Defamation

Application of the petitioner, filed after closure of evidence, for sending the video for forensic report/expert opinion regarding its originality was dismissed by the Trial Court

Validity

By now, it is possible with the advancement of science and technology to get a forensic examination, audit or test conducted through an appropriate laboratory, so as to get it ascertained as to whether a video or tape is genuine or not and such examination, audit or test can also reasonably establish, if such video has been edited, doctored or tampered with or not

Any party could make a request for forensic examination of an audio tape or video through an appropriate laboratory, so as to get it ascertained as to whether the audio tape or video is genuine or not through moving a proper application to the concerned court

Trial Court had totally overlooked the fact that the petitioner was seeking expert opinion of the video regarding its originality or otherwise and production of additional evidence in light thereof

Trial Court also failed to appreciate that by virtue of O. XVIII, R. 17, C.P.C., the additional evidence could be allowed at any stage

Even if one or the other party had failed to produce all the material documents and/or failed to request for proper examination of the disputed documents/ signatures/video, the court had ample power to do the needful so as to advance justice rather than injustice

Trial was at the verge of conclusion, but in order to ascertain as to whether the video in question was genuine or not, there was no harm, even at such stage, to accept the request of the petitioner qua sending the video for forensic report regarding its originality and genuineness in the larger interest of the justice

Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances, while accepting the application of the petitioner for sending video for forensic report/expert opinion.

Petitioner / complainant filed private complaint on the basis of allegations made in FIR registered by respondent / accused

Trial Court acquitted respondent / accused as the FIR was cancelled and no judicial proceedings had been conducted

Validity

Matter reported had passed through stage of investigation but had not been finalized

Statements made during investigation at such premature stage could not be used for an offence of defamation

Provision of S.499 P.P.C. authorizes a person to bring a complaint against a person who entirely makes defamatory statement to harm his reputation but when such statement is made to a police authority, it falls within the exception of S.499 P.P.C.

High Court declined to interfere in order of acquittal which was rightly passed by Trial Court and was justified in the facts and circumstances

Petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Guarantee of fair trial is the foremost imperative in the administration of justice and serves as the central criterion for the court's consideration

When evaluating a motion for transfer of a case and for the transfer of a criminal case, the party must demonstrate a reasonable apprehension that justice will not be served

Apprehension of not receiving a fair and impartial inquiry or trial must be reasonable and grounded in facts, rather than being speculative or based on conjectures and surmises

Proceedings pending before one competent court should not be transferred to another court merely on bald assertions or allegations of any of the parties unless the same are supported by strong, cogent reasons and convincing evidence

Bias in a judge must be demonstrated as a fact, not merely as an opinion

Real likelihood of bias must be established, grounded in personal prejudice so significant that it impairs the judge's ability to act impartially in the specific case

Applicant failed to establish any reasonable apprehension of being denied a fair trial, as he lacked sufficient merit to raise concern in the mind of a prudent and reasonable person

Without clear evidence/ material, such claims do little more than cast unwarranted aspersions on the impartiality of the trial judge, an act that is both baseless and deeply unwarranted

Transfer application of the applicant was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner filed private complaint against the respondent with the contention that he levelled false allegation of zina upon her

Complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court

Validity

Admittedly, the accusation of zina/illicit terms with "RM" against the petitioner was imputed by the respondent in divorce deed dated 07.06.2020, which he repeatedly made in the pleadings of the suits and family matters, which he also reiterated and reaffirmed in presence of the Court and in public, in union council office, and judicial/non-judicial proceedings, even after severing marital bond with the petitioner and no longer remaining her husband

This prima facie fell within the definition of Qazf and there was no question of applicability of the provisions of S.14 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 regarding the li'an in this case

Trial judge very conveniently overlooked such aspects of the case and dismissed the subject complaint, being not maintainable, holding that the respondent, who was the husband of the petitioner, had made the accusation of zina/ illicit relations against the petitioner during subsistence of the marriage, therefore, the provisions of S.14 of the Qazf Ordinance, 1979, were attracted to the case of the petitioner

Petitioner had supported the contents of her complaint by cursory evidence and she had also been supported by the witnesses in their respective cursory statements recorded before the Judicial Magistrate, who after conducting preliminary enquiry under S.202, Cr.P.C, and recording the statements of petitioner's witnesses submitted his enquiry report dated 16.01.2023, in affirmative, which had also been completely ignored by the trial judge while passing the impugned order

Said material brought on the record had to be considered to determine whether a prima facie case was made out or not and no deeper appreciation was required at the initial stage

Impugned order, which was patently illegal, suffered from mis-reading and non-reading of the record and could not be sustained

Criminal revision petition was allowed and the case was remitted back to the Trial Court with the directions to pass an appropriate order based upon the consideration of the complaint and cursory evidence of the petitioner etc. in accordance with the law.

