Delegation of Powers

Similarly, where the power to enact sub-statutory legislation is vested in any authority, the same can only be exercised within the four corners of the statute, in a manner consistent with the provisions of the statute.

Levy of tax for the purposes of Federation is not permissible except by or under the authority of an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)

Such legislative powers cannot be delegated to executive authorities

Parliament alone and not the Government/Executive is empowered to levy tax

Delegation of such powers to Government Executive is for the purpose of implementation of such laws, which is to be done by framing rules or issuing notifications etc.

Objection raised by the appellant (Insurance Company, being authorized to undertake non-life insurance business and to carry on Window Takaful Operations /WTO), was that the Show-Cause Notice was controversial because powers under S. 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, had been delegated to different persons (Commissioner Insurance, HOD, Adjudication and Wing Head Adjudication-I) which tantamount to sub-delegation of powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission)

Validity

Under the SRO No. 1545(I)/2019 dated December 6, 2019 ('the SRO-in-question'), powers had been delegated to the different administered legislations (persons) of the Commission (the Commissioners, Heads of Departments and Wing Heads)

Thus, the appellant's objection was misconceived as S. 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, was a penal clause that was delegated to different persons to adjudicate the matters involving violations of the substantive provisions of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000

Appellate Bench found no reason to interfere in the merits of the impugned order

Appeal was dismissed.

Appellant (Insurance Company) was penalized by the Director /HOD of Adjudication Department of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Respondent)

Argument of the appellant was that delegation of powers under S. 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, to respondent amounted to sub-delegation

Validity

Section 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, was is a penal clause that was delegated in different persons to adjudicate the matters involving violations of the substantive provisions of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000

Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan ('Commission') had delegated its powers through SRO No. 1545(I)/2019 ('the SRO') to various persons, therefore, it was not sub-delegation, rather it was a direct delegation of powers

Sub-delegation was the process whereby a delegatee further delegates powers delegated tohim to any third person, however, in the present case, the Commission directly delegated its powers to different persons including the Respondent (Director /HOD of Adjudication Department of Commission), therefore, it could not be considered as sub-delegation

Even the preamble of the SRO was self-explanatory, that the Commission had delegated its powers through the SRO to different officers, therefore, the question of sub-delegation did not arise

Even otherwise, S. 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, was not relevant to the present case because neither the Show Cause Notice was issued under the said section nor the impugned order had relied upon the said provision

Misreporting of financial facts was a serious violation and the misreporting of admissible assets by the Appellant for calculation of solvency had been duly established by the Respondent which included "related party" receivables while calculating solvency

Appeal, filed by Insurance Company, was dismissed.

Delegator cannot denude itself of its authority either to revoke the delegation or to exercise its power as a parent authority, however, only in cases where the delegatee has already decided the matter, the delegator cannot revisit the decision of the delegate unless an express power is conferred in this regard.

Delegator cannot denude itself of its authority either to revoke the delegation or to exercise its power as a parent authority, however, only in cases where the delegatee has already decided the matter, the delegator cannot revisit the decision of the delegate unless an express power is conferred in this regard.

Legislature merely delegates power to Federal Government so as to enable it to work out certain details and exercise its discretion in order to achieve object of the statute

Legislature, by no stretch of imagination, abdicates its power and authority expressly provided under Article 77 of the Constitution.

Legislature merely delegates power to Federal Government so as to enable it to work out certain details and exercise its discretion in order to achieve object of the statute

Legislature, by no stretch of imagination, abdicates its power and authority expressly provided under Article 77 of the Constitution.

Majilis-e-Shoora (Parliament) is a creation of the Constitution, therefore, it cannot exceed boundaries expressly set out therein

Power to exercise legislative authority expressly provided under the Constitution cannot be abdicated by the Legislature by way of delegation

Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated beyond reasonable limits because doing so would be in violation of the Constitution

Legislature being the creation of the Constitution, does not inherently possess absolute legislative power but the same can only be exercised in conformity with the powers granted by the Constitution

Legislature determines legislative policies and sets out principles and standards for guidance of delegated authority

Fundamental legislative responsibility cannot be delegated

Delegation must adhere to certain constraints

General principles set out for exercising power of legislation are met by Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and once that has been done, delegation of authority is confined to making subordinate legislation or to attend to other matters of administration and details

Primary functions expressly stated in the Constitution have to be fulfilled by the Legislature itself while the latter may delegate ancillary and incidental functions to an outside agency or authority.

