2011 PLC (C (PLP)
AKHTAR ALI Versus MUHAMMAD SHOIAB AHMAD
| Citation | 2011 PLC (C (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore High Court |
| Bench Members | Umar Ata Bandial and Muhammad Ashraf Bhatti, JJ |
| Parties | AKHTAR ALI Versus MUHAMMAD SHOIAB AHMAD |
| Primary Law | Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2011 PLC (C (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2011 PLC (C (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Umar Ata Bandial and Muhammad Ashraf Bhatti, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2011 PLC (C (PLP) (AKHTAR ALI Versus MUHAMMAD SHOIAB AHMAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- M. Akhtar Ali Chaudhry for Appellant.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss. 5(h) & 6
Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.11
Plaintiff, a civil servant, was aggrieved of the comments in his Annual Confidential Report, prepared by defendant another civil servant
Trial Court rejected the plaint for non-disclosure of cause of action
For wrongful act of defamation to be committed it was necessary that communication of defamatory material be made to "at least one person other than the person defamed"-To prove defamation, recipient of communication were necessary to allege that plaintiff was defamed or ridiculed
Plaint lacked any such particulars of "communication" and wrong of defamation was incomplete without communication
Annual Confidential Report of a government servant contained confidential opinion given by reporting officer about service credentials, performance and capabilities of his subordinate officer
As name of the report suggested, such remarks were made in strict confidence under the provision of law
Annual Confidential Reports formed part of the record of competent authority in government for determining service prospects and capabilities of officer commented upon it was essential that an objected communication and the person to whom it was made be stated in pleadings
Particulars about slander were given to the extent that essential ingredients of falsity of statement, injury to reputation or exposure to a claim in consequence of false statement, must be evident from pleadings Plaint in the suit had been rightly rejected for non-disclosure of cause of action and High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Trial Court
Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.
Judgment & Decree
This appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 29-10-2007 rejecting the plaint in the appellant's suit under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C., The appellant filed his suit against the respondent for recovery of damages in the amount of Rs.10.026 million for committing defamation of the appellant/plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and the respondent/defendant are civil servants.
2. The essence of the plaintiff's case is that the respondent was posted as Principal of the Government Degree College, Tandilanwala while the appellant was working there as an Assistant Professor. It is alleged that owing to his personal malice for the appellant, the respondent recorded false and derogatory remarks about the appellant in the latter's Annual Confidential Reports for the years 2003 and 2004. The precise content of the disputed remarks as follows: "work and conduct both below average, habitual scandal monger blackmailer, intriguer, agitator" The above remarks are said to have been repeated by the respondent in private meetings and in the presence of college faculty, its students and private persons. No particulars of the date, place or content of the alleged slander or the names of persons before whom such remarks were made is given in the plaint.
3. By the impugned order dated 29-10-2007 the learned trial court rejected the plaint on several grounds including, inter alia, that the impugned remarks having been made in an official capacity enjoyed absolute privilege under section 6 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ("Ordinance") as an opinion written under the authority of the provincial government. It was also held that the suit was time barred, was vague in its contents and immune under the defence of fair comment. Learned counsel for the appellant assails the findings on the ground that privilege does not authorize public expression of adverse opinion.
4. For the wrongful act of defamation to be committed it is necessary that the communication of the defamatory material be made to "at least one person other- than the person defamed" section 2(e) of the (Ordinance). The particulars of such recipient of communication are necessary to allege that the plaintiff was defamed or ridiculed thereby. The plaint lacks any particulars of "communication". Since the wrong of defamation is incomplete without communication, therefore, the non-mention of its particulars in a plaint leaves the cause of action to remain unstated, as in the present case. Consequently, the plaint in the suit has been rejected rightfully for nondisclosure of cause of action.
5. Turning to the merits of the appellant's claim it is important to consider the subject matter of the alleged slander. The alleged defamation is claimed to be caused by the disclosure of the respondent's adverse opinion about the appellant as expressed in the latter's Annual Confidential Report ("ACR"). An ACR of a government servant contains the confidential opinion given by a reporting officer about the service credentials, performance and capabilities of his subordinate officer. As the name of the report suggests, such remarks are made in strict confidence under provision of law. These reports form part of the record of the competent authority in the government for determining the service prospects and capabilities of the officer commented upon. In order for such remarks to be useful it is fundamental that these are candid and forthright. As a report written under legal duty for the Provincial Government's record, the appellant's ACRs contains material that is protected by absolute privilege. Its communication, though involving breach of law, cannot under section 6 of the Ordinance which confers absolute privilege, read with section 5(h) of the Ordinance which makes such privilege a defence to an action for defamation, operates as a complete answer to the claim filed by the appellant.
6. In so far as the oral disclosure by the respondent of the contents of the adverse remarks made in the ACRs is concerned, the plaint is utterly vague regarding relevant particulars about the oral statement for a defamation claim to be sustained. It is essential that an objected communication and the person to whom it is made be stated in the pleadings. And particulars about the slander are given to the extent that the essential ingredients of falsity of the statement, injury to reputation or exposure to a claim in consequence of the false statement, must be evident from the pleadings. In the present case, the plaint in the appellant's suit is completed devoid of the essential elements that make out a claim for defamation.
7. Hence, in this respect also the plaint in the appellant's suit fails to disclose a cause of action. Resultantly, the impugned order has reached the right conclusion. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed in limine. M.H./A-233/L Appeal dismissed.