Assertion of the respondent/complainant was that the petitioner in different documents, including habeas/guardian petition for a, had alleged that he (complainant) was a Ahmadi/Qadiani by faith whereas he was a Barelvi Muslim , thus petitioner had defamed him by causing false imputation

Validity

Essential ingredient of defamation as per S.499 of the Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.) is mens rea, therefore according to the Eighth Exception to S.499, P.P.C., accusation levelled in good faith before a lawful authority for protection of right or interest can not be defamation

When the statement is made for public good and to safeguard the interest of its maker, without any malicious motive, offence of defamation is not made out

However, for summoning an accused person, the facts of the case should only be discussed prima facie and, therefore, the inherent powers of the High Court are to be sparingly exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of law

Some important questions must not be lost sight of: firstly, whether the faith of father does not determine the faith of the child in normal circumstances; secondly, in the wake of total denial of a particular faith by a person, whether a Family Court can issue any such declaration within the scope of Family Courts Act, 1964 , while determining welfare of the minor in deciding his custody petition; thirdly, whether the allegations before the judicial authorities are in good faith; fourthly, whether the Sessions Court is not the forum to determine the criminal consequences of calling someone with some faith other than his own

However, all said questions will have to be determined by the Sessions Court, once the same may be brought to its (Court's) notice through an application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C

Since the petitioner had already entered appearance before it (the Court), criminal revision was disposed of accordingly.

Petitioner uploaded a video on his YouTube channel, which two employees working for respondent company claimed defamed the company

Respondent company filed a private complaint against the petitioner and the Trial Court registered the complaint

Validity

If respondent company was aggrieved then why did it not act, as required under the companies legislation, to initiate criminal proceedings

No resolution passed by the company in its general body or Board of Directors was on record or was ever obtained

How did the two persons, who had filed the complaint, claim that they were aggrieved by the alleged defamation when they were in essence some unknown employees of a subsidiary, of respondent company

Why was a criminal complaint being filed in city "K", even though the law allowed the same to be filed, however it would have been more convenient for both parties to litigate in city "I"

Court should have considered the said basics, at the very least, before taking cognizance of a criminal complaint that was a challenge to the fundamental right of freedom of speech

Initiation of unnecessary litigation causes massive burden and inconvenience to the parties involved and further burdens an already struggling criminal justice system

Both the parties in their own ways had contributed extensively towards defending the right of freedom of expression and speech in the country

When persons of such profile and large admiration base come into conflict for minor, insignificant reasons, it no doubt causes a negative impact on the right of freedom of expression

It seemed that present case was more a case of conflict of egos than real criminal harm

Hopefully parties will be in a position to resolve such disputes through mediation

Complaint was vague from which it seemed that respondent company itself had given an interpretation to claim that what petitioner said was regarding them

Two unknown employees of a subsidiary company of respondent claimed to be aggrieved; respondent, itself did not initiate any complaint for defamation to it; no authorization was available from respondent to the two employees to initiate action; and most importantly the right of freedom of expression was being attacked on a flimsy ground

In such circumstances, it would be appropriate to quash the proceeding arising out of the complaint filed by respondent

Proceedings were quashed accordingly.

Types of defamation and key elements that need to be established by a claimant to succeed in a defamation case stated.

Appellant / plaintiff was aggrieved of dismissal of his suit filed against respondent / defendant newspaper for publishing a news item in its newspaper

Validity

Onus was on respondent / defendant to prove its plea by calling record of relevant authorities and failure to do the same would result in adverse inference to be drawn in terms of Art. 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 for withholding best evidence

High Court depreciated practice of mere publication of news without confronting the originator of the news or concerned person to prove the fact that he had so reported

High Court awarded general damages against respondent / defendant newspaper, as appellant / plaintiff failed to demonstrate loss of any special damages in any reference and apparent defamation was demonstrated from record

High Court directed respondent / defendant newspaper to also publish apology in its newspaper in the similar manner in which defamatory news was published

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

In awarding general damages, Courts are to apply rule of thumb, according to which discretion rests within the Court to calculate such compensation keeping in view the attending circumstances of each case.

[Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view): Proceedings of the case were prolonged by the petitioner (defendant) at every stage of the case in the Trial Court to delay the decision of the case

During proceedings for delivering and answering the interrogatories by the parties under Order XI, C.P.C., the petitioner showed the same delaying tactics by which he had been hindering the progress of the suit earlier

Trial Court had provided the petitioner with more than sufficient opportunities to submit his answers to the interrogatories of the respondent, before taking the penal action under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C.