Petitioner was accused facing trial before Accountability Court, who was aggrieved of grant of pardon by Director General NAB (National Accountability Bureau) to two accused persons

Plea raised by petitioner was that such power could not be delegated by Chairman NAB

Validity

Chairman NAB under Ss.6(b)(iv) & 34-A of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, could delegate his authority/power to any officer of NAB

Such delegation was notified through notification dated 30-10-2015, whereby under S.26 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, power to tender pardon was delegated to DG Operations NAB HQ and DGs Regional NAB with certain conditions

High Court declined to interfere in Authority exercised by Director General granting pardon to two witnesses as the same was intra vires

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioners were land owners and their grievance was that Additional Deputy Commissioner could not have decided the matter on behalf of Deputy Commissioner with regard to forwarding of References to Referee Court for enhancement of compensation

Validity

Authority or public functionary could delegate its function to any other person / officer if statue under which it was performing function, provided for delegation of such power

In absence of such statutory delegation, authority / public functionary, was not competent to delegate its functions / powers

Reference under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 filed by land owners / objectors was to be dealt with by Collector itself or by an officer who was appointed by Board of Revenue or Commissioner to act as Collector of a district

Collector under no circumstances could entrust a Reference to any other person / officer to deal with it as his delegatee

Collector was not legally authorized to delegate his functions to Additional Deputy Commissioner, to deal with Reference of petitioners as under Land Acquisition Act 1894, he was not bestowed upon with such power of delegation of his functions to any other person or officer

High Court declared all proceedings conducted and orders passed by Additional Deputy Commissioner, as illegal, unlawful and ineffective upon rights of petitioners

High Court remanded the matter to Collector for decision afresh after hearing the petitioners

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Undertakings argued that the requisite approval/authority was not duly delegated to the Enquiry Officers, the Registrar and the Secretary of the Commission, hence, the show cause notices issued under S. 30 of the Competition Act, 2010 were invalid

Validity

Section 28(2) of the Competition Act, 2010 had provided the Commission with the power to delegate all or any of its functions and powers to any of its Members or officers as it deemed fit

Commission had delegated all powers under Ss. 33, 36 & 50 of the Competition Act, 2010 to the Enquiry Committee during the course of enquiry, which included the discovery and production of any document or other material object as evidence

Registrar was competent under Regulation 5(m) of the Competition Commission (Duties and Responsibilities of Registrar) Regulations, 2016 to draft and issue the show cause notice with the approval of the competent authority (which was duly given by the Commission in a meeting)

Commission in its meeting and through resolution by circulation had specifically authorized the Secretary to the Commission to issue the authorization for the search and inspections under S. 34 of the Competition Act, 2010.

In order to enable a person to delegate powers and functions, there must be an authority, express or implied, to delegate

When power is conferred on a particular person, then that person alone has to exercise powers and cannot transfer its exercise to another person.

Taxpayer was aggrieved of show-cause notice issued under S.11(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 for recovery of additional tax liabilities without selection of case or without audit by Commissioner Inland Revenue

Validity

No provision of delegation of powers like S.210 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 existed with Commissioner Inland Revenue

Delegatee could not further delegate his powers and only Commissioner was competent and empowered to undertake assessment proceedings under S.11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and not any other officer

Show-cause notice issued under S.11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 by Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue was of no legal effect who was not empowered to issue notice and could not pass order in question as such powers exclusively vested with the Commissioner

Order-in-Original passed by Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue was without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and without any legal effect

Such show-cause notice issued under S.11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 was ab initio void, illegal as notice was to be issued under S.25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990

Web-portal Evidence Showed that all the parties which were blacklisted subsequently were active taxpayers at the time of transactions

Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the orders passed by officers below as same were without jurisdiction

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Officer(s) of the Sales Tax Department could exercise all powers and discharge all duties conferred or imposed upon any officer subordinate to such officer(s) and in cases under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, High Court was to adjudicate the same with proper appreciation and interpretation of Ss. 31 & 32 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

Accused was put to trial under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, resultantly he was convicted and sentenced by Trial Court

