CLC 1989

1989 PLP 394 (CLC)

RASHID IFTIKHAR and another‑‑Petitioners Versus KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTJIORITY and 3 others‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
Constitutional Petition No. 226 and Miscellaneous No. 544 of 1988, decided on 24th October, 1988.
Honorable Judges
Ajmal Mian, C. J and
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1989 PLP 394 (CLC)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members Ajmal Mian, C. J and
Parties RASHID IFTIKHAR and another‑‑Petitioners Versus KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTJIORITY and 3 others‑‑Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 394 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 394 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Ajmal Mian, C. J and.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 394 (CLC) (RASHID IFTIKHAR and another‑‑Petitioners Versus KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTJIORITY and 3 others‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Abul Khair for Petitioners. Sabir Hussain Kizilbash for Respondents Nos.l to 3 A.A. Mohammadally, Actg. A.‑G. Sind.

Headnotes / Summary

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑ ‑‑‑O. XXXIX Rr.l & 2‑‑Injunction‑‑Petitioner praying for grant of stay order against recovery of additional occupancy charges of plot belonging to respondent‑‑Question whether respondent could claim additional occupancy charges in respect of lease which was executed prior to notification levying additional charges requiring consideration and since respondent made demand for recovery, petitioner was prima facie entitled to maintain petition against respondent‑‑No relief claimed as to declaration of notification being void or impugning its vires and question before Court being whether said notification could be enforced retrospectively or prospