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution.

Contention of the petitioner was that his juniors had been posted to higher posts but as per departmental practice petitioner being the senior most officer was a legitimate expectant for the higher post

Validity

Petitioner was much senior to respondents, who were holding managerial posts of Dock Master and Deputy Harbour Master, while the petitioner was posted as Pilot/Tug Commander

As per past practice the seniors in rank had been posted on the said positions, thus, petitioner had legitimate expectation of being treated in the same way owing to uniform practice and policy made and adopted by the administrative authorities of the PQA, and since such legitimate expectation had been eliminated, it had afforded locus standi to petitioner to challenge the administrative action of the respondents through the constitutional petition

PQA Service Regulations itself provided a pattern and design of posts in ranks one to six under Operations Cadre (Marine Operations) of PQA, which were to be assigned as per seniority roll; otherwise, it would cast doubts over the fair and square acts of the respondents in all matters encompassing legitimate expectation, thus, High Court repelled the plea of the respondents that past practice could never substitute codified law

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances, with directions to respondents to assign a post to petitioner as per seniority roll.

Petitioner in public interest assailed establishing of a residential scheme by a private company allegedly in the vicinity of Cantonment and an Airbase

Validity

Petitioner had no interest at all in the housing scheme in question and its development had no effect on him

Petitioner was not an aggrieved person under Art. 199 of the Constitution and his Constitutional petition was not maintainable

Petitioner sought relief of declarations/directions against private individuals and as such his petition was not maintainable under Art. 199(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution, as the respondents/ private persons were not performing functions in connection with the affairs of Federation, Province or a local authority

Even no fundamental right of petitioner had been infringed

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Respondent/complainant alleged that petitioner/accused facilitated falsification of NADRA record reflecting an adopted child as his son

Plea raised by petitioner/accused was that question of paternity could not be determined by brining criminal charges

Validity

No negative declaration can be sought under S. 42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 with regard to paternity of an individual

Law only vests a right in an individual to seek a positive declaration regarding his/her paternity

Even a father cannot deny paternity of a child beyond the period prescribed in Art. 128 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

No third party, including a putative brother or sister or a family member or a relative, has locus standi to challenge paternity of an individual as no evidence can be accepted to negate statutory declaration made by Art. 128 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984

Prohibition against bringing a challenge against paternity of an individual is designed to protect right of such individual to dignity and privacy guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution, as well as the collective interest of society in protecting rights and interests of women and children, including privacy, identity, and reputation of children from being besmirched from allegations of illegitimacy

Complainant sought to abuse process of law to question legitimacy and identity of child for pecuniary gain and in doing so he had used provisions of P.P.C. and Cr.P.C. to put pressure on the petitioner to enter into a settlement after instigating arrest of petitioner in relation to FIR in question

High Court in exercise of extraordinary Constitutional power, quashed FIR. in question that should never have been registered as no cognizable offence was made out in view of the petitioner claiming that he was father of minor as was reflected in various documents which were alleged to have been fabricated by petitioner

High Court imposed costs of Rs. 100,000/- upon respondent/complainant

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

While considering validity of arbitration award within the limbo of S. 30 of Arbitration Act, 1940, Court does not sit as a Court of appeal and avoids reappraisal of evidence

Parties resorted to arbitration of their free will, thereof, award has become final in relation to facts as well as in law and interference therewith by Court was hardly merited unless there existed patent illegality or specific grounds as enunciated in Arbitration Act, 1940

Award was exceptionable and could be interfered with only in cases where there surfaced an error on the face of record not requiring scrutiny beyond Award for discovering the same

Award could be filed by not just the arbitrator/umpire but by parties to arbitration proceedings as well

Arbitrator/umpire was not obligated under S. 14 of Arbitration Act, 1940, to provide the parties with signed copies of the award

Provision of S. 14 of Arbitration Act, 1940, did not pose obstacle before arbitrator/umpire from providing un-signed copies of the award to parties

Where arbitrator/umpire provided the parties with signed copies of the award, they or any of them were at liberty to file the same in Court on the basis of R. 10 of Rules under Arbitration Act, 1940

High Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Trial Court

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner/accused was aggrieved of criminal proceedings initiated by respondent/ complainant alleging his illegal dispossession by force

Plea raised by petitioner/accused was that provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 were restricted to Qabza Mafia or land grabbers

Validity

Any person who is lawful owner or lawful occupier of property and has been illegally dispossessed, can bring a complaint under the provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005

