Limitation

Appellant challenged, before the Service Tribunal, a notification vide which the respondent was granted time (notification-in-question), however, the same was dismissed being time-barred having been filed after a period of almost one and a half year

Validity

Appellant in (relevant ground /para of) the memo of appeal before the Service Tribunal had furnished explanation regarding the delay in filing the appeal and stated that the notification-in-question was neither communicated to him nor the same was published in the official gazette

In support of his stance, he appended the certification issued by the Printing and Stationary Department along with the appeal

Moreover, the appellant also filed a separate application for condonation of delay accompanied by an affidavit

Under S. 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act, 1975, any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority, in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service, may, within ninety days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal

After perusal of ground (specifically taken in memo of appeal) and the certification issued by the Printing and Stationary Department, it appeared that the notification impugned before the Service Tribunal was neither communicated to the appellant nor the same was published in the official gazette, hence, the appeal filed by the appellant before the Service Tribunal was within limitation.

In a case where Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969, has been invoked, the limitation under section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, after the date of issuance of the show cause notice is 30 days and in such cases the Collector is not vested with any kind of jurisdiction insofar as extension of time in terms of section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, is concerned

In the present case, the accusations in the Show Cause Notice revolved around Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969, which was issued on 27.04.2020 and the order-in-original was passed on 10.08.2020

The Collector (Adjudication) and the Customs Appellate Tribunal wrongly presumed that the period prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, for the purpose of issuing an order-in-original in respect of cases brought under Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969, was also 90 days

The proviso to Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969,would make it clear that for goods falling in Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969, the requisite time-frame for passing order-in-original is 30 days for which no extension was permitted in the law

No case for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court was made out

Leave to appeal was refused.

Briefly, the petitioners' (through their late father) filed a civil suit before seeking declaration, perpetual injunction and, in the alternative, possession regarding the shop in question, claiming leasehold rights and challenging a registered lease deed executed in favour of respondent No.1; the suit was decreed and the respondent's appeal was dismissed, but in civil revision the High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and dismissed the suit, leading to the filing of present petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, whereby, the Supreme Court considered maintainability of the suit in view of the earlier civil suit (on the same cause and lease deed) which was withdrawn without permission to file a fresh suit

Held: The application seeking withdrawal of the earlier suit was completely silent as to any condition, reservation, or liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action

A withdrawal founded upon a private arrangement which neither received judicial recognition nor was reflected in the order of the Court could not, in law, be treated as anything other than a withdrawal simpliciter

Such an unconditional withdrawal squarely attracted the bar contained in Order XXIII, Rule 1(3), C.P.C., thereby precluding the institution of a subsequent suit in respect of the same subject-matter

With respect to the issue of limitation the petitioners had neither pleaded nor established any factual or legal basis to attract the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908

There was no assertion, much less proof, that the earlier proceedings were prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith before a Court lacking jurisdiction or suffering from any defect of a like nature

Consequently, the challenge laid to the registered lease deed, after the lapse of several years, was manifestly beyond the prescribed period of limitation and was, therefore, hopelessly time-barred

Withdrawal of the earlier suit without permission to institute a fresh suit operated as a complete bar under Order XXIII, Rule 1, C.P.C.

The subsequent suit was not only barred by law but also by limitation

The failure of the petitioners to challenge the withdrawal order further estopped them from re-agitating the same cause of action

Leave was refused and present petition being devoid of merit was dismissed.

Record reveals that respondents/customers filed appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Single Bench of High Court without affixing the requisite court fee on the memo of appeal

Relevant office objection proforma of Appellate/High Court specifically mentioned that the office objections have to be removed(complied with) within three days subject to limitation

It was very much in the knowledge of respondents / customers and their counsel that the appeal was incomplete due to non-affixation of the requisite court fee

Neither the requisite court fee was filed within three days of the office objection nor any application was filed before the court for extending time to affix the requisite court fee on the memo of appeal

The appeal was re-filed by respondents/customers with requisite court fee after delay of 173 days whereas under subsection (1) of Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001'), it was to be filed within thirty days;the same was not accompanied with any application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal

Thus, the conduct of respondents /customers was contumacious

If the objections raised by the office are not removed during the period allowed by the office and in the meanwhile the limitation period expires and the conduct of the appellant is considered to be contumacious, the appeal has to be rejected being time barred

Thus, the Appellate/High Court by accepting appeal after holding the same as not barred by time and granting leave to defend erred in facts as well as law

Supreme Court set-aside impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court in favour of respondents /customers, being barred by time and having no merits

Appeal, filed by bank, was allowed.

The astuteness of the law of limitation does not confer a right but ensues incapacitation after the lapse of the period allowed for enforcing some existing legal rights and it foresees the culmination of claims which have decayed by efflux of time.

Present Civil Appeal arose against the judgment of the Divisional Bench of the High Court, whereby, the appeal was dismissed as being time-barred

The appellant contended that the High Court erroneously applied Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribed twenty days for filing an appeal against a decree, whereas the correct provision was Article 156 of the Limitation Act, 1908 allowing 90 days

It was further argued that while making the award a rule of court, the Single Judge in Chambers failed to consider material defects rendering the award void ab initio, and hence no limitation could run against a void order

Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider whether "the High Court rightly applied Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides limitation of twenty days for filing a High Court appeal against a decree and whether award which was made rule of court was not a decree, therefore, Article 156 which prescribed limitation of ninety days was applicable in the case"

Held: Decree was obviously passed by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction for which twenty days' time was provided for challenging such a decree in accordance with Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908

Nevertheless, even if Article 156 applied then also the appeal was filed much later than ninety days

Award being void could not qualify as a ground for condoning the delay in filing of appeal

Due to carelessness and inattention or lack of bona fide on the part of the appellant there was no lawful justification to expose or burden the other side to the time-barred appeal

There was no justification warranting interreference of the Supreme Court

Civil appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

An arbitral award was made in favor of the respondent and was initially filed before the civil court but was returned for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, after which the arbitrator himself filed the award before the district court

Petitioner objected that the filing was barred by limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908

Objection was accepted by the district court but set aside by the High Court, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court requiring determination of the issue as to “whether Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied where the award was filed by the arbitrator himself without a party applying to the court, or whether such filing was governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908?”

