PLC 1990

1990 PLP 453 (PLC)

SINDH ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION Versus ABDUL RAHIM

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Decided Date
Appeal No. HYD‑221 of 1988, decided on 13th May, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 453 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Bench Members Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi, Appellate Tribunal
Parties SINDH ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION Versus ABDUL RAHIM
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 453 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 453 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 453 (PLC) (SINDH ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION Versus ABDUL RAHIM). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑

Representation

  • Raes M. Mushtaq for Appellant.
  • Wahid Bux Representative for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 13th May, 1989.
  • 2. The bare reading of the operative part of the impugned order would show that the order was passed with the consent of both the parties and as such it was a consent order against which no appeal lies. However, Mr. Raes Mushtaq, learned Advocate for the appellants states that he did not concede to the above order. However, the record does not show that any application to this effect was moved before the learned Labour Court on the day when the order was passed or ever afterwards. Mr. Wahid Bux learned representative for the respondent states that the order was passed by consent of the parties. I also rind that in the memo of appeal the grounds that have shown for setting aside the impugned order do not disclose that the counsel for the appellants did not concede to the impugned order. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order was passed with the consent of the parties. Anyhow I do not find any point which requires consideration in appeal.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑S. 37‑‑Appeal‑‑‑Impugned order of Labour Court passed with consent of parties‑‑‑Appellant taking plea that he did not concede to such order‑‑‑No application to the effect that appellant had not conceded was moved before Labour Court on day of order or thereafter‑‑‑Memo of appeal not disclosing that counsel of appellant did not concede to impugned order‑‑‑Appeal, held, was not maintainable.

Judgment & Decree

Raes M. Mushtaq for Appellant. Wahid Bux Representative for Respondent. Date of hearing: 13th May, 1989. This is an appeal against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad, dated 7‑5‑1988, the operative part of which reads as under:‑‑ "The medical opinion has been received and it shows the applicant to be 57 years of age. In view of this Finding, Mr. Mushtaq admits that the respondent is to now reinstate the applicant with consequential benefits. Let the applicant now be reinstated forthwith with consequential benefits."

2. The bare reading of the operative part of the impugned order would show that the order was passed with the consent of both the parties and as such it was a consent order against which no appeal lies. However, Mr. Raes Mushtaq, learned Advocate for the appellants states that he did not concede to the above order. However, the record does not show that any application to this effect was moved before the learned Labour Court on the day when the order was passed or ever afterwards. Mr. Wahid Bux learned representative for the respondent states that the order was passed by consent of the parties. I also rind that in the memo of appeal the grounds that have shown for setting aside the impugned order do not disclose that the counsel for the appellants did not concede to the impugned order. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order was passed with the consent of the parties. Anyhow I do not find any point which requires consideration in appeal.

3. In view of the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the appeal is not maintainable. As such, I would dismiss the appeal. A.E./1451/Lb. S Appeal dismissed.