In order to make out a case under sections 3 and 4 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, complainant has to prima facie establish before Court that he is lawful owner or was occupier of subject property and accused had entered into or upon the property without having any lawful authority, which act was done by accused with the intention to dispossess or to grab or to control or to occupy the property

Applicability of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is not restricted to Qabza Mafia or land grabbers

Scope of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is wide enough to cover any illegal occupant and is not limited to mafia or Qabza Groups only

Supreme Court declined to interfere in orders passed by Courts below

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Partition had taken place between parties in year 1963 and in such regard a partition deed dated 22-12-1963 was also executed

Petitioners/plaintiffs admitted such fact in their evidence

After execution of partition deed, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners / plaintiffs remained alive for about 8 years, who in his lifetime had neither challenged validity and authenticity of partition deed, nor approached Civil Court by filing any suit against his brother

Petitioners/plaintiffs for their Shari shares in legacy of their predecessor-in-interest had no locus standi to claim the same through filing of suit in year 2008

High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of facts arrived by two Courts below which were result of proper appraisal of facts and circumstances and evidence so recorded

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioners assailed acceptance of nomination papers of respondent candidate by Election Appellate Tribunal which set aside the order passed by Returning Officer

Validity

Petitioners did not file any objections to candidature of respondent candidate at the time of scrutiny of his nomination papers under S.62 (i) of Elections Act, 2017

Locus standi of petitioners to challenge order of Election Appellate Tribunal in favour of respondent candidate was under heavy shadow

Nomination papers of respondent candidate were not rejected on any objection raised by any of the voters of the constituency but by Returning Officer on his own motion considering him as defaulter in payment of government taxes

Even in appeal before Election Appellate Tribunal against such order of Returning Officer, petitioners did not file any application to be made as party under S.63 of Elections Act, 2017, nor opposed appeal in any form

Petitioners lacked competency at such belated stage to challenge order of Election Appellate Tribunal

High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Election Appellate Tribunal as there was no illegality in it and was based on valid reason

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Provision of Art. 158 of the Constitution gives precedence in meeting requirements from a gas well-head situated in that Province

Such precedence is with the aim of addressing an issue, should one arise, between that Province and Federal Government over the use of gas from a well-head

Prerogative of Provincial Government under Art. 158 of the Constitution exists but it does not give actionable cause to a person other than the concerned Provincial Government to invoke the same

It may well be that a Provincial Government decides not to invoke that prerogative for political considerations or to maintain unity of the Federation, or barters that prerogative with another Province or the Federation for another resource keeping in view the over-all requirements of the Province.

Petitioner companies were aggrieved of order passed by Lower Appellate Court maintaining judgment and decree by Trial Court allowing objections of respondent / Pakistan State Oil Company against arbitration award

Validity

Notice for arbitration, statement of claim, application to make award rule of Court and appeal under S. 39 of Arbitration Act, 1940, against judgment and decree passed by Trial Court were all filed by petitioner / APCNGA in its own name

Petitioner / APCNGA was not a party to licenses / agreements, therefore, it could neither have invoked arbitration clause embedded therein, nor have filed application or appeal

High Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings of two Courts below as petitioner / APCNGA was a stranger to licenses / agreements and arbitration proceedings

Concurrent judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below did not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or irregularity

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Stranger to a suit can file appeal if he is aggrieved by decision in suit notwithstanding the fact that he was not a party to the suit

Appellant company had no standing before High Court as it had not availed right to file first appeal before Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal or where such appeal was dismissed on grounds of limitation

Affording such right to appellant company would render redundant the period of limitation prescribed by Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 for the purposes of filing an appeal before Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal

Any party then could choose not to file appeal before Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal in the event that period of limitation had passed and would come to High Court which was second appellate forum, to avail their first right of appeal

Scheme of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 did not permit the same

Party who did not timely avail right of appeal before Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal could not be entertained by High Court by stepping into the shoes of First Appellate Court

Scope of appeal before High Court as second appellate forum was much more limited

High Court declined to become an instrument in altering adjudicatory scheme prescribed by Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, creating Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal as the primary appellate forum

Appeals were dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner was aggrieved of inserting a "comma" in between words "engineering" and "technologies" appearing in S.4(1) of National University of Technology Act, 2018 through corrigendum issued by National Assembly Secretariat

Validity

Procedure under R. 261 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly, 2007, can be invoked only to give effect to amendments in a Bill accepted by the House and not otherwise

Amendment brought about in S.4(1) of National University of Technology Act, 2018, by insertion of a comma between the words "engineering" and "technologies" had at no material stage been subjected to a legislative process or accepted by the Parliament