Held: Article 178 of the Act of 1908 being the primary provision regulated the period within which proceedings could be instituted for making an Award Rule of the Court

It prescribed a period of ninety days, running from the date on which notice of the making of the Award was served

Where a party did not first request the arbitrator or umpire to file the Award in Court, it could directly approach the Court and seek an order directing the Arbitrator or umpire to file the Award or a signed copy thereof

An application of this nature fell within the ambit of Article 178 of the Act of 1908, provided that notice of the Award had been served in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1940

A different legal regime applied where no notice of the Award had been served and the party merely requested the Arbitrator, under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940, to file the Award in Court

In such a situation, the residuary Article 181 of the Act of 1908 applied

Article 181 prescribed a period of three years commencing from the date when the right to apply accrued

In matters of arbitration, that right accrued when the Award is made and the party obtained knowledge of it

Article 178 of the Act of 1908 has no application where the Award was filed by the Arbitrator himself because he sought no relief for his own benefit

Service of notice upon the party is, therefore, a sine qua non for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of 1908, and in the absence of such notice, the provision could not be invoked

In the present case, the record clearly demonstrated that the respondent did not, at any material stage, file an application under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940 seeking a direction from the Court requiring the Arbitrator to file the Award

Instead, it was the Arbitrator who filed the Award before the district court, without any judicial direction compelling him to do so

In such circumstances, the essential preconditions for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of1908 were not met, and the provision was erroneously invoked

High Court rightly held that Article 178 of the Act of 1908 applied only where a party to the arbitration proceedings applied to the Court for filing of the Award

It did not apply to an application made by the party to the Arbitrator for filing the Award, which would instead been governed by Article 181 of the Act of 1908

Leave was declined and present petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Record reveals that respondents/customers filed appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Single Bench of High Court without affixing the requisite court fee on the memo of appeal

Relevant office objection proforma of Appellate/High Court specifically mentioned that the office objections have to be removed(complied with) within three days subject to limitation

It was very much in the knowledge of respondents / customers and their counsel that the appeal was incomplete due to non-affixation of the requisite court fee

Neither the requisite court fee was filed within three days of the office objection nor any application was filed before the court for extending time to affix the requisite court fee on the memo of appeal

The appeal was re-filed by respondents/customers with requisite court fee after delay of 173 days whereas under subsection (1) of Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001'), it was to be filed within thirty days;the same was not accompanied with any application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal

Thus, the conduct of respondents /customers was contumacious

If the objections raised by the office are not removed during the period allowed by the office and in the meanwhile the limitation period expires and the conduct of the appellant is considered to be contumacious, the appeal has to be rejected being time barred

Thus, the Appellate/High Court by accepting appeal after holding the same as not barred by time and granting leave to defend erred in facts as well as law

Supreme Court set-aside impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court in favour of respondents /customers, being barred by time and having no merits

Appeal, filed by bank, was allowed.

An arbitral award was made in favor of the respondent and was initially filed before the civil court but was returned for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, after which the arbitrator himself filed the award before the district court

Petitioner objected that the filing was barred by limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908

Objection was accepted by the district court but set aside by the High Court, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court requiring determination of the issue as to "whether Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied where the award was filed by the arbitrator himself without a party applying to the court, or whether such filing was governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908?"

Held: Article 178 of the Act of 1908 being the primary provision regulated the period within which proceedings could be instituted for making an Award Rule of the Court

It prescribed a period of ninety days, running from the date on which notice of the making of the Award was served

Where a party did not first request the arbitrator or umpire to file the Award in Court, it could directly approach the Court and seek an order directing the Arbitrator or umpire to file the Award or a signed copy thereof

An application of this nature fell within the ambit of Article 178 of the Act of 1908,provided that notice of the Award had been served in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1940

A different legal regime applied where no notice of the Award had been served and the party merely requested the Arbitrator, under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940, to file the Award in Court

In such a situation, the residuary Article 181 of the Act of 1908 applied

Article 181 prescribed a period of three years commencing from the date when the right to apply accrued

In matters of arbitration, that right accrued when the Award is made and the party obtained knowledge of it

Article 178 of the Act of 1908 has no application where the Award was filed by the Arbitrator himself because he sought no relief for his own benefit

Service of notice upon the party is, therefore, a sine qua non for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of 1908, and in the absence of such notice, the provision could not be invoked

In the present case, the record clearly demonstrated that the respondent did not, at any material stage, file an application under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940 seeking a direction from the Court requiring the Arbitrator to file the Award

Instead, it was the Arbitrator who filed the Award before the district court, without any judicial direction compelling him to do so

In such circumstances, the essential preconditions for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of1908 were not met, and the provision was erroneously invoked

High Court rightly held that Article 178 of the Act of 1908 applied only where a party to the arbitration proceedings applied to the Court for filing of the Award

It did not apply to an application made by the party to the Arbitrator for filing the Award, which would instead been governed by Article 181 of the Act of 1908

Leave was declined and present petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

If any person or party wants to file an appeal in the higher court, he should be vigilant and diligent in pursuing his available remedy within the stipulated timeframe

No doubt, the law favours adjudication on merits, but simultaneously one should not close their eyes or oversee another aspect of great consequence, namely that the law helps the vigilant and not the indolent.

Limitation does not run against a void order because an order that has no legal existence cannot trigger the period of limitation.

Under subsection (2) of S.12 of the Act, 1894 where notice has been issued to the claimant within six weeks from the receipt of notice, the period of filing reference is six months.

Clause (a) of subsection 2 of S. 18 of the Act of 1894 provides that where the person himself or represented by any one before the collector at the time award is made, the party who is aggrieved from the award can file objection to the collector within six weeks from the date of award, whereas, clause (b) of subsection (2) of S.18 of the Act, 1894 provides that for other cases within six weeks of receipt of the notice from collector under S.12(2) or within six months from the date of the collector's award.

