1980 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

Case No. 244/173 of 1978, decided on 15th February, 1979.

Read with Punjab Excise and Taxation Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1975, r. 3(2)‑Departmental proceedings‑Pending before promulgation of Rules of 1975‑To be processed and completed and orders passed by Authority under Rules of 1962‑Proceedings started in 1974‑Orders passed by authority prescribed under Rules of 1975 and not by that prescribed by Rules of 1962, held, by incompetent authority hence sex aside. Malik Muhammad Nawaz for Appellant. A. G. Humayun, Government Pleader for Respondents. M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRDIAN).‑The appellant in this case assails the order dated 27‑2‑1978 by the respondent No. 2 demoting him from the post of Inspector, Excise & Taxation to that of Sub‑Inspector. The main grounds pressed before us are that respondent No. 2 was not the authority competent to pass such order in his case. It has been stated that the appellant was served with charge‑sheet signed by the Member, Board of Revenue on 22‑10‑1975. An Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Director‑General, Excise & taxation (respondent No. 2) on 1‑2‑1975. A show‑cause notice over the signatures o: Director (Headquarters) was served on the appellant on 28‑4‑1975. A second show‑cause notice over the signature of Director General was served on him on 17‑1‑1978. The impugned order was passed by the Director‑General on 27‑2‑1978. The proceedings were started against him on 22‑10‑1974 and as such the Efficiency and Discipline Rules of 1960 were applicable. In accordance with the West Pakistan Excise and Taxation Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1962, applicable to the case at that time the "authority" competent to inflict a major penalty on the appellant was the Secretary, Board of Revenue. These Rules were repealed with the promulgation of the Punjab Excise & Taxation Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1975 notified on 20th September 1975 wherein the `authority' in the appellant's case was the Director, Headquarter. Pare. 3(2) of the said Notification of' 20th September 1975, however, provided 'hat notwithstanding the repeal of the 1962 Rule, any departmental enquiry, proceedings or action pending immediately before coming into force of these Rules shall be comp leted and orders passed by the Authority, Officer, as if the 1962 rules had not been repealed. The appellant contends that in view of the clear provisions of the Delegation of Powers Rules even if for the sake of argument it may be presumed that the 1975 Delegation of Powers Rules were applicable, the Director‑General, Excise and Taxation or Member, Board of Revenue who signed the original charge‑sheet do not figure anywhere and the various orders having been passed by the authorities not delegated with the necessary powers were incompetent and void ab initio.

2. The respondents conceded the point as far as the provision of the Delegation of Powers Rules are concerned but explained that on the creation of a separate administrative Department of Excise and Taxation, all functions had been shifted to that Department. from the Board of Revenue and as such the Secretary, Board of Revenue could not take any action against the incumbents of the said Department. It was further stated that on the separation of the functions of the Director‑General and Secretary, which were performed by the name person to start with, the post of Director, Headquarters was upgraded to create a separate Office of the Director‑General Excise and Taxation and as such the Director‑General exercised the powers which were delegated to the erstwhile Director, Headquarters. In case the contention of the respondent was correct, the inclusion of para. 3(2) in the Delagat on of Powers Rules, 1975 (which clearly prescribes the processing of pending cases A by authorities stipulated in the Delegation of Powers Rules, 1962) becomes purposeless. This specific provision, therefore, belies the contention of the respondent and in the presence of the same we see no force in the contention of the respondent and hold that the 1975 Rules were not applicable in the present case. The respondents could not produce before us any justification for not agreeing with the contention of the appellant that the impugned orders were passed by an authority not competent for the same. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders on this ground alone and do not find it necessary to go into the other grounds of appeal. Appeal accepted.