Amendments in a statute no matter how insignificant made through a process other than the legislative process prescribed in the Constitution is a matter of public importance and could be judicially reviewed at the instance of a public interest litigant

It is the fundamental right of every citizen to ensure that legislation is carried out strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution

Petitioner might not be personally aggrieved by corrigendum in question but when subjected to a challenge and given the fact that it was issued in order to amend S.4(1) of National University of Technology Act, 2018, without resort to the legislative process envisaged by the Constitution, High Court was left with no option but to declare it as without lawful authority and of no legal effect

High Court declared that corrigendum in question was issued without lawful authority and of no legal effect

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Contention of the petitioner was that respondent had been re-employed without any public interest and that too by creating blockade in promotion prospects of the petitioner

Validity

Re-employment of a retired civil servant is an exception to the rule that a civil servant is to retire upon attaining the age of superannuation, which is only available in cases of absolute necessity in the public interest and in order to eliminate element of arbitrariness in re-employing a retired civil servant, the process is to be transparent and the reasons for such necessity must be recorded in writing

Civil servant, who is re-employed after his retirement, could not glorify himself as had been done by retired respondent through pleadings in his written comments, rather it was for appointing authority to record reasons as to why such re-employment was considered imperative for the public interest

No material had been brought on record to satisfy the High Court that respondent's appointment after retirement was a matter of necessity or that the public interest would be at stake had he not been appointed

Nothing was on the record to indicate the fulfillment of the essential perquisite of "non-availability of suitably qualified or experienced officers to replace the retiring officer" or that the re-employment of respondent would subserve the public interest

Decision making process by the appointing authority in terms of S.14 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 was justiciable under exercise of the powers of judicial review in terms of Art.199 of the Constitution

In such process of judicial review, in absence of the material or reasons which make out an exceptional case justifying a civil servant's re-employment after retirement, such appointment would be liable to be struck down

Petitioner, being the senior most serving Professor in the Department had legitimate expectation to be appointed as the Head of the Department

Re-employment of respondent had resulted in the usurpation of the petitioner's right to be considered for appointed as the head of the said department

Constitution petition was allowed accordingly.

Under the provision of S.5(1) the Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2022, the Project Director did not fall within the definition of Civil Servant, therefore, could not knock the door of Tribunal

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Held, that an additional charge of Project Director does not fall within the scope of terms and conditions of "Civil Servant" as defined under S.5(1) of Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2022

Consequently, appellant in the capacity of additional charge did not qualify as civil servant

Besides, on examination of relevant Notification while relieving the service of the appellant as Project Director, additional charge had been granted to another Superintending Engineer, LG&RD, which was also illegal, unlawful and against the practice and procedure as laid down by Planning Commission Manual for Development Project, 2024 in paras. Nos. 4.6 to 4.10

Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal ('Tribunal') also set-aside the said Notification to such extent

Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Additional charge of a Project Director does not fall within the scope of terms and conditions of "Civil Servant" as defined under S. 5(1) of Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2022

Consequently, appellant in the capacity of additional charge did not qualify as civil servant

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Article 199(1)(c) of the Constitution did not necessarily require an aggrieved person to file application, rather on an application of any person, a High Court can make an order, requiring a person within its jurisdiction, holding or purporting to hold a public office to show under what authority of law, he claimed to hold that office

Object of the stated provision of the Constitution was to determine the legality of the holder of a public office

Once an information was received by a Court, it was under an obligation to inquiry from a person holding an office to show as to under which authority of law, he/she was lawfully holding the same

For invoking the jurisdiction of a High Court under Art.199(1)(c) of the Constitution, it is not necessary for a person to be aggrieved, as such, any person having knowledge about any person holding a public office in violation of law has a locus standi to inform the Court through an application

Petitioner had locus standi to file the petition

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

Mutation of inheritance attested on 27-03-1922 on the basis of Riwaj (custom), respondents / plaintiffs claimed that sons from three widows of deceased owner were to be given equal shares instead of giving 1/3rd to sons from each widow

Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court decreed the suit and dismissed the appeal respectively

Validity

When legal heir was deprived of his/her legal right of inheritance and if he/she remained alive for a considerable period and had not challenged his/her deprivation from legacy of predecessor then at late stage when the legacy had changed many hands the further legal heirs had no locus standi to challenge such mutation of inheritance, which remained unchallenged during the lifetime of their predecessors

Immediate legal heir of deceased owner of the estate during their lifetime never challenged mutation in question

Suit which was filed in the year 2006, was barred by time as by then good number of transactions had taken place

High Court in exercise for revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below and dismissed the suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs

Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Appellant assailed action of Provincial Government defying notification of posting of respondent issued by Federal Government

Judge in Chambers of High Court declined to interfere in the matter as petitioner did not have any locus standi to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution

Plea raised by appellant was that petition filed by him was in the nature of quo warranto

Validity

Petition of appellant was not in the nature of quo warranto, rather he was seeking a direction in the nature of mandamus against Provincial Government to relieve respondent official to join his place of posting with Establishment Division

For such purpose petitioner was required to show that he was an aggrieved party in the matter, which appellant failed to demonstrate

Judge in Chambers of High Court was justified to hold that appellant did not have any locus standi to file petition resulting in dismissal of his petition

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court, which order did not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional defect

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner claimed that the proposed installation of a tube well in a park reserved for public use and children's recreation would negatively impact the playground

However, the respondents argued that the tube well was to be installed in a vacant area

Validity

Petitioner was not directly affected by any actions taken by the respondents regarding the installation of the tube well, which was solely between the cooperative society and Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA)

Petitioner did not have locus standi to approach the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

It is sine qua non for initiation of proceedings under Art. 199 of the Constitution that the petitioner should have a locus standi to institute the proceedings or in other words the petitioner should be an aggrieved party from the action of the respondent.

Petitioner contended that determining factor for invoking the jurisdiction was the subject-matter of the suit and not the party who had brought the lis; that she was the successor of the deceased and was entitled to inherit 1/2 of the share from the property of her deceased sister

Held, that perusal of the Schedule attached to the Family Courts Act, 1964, transpired that it did not empower family court to adjudicate upon a claim of a party qua his/her right of inheritance or tarka

Determination of share in the estate/tarka of deceased or its distribution did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Family Court

Petitioner's suit was not maintainable as she had no locus standi to approach the Family Court

Petitioner needed to approach the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction

Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

Family Courts were established for "expeditious settlement" and "disposal of disputes" arising out of "marriage" which were between the "spouses" and the "family affairs" which were outcome of marriage

Two exceptions to the question of locus standi were created in the cases of guardianship in which the paramount consideration was the welfare of minors; and in cases where the parents of a deceased daughter would sought recovery of dowry articles since they were the ones who had given those articles to the deceased.

To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, the petitioner must establish that his legal or fundamental rights have been violated.

There is a significant difference between writs under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), (b)(ii) of the Constitution in terms of the aggrieved person

Writ of certiorari can only be moved by an aggrieved person who is competent to seek a declaration, whereas for a writ of quo warranto, there is no such restriction, and any person, whether aggrieved or not, can move a writ of quo warranto

For the maintainability of writs of certiorari and/or prohibition, it is necessary that the right sought to be enforced should ordinarily be a personal or individual right of the individual person.

Petitioners challenged Azad Jammu and Kashmir Elections Amendment Act, 2021, dated: 08.02.20221 to the extent of amendment in S. 24 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Elections Act, 2021 and further a direction was sought to the respondents not to remove the petitioners and other State subjects from the voters list according to which they were entitled to vote on temporary addresses

Validity

All the beneficiaries were necessary party but the petitioners had failed to implead them as party and in the absence of necessary party, no direction could be issued

Petitioners were not aggrieved persons, therefore, they could not have filed the writ petitions

Petitioners had no locus standi to file the writ petition

Petitioners themselves had got mentioned their permanent residences in the CNICs

No legal right of petitioners appeared to have been infringed, therefore, they did not fall within the definition of aggrieved persons

Writ petitions were dismissed, in circum-stances.

Person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.

Judicial redress is available to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his/her legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his/her legal right or legally protected interest by any such action

Basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress.

Only a person who has suffered legal injury can file a writ petition for redressal of his/her grievance and no third party can be permitted to have access to the Court for the purpose of seeking redressal for the person injured.

In the absence of locus standi and legal grievance, no one can ask for indulgence of High Court in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

Meaning.

Concerned citizens were not prevented from placing their grievances before competent Courts or high forums, even if they were not direct affectees but noticed that environmental issues were handled wrongly or unjustifiably with illegality and irregularity etc.

Appellants had a right to approach Environmental Protection Tribunal as aggrieved persons and concerned citizens having sufficient interest and locus standi to be heard in the matter

Appeal was maintainable, in circumstances.