Conduct of the petitioner had remained willfully contumacious and disobedient throughout the proceedings of the case in the Trial Court

Trial Court had not committed any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by dismissing the objections (application) of the petitioner for rejection of the interrogatories of the respondent and directing him to submit the answers to those interrogatories and subsequently by striking out the right of defence of the petitioner due to non-submission of the answers to the said interrogatories]

[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view): In the present case the order of the Trial Court whereby the right of the petitioner's defence was struck out, the facts of the case did not establish that the petitioner committed willful default or intentionally and deliberately disobeyed an order of the Court

Effect of striking out the defence was that it deprived the party of its ability to defend itself in the case which was a serious matter

In the present case the Court had other alternatives, at its disposal, to regulate the pace of the proceedings as well as the conduct of the petitioner, one of which was to impose costs which would not only serve as a form of deterrence but would also lay the foundation for expeditious justice

Trial Court proceeded in a mechanical manner with the case, and granted numerous adjournments without so much as imposing cost so as to discourage the same

Order by which the right of defence of the petitioner was struck out, did not state that it was based on the history of the case or the overall conduct of the petitioner in the case

Petitioner's recent public shooting and injury at a political rally justified the grant of an adjournment for a reasonable time under the circumstances

Right to defence could not be struck out without considering all relevant factors

Impugned order of the Trial Court, whereby right of defence of petitioner was struck out, was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court to grant reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to file answers to the interrogatories and thereafter to proceed with the case in accordance with law]

Where an issue of law and facts had arisen in plaint of the suit and Trial Court believed that case or part thereof on the issue of law only, Trial Court under the provision of O.XIV, R.2, C.P.C., could decide the issue related to (a) jurisdiction of the court or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force

To invoke provisions of O.VII, R.11(d), C.P.C., no evidence could be looked into and conclusion that the suit was barred under the law must be drawn from averments made in the plaint

Allegation of defamation was a mixed question of law and facts

Such issue could not be tried as a preliminary issue in other words, such issues could be those where no evidence was required and on the basis of plain reading of plaint of suit, it appeared that jurisdiction of Court was barred, then the Court could decide such issue of law at the first stance

High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Trial Court and remanded the suit to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Defamation is publication of statement which reflects on a person's reputation and tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society generally or tends to make them shun or avoid him

Defamation takes forum of two separate torts i.e. libel and slander

Libel is actionable per se and injury to reputation is presumed

Whether a case is one of libel or slander, three elements must be proved by claimant: (a) the imputation must be defamatory; (b) it must identify or refer to the claimant; (c) it must be published/communicated to at least one person other than the claimant.

Section 193 of Cr.P.C. placed a complete and clear bar on taking of cognizance of any offence by the Court of Session in its original jurisdiction unless the case was sent up by a Magistrate under S. 190(2) of Cr.P.C.

Offence of defamation under S. 500 of the P.P.C. was punishable with imprisonment that may possibly extend to a period of 5 years and as such, was triable by a Magistrate

Legislature in its wisdom desired an expeditious trial of the offence with right of appeal going to the High Court and this appeared to be the dominant purpose for insertion of S. 502A in the P.P.C. with no bearings upon the procedure, otherwise provided for the institution of a complaint

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Defamation Ordinance, 2002, is a special law which has prescribed limitation for filing suit for defamation and Limitation Act, 1908, does not apply to the actions brought under the Ordinance.

Respondent had filed an application for rejection of plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. stating therein that the plaintiff had filed a suit for damages and defamation against him on similar grounds before the Court of Additional District Judge and the same was simply withdrawn and that the appellant had also instituted a second suit in the Court of Civil Judge against him for damages and defamation on similar cause of action, in which plaint was rejected by the Court

Validity

Appellant had not mentioned such facts in his plaint and it was clear that he had approached the Trial Court with unclean hands

Appellant having withdrawn the earlier suit unconditionally was precluded from re-agitating the same cause of action before the Trial Court on the basis of same subject matter

Subsequent suit was barred under O. XXIII, R. 1(3) of C.P.C.

Suit was also barred by S.3, read with Ss. 8 & 12 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002

Appellant had given legal notice to the respondent with a delay of eight years

Trial Court had rightly rejected the plaint

Appeal was dismissed.

Qualified privilege.

Defamation is one of the things that violates it.

Explanations and the exceptions set out in S. 499, P.P.C. would be read into S. 20 of the PECA by virtue of Ss. 28 & 50 of PECA.

