1984 PLP 1525 (CLC)

‑‑ S. 3‑Provisional Constitution Order (1 of 1981), Art. 9 Pakistan Petroleum (Refining, Blending and Marketing) Rules, 1971, Rr. 26(1)(27), 2 ‑ Constitutional petition ‑ Intra‑Court appeal‑Oil Company granted approval by Government of Pakistan for installation of filling station subject to conditions that there existed no sanctioned site of any Oil Company within 3 Km. of proposed site on either side of same road‑Company, after 5 months granted approval for installation of another filling station with condition that "distance restriction of 3 Km. location for two filling stations was relaxed subject to submission of a written under taking by Company to the effect that its dealer of existing filling station located near 1,660 ft. from sanctioned side would not file any complaint against exemption granted under this letter " Such condition later on withdrawn by Government as a special case‑Locus standi of dealer of company who had purchased land for installation of filling station for which company had obtained approval, to file constitutional petition to challenge such con dition and its withdrawal by Federal Government‑Held, dealer of company had no locus standi to challenge orders of Federal Government as approval was not given to him but to company Relationship was between Company and Government and if both were agreeable to change terms and conditions none else could have locus standi to complain against such agreement‑Approval if had been granted to dealer and later on charged or deluted he would then have a locus standi‑Constitutional petition by dealer having no locus standi in matter, held, rightly dismissed‑Intra -Court Appeal also dismissed in limine in circumstances. ORDER ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.‑The Pakistan State Oil Limited respon dent No. 2 was granted approval by the Government of Pakistan as required under rules 26(1) and 27(2) of the Pakistan Petroleum (Refining, Blending and Marketing) Rules, 1971 (as amended to‑date) for installation of MS/HSD retail outlet between Km. 3 and 4 on Gojra/Painsra Road at Goira. This was "subject to the condition that there was no sanctioned site of any Oil Company within 3 Km. of the proposed site on either side of the same road". This is dated 4th May, 1983. The case of the appel lant is that this approval was for the purpose of installation of a filling station by the appellant as a dealer of the aforesaid Company. On 22nd October, 1983 the Company was granted approval for another installation of MS/HSD Retail outlet. It was added in para. 2 of the order that "the distance restriction of 3 Km (Rural) location two outlets is relaxed subject to the submission of a written undertaking by the Company to the effect that its dealer of the existing pump located near 1660 ft. from the sanctioned side would not file any complaint against the exemption granted under this letter". It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that this was with reference to the first approval and the under taking was to be given by the appellant if he had so thought fit. Of course, he has not done so. However, the Government of Pakistan vide its Memo. dated 9th January, 1984 communicated to the Company that "the condition appearing in para. 2 of the letter referred above requiring the company to submit a written undertaking to the effect that its dealer of the existing pump located near 1,660 ft. from the sanctioned site would not file any complaint against the exemption granted under our letter quoted above (and) is hereby withdrawn as a special case". It is stated that this was done for the benefit of the respondent Mst. Irshad Begum widow of Ali Asghar. The appellant made a representation against the second approval and withdrawal of the condition therein but the same has been rejected. He filed a Constitutional petition which has been dismissed by a learned Single Judge on the ground that the appel lant had no locus standi and that he has an alternate remedy by way of appeal under rule 33(3) of the Petroleum (Refining) Rules, 1971. Hence, this I. C. A.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the appellant had no locus standi because the appellant had purchased land to install a petrol pump as a dealer of the Company, for which the Company had obtained approval of the Federal Government. He next submitted that the Federal Government on 7th April, 1980 had laid down that "Restric tion of one mile limit on installation of retail outlets on the same road in urban areas has been extended to 3 Km. Similarly, a restriction of 3 Km. limit will be applicable to the rural areas". When the Company applied for second approval for installation of the petrol pump by res pondent No. 6, the Government granted the sanction but subject to the condition that the appellant would not complain and an undertaking to that effect would be submitted by the Company to the Government. This would show that but for the appellant's agreement, no second approval would have been given for installation of the petrol pump within a radius of 3 Km. He further submitted that this condition for obtaining an undertaking by the Company from the appellant was waived by the Government on 19th January, 1984 but this action was illegal because that would lead to contravention of the instructions that there should be no installation within a distance of 3 Km. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant had the necessary locus standi to question the action of the Federal Government. He relied on Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (P L D 1969 S C 223) and Rashid A. Khan v. West Pakistan Railway Board through its Chairman and another (P L D 1973 Lah. 733). As regards alternate remedy the learned counsel submitted that rule 33(3) of Petroleum (Refining) Rules, 1971 was not applicable at all because the Rule contemplates revocation and not sanction and only a person affected by revocation or modification can file an appeal. The appellant is challenging the second sanction.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length. It may be that the appellant purchased the land to install a petrol pump for which the Company asked for the approval of the Federal Government and was granted the same. True it may be that the appel lant may derive some benefit by the installation. But the grant of the approval by the Federal Government was in favour of the Company. The observation read out from the first case quoted by the learned counsel for the appellant is that "the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding in writ jurisdiction is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege or liberty or franchise". The observation in the context con noted that the relationship was between the applicant and the authority required to perform the legal duty‑not when the matter was between a third party and the authority performing the legal duty. If the approval bad been granted to the appellant and later on changed or diluted he would have a locus standi but the approval was not given to him but to the Company. The relationship was between the Company and the Government and if both are agreed to change the terms none else can complain. The fact that by no change, the appellant would have derived benefit is no ground to clothe him with a locus standi because by instalment of the petrol pump not only he but thousands upon thousands may derive benefit by easy access to petrol pump but that would not give locus standi to all the users or beneficiaries of the petrol pump. The approval for installation was the matter' between the Government and the Company and if the Company has no grievance, its dealer can have none either, like any other bene ficiaries, by the goods of the Company. The reliance on letter of the Federal Government, dated 7th April, 1980 is not sound because it was a communication between the Government and the companies regarding their relationship based on policy decision. It created no right in favour of the others, nor, put any fetters on the authority of the Government to change its policy or allow exception .in a `special case' as done in this case.

4. In view of what has been stated above, the appeal has no force and is dismissed in limine. M. Z. M. Appeal dismissed.