1997 PLP 737 (CLC)
NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ALLIED PAPER INDUSTRIES LTD. and others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1997 PLP 737 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Salahuddin Mina, J |
| Parties | NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ALLIED PAPER INDUSTRIES LTD. and others‑‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1997 PLP 737 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1997 PLP 737 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Salahuddin Mina, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1997 PLP 737 (CLC) (NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus ALLIED PAPER INDUSTRIES LTD. and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑‑S.316(1)‑‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47‑‑‑Execution of decree‑‑ Application for‑‑‑According to decree passed by Court all judgment‑debtors including individuals as well as company having been made responsible jointly and severally‑‑‑Application for execution of such decree in which company, which already stood wound up, was impleaded as judgment‑debtor, was maintainable notwithstanding the fact that "Leave of Court" as contemplated by S. 316(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 had not been obtained because execution of decree would be applicable against individual judgment‑debtors as decree made them responsible jointly and severally. Aftab Kazilbash for the Decree‑Holder. Umer A. Bandial for the Judgment‑Debtor No. 3.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑‑‑S.316(1)‑‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47‑‑‑Execution of decree‑‑ Application for‑‑‑According to decree passed by Court all judgment‑debtors including individuals as well as company having been made responsible jointly and severally‑‑‑Application for execution of such decree in which company, which already stood wound up, was impleaded as judgment‑debtor, was maintainable notwithstanding the fact that "Leave of Court" as contemplated by S. 316(1) of Companies Ordinance, 1984 had not been obtained because execution of decree would be applicable against individual judgment‑debtors as decree made them responsible jointly and severally. Aftab Kazilbash for the Decree‑Holder. Umer A. Bandial for the Judgment‑Debtor No.
3. This is an application under section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 read with section 47, GYP.C. by Judgment‑Debtor No.2. It is averred by the applicant that Judgment‑Debtor No. 1 is a limited company which was under liquidation and was wound‑up by the Order of this Court on 30‑8‑1983 in J.M. No.23 of 1983, whereas the execution application was filed on 11‑12‑1988, nearly four years after the winding up, and was, therefore, not maintainable under section 316(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 because the requisite "leave of the Court" had not been obtained. In their counter‑affidavit the Decree-- Holder states that all Judgment‑Debtors are liable to pay decretal amount "jointly and severally" and, therefore, Judgment‑Debtor No‑2, who was the may behind the establishment of Judgment‑Debtor No. 1, was personally liable to pay the decretal amount and the condition precedent of "leave of the Court" as contemplated by section 316(1) was not attracted in the case of individuals and is confined only to proceedings against the company. I have heard learned counsel of the parties on the above point. Mr. Bandial concedes that section 316(1) of the Ordinance is not attracted in case of individuals and its applicability is confined to companies under liquidation but contended that in that case the execution application, should have been only against the individuals and the company should not have been impleaded in the execution application and now that it is impleaded, section 316(1) shall apply to the execution application. I am not impressed by the contention of learned counsel of Judgment --Debtor No.2. Notwithstanding that the company is impleaded as Judgment --Debtor No. l and requisite permission as contemplated by section 316(1) of the Ordinance has not been obtained, the execution application is maintainable against other Judgment‑Debtors as the decree makes them responsible jointly and severally. There is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.
2. Execution application shall proceed. Attachment warrants be issued. H.B.T./N‑25/K Application dismissed.