Petitioners' claim was that S. 20 of PECA was discriminatory vis-a-vis Ss. 499 & 500 of P.P.C., so it is liable to be struck down

Validity

Pakistan Penal Code is the general Penal Code for Pakistan

Section 499, P.P.C. defines "defamation"

Section 500, P.P.C. criminalizes defamation

In contrast, S. 20 of PECA relates to offences against dignity of a natural person and defamation is one of the acts that it criminalizes

Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act is lex specialis which aims to check cybercrimes and provide a legal framework for their investigation, prosecution and trial and for international cooperation to that end

Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act does not override P.P.C.

Section 28 of PECA rather says that the provisions of the P.P.C. shall apply to the offences provided in the PECA unless they are inconsistent with it

Language of S. 28 is perspicuous but S. 50 presents some difficulty because of the expression "not in derogation of"

Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act has to be read in tandem with the laws mentioned in S. 50(1) thereof

Sections 499 & 500, P.P.C. apply to ordinary situations while S. 20 of the PECA is invoked where defamation is committed in the cyberspace through the computers

Cybercrimes are a category apart by their very nature as they may extend beyond the local and provincial boundaries and even national frontiers; they require special expertise for investigation which is generally not available with the local police

For all these reasons S.20 of the PECA and Ss. 499 & 500, P.P.C., do not overlap but stand the test of reasonable classification envisaged by Art. 25 of the Constitution.

Applicant assailed order passed by Trial Court whereby it dismissed the complaint filed under Ss. 499 & 500, P.P.C. on the ground that a specific remedy was given under S. 26 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002

Validity

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, did not derogate the general penal laws

No special law could declare a malum prohibitum as non-offence

Revision application was allowed by the High Court and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for passing an appropriate speaking order after hearing the parties concerned.

Rationale underlying the notice is to provide information with respect to the alleged action, infringement brought about by defendant and quantum of claim/damages

Mere dispatching the notice in a mechanical manner without disclosure of essential ingredients such as specific date of plaintiff's knowledge about the defamatory remarks, its source, the precise contents of defamatory remarks and explicit monetary claim, would not suffice as it could not be a true demonstration of the objective compliance of the constant principle underlying law nor could it serve the purpose in a beneficial manner

Foremost purpose to serve the notice was to facilitate the recipient to reconsider his remarks for withdrawal/abandonment thereof and thereby to avail such opportunity for settlement of the dispute, if so advised, without recourse to the trouble and cost of litigation.

Appellant had instituted a suit for defamation against the respondent on the ground that he had got lodged an FIR against him which was disposed of in class "C" and that he had also written a letter to panchayat with false and baseless allegations

Validity

Section 8 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, provided that no action would lie unless the plaintiff had given to the defendant fourteen days' notice in writing of his intention to bring an action with particulars of defamatory matter complained of and that too within two months of the publication of the defamatory matter or from the date of gaining knowledge thereof

Appellant had sent notice after one year of the order passed by the Magistrate disposing of the subject FIR under Class "C" and the alleged complaint made by respondent to the panchayat against the appellant

Trial Court had not committed any illegality while passing the impugned order

Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

'Public interest' defence under common law (as developed in the judgment Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127) and that under S. 4 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (UK)

Scope and distinction.

Defamatory words published in newspaper are presumed under law to be false and burden is on the plaintiff to prove that defamatory words have been published by defendant, after that defendant is to prove that words so published are true.

Accused-appellant was convicted and sentenced to fine on the basis of moving false complaints and publishing pamphlets with defamatory words against the respondents

Complainant produced two witnesses including his brother in support of his claim

Record showed that Trial Court, after recording statement of accused under S. 342, Cr.P.C. and hearing final arguments, without assigning any reason, instead announcing order on merit, restarted the trial and issued process for evidence to the Additional Collector as court witness

Trial Court, after recording statement of court witness, recorded statement of accused under Ss.342 & 340(2), Cr.P.C. second time

Accused, after second statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. had examined himself on oath and had produced documents showing character of the complainant

Record showed that Trial Court failed to appreciate that even complainant's own brother had not supported him

Trial Court misinterpreted the evidence with reference to the burden of proof in criminal cases

Record did not show that the complainant had by way of rejoinder affidavit denied the contents of counter affidavit of officials containing the allegation of blackmailing and harassment by the complainant and, therefore, it ought to have been accepted as admitted document about a truth

Trial court failed to appreciate that the complainant was not aggrieved by derogatory remarks on oath against him

If such remarks did not cause any defamation to the complainant then how a letter written to any government functionary, which had not been conveyed to the complainant, would have caused any injury to the complainant

Trial Court clearly favoured the complainant when he convicted the accused and sentenced him to pay fine of Rs. 100,000/- as punishment and further ordered that fine be paid to the complainant

Trial Court had no authority to handover the amount of fine to the complainant

Amount of fine imposed as punishment had to be deposited by court through its ministerial office in the government treasury

Circumstances established that complainant failed to prove his claim

Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court.