Plea raised by accused was that no specific clause of S. 9 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, was mentioned by Trial Court and the reference was filed unauthorizedly

Validity

Judge of Trial Court committed an error by convicting accused and found him guilty of the offence falling under S. 9 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, as the Court had not taken care of to prosecute and convict accused under exact clause of S. 9 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

In the reference allegations of misappropriation was elaborately drawn but fine was not reduced into a well-defined charge

High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and case was remanded to Trial Court for decision afresh

High Court directed the Trial Court to reframe charge under proper head only if it would decide first that the reference was competently filed

Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Order of removal from service issued was served by the said officer and order of acceptance of departmental appeal conveyed to the employee was again served through the same officer

Validity

Nothing was on record that departmental proceedings/penalty was approved by the Authority

Whole proceedings in the present case were initiated and authorized by Manager Discipline and never authorized by the competent authority

Even if there was any delegation of powers then Executive Vice-President (HR) being himself as delegatee could not further delegate his powers to the Manager Discipline Management

Where through a law or notification powers were delegated to an authority and that law or notification had not given any power to the authority for further delegation of said power then any such further delegation would not vest the delegatee such powers

Department had violated the concept of authority and authorized officer

Where the department itself constituted and notified the authority then all the departmental actions should have been initiated under the order of Authority

Order of penalty also required the approval of the Authority

Proceedings initiated against the employee and concluded having not been authorized by the Authority, had no legal status and were declared illegal and without lawful authority by the High Court

Impugned order of compulsory retirement was set aside and department was allowed to initiate fresh departmental inquiry, if so advised

Employee was directed to be reinstated and his back benefit's any should be decided after the out-come of such inquiry

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Saleemullah Khan Ranazai and Anwarul Haq for Petitioner.

Delegatee could not go beyond the powers delegated to him nor the delegator could delegate the powers which were not vested in him

Minister for transport was delegated the powers of government vested in it under S.50(1) of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1971

Minister while exercising said powers was only authorized to order the Transport Authority for introduction of new routes or any number of additional permits for existing route of stage carriage and granting the same to any particular party or parties

Minister for transport could not directly sanction the route permits himself or grant sanction for contract carriage permits

Neither the provision of S.50 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1971 dealt with the matter of contract carriage permits nor any powers with regard to contract carriage permits had been delegated to the Minister

Section 50 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1971 dealt with the matter of stage carriage permits

Route permits issued were not of stage carriage but were of contract carriage

Minister for transport had granted contract carriage permits but powers delegated to him were with regard to stage carriage

Minister for transport had nothing to do with contract carriage route permits

Said routs permits issued were without lawful authority

Petitioners had no alternate, efficacious or adequate remedy

No order, proceedings or any act of the Provincial or Regional Transport Authority was called in question

Controversy in the present case was with regard to the notifications issued by the Minister for transport who was neither Provincial nor Regional Transport Authority

Only remedy available to the petitioners was to approach the High Court for exercising the powers in extraordinary writ jurisdiction

No illegality had been pointed out in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Appellants were accused facing trial under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, who were aggrieved of approval granted by Trial Court to freezing order passed by Director-General National Accountability Bureau

Plea raised by appellants was that powers to freeze property vested with Chairman and not Director-General National Accountability Bureau

Validity

Chairman National Accountability Bureau possessed power under S.12 of National Accountability Ordinance,1999 to freeze property

Chairman National Accountability Bureau could delegate under S.34-A of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, such or any of his powers to and could authorize performance of any of his functions to any officer of National Accountability Bureau

Freezing order passed by Chairman could not remain in force more than 15 days unless confirmed by Accountability Court where the reference under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was sent by the Chairman

High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Trial Court as same was well reasoned and based on proper appreciation of law

Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Regulators drew their authority from Legislation which created it, and limits placed on a regulator were prescribed by law.

Petitioner company was aggrieved of demand notice issued by a private company for recovery of advertisement fee on behalf of Cantonment Board with regard to signboards and advertisements affixed in private shops

Validity

Cantonment Board was not providing any service to petitioner for displaying and advertising its products on billboards/signboards of shops on its private vendors/retailer shops

Such was a private arrangement between petitioner and shopkeepers

Petitioner used billboards/signboards of shops to advertise its products at the expense of petitioner

High Court declared illegal, money demanded by private company under the name of 'advertisement fee' without providing any services in respect thereof, on principle of quid pro quo

Cantonment Board could not delegate power to a private person and could only delegate the same to its own officers

Delegation of sovereign right to levy or collect any tax by State to private person was otherwise contrary to Constitutional mandate

Such delegation of power to private company to collect subject levy was unlawful

High Court quashed proceedings pending before Magistrate for recovery of advertisement fee

Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Petitioner company was aggrieved of demand notice issued by a private company for recovery of advertisement fee on behalf of Cantonment Board with regard to signboards and advertisements affixed in private shops

Validity

Cantonment Board was not providing any service to petitioner for displaying and advertising its products on billboards/signboards of shops on its private vendors/retailer shops

Such was a private arrangement between petitioner and shopkeepers

Petitioner used billboards/signboards of shops to advertise its products at the expense of petitioner

High Court declared illegal, money demanded by private company under the name of 'advertisement fee' without providing any services in respect thereof, on principle of quid pro quo

Cantonment Board could not delegate power to a private person and could only delegate the same to its own officers

Delegation of sovereign right to levy or collect any tax by State to private person was otherwise contrary to Constitutional mandate

Such delegation of power to private company to collect subject levy was unlawful

High Court quashed proceedings pending before Magistrate for recovery of advertisement fee

Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Procedure of appointment of Chairman NAB is cumbersome and one is appointed by the President of Pakistan directly, there can be a gap between the period of an earlier NAB Chairman leaving and new incumbent taking over the charge

Such gap cannot give benefit or open a flood gate for those involved in corruption and plundering public money on account of such gap.

Executive power conferred by a statute upon a particular functionary could not be delegated in absence of express words or necessary implication.

Scope and parameters.

In order to enable a person to delegate powers or functions, there must be an authority, express or implied, to delegate

Power, when conferred on a particular person, can only be exercised by the person alone, and its exercise could not be transferred to another person.

Objection was raised with regard to issuance of order on behalf of Wafaqi Mohtasib, by a Consultant appointed in the Office, while the post of Wafaqi Mohtasib was vacant

Validity

At no time quasi judicial power of Mohtasib to decide a matter had been delegated to any of the staff or any of the Committee Members, who at the best could assist the Mohtasib in performing his functions

Such assistance might entail carrying out field inspections and investigations to a limited extent provided in Art.14(1) of Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, and no more

High Court directed the Secretary Wafaqi Mohtasib to hold a detail inquiry into the matter and to initiate departmental action against the officers/consultants, who had violated the law by passing interim orders on behalf of Wafaqi Mohtasib

High Court further directed the Secretary to ensure that no judicial order/interim order should be issued in future by the staff/consultants working at Wafaqi Mohtasib

Objection was disposed of accordingly.

Registrar, in terms of O.III, Rr. 4 & 5 of Supreme Courts Rules, 1980, is fully empowered to delegate and assign such work/task among officers of the Court

Institution Officer is officer of Supreme Court in Basic Pay Scale-18, thus powers so exercised by him cannot be objected to.

Under S.122 sub-sections (1) & (4) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the Commissioner had been given the power to amend and further amend the assessment orders

Powers under S.122(5-A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was a kind of revisional power possessed by the Commissioner, which under repealed law vested in Inspecting Additional Commissioner

Powers under subsection (5-A) or (5-B) of S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were exercisable on the basis of date already available in shape of return and other documents annexed with the return

Jurisdiction could be exercised, if Commissioner on the basis of the available date would consider that assessment order was erroneous and was prejudiced to the interest of the Revenue

However, if the Commissioner would acquire some additional information from audit or through any other source, he could exercise his powers under subsection (1) of S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to amend assessment order treated as the one issued under S.120 of the Ordinance or passed under S.121 of Ordinance

Since the power under S.122(5-A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was exercisable on the basis of the material already available, if order passed was appealed against and the appellate order would come into field the doctrine of merger would be applicable

Appellate order could not be amended, however, powers under subsections (1) and (4) of S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were altogether different

Even in presence of appellate order, if the Commissioner would acquire definite information, he could proceed under the law to amend or further amend the assessment order

Section 210(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had conferred power on the Commission to delegate its powers subject to subsection (1-A) of S.210 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to a Taxation Officer.