Any person and not necessarily an aggrieved person, can seek redressal from High Court against usurpation of a public office by a person who is holding it "without lawful authority" on that account

On such account it could not be doubted that petitioner did not have any locus standi to file petition

Respondent was serving as an officer in BPS-18 in Pakistan Railways and was posted as Director (Admn) Galiyat Development Authority in his own pay scale on deputation basis

Respondent was also given additional charge of the post of Director General Galiyat Development Authority, till further orders

Subsequently he was appointed as Director General in exercise of powers under S.10 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority Act, 2016

High Court declared that appointment of respondent was made in violation of S.10 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Development Authority Act, 2016, in excess of authority and the same was declared illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Service Tribunals have been constituted under Art.212 of the Constitution for dealing with the grievances of civil servants and not for their legal heirs

No provision in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, to provide any remedy to the successors-in-interest of a civil servant

Appeal before Service Tribunal would not be maintainedable

Constitutional petition was maintainable in the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction.

Petitioner / Establishment was aggrieved of registration of respondent as a Collective Bargaining Agent by the Registrar of Trade Unions

Contention of respondent was that an employer did not have standing to challenge the registration of trade union

Validity

Challenge here was not entirely to the registration of trade union but to a determination made by the Registrar

Petitioner was a trust and was directly aggrieved of the determination of the Registrar, in that, it concluded that it was being run and managed on commercial basis which had impacted the status of the petitioner as a charitable institution and its entitlement to benefits under various laws.

Environmental Protection Agency Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 2000, Sched. II

Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, Rr. 234 & 235

Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199

Constitutional petition

Locus standi

Efficacious and alternate remedy

Petitioners assailed stone crushing units established by respondents on the plea of absence of proper approval by relevant authorities

Validity

Petitioners invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution and they had to establish that their legal or fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution were violated

Petitioners were to prove their locus standi to seek direction to authorities in such regard under denial of their legal rights, if any

Such was a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings under Art. 199 of the Constitution that petitioners had a locus standi to institute such proceedings

Petitioners were to be an aggrieved party from actions of respondents

Specific remedy under Rr. 234 & 235 of Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002 and S. 12 of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, was available to petitioner

Instead of availing specific remedy petitioners assailed Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court

In the wake of an alternate efficacious remedy available to a litigant, jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution could not be invoked

High Court directed petitioners to approach concerned authorities for redressal of their grievance and concerned authorities would redress their grievance

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Petitioner company assailed show cause notice issued by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to appoint inspectors to investigate its affairs

Validity

If at all Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) was to investigate into the affairs of a company on an application, it must be an application made by one of the persons or entities mentioned in S. 256 of Companies Act, 2017 and none else

Respondent Banks were not entitled to make an application under S. 256 of Companies Act, 2017

Cognizance of matter relating to investigation could not be taken by a circuitous route, that is, by firstly receiving a complaint and thereafter (upon finding it to be outside the ambit of S. 256 of Companies Act, 2017) invoking its powers under S. 257 of Companies Act, 2017, whimsically and unreasonably, to serve a notice on petitioner company

Power to be exercised by the Commission under S. 257 of Companies Act, 2017 had to be preceded by formation of an opinion and thereafter a show cause notice giving the company an opportunity of hearing could be issued

No formation of opinion by the Commission against petitioner company which was conspicuous by its absence

High Court set aside the show cause notice as the Commission acted mechanically on a complaint filed by creditors of the company which was reflexively treated and did not apply its mind while forming an opinion

Constitutional petition was set aside, in circumstances.

Petitioner was aggrieved of concurrent orders passed by Magistrate and Lower Appellate Court for exhumation/disinterment of dead body to determine cause of death

Plea raised by petitioner was that complainant had no locus standi to file such application and it would disgrace grave of the deceased

Validity

For passing order on application filed under S.176, Cr.P.C. nothing was necessary except that of satisfaction of Magistrate only to the extent that 'exhumation was necessary for knowing cause of death'

Such order was for the purpose to remove clouds of suspicion

Discretion needed to be exercised even if single reasonable circumstance/suspicion so justified

Determination of 'cause of death' would do nothing except setting criminal machinery into motion or otherwise

Such discretion should not be denied merely on account of request made by a stranger

Legal heirs were custodian of grave but when they themselves had come in sphere of suspicion, they would lose their such right

High Court declined to interfere in orders passed by two Courts below as disinterment of dead body of deceased was inevitable to determine cause of her death in order to inquire into allegations and suspicions levelled by complainant

Petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

If the intention of the lawmaker had been to restrict the right of filing application under S.12(2) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, only to the person who was party to the suit, then the word "party" ought to have been used.

If the intention of the lawmaker had been to restrict the right of filing application only to "person" who was party to the suit, then the word "party" ought to have been used.