Distinct origins, scope and reliefs awarded for torts of 'libel' and 'slander' stated.

'Serious harm' that had caused or was likely to cause the body serious 'financial loss' [section 1(2) of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom)]

Scope and meaning

Financial loss was not the same as special damage, in the sense in which that term was used in the law of defamation

Section 1 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) was concerned with harm to reputation, whereas special damage represented pecuniary loss to interests other than reputation

Section 1(2) must refer not to the harm done to the claimant's reputation, but to the loss which that harm had caused or was likely to cause

Financial loss was the measure of the harm and must exceed the threshold of seriousness

As applied to harm which the defamatory statement "had caused", this necessarily called for an investigation of the actual impact of the statement

Given statement said to be defamatory may cause greater or lesser financial loss to the claimant, depending on his or her particular circumstances and the reaction of those to whom it was published

Whether that financial loss had occurred and whether it was "serious" were questions which could not be answered by reference only to the inherent tendency of the words.

For defamation still actionable per se (libel and some slanders) the effect of section 1 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) was not to postpone the cause of action, which still arose upon publication

Impact of publication on reputation would in practice occur at that moment in almost all cases

If for some reason it did not occur at that moment, the subsequent events would be evidence of the likelihood of its occurring

In either case, subsequent events may serve to demonstrate the seriousness of the statement's impact including, in the case of a body trading for profit, its financial implications

Not necessary that those events must have occurred before the claimant's cause of action could be said to have accrued; their relevance was purely evidential

Position was different where a statement was not actionable per se, because the interest protected by the law in that case was purely pecuniary

Pecuniary loss must therefore have occurred.

'Repetition rule' or the 'Dingle rule' [as stated in the case reported as Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1964] AC 371)]

Scope

'Dingle rule' or 'repetition rule' provided that a defendant could not rely in mitigation of damages on the fact that similar defamatory statements had been published about the same claimant by other persons

Statement that someone else had made a defamatory statement about the claimant, although literally true, was treated as equivalent to a direct statement to the same effect

Policy was that repeating someone else's libellous statement was just as bad as making the statement directly

Repetition rule had nothing to do with the threshold of seriousness, and nothing in the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) could be taken as implicitly abolishing the said rule or limiting its application

Repetition rule was criticised, but it was well established; it had the pragmatic advantage of making it unnecessary to determine which of multiple publications of substantially the same statement occurred first, something which in the case of a newspaper would often be impossible to ascertain and might differ from one reader to the next.

Requirement that statement "had caused or was likely to cause 'serious harm' to the reputation of the claimant" [section 1(1) of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom)]

Scope and meaning

Whether tendency to cause serious harm was sufficient to bring a claim for defamation

Held, that in addition to the common law presumption of damage to reputation, S. 1 of the Defamation Act, 2013 (United Kingdom) imposed a new threshold that the harm caused had to be serious

Such higher threshold of serious harm was a clear departure from the previous common law position

Application of the new threshold of serious harm to reputation must be determined by reference to the actual facts about its impact, and not just the meaning of the words

Establishing whether there was a cause of action depended on an assessment of the actual consequences resulting from the publication of the defamatory statement, which may include the size, and characteristics of the relevant audience, the quality of the publication and whether the claimant had any reputation to begin with

Serious harm to reputation could not be established solely by reference to the inherent tendency of words to cause harm to reputation

"Likely" to be caused referred to probable future harm and not merely to the tendency of the words

As a consequence, claimants were now required to show through a combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact that serious harm had or was likely to be caused to the claimant's reputation.

History of tort of defamation (in the United Kingdom) and attempts to statutorily reform it stated.

Defendant posted on a social media platform that the claimant (defendant's ex-husband) "tried to strangle" her; that he had been removed from their home following a number of threats that he had made, and that the police felt that he had broken the terms of a non-molestation order

Claimant, who did not deny that he had grasped the defendant by the neck and had also breached a non-molestation order, brought an action for defamation (libel) against the defendant, alleging that the words "tried to strangle" meant "tried to kill" and were defamatory

Defendant denied that the words had such meaning and pleaded justification by contending that words "tried to strangle" would be understood to mean that the claimant had grasped her by the neck and inhibited her breathing so as to put her in fear of being killed

Trial judge relied on dictionary definition of the word "strangle" and found defendant's words defamatory on the basis that claimant's intention was to silence and not to kill the defendant, and that the social media post was a distorting overstatement of what had in fact occurred and had the meaning that the claimant was a man who was dangerous to any woman with whom he lived

Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal

Held, that a critical circumstance in the present case was that the court was dealing with a social media post which was read by a certain type of reader; the social media user