Original assessment framed by making additions under Ss.13 (1)(d) & 13(1)(aa) of (repealed) Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, were contested by the assessee in appeal and Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) having set aside said additions, department had filed appeal against order of Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals)

Tribunal in its earlier decisions had decided that under the provisions of (repealed) Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, the powers of assessment and powers of approval were vested in two different authorities i.e. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax respectively

In-built mechanism of approval being available under repealed Ordinance, approval of addition granted by the Inspecting' Additional Commissioner was according to the said mechanism

Under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 a complete switch over had been made about the mechanism of assessment

Under said new law there was no concept of approval by any higher authority

Commissioner himself was the authority who could delegate his power for exercise of his functions by the subordinate officer

Under the new Ordinance, 2001 it was the Commissioner who could make assessment; he could not at the same time be an authority for assessment and also for approval

Under subsections (1) & (2) of S.239 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 it was provided that in case of assessment in respect of any income year ending on or before 30-6-2002 the provisions of repealed Ordinance, 1979 would apply for the purpose of computation of income and tax payable thereon, however, such assessments would be made by the Income Tax Authority who was competent to make assessment under new Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Since there was no concept of granting any kind of approval in the new law, no authority appointed under said new Ordinance had any such powers of making approval

Approval from IAC for the assessment under appeal was not according to the provisions of law

Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case and the ratio already settled by the Tribunal, orders passed by the Commissioner Income Tax were upheld and appeals of the department were rejected for being without any merit.

Under S.32(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 the Collector may delegate its powers to any officers of the Sales Tax subordinate to him

News item in newspaper did not supersede the enactment

Collector could empower the Assistant Collector what was enjoyed by him, therefore, finding that contravention report sent by Assistant Collector was coram non judice and void was not correct.

Delegattee cannot further delegate its powers unless so allowed by law.

Delegator by delegating his powers, would not get denuded of those powers nor delegation would imply a parting with powers by the person who granted delegation

Delegator and delegatee simultaneously or successively, could not exercise the power, however, it could not be accepted that after delegation of powers, delegator was deprived to exercise such powers, which otherwise vested in him under law

Authority once having competently exercised by delegatee, would get exhausted and there would be left no power with delegator to exercise same in same cause.

Contention of the civil servant was that the Chief Executive had not been delegated any powers by the Chairman under the provisions of S.20 of the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, that the Service Tribunal should not have dismissed the appeal of the civil servant in limine in which complicated facts and law were involved; and that the holding of regular inquiry could not be dispensed with in facts and circumstances of the case

Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider the contention of the civil servant.

Delegation of Powers Duty of delegatee???When power was conferred on a particular person then that person could neither transfer its exercise to another person nor could exercise it without application of his mind to facts and circumstances of that case???Such person has to exercise that power with application of his independent mind to the facts and circumstances of that case regardless of any extraneous/dictative influence.

Delegation of Powers Where power was conferred on one person that person could not transfer its exercise to another person

Such act would be ultra sires for having been done by wrong person and same would amount to usurpation of power and thus, a nullity.

Delegatee cannot further delegate its powers without permission of delegator.

Delegator after delegating the powers is not divested of powers or authority under the law.

[Administration of justice]

Statute may authorise that functionary named may delegate or assign its work to any other functionary.

Where power Is given to do a certain their in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.

Special Tribunals, Public Bodies or Executive Authorities exercising functions similar to the judicial or quasi-judicial cannot delegate their power to decide matter to any third body or person, but can entrust to a person or group of persons with authority to investigate and to submit its recommendations.

Duty of donee of powers to act in dictates of another body or person held, not warranted.

(d) Delegation of powers-Delegate not competent to delegate his authority to any other person.

Delegation of Powers Delegation of legislative powers-Nature, limit and scope examined.

Delegation of Powers Delegated authority cannot be delegated further.

Delegation of Powers Delegation of powers-Delegating authority not divested of powers delegated-Bahawalpur Control of Goondas Act, 1955 -Validity.

Delegation of powers-Delegator not divested or powers by the fact of delegation-Central Government delegating powers under S. 3, Security of Pakistan Act (XXXV of 1952), to the Chief Commissioner, Karachi-Central Government not divested thereby of powers under S. 3.