Brief facts were that the petitioner was owner of land in question and challenged acquisition of his land acquired for extension of road; award was fixed compensation at Rs.1725 per sq.ft.; reference for enhancement of compensation was dismissed as time-barred, prompting the filing of the present constitutional petition

Pivotal question for determination in the present matter was as to "whether the reference was barred by limitation and whether the impugned order warranted interference in constitutional jurisdiction?"

Held: Order passed by respondent No.4 dismissing the reference of petitioner was not a speaking one and was passed in violation of the ratio of judgment reported as 1990 CLC 1812 as well as in violation of Ss.18 & 42 of the Act, 1894

The order of the Deputy Commissioner cum Collector was silent as to whether notices had been sent to the petitioner after passing award, as provided under S. 12(2) of the Act, 1894

Impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded for decision afresh

Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

The structure of the law of limitation is founded upon the legal maxims, that delay defeats equity; time and tide wait for none; and law helps the vigilant not the indolent

The object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent

Helping hand could not be extended to a litigant who became forgetful of his rights

Besides, invoking of remedy by some aggrieved person beyond the period of limitation prescribed for redressal of grievance, creates a valuable right in favour of the opposite party, therefore, in such case, delay of each day has to be explained by the defaulting party to the satisfaction of the Court, which could not be condoned lightly or as of routine, as such arbitrary exercise of discretion would cause serious prejudice to the opposite party.

Petitioners were aggrieved of setting aside of consent decree dated 09-12-1998 assailed in application under S.12 (2) C.P.C dated 07-04-2021

Validity

Statutes of limitation are not merely procedural but substantive in their operation, they create a bar to legal remedies after prescribed period has elapsed

Law of limitation does not confer any right upon a litigant but strictly regulates exercise of existing rights within fixed time limits

Once statutory period expires, a vested right accrues in favour of opposite party and such right cannot be extinguished or curtailed unless conditions prescribed for such extinguishments are fully satisfied in both letter and spirit

High Court in exercise of Constitution jurisdiction set aside order in question as the same had been passed against the law and in disregard of settled principles

Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Suit was filed by respondents / plaintiffs assailing mutation containing names of petitioners/defendants as owners of suit land

Trial Court dismissed the suit but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of respondents/plaintiffs

Two revision applications were filed against same judgment, one was within time while the other was barred by limitation

Held: Respondents/plaintiffs had been in possession of property since long and their possession was never disturbed in any manner

There had not been any actual denial of their rights except through mutation in question

One of the mutations was attested on 28-06-1997 while the other mutation had been attested on 25-05-1998

Suit instituted on 23-09-2000 was within six years of attestation of mutation when actual denial of right took place

Delay in limitation in filing of other revision application was condoned as the other application filed against same judgment was filed within time and was also sought to be disposed of through single judgment

High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court in favour of respondents / plaintiffs

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Fraud vitiates most solemn proceedings and thus period of limitation would not be an embargo upon justifiable claim directed against fraud

When the very foundational transaction is based on fraud and mala fide, the subsequent superstructure built thereon cannot be allowed to stand and ultimately collapses.

Claim of the petitioners was that his deceased brother died issueless and daughter (respondent No.2) was born out of the second marriage of wife (respondent No.1) of his deceased brother

Validity

Question of the parentage of respondent No.2 was never raised by the petitioners in the earlier suit instituted by respondent No.1 for recovery of dower against the petitioners etc., thus, petitioners by their conduct were estopped to question the parentage of respondent No.2

Not a single witness was produced by the petitioners to establish that respondent No.2 was born as a result of second marriage of respondent No.1

Evidence in the shape of school and NADRA record also revealed that the date of birth of respondent No.2 was recorded as 1997, whereas respondent No.1 contracted second marriage in the year 2005 and there was no rebuttal to that effect from petitioners' side

In the absence of any convincing and cogent evidence, the oral assertion of petitioners was not a valid and acceptable ground that respondent No.2 was not the daughter of the deceased brother of petitioners

Inheritance mutation was attested in 1999, whereas, suit was instituted by petitioners in 2016 i.e. after more than 17 years without giving any convincing justification, especially when respondent No.1 also claimed her dower through earlier suit in 2005

Not only the question of limitation was involved in the case, but petitioners through acquiescence had also weakened their stance while claiming the inheritance of their deceased brother

Petitioners failed to point out any flaw in the concurrent judgments of courts below

Revision petition was dismissed.

Once discretion is exercised by the Court qua condonation of delay, the High Court or, as the case may be, the Supreme Court would interfere in very rare cases and in exceptional circumstances where patent illegality or material irregularity is evident

No jurisdictional defect or illegality in the exercise of discretion by the Appellate Court had been pointed out

Revision petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Applicant-Department filed the reference application and the office raised objection that file was 'totally incomplete', and directed to resubmit after removal of objections within three days, however, the Applicant-Department, after removing the objections, re-filed the reference application after 347 days beyond the period granted for removal of the office objections

Held: Inordinate delay was fatal in absence of any explanation demonstrating "sufficient cause" as required under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908

In the present matter, the Applicant-Department had failed to furnish any justification, much less a satisfactory or legally sufficient cause, for the delay in re-filing the reference application

The prescribed period of limitation is not merely a procedural formality but a matter of substantive right

Once the limitation period commences, it runs inexorably and cannot be arrested or extended by administrative lapses or clerical omissions

The Court is duty bound to enforce limitation statutes with judicial rigour and restraint, regardless of whether limitation is raised as a defense

Further, the law aids the vigilant, not the indolent (leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt)

Ignorance of law, inadvertence, does not constitute valid grounds for condonation, which is not to be granted as a matter of right, but only upon establishing sufficient cause with due diligence

Reference application filed by the Department, being non-maintainable on the ground of limitation, was dismissed, in circumstances.