In deciding how a social media post would be interpreted by such a reader the judge had to keep in mind how such postings were made and read, and it was imperative to ascertain how a typical, ordinary, reasonable social media user would interpret the message

In such a situation it would be wrong to engage in an elaborate analysis of a social media post or its theoretically or logically deducible meaning

Meaning ascribed to the post should reflect the circumstance that the social media platform in question (Facebook) was a casual medium in the nature of a conversation rather than carefully chosen expression, and it was pre-eminently one in which the reader read and passed on

People scrolled through social media platforms (such as Facebook) quickly; they did not pause and reflect; they did not ponder on what meaning the statement might possibly bear, and their reaction to a post was impressionistic and fleeting

Once the verb, "strangle" was removed from its context and given only two possible (dictionary) meanings before it was reconnected to the word, "tried" the chances of a strained meaning were increased

Words must be taken together so as to determine what the ordinary reasonable reader would understand them to mean

Judge had fallen into legal error in relying on the dictionary definition as dictating the meaning of the defendant's social media post and had failed to conduct a realistic exploration of how the ordinary reader of the post would have understood it

Ordinary reader of the social media platform (Facebook) would not have spliced the defendant's post into separate clauses or isolated individual words and contemplated their possible significance, but would unquestionably have interpreted the post as meaning that the claimant had grasped his wife (the defendant) by the throat and applied force to her neck rather than trying deliberately to kill her

If the defendant had meant to convey that her husband/claimant had attempted to kill her, why would she not say so explicitly

In view of the trial judge's error of law, his decision as to the meaning of the social media post could not stand

In such circumstances the Court of Appeal should have considered afresh the meaning of the post but it had not done so

In the present case, it was not disputed that the claimant grasped his wife (defendant) by the throat so tightly as to leave red marks on her neck visible to police officers two hours after the attack on her took place

Claimant further did not dispute that he breached a non-molestation order, nor had it been asserted that he did not utter threats to the defendant

Many would consider such circumstances to be sufficient to establish that the claimant was a dangerous and disreputable man, which was the justification which the defendant sought to establish

Defendant was entitled to succeed on the defence of justification.

Where a statement had more than one plausible meaning, the question of whether it was defamatory would only be answered by the judge deciding that one particular meaning should be ascribed to it

Where a range of meanings was available and where it was possible to light on one meaning which was not defamatory among a series of meanings which were, the court was not obliged to select the non-defamatory meaning

Touchstone remained what would the ordinary reasonable reader consider the words to mean

Simply because it was theoretically possible to come up with a meaning which was not defamatory, the court was not impelled to select that meaning

Primary role of the court was to focus on how the ordinary reader would construe the words

In order to fulfil such obligation the court should be particularly conscious of the context in which the statement had been made and consider the hypothetical reader to be a person who would read the publication and react to it in a way which reflected the circumstances in which it had been made

Use of dictionary definitions to provide a guide to the meaning of an alleged defamatory statement was not advisable

Such meaning was to be determined according to how it would be understood by the ordinary reasonable reader; it was not fixed by technical, linguistically precise dictionary definitions, divorced from the context in which the statement was made.

Plaintiff was a government servant who filed suit against defendants under Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and sought recovery of compensation through damages

Trial Court decreed suit in favour of plaintiff

Validity

Provisions of R.31 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1987 were applicable to the parties before court

Decree-holder was civil servant/government servant and allegations levelled against him were directly connecting to his post/position which according to him disgraced him in society etc.

Government servant/civil servant could not under any circumstances had recourse to any court for vindication of his public acts and character etc., except with prior permission of government

High Court set aside judgment and decrees passed by the Trial Court as no permission was sought by plaintiff before filing suit

Appeal was dismissed under circumstances.

Plaintiff was a government servant who filed suit against defendants under Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and sought recovery of compensation through damages

Trial Court decreed suit in favour of plaintiff

Validity

Provisions of R. 31 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1987 was applicable to the parties before court

Decree-holder was civil servant/government servant and allegations levelled against him were directly connecting to his post/position which according to him disgraced him in the society etc.

Government servant/civil servant could not under any circumstances had recourse to any court for vindication of his public acts and character etc., except with prior permission of government

High Court set aside judgment and decrees passed by the Trial Court as no permission was sought by plaintiff before filing suit

Appeal was dismissed under circumstances.

