2002 PLP 778 (CLD)
MAJEED AKBAR FAROOQI‑‑‑Appellant Versus BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager (Attorney)‑‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 2002 PLP 778 (CLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ |
| Parties | MAJEED AKBAR FAROOQI‑‑‑Appellant Versus BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager (Attorney)‑‑‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2002 PLP 778 (CLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2002 PLP 778 (CLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2002 PLP 778 (CLD) (MAJEED AKBAR FAROOQI‑‑‑Appellant Versus BANK OF PUNJAB through Manager (Attorney)‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Mirza Javed Mukhtiar for Appellant.
- Tariq Shamim assisted by Muhammad Ramzan Wattoo for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S.21‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29‑‑‑Appeal‑‑ Condonation of delay‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Period of filing of appeal having been specified in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997, itself, the provisions of S.29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, were applicable‑‑‑Delay in filing of appeal could riot be condoned under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or under any other provision of law. (b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑S.21‑‑.Appeal‑‑‑Condonation of delay‑‑‑Ignorance of law‑‑ Instead of filing appeal in the first instance against judgment and decree the appellant filed Constitutional petition‑‑‑Present appeal was filed after withdrawal of the petition‑‑‑‑Plea of ignorance was raised‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Ignorance of law could not constitute a valid ground for condoning delay‑‑‑Appeal was dismissed as time‑barred.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑‑‑S.21‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29‑‑‑Appeal‑‑ Condonation of delay‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Period of filing of appeal having been specified in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act 1997, itself, the provisions of S.29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, were applicable‑‑‑Delay in filing of appeal could riot be condoned under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or under any other provision of law. (b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑S.21‑‑.Appeal‑‑‑Condonation of delay‑‑‑Ignorance of law‑‑ Instead of filing appeal in the first instance against judgment and decree the appellant filed Constitutional petition‑‑‑Present appeal was filed after withdrawal of the petition‑‑‑‑Plea of ignorance was raised‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Ignorance of law could not constitute a valid ground for condoning delay‑‑‑Appeal was dismissed as time‑barred. Mirza Javed Mukhtiar for Appellant. Tariq Shamim assisted by Muhammad Ramzan Wattoo for Respondents. This appeal impugns the order, dated 20‑6‑2001 passed by the leered Banking Court No.II, Gujranwala. The appeal is admittedly time‑barred. It is for this reason an application for condonation of delay has been filed by the appellant. Since a period of filing of appeals has been specified in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 itself, the provisions of section 29 of the Limitation Act are applicable. As such, delay in the filing of the appeal cannot be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act or under any other legal provision. We have also gone through the grounds set out in the application for condonation of delay. It has been averred in the said application that a writ petition was filed by the appellant to challenge the impugned order which was withdrawn because an appellate remedy was available. Ignorance of law cannot constitute a valid ground for condoning delay.
2. For the foregoing reasons we find that this appeal is time‑barred. It is, therefore, dismissed. Q. M. H./M.A.K./M‑1050/L Appeal dismissed.