P L D 2010 Supreme Court 582 (PLP)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J.

Province of Punjab, with leave of the Court, has filed this appeal against the judgment dated 29-11-2002, passed by a learned Judge in chambers of Lahore High Court, whereby, a Civil Revision filed by the Government of Punjab was dismissed on the grounds; Firstly, that the Revision before the High Court was barred by 35 days; secondly, that as the period of limitation of 90 days was specifically mentioned in the Code itself, section 5 of the Limitation Act, concerning the condonation of delay, would not be applicable as provided by section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and; thirdly, that the time between filing of application and delivery of the copy thereof cannot be excluded within the contemplation of section 12(2), Limitation Act in case of revisions, because the word `Revision' is not mentioned in the said section. Thus, according to the learned High Court, limitation for filing a Revision is to start running from the date of the judgment and order involved.

2. After hearing the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate General, it would be convenient to first discuss the exclusion of time as provided by section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. It is a known fact that no period of limitation was ever provided for the Revisional Court to revise any order of the subordinate Court. It was so because revision is considered to be a matter between the superior Court and the lower Court. When no period of limitation was provided for revision, the reference thereof, obviously, got omitted in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. It may be recalled that such limitation was provided in the year 1992 through Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act (III of 1992). As usual with our amendments, no notice was taken to amend the corresponding section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and to include therein the revision as well. We are therefore, of the view that at the time of enactment of Limitation Act, the word `revision' was rightly omitted because no period of limitation was provided therefor. It does not mean that such period spent for obtaining the copies cannot be computed for filing a revision. In the present case, if such time is computed, the Revision petition before the High Court was within time.

3. Coming to the next question that condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be considered when juxtaposed to section 115, C.P.C. We agree that this notion of law, already determined by this Court in Allah Dino's case (2001 SCMR 286), is correct. Anyhow, the effect thereof would be discussed hereinafter Muhammad Mian's case (1995 SCMR 69) and Government of N.-W.F.P's case 1994 SCMR 833 are not applicable to the present case because the revisions in those cases were filed prior to the amendment through Act HI of 1992 (supra).

4. It is not a healthy approach to brush aside the cases on the ground of limitation which, with reference to section 115, C.P.C. is not absolute either. A perusal of the section would indicate that a High Court may at any time call for the record of any case from a subordinate Court in order to determine as to whether the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or has acted illegally or with material irregularity: It is a matter of commonsense and simple logic that if such power is vested in a High Court, it should not be restricted by any period of limitation. So it does when section 115, C.P.C. was originally enacted. The controversy seems to have cropped up because of the amendment in the year 1992 when, through second proviso, a period of 90 days was fixed for filing a Revision petition. A plain perusal of first and second provisos would indicate that a limitation of 90 days is relevant only when some revision petition is filed by some person or party to the proceedings. Such impediment is non-existent when Court itself exercises the power of revision under subsection (1) of section 115, C.P.C.

5. As the job of a Court is to do ultimate justice, it can look into the matter itself despite the fact that some application filed by a party might be barred by time. Any such application can be considered by the Court as a mere information. What we intend to bring home is that if merits of the case demand that the challenged order be set aside, a High Court should not avoid hearing under section 115(1), C.P.C. for which no limitation is provided, merely because the application is filed by some body who is bound by limitation. This Court in Riaz Hussain's case 2003 SCMR 181 has observed in principle that "mere technicalities unless suffering any surmountable hurdle should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice and the logic of words should yield to the logic of realities".

6. Law of limitation, we believe, is a substantive law of the land and hence should not in every case be considered as a mere technicality, yet, we firmly believe that under section 115, C.P.C. having been split into two parts, the stringent implication of law of limitation can easily be avoid by the Court taking suo motu action under subsection (1) of section 115, C.P.C. in cases where merit so demands.

7. Consequently, we make a two-fold observation. Firstly, that section 12(2) of the Limitation Act was not applicable to Revisions when both the Limitation Act and Civil Procedure Code were enacted. So no limitation for revision was provided at that time. Now that we have amended section 115, C.P.C. by providing a limitation, therefore, the time, as mentioned in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, should be excluded while computing the period in question. Secondly, that despite such limitation, restricted for the party or person, the High Court could have assumed jurisdiction provided the merits of the cases demanded Resultantly, the appeal is accepted, the impugned judgment dated 29-11-2002 is set aside and the case is remanded back to the learned High Court for deciding Civil Revision No.1723 of 2002 on merits. S.A.K./P-15/S Case remanded.