True import of statute of limitation, its significance and essence stated:-(i) The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes and is to be strictly complied with

There is no scope in law of limitation for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them; justice, equity and good conscience do not override the law of limitation;(ii) The hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court

Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties;(iii) There is absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined judicial discretion vis-a-vis interpretation of a provision, whatever hardship may result from following strictly the statutory provision

There is no scope for any equity

The Court cannot claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction;(iv) The law of limitation is an artificial mode conceived to terminate justiciable disputes

Therefore, it is to be construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor.

Briefly, the appellants, being the brother and mother of the deceased, filed an insurance appeal after their claim under a family takaful policy was not paid in full, however, prior to approaching the Insurance Tribunal, they had already pursued the same grievance before the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, who passed an order awarding partial payment, followed by dismissal of their review petition, without availing further statutory remedies

The Insurance Tribunal dismissed their petition as not maintainable, and the present insurance appeal before the High Court raised the issue as to “whether, after invoking and exhausting the jurisdiction of the Federal Insurance Ombudsman, the appellants could lawfully re-agitate the same matter before the Insurance Tribunal in view of S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and the bar of limitation?”

Held: Applicants/appellants asserted that the delay occurred due to a miscalculation during Eid vacations, which they argued constituted a sufficient cause, however, the explanation offered was vague, unsupported by any evidence, and did not qualify as "sufficient cause" under the strict interpretation of limitation law

Each day of delay had to be explained satisfactorily and casual or administrative oversights did not justify condonation

In the present case, no substantive cause had been made out to warrant relaxation of the statutory limitation

The applicants' plea of oversight due to vacations failed to meet the threshold required for condonation

Against order for dismissal by the Federal Ombudsman no representation was filed under S. 14 of the Act before the President of Pakistan as indicated by the record

In view of S.18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, the appellants' petition was not maintainable before the Insurance Tribunal

As per S. 18 of the Act, once the Federal Ombudsman had initiated proceedings or decided a matter, no court or tribunal could take cognizance of that matter

Moreover, through exercise of judicial review, High Court examined S. 18 in detail and found it to be legally valid, enforceable, and constitutionally compliant

Being a quasi-judicial forum, the Ombudsman could not assume the role of a litigant or act as a party to assert or defend its own orders in appellate or judicial proceeding

Appellant did not avail the remedies provided under S.14 of the Act 2013 as well as S. 130(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000

In the present case, the appellants themselves elected to file their claim before the Federal Ombudsman, accepted the adjudicated compensation, and also pursued a statutory review, which was dismissed

Having fully availed and exhausted the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, the appellants could not subsequently seek to re-agitate the same grievance before the Insurance Tribunal

The principle of finality squarely applied in said circumstances

Present appeal was barred under S. 18 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 and was hit by the doctrine of election as well as law of limitation

Application for condonation of delay was dismissed and the present appeal was found to be devoid of merit and was also dismissed.

This would require a petition by members having not less than 10% of the voting power in the company and may be declared invalid by reason of a material defect or omission in the notice or irregularity in the proceedings of the meeting

Therefore, the law itself provides an alternate remedy to the members having not less than 10% of the voting power

Petition shall be made within thirty days of the impugned meeting

If a minority shareholder does not file the petition within time he cannot allege oppression of the minority shareholders.

Petitioner, being shareholder of the Private Limited Company ('the Company'), challenged the election process of the Board of Directors of the Company

Objection qua limitation was raised as petition before the Court was filed after about one and half month of the impugned election

Validity

The delay in filing petition had been satisfactorily explained

Petitioner applied for certified copies of relevant minutes on the very next day of impugned proceedings, however, only uncertified copies were provided after about fifteen days ; certified copies were re-applied for but, unrebuttedly, were never issued

Accordingly, the delay stood duly explained

Therefore, there was no merit in the contention that the petition was barred by limitation, particularly when there had been a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Ss. 159(1) & (2) of the Companies Act, 2017

High Court declared the election of the Board of Directors of the Company as illegal, void ab initio and without lawful authority, being violative of the mandatory provisions of the Act 2017, and set aside the entire election process and resolutions passed ; consequently, directing the existing Board of Directors to proceed election process in compliance with provisions of Ss. 159(1) & 159 (2) of the Act, 2017

Petition, filed by shareholder of Company, was allowed accordingly.

Briefly, a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell was instituted by the respondent/plaintiff against the vendor (mother of the petitioners), which was decreed, subject to payment of the remaining sale consideration

The appeal against the decree was dismissed for non-prosecution, and the restoration application was also dismissed

Thereafter, the decree-holder filed an execution petition

Objections to execution were filed by the judgment-debtors which were dismissed, and the appeal against that order was also dismissed

The matter before the High Court in present civil revision petition concerned "whether the execution petition was barred by limitation and whether the objections to execution had been rightly dismissed by the courts below?"

Held: There was no specific Article of Limitation Act, 1908 which regulated the filing of execution petition in the matter of decree for specific performance or a preemption matter and the residuary Art.181 of the said Act applied which provided a period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrued and if decree holder was in possession of property having paid or deposited the sale price he would not have been required to file execution petition and right to apply in the matter would have arisen had the judgment debtor refused to perform his part

In the present case the findings of the Trial Court were to the effect that the decree-holder was in possession of the property and had paid the earnest money while the balance sale price was deposited in terms of the decree of the court, as such, respondent No.1 could legally proceed with the execution of decree

As to the objection viz. balance sale consideration not being deposited in court within time, it was observed that decree was silent and did not stipulate the period during which balance sale consideration was to be deposited and, therefore, respondent could not suffer due to act or fault of court which passed the decree and that the respondent having deposited the amount on vacation of injunctive order passed in appeal, could not be made to suffer adversely

Even otherwise the Executing Court had to execute the decree as it was and could not question validity of the same on the ground which could have been raised in appeal against the decree

Another factor in the present case was that the suit was decreed on 10.12.2012 against which an appeal was filed on 02.1.2013 and on 02.1.2013 status quo was ordered to be maintained with the result that execution petition could not be filed and that the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution

