1976 PLC 299 (PLP)

2. An application under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was pending in Labour Court No. 2 and some evidence was recorded. On 26th February 1976 the Labour Court No. 2 made a reference for the transfer of the application on personal grounds. Notice of this was issued to both the parties. On 2nd March 1976 the parties appeared through their counsel, and they made a statement that they had no objection to the transfer of the application. Consequently, it was transferred to Labour Court No. 5 and the parties were directed to appear before that Court with their evidence on 6th March 1976 at 8-30 a. m, At the request of the counsel for the respondent it was ordered that the case should proceed day to day for early disposal.

3. On 9th March 1976 the pr1sent transfer application was made on the ground that counsel for the applicant appeared in Court at 9-00 a. m. when he was notified that the case had already been adjourned to 8th March 1976 as the Labour Court not work on Saturday, however, on 8th the counsel of the applicant did not appear and an adjournment application was made on the ground that the counsel was busy in the High Court. This application was rejected with the remark that the application for adjournment had been made for the purpose of causing delay.

4. I called for the comments from the Labour Court. It was stated by the Labour Court that on 6th Mirth 1976 when the case was taken up neither the applicant nor his counsel was present, and it was not considered proper to close the side of the applicant and as such the case was adjourned to 8th March 1976. On the adjourned hearing the General Secretary of the Union appeared and moved an application but it was rejected on the clear proof that the applicant was adopting dilatory tactics. The General Secretary was asked to proceed with the cross-examination of the witness which was reserved earlier but be declined and, therefore the cross-examination was closed and the case was adjourned to 9th March 1976 to allow the respondent to file affidavit by way of evidence. However, on 9th March 1976 no progress could be made as it was stated that an application for transfer had been made. So the case was adjourned.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant. I see no justifica tion to transfer the case. The circumstances appearing in the case vindicate the view of the Labour Court that the applicant is trying to adopt dilatory tactics to prolong the proceedings. The allegations of bias are baseless. Indulgence was, on contrary, shown when the applicant and his counsel did not appear on 6th March 1976 at the time fixed by me. It is also pertinent to note that the applicant appeared soon after the case was adjourned. This could not be without some extraneous considerations. Not only this but on that day no request was made to alter the date on the ground of being inconvenient to the counsel despite the fact that the counsel for the opposite-party was still available. Yet another fact which confirms our view in that today an application has been made to me requesting that the direction for holding day to day trial should be withdrawn. Looking to the conduct of the applicant I am unable to accept the request.

6. For the aforesaid reasons I find no ground for the transfer of the case. The application is, therefore, rejected. This is an application under section 38 (7) of the I. R. O. for the transfer of the case from Labour Court No. 5.

2. An application under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was pending in Labour Court No. 2 and some evidence was recorded. On 26th February 1976 the Labour Court No. 2 made a reference for the transfer of the application on personal grounds. Notice of this was issued to both the parties. On 2nd March 1976 the parties appeared through their counsel, and they made a statement that they had no objection to the transfer of the application. Consequently, it was transferred to Labour Court No. 5 and the parties were directed to appear before that Court with their evidence on 6th March 1976 at 8-30 a. m, At the request of the counsel for the respondent it was ordered that the case should proceed day to day for early disposal.

3. On 9th March 1976 the pr1sent transfer application was made on the ground that counsel for the applicant appeared in Court at 9-00 a. m. when he was notified that the case had already been adjourned to 8th March 1976 as the Labour Court not work on Saturday, however, on 8th the counsel of the applicant did not appear and an adjournment application was made on the ground that the counsel was busy in the High Court. This application was rejected with the remark that the application for adjournment had been made for the purpose of causing delay.

4. I called for the comments from the Labour Court. It was stated by the Labour Court that on 6th Mirth 1976 when the case was taken up neither the applicant nor his counsel was present, and it was not considered proper to close the side of the applicant and as such the case was adjourned to 8th March 1976. On the adjourned hearing the General Secretary of the Union appeared and moved an application but it was rejected on the clear proof that the applicant was adopting dilatory tactics. The General Secretary was asked to proceed with the cross-examination of the witness which was reserved earlier but be declined and, therefore the cross-examination was closed and the case was adjourned to 9th March 1976 to allow the respondent to file affidavit by way of evidence. However, on 9th March 1976 no progress could be made as it was stated that an application for transfer had been made. So the case was adjourned.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant. I see no justifica tion to transfer the case. The circumstances appearing in the case vindicate the view of the Labour Court that the applicant is trying to adopt dilatory tactics to prolong the proceedings. The allegations of bias are baseless. Indulgence was, on contrary, shown when the applicant and his counsel did not appear on 6th March 1976 at the time fixed by me. It is also pertinent to note that the applicant appeared soon after the case was adjourned. This could not be without some extraneous considerations. Not only this but on that day no request was made to alter the date on the ground of being inconvenient to the counsel despite the fact that the counsel for the opposite-party was still available. Yet another fact which confirms our view in that today an application has been made to me requesting that the direction for holding day to day trial should be withdrawn. Looking to the conduct of the applicant I am unable to accept the request.

6. For the aforesaid reasons I find no ground for the transfer of the case. The application is, therefore, rejected.