Plea raised by accused persons was that Magistrate had examined only one witness who was representative of complainant during inquiry

Validity

Not necessary for Magistrate to examine all witnesses produced at time of inquiry and was not necessary for a complainant to produce all witnesses during inquiry

Purpose of inquiry was to persuade Magistrate to form an opinion regarding credibility of complaint and prima facie a case was made out for taking cognizance

At time of examining witness during inquiry, Inquiry Magistrate could put some questions to clarify something and could examine any document annexed in complaint and referred by witness during such examination

Inquiry Magistrate was not required to cross-examine a witness and evaluate evidence in the way of Trial Court

Status of Inquiry Magistrate was at a pedestal higher than investigating officer but he was not allowed to enter into domain of Trial Court while evaluating record during inquiry

Report of Inquiry Magistrate could again be evaluated by Trial Court at time of framing of charge

Up to stage of inquiry, in a criminal complaint it was responsibility of complainant to establish that he had a prima facie case in his favour

As soon as cognizance was taken, accused persons would have every right to appear and defend themselves

Even before framing of charge accused persons could approach Trial Court for their premature or pre-trial acquittal by filing application under S. 249-A or S.265-K, Cr.P.C. and if they were able to convince Trial Court regarding their point of view they would be acquitted without bothering them to go through a full-dress trial

High Court declined to interfere in process issued by Trial Court

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Claim of a person, acting bona fide, in matters of public notice does not give him a license to couch such 'public notice' in a manner and fashion which may or is likely to result in crossing the limits, violation of ethical values, decency and other laws of the land.

Public notice is got flashed in a newspaper yet it is always based on request of some specific person hence, normally no responsibility is attached to the publisher except that he shall always keep the line of decency in view even while flashing the public notice because the phrase "freedom of press" is not synonym to unfettered powers to publish whatever one (publisher) wishes.

Even an admission of the publisher that the news has caused defamation shall not entitle the plaintiff for a relief against him, unless it is established that he had any malice on his part or that he had added or substituted any 'indecent' word in press release, provided by a person (initiator of the news).

Plaintiff filed suit for damages and claimed that the defendants published and got published defamatory allegations (public notice) against him without verification of the facts

Validity

Public notice got issued by defendant prima facie had a reason of its publication i.e.the claim of land

Public notice was issued to put public onto notice about claims of the defendant and its intended action was to protect every inch of its property, hence to such extent public notice was within its object and purpose

Deliberate use of the name of plaintiff in public notice seemed to allow general public to have wrong impression about the plaintiff that he had illegally allotted its lands

Mere claim of bona fide or to have acted in the interest of defendant did not absolve the defendants from establishing bona fide

Public notice to the extent of mentioning the name of plaintiff was not in public interest rather was causeless resulting in damage to the reputation of plaintiff

Plaintiff, on establishing defamation, had only become entitled to compensation but quantum thereof was an entirely different thing which had got its own peculiar requirements/ingredients and mere claim of certain amount as a damages did not earn plaintiff a right to insist decree to such extent

Plaintiff had never attempted to differentiate damages with regard to mental torture, agony, defamation and financial loss but had claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 50 million

High Court, in absence of proof of mental shock and bifurcation of claimed damages, found it proper and justified to award an amount of Rs. 80,00,000/-(eighty lac) to the plaintiff

Suit was partially decreed.

Public notice is an information got flashed in a newspaper to put people onto notice about the matter with which they may likely to be affected or may have interest.

Where it is established that a public notice contained an allegation, direct or indirect, which caused prejudice or harm to the plaintiff, then it shall be presumed that the maker of such public notice has defamed the plaintiff, particularly when plaintiff claims to have been defamed in result of such public notice.

Plaintiff filed suit for damages and claimed that the defendants published and got published defamatory allegations against him without verification of the facts

Validity

Publisher had published an unchanged piece of the press release, therefore, he could not be held responsible for any loss (defamation), particularly when no mala fide had been pleaded on the part of publisher

Press release was issued by an institution which had nothing to do with the defendant

Said institution was not made party nor the plaintiff at later stage had sought joining of it in the suit

Plaintiff had not impleaded the initiator of the news, hence, the claim of plaintiff against the publisher was not legally justified

Suit was dismissed against the said defendant.

Complaint was dismissed on the ground that once the petitioners had withdrawn their complaint of similar nature subsequent complaint was not competent

Validity

Record showed that earlier complaint had been withdrawn by the petitioners to file a fresh complaint before the proper forum

Petitioners had brought fresh complaint, which after compliance of the provisions of S.190(2) Cr.P.C., was referred to the Trial Court

Application for withdrawal of the complaint clearly showed that withdrawal of complaint was to approach the proper forum, but the words "with permission to file a fresh complaint before proper forum were not mentioned in the order"

Said order was muted as to why petitioners were not granted permission for filing fresh complaint before proper forum, which could be the result of inadvertence

Subsequent complaint filed by the petitioners before the Trial Court, in circumstances, was competent in view of the conditional withdrawal of the earlier complaint

Earlier complaint having not been decided on merits and the same having been withdrawn on the ground of procedural defect coupled with the fact that the respondents had not earned their acquittal, revision petition was allowed.