On 29.4.2016 an application for restoration was filed which also remained pending for a considerable time and thereafter same was dismissed on 01.3.2017, while the execution petition was filed on 28.2.2020 which was within three years from the date of actual date of termination of proceedings

Impugned order was just, fair and legal and called for no interference

Civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Petitioner/plaintiff assailed Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) issued in favour of respondent/defendant claiming to be owner of suit property

Suit and appeal filed by petitioner/plaintiff was dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court

Vaidity

Period of limitation, as per Art. 14 of First Sched., to Limitation Act, 1908, for instituting a suit to set aside any act or order of an officer of Government made by him in his official capacity is one year from the date of the act or order

Period of limitation is six years under residuary Art. 120 of First Sched., to Limitation Act, 1908

Whichever of the two periods was applied, the suit of petitioner/plaintiff having been instituted on 27-02-1979 to challenge Permanent Transfer Deed dated 22-05-1965 was badly barred by the law of limitation

Petitioner/ plaintiff failed to demonstrate before High Court any misreading or non-reading of evidence, or to point out any material illegality or irregularity committed by the Courts below

Oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties was duly appreciated in accordance with law and suit of petitioner/plaintiff was rightly dismissed

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C could not disturb concurrent findings on facts when the same did not suffer not misreading and non-reading of evidence, howsoever erroneous

High Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below as there was no illegality, infirmity, or jurisdictional defect and findings of Courts below were well-reasoned and in consonance with law

Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Reason which prevailed the Magistrateto decline the application moved by the petitioner for re-medico legal examination was that the application was to be moved within twenty-one days

Held: So far as the ground taken by the learned Magistrate to the effect that the application was to be moved within twenty-one days was concerned; in this regard two letters issued by Government of the Punjab, Health Department, Lahore, were relevant; both bearing (the same) NO.SO(H&D)6-1/90, first was dated 12-2-1990 ('letter dated 12-2-1990') ; while the second was dated 8-2-1992 ('letter dated 8-2-1992')

In the letter dated 12-2-1990 the maximum period for medical re-examination was fixed as three weeks which stood enhanced to indefinite period vide letter dated 8-2-1992

However, the said indefinite period should be reasonable according to the discretion of the District Magistrate keeping in view the fact that the injuries on the person of injured to be medically re-examined were healed with the passage of time

High Court directed concerned Medical Superintendent, District Headquarter Hospital, to ensure a meeting of District Standing Medical Board earliest for re-medico legal examination of injured / complainant of subject FIR

Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Stance taken by the appellants (Secretary -Government Department) was that reference/ judgment was not in the knowledge due to prolonged correspondence among the offices

Validity

Under S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is the inherent duty of the Court to dilate into the question of limitation

Notably, the references were filed by the respondents in 2014 and after adopting due process, the same were decided by the Trial Court in the year 2024 which had been assailed under S.54 of the Land Acquisition Act

Present appeal had been filed with the delay of 318 days

The communication and correspondence inter se the departments cannot be considered a valid and reasonable ground for condonation of delay

Provisions of Art.156 of the Limitation Act, 1908, would apply to appeals filed under S.54 of the Land Acquisition Act

The law of limitation is designed to ensure diligence in pursuing legal remedies

Appellants had to explain the delay of each and every day with justified and cogent reasons

In the absence of any reasonable cause, the delay for such a long period cannot be condoned

Record revealed that the counsel for the appellants was appearing during the proceedings before the Trial court and participated in each and every step

Thus, the ground for no knowledge was against the admitted facts and record of the Trial court, therefore, had no substance

Even otherwise, limitation is not a mere technicality rather it creates a vested right for the opposite party and delay results in the extinction of a legal remedy unless valid reasons are taken

Record also revealed that the counsel for the appellants cross-examined the respondents and was present during the proceedings

Thus, the stance taken by the appellants was not justified and there was no sufficient reason to condone the limitation

Therefore, relying on the internal correspondence amongst the appellants was not sufficient cause and plausible explanation for condonation of delay

The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the appellants could not justify such a long delay; thus, the appeal was badly time barred

Application for condonation of delay was dismissed

Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, was dismissed.

Cases of government departments must be assessed on the same standards applicable to public litigants and application for condonation of delay requires same scrutiny

Even otherwise, law favours the vigilant not the indolent

Relying on the internal correspondence amongst the government departments is not sufficient cause and plausible explanation for condonation of delay.

The applicants filed a civil revision challenging a judgment dated 08.05.2025 and obtained a certified copy on 19.05.2025, which was received by them on 17.07.2025

The civil revision was first filed on 08.09.2025, but on 11.09.2025 the office of the Court raised objections and returned the file for removal of those objections

The file was received back by the applicants on 16.09.2025, and the civil revision was ultimately re-filed on 27.09.2025

No explanation was provided for the period between receiving the file with objections and the date of re-filing

Question requiring determination before the High Court was "whether the delay in re-filing the civil revision, after receiving the file back with objections, could be condoned when no explanation was given for the intervening period?"

Held: For the interregnum period no explanation seeking condonation of delay was given, therefore, the delay could not be condoned

Office of the High Court raised certain objections to the civil revision on 11.09.2025 with the stipulation that it was to be re-filed, whereupon, the case file was received by the applicants on 16.09.2025, however, it was re-filed on 27.09.2025, thus, even if it was considered that when the civil revision was filed, it was within time, however, when the office objections were raised and time was given to remove the same, period of limitation started to run against the applicants as and when the file was received by the applicant and since no valid explanation had been given for the interregnum period (when the file was received and re-filed) as it was not the case of the applicants that they were not aware of the office objections or had not received any intimation qua the same, as they received the case file on 16.09.2025, however, they re-filed the same on 27.09.2025, therefore, when the civil revision was re-filed, the period of limitation as contemplated in S.115 C.P.C and Art.162-A of the Limitation Act, 1908 had already elapsed and as no sufficient cause had been given for the interregnum period, hence, the delay in re-filing the civil revision, which was re-filed after the expiry of period of limitation of the civil revision, thus, could not be condoned

Since the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present revision petition had been dismissed, therefore, present revision petition was also dismissed being barred by time.

Previously, the limitation for filing a civil revision was provided in S.115 of C.P.C (90 days from the date of order, judgment and decree), however, since S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable, hence, the delay could not have been condoned, however, in view of an amendment made in First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 a new Article (Article 162-A) has been inserted, which spells out the period for filing a civil revision, thus, as a natural corollary to that S.5 of the Act has been made applicable to S.115 C.P.C, however, in order to seek refuge of the said provision sufficient cause has to be given by the applicants for seeking condonation of delay.

When office of High Court raises an objection to a petition and gives time for removing the same, if till the expiry of the prescribed period, the objection is not removed or no permission is sought from the Court for extension in the given time, the limitation will start running from the date when the given/prescribed time expires.

Even a void order has to be assailed within the period of limitation prescribed under the law.

Evidently, the appellant, rather than filing an appeal before the Court of Session, should have approached the High Court directly, because the appropriate legal remedy in such cases laid in filing an appeal under S.45-A of the Act of 2011 and not before a subordinate forum

Therefore, any person aggrieved by a sentence or order passed under S.24-A of the Act of 2011 must file an appeal before the High Court within the prescribed limitation period of thirty days

Appellant was convicted and sentenced by the Magistrate on 15.05.2017 and instead of approaching the High Court, as required under S.45-A of the Act of 2011, he filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions on 22.05.2017, a forum that did not have the jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal under the said Act

Appeal remained pending before the Court of Sessions for several months and was ultimately dismissed on 21.12.2017 on the ground of being incompetent and not maintainable due to the lack of jurisdiction

Following that dismissal, the appellant filed the present appeal before the High Court on 19.01.2018, once again challenging the original conviction dated 15.05.2017, as handed down by the Magistrate

Along with this appeal, the appellant also submitted an application under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the appropriate forum

However, a significant procedural lapse on the part of the appellant was evident, who did not challenge or seek to set aside the judgment dated 21.12.2017 passed by the Court of Sessions, which dismissed his earlier appeal

Consequently, the earlier dismissal order remained intact and unchallenged, which might have implications on the maintainability and admissibility of the present appeal before the High Court

Admittedly, the High Court, in the interest ofjustice, often exercised discretion to condone delay in appeals filed by convicted persons, such condonation is not automatic nor is it a matter of routine practice

Certainly, it is not to be treated as a rigid or mechanical rule that applied in every case, regardless of circumstances

Condonation of delay, particularly in appeals against conviction must be considered if sufficient cause is demonstrated by the accused-appellant

Onus lies on the convict to present cogent, convincing, and reasonable explanations for the delay

Simply relying on the plea that the delay resulted from pursuing a remedy before an incorrect forum did not meet the approach required under the law

Mere procedural mistake, unless accompanied by bona fide reasons and supported by diligent conduct, could not be considered a reasonable justification for the condonation of delay

In such circumstances, the High Court was not persuaded to find any sufficient or lawful justification for condoning the delay in the filing of the present appeal

Even otherwise, the appellant could not be allowed to take advantage of his own lapse, nor could the delay in filing the present appeal be excused merely on the basis of having earlier approached the wrong forum

Appeal suffered from a fatal defect of limitation, thus, was dismissed.

Limitation is not a mere technicality or a hyper technicality rather, once limitation expires, a right accrues in favour of the other side by operation of law which cannot lightly be taken away.

Decree for specific performance of agreement to sell was sought with the assertion/plea that though a target date was fixed but the same was extended, as per terms and conditions of the agreement automatically, due to pendency of the civil litigation inter se seller and his other co-sharers

Suit was concurrently dismissed on the ground of limitation

Validity

Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, provides three years for filing such suit from the date fixed for the performance, or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused

In the present case, the petitioner /plaintiff sought decree for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 25.02.2010 with the assertion that the target date was 15.03.2010 which was extended as per terms and conditions of the agreement, automatically, due to pendency of the civil litigation inter se seller (respondent/defendant) and his other co-sharers

It was evident from the record that no injunctive order germane to suit property was ever passed by any Court of competent jurisdiction in proceedings of the civil litigation and nothing as such was incorporated in the revenue record till the target date and the same position remained till 17.10.2012; meaning thereby the petitioner failed to perform his part of agreement till the target date and he even did not issue any notice showing his willingness to perform his part and the petitioner remained indolent for a considerable period

Petitioner /plaintiff instituted the suit after transfer of the suit property in favour of the transferees (respondents) on 06.05.2013, which was beyond the period of limitation, prescribed under Art.113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, from the target date

Courts committed no illegality, irregularity and wrong exercise of jurisdiction, rather after evaluating evidence on record had reached a just conclusion

Revision filed by the plaintiff, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Such question, being question of law, even if not taken or raised by the opposite party, could be considered by the Courts even at appellate and revisional stage.

Petitioner was aggrieved of dismissal of his application by Trial Court declining to frame specific issue pertaining to limitation for recovery proceedings

Validity

Bar of limitation does not apply for recovery of arrears of dues of any kind

Framing of issue regarding limitation was against the intention of framers of the statute and would be a futile exercise

Trial Court framed issue regarding maintainability of suit under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. which was wider in sense and would cover all legal permissible objections

High Court declined to interfere in the order of Trial Court, as petitioner failed to pinpoint any illegality, legal infirmity or perversity in the order

Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Petitioners / defendants were aggrieved of the judgment passed by the Courts below on the basis that no issue pertaining to limitation was framed

Validity

Provision of O. XIV, C.P.C. casts heavy duty upon Court to firstly determine points of dispute between the parties and then to move for recording their evidence

Parties are supposed to lead evidence to support or oppose a fact put before them in the shape of formal issues

In absence of material issue on a particular point, it cannot be believed that party concerned was aware about the exact nature of dispute regarding which that party had to lead evidence

High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and appeal was remanded for decision afresh after framing proper issues particularly on the point of limitation

Revision was allowed accordingly.

This would require a petition by members having not less than 10% of the voting power in the company and may be declared invalid by reason of a material defect or omission in the notice or irregularity in the proceedings of the meeting

Therefore, the law itself provides an alternate remedy to the members having not less than 10% of the voting power

Petition shall be made within thirty days of the impugned meeting

If a minority shareholder does not file the petition within time he cannot allege oppression of the minority shareholders.

Suit filed by respondents / plaintiffs was with regard to share of a deceased widow whose husband (owner of land) died in year 1947 during migration to Pakistan

Suit was filed in year 2009 and Lower Appellate Court partially decreed the suit in favour of respondents / plaintiffs

Validity

Claim of inheritance must cross the bridge of limitation, waiver and acquiescence

Unchecked tendency of encouraging a relief in the guise of inheritance was not warranted under the law

Encouragement of such claims and long drawn trials in statute barred suits is counterproductive for genuine and bona fide claims of female heirs

Predecessor-in-interest respondents/ plaintiffs (deceased widow) never voiced any grievance against mutation of inheritance even on her demise in year 1988

Legal heirs of deceased widow (respondents/plaintiffs), kept silent for almost 21 years and suddenly woke up from their slumber and had filed suit in year 2009, which was not permissible under the law

At the time of sanction of mutation of inheritance in year 1952 provisions of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 had to be applied

Jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred for the purpose of suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs

Suit was even otherwise statute barred, in terms of Arts. 95 and 120 of First Schedule, read with section 18 of Limitation Act, 1908

High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court resultantly suit filed by respondents/ plaintiffs was dismissed

Second Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioner underwent a surgical procedure performed by respondent No.3 at Doctor's Hospital, Lahore in September 2018 and was subsequently diagnosed with a 'rotator cuff tear' at the same operative site

As asserted by the petitioner, he approached PHC in June 2021 on the premise that the cause of action was recurring in nature, contending that the injury which had been attributed to the alleged medical negligence not only persisted but had progressively worsened

He further maintained that the complaint was instituted only upon obtaining what he considered conclusive medical evidence substantiating the respondent doctor's negligence

PHC, however, dismissed the complaint as time-barred under S. 23(2) of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 (PHC Act) citing sixty-day limitation period from the date of knowledge of cause of action

Pivotal question requiring determination before the High Court was as to "whether, in the circumstances of the present case, the petitioner's asserted cause of action constituted a recurring or continuing cause of action so as to extend the limitation period, or whether the limitation prescribed under S. 23(2) of the PHC Actwas applicable stricto sensu from the date of knowledge?"

Held: In para No. 27 of the complaint the petitioner himself submitted that the cause of action in the instant matter initially accrued on 13.09.2018 when the negligent surgery was performed by respondent doctor, thereafter, accrued on 19.10.2019 when the IM Nail was removed through another surgery where the tear to the rotator cuff could have been observed and treated

Petitioner filed a complaint on 11.06.2021, and in para 27,the cause of action was stated to have accrued

Para No. 27 stated that "the cause of action in the instant matter initially accrued on 13.09.2018 when the negligent surgery was performed, thereafter accrued on 19.10.2019 when the IM Nail was removed through another surgery where the tear to the rotator cuff could have been observed and treated; thereafter, the cause of action has been recurring as the rotator cuff tear caused by negligent surgeries still exists and has worsened, as also acknowledged by different consultants through their expert opinions, and keeps on worsening each day by agonizing and distressing the complainant as well as interfering in the complainant's daily routine work being a professional doctor in Gastrointestinal Endoscopy; the cause of action is de die in diem"

The petitioner had already explicitly stated that the cause of action was accrued on 13.09.2018, when the negligent surgery was performed by respondent doctor and thereafter on 19.10.2019, when the IM Nail was removed during another surgery, both of which were time-barred by 31 months and 13 months, respectively

The counsel for the respondent doctor submitted that the petitioner also filed "suit for damages for Rupees 500,000,000/- (50Crore) on account of medical negligence before the civil courts at Lahore on 04.10.2021, wherein in para 27, the exact cause of action was mentioned

If the cause of action was considered to have accrued on 13.09.2018 and 19.10.2019, respectively, as narrated in the complaint, which was filed with the Punjab Healthcare Commission on 11.06.2021, then the complaint was filed with a delay of 31 months and 13 months, respectively, excluding the period of filing the complaint, i.e., 60 days

If the dates of cause of action were taken from the reply submitted by the petitioner before the PHC, i.e., 07.06.2020, when the x-ray was received, and the expert opinions obtained by the petitioner dated 17.07.2020, and 05.08.2020, respectively, then the delays became 10 months, 9 months, and 8 months, respectively, excluding the period of filing the complaint

In any eventuality, the complaint before the PHC was time-barred

The dates that the petitioner mentioned in his reply to the application of respondent doctor were already in the knowledge of the petitioner at the time of submitting the complaint, still he did not mention it in his complaint

He did not even mention this fact in the "suit for damages"

Petitioner was a doctor by profession and was aware of the harm he had suffered

However, he continued to try to justify his delay by consulting various doctors, and based on their opinions, it could not be determined whether the complaint was filed on time

Therefore, the PHC had rightly disposed of the petitioner's complaint by ruling that the complaint was time-barred

There was no illegality or legal infirmity in the impugned order passed by the PHC warranting interference by the High Court

Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Burden of explaining the delay of each and every day must be discharged by indolent party with a clear and full justification

It is the duty of every litigant to diligently and vigilantly pursue their case, keeping track of the progress at every stage and inquiring about its status from counsel after each hearing.