Court of Session could entertain a complaint filed under S. 500, P.P.C.

Complainant being Medical specialist and civil servant serving as Medical Superintendent in Tehsil Headquarter Hospital had filed a complaint against the accused alleging that the material published by him in the newspaper amounted to defamation

Trial Court, after getting preliminary inquiry report conducted by police summoned the accused and after hearing arguments of parties dismissed the complaint

Validity

Record showed that Assistant Commissioner carried out inspection of the hospital on the complaint of local Member of Provincial Assembly

Accused had reported in the newspaper disclosing certain facts about irregularities in the hospital, non-availability of some instruments and other articles valuing in million of rupees donated by some foreign Non-Government Organization

Complainant had neither filed any complaint against Assistant Commissioner nor against the Member of Provincial Assembly

Complaint was filed against the local journalist, who only reported the matter in the newspaper

Allegation leveled in the complaint under Ss. 500 & 501 Penal Code, 1860 were not attracted and applicable, as the accused had performed his duty by reporting a raid conducted by Assistant Commissioner on the direction of Member of Provincial Assembly

Member of Provincial Assembly being people's representative had complained about some irregularities, mismanagement and misuse of public funds in the hospital

No case of defamation had been made out as the very element of "mens rea" which was essential element for defamation, was missing

Nothing on record, which had allegedly lowered down the reputation of complainant, even no name of complainant had been given in the news item

Fundamental Rights had been protected for expression and freedom of press

Circumstances established that no prima facie case under Ss.500 & 501 Penal Code, 1860 had been made out

Impugned order did not call for any interference

Petition was dismissed accordingly.

In order to constitute defamation in a suit under Defamation Ordinance, 2002; allegations levelled against a plaintiff should be false, baseless and unfounded; the wording used and allegation levelled against a plaintiff should on the face of it be defamatory and derogatory in nature, and such allegations should have been published in widely circulated newspapers or spoken in large gathering and said publications made or wording used should have been with malice without any reasonable excuse and justification and such allegations should have been directly attributed to plaintiff by specifically mentioning his/her name

In cases of defamation, falsehood was presumed on part of the defendant unless proved that the published/broadcasted materials were true and plaintiff could only be burdened to prove malice in case defendant succeeded in proving that defamatory words were true and privileged otherwise court shall presume that defamatory materials published or broadcast were false and male fide existed on part of the defendant

Article 19 of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of speech but it also imposed certain restrictions and limitations and did not provide licence to any person to make personal attempt on an individual to disgrace his/her dignity and reputation

Print and electronic media were in no way vested with unfettered liberty and impunity to public and telecast any material which was prejudicial to interest of any person or harmed or caused damage to a reputation, honour, prestige of a person

Author or broadcasting agency were not free to telecast anything for promotion of a company or corporation or on instruction of some quarter or according to its desires but their freedom was subject to a moral code of conduct and such reasonable restrictions as may be legitimately imposed under law in public interest and glory of Islam

When an untrue statement or scene was broadcast, and added to an evil act of person, the law of defamation would plunge into the rescue of such a person.

Contention of plaintiff was that it was option of the aggrieved person to avail remedy by filing suit under S.9, C.P.C. or under Defamation Ordinance, 2002

Validity

Civil court was court of ultimate jurisdiction

Neither there was any repealing clause nor ouster of jurisdiction of civil court to try the suit filed before it with regard to damages on account of defamation

If in respect of same dispute/litigation general law and special law were in field, special law would prevail subject to condition that special law contained provisions of ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts

Aggrieved person, therefore, had option either to opt for redressal against defamatory action before court of general jurisdiction i.e. civil court or under the special law

Jurisdiction of civil court covered all kinds of civil litigation on the strength and force of S. 9, C.P.C.

Plaintiff had availed the option of the civil court but his plaint was returned while misinterpretin g the law

Impugned order was not sustainable in circumstances which was set aside and matter was remanded for decision afresh in accordance with law

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Jurisdiction of civil court with regard to suit for damages on the ground of loss of reputation and defamation was barred under S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002

District Court had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters

When special tribunal or court had been established to hear and decide the dispute then jurisdiction of courts constituted under general law should be ousted from exercising power of the nature

Word "shall" used in Section 13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002 had mandatory nature of provision with regard to exclusive jurisdiction to try cases of defamation.

Trial Court dismissed application for rejection of plaint on the ground that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter under S.9, C.P.C.

Validity

Plaint could not be dismissed in piecemeal even if out of several prayers one could not be granted

Trial Court was directed to frame issue with regard to the maintainability of suit pending before it, in view of S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and pronounce judgment on the same along with other issues

Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.