Accused was alleged to have been found involved in theft of natural gas through a rubber and iron pipe connected to the main auxiliary gas line

Acquittal judgment was passed on 30-10-2021, whereas the appeal against acquittal had been filed on 26-02-2022 after a delay of almost four (04) months, well beyond the prescribed limitation period

Only ground mentioned in the application for condonation of delay was that the complainant was terminated from his service in Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC) and was later reinstated, and due to his termination, the appeal could not be filed in time

However, this ground was not legally sufficient to justify the inordinate delay in filing the appeal

First Information Report was lodged on behalf of Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC), a corporate entity, and not by the complainant in his personal capacity

Termination or reinstatement of the complainant had no bearing on the ability of Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC), as a company, to pursue the case within the prescribed time limit

Complainant was merely an individual officer of Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC), whereas the case was initiated in the corporate capacity of the company

Hence, the complainant's termination did not constitute valid justification for condoning such a significant delay

Condonation of delay was not a matter of right but an exception that could only be granted if the delay was satisfactorily explained

Mere negligence, inaction, or personal inconvenience of a complainant was not a valid excuse to condone the delay

Since the appellant had failed to show sufficient cause, the application for condonation of delay was liable to be dismissed

Appeal against acquittal being time barred was dismissed, in circumstances.

The respondent filed suit for recovery of certain outstanding amounts allegedly reflected in statements of account exchanged between the parties during 2015-2021

The suit was initially rejected under O.VII R.11, C.P.C., but the appellate court remanded the matter for a decision on merits

After trial, the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground of limitation, but the first appellate court reversed that decision and decreed the claim

The present second appeal arose from this reversal, raising the issue as to "whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the appellate court had correctly relied upon the email-based statements of account sent by the appellant as constituting a workable basis for the decree?"

Held: Cross examination of the appellant revealed that appellate had conceded to the cause of action arising in the year 2021

The email of 2021 had been admitted by the appellant and in this regard, High Court agreed with the findings of the appellate court that even if it is presumed that Art.62 of the Limitation Act of 1908 was applicable to the present case, even then the suit filed by the respondent was within the prescribed period of limitation

The time, it was held, was correctly calculated from the date of refusal i.e.04.03.2021, by the appellate court

Statements of accounts admittedly sent by the appellant through the email reflected the amount owed to the respondent

The said statement of accounts had not been denied by the appellant's witness

It was also admitted that the appellant did not produce their accountant before the Trial Court to rebut the claim of the respondent

It was further held that once the statement of accounts was exhibited by the respondent before the Trial Court, the burden shifted to the appellant to disprove the same for which he made no such effort

Trial Court needlessly deliberated, very extensively, on the applicability of various Articles of the Limitation Act 1908, without appreciating that the cause of action arose in the favour of the respondent lastly on 04.03.2021

Once this apparent conclusion was reached the deliberation regarding the applicability of various Articles under the Limitation Act, 1908 became futile

Present second appeal was devoid of any merits

Suit of the respondent was decreed in the sum of Rs.4,617,021.62/

Present appeal was dismissed, in circumstance.

In terms of subject agreements, date of commencement for payment of annual rentals was to start after seven days from installation of equipment, therefore, suit should have been filed within three years that was latest by 09-02-1983 but it was instituted on 07-08-1986

Trial Court had rightly concluded that the suit was time barred

No evidence was brought on record by appellants' / plaintiffs' witness that alleged loan was disbursed to them, therefore, evidence of appellants / plaintiffs did not support their stance with regard to supply of entire consignment of system / equipment

Appellants / plaintiffs failed to prove claim against respondent / defendant and also failed to prove any privity of contract between appellants / plaintiffs and respondent / defendant

Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court

Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Appellant (Registered person / Company) filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal'), which was late by 99 days

Plea of the appellant was that, against the order passed by the concerned Commissioner ('impugned order'), it had filed complaint before the Federal Tax Ombudsman ('Ombudsman') under the wrong impression that the there was no right of appeal and after disposal of said complaint , the Tribunal was approached

Validity

Record showed that against the impugned order, the appellant had approached the Ombudsman

Since the appellant had already filed complaint before the Ombudsman which was later rejected for lack of jurisdiction, the delay in filing the (present) appeal late was not without reason

Delay in filing of appeal was a technical error

Prayer for condonation of delay should be considered sympathetically

Technical ground of delay in filing appeal should not be made to hinder the cause of justice

When technical and procedural considerations were pitted against rights on substantial considerations, the substantial considerations had to be preferred over technical considerations in order to effectuate the cause of justice

Case of the appellant deserved to be decided on merits of facts and legal provisions rather than mere technicalities

Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue condoned the delay in filing the appeal and admitted the main appeal for hearing and adjudication on merits

Application for condonation of delay was accepted accordingly.

Customs Reference was allowed.

Petitioner /defendant assailed order whereby the preliminary issue with regard to limitation in the suit filed by the respondents was answered in negative and the suit was found to be within time

Validity

Prayers made by the respondents /plaintiffs showed that they filed the suit seeking multiple reliefs i.e. litigation charges on account of malicious prosecution suffered in the suit filed by the petitioner as well as the litigation cost of the suit

Therefore, it transpired that it was a composite suit involving multiple causes of action subject to different limitation periods, such as Arts. 23 and 24 of the Limitation Act, 1908

Principles of natural justice and due process do not envisage the Court to act as a mere conduit mechanically applying one limitation period to the entire suit, rather, the Court is required to perform an active judicial function and consciously apply the limitation period relevant to each specific cause of action

Where causes of action are distinct and separable, limitation is assessed individually for each claim

The principle is to identify the dominant or primary cause of action and apply the corresponding limitation period

This distinction is critical in composite suits involving multiple claims

Where a suit combines claims for compensation for malicious prosecution (Article 23) and compensation for libel (Article 24), limitation for each claim is to be assessed separately

There is a responsibility upon the Court to exercise its judicial mind on each independent cause of action because the consequence of misapplying limitation periods would result in the potential denial of substantive rights or unjust dismissal of claims

Record showed that the petitioner filed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction on 08.10.2021, relevant paragraph of which contained the alleged libel ;that suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 11.10.2022

The respondents filed the suit for recovery of damages on 28.11.2022

Said sequence indicated that the respondents' claim for damages was well within time

Thus, no illegality or jurisdictional defect had been found in the impugned order passed by Trial Court

Revision, being merit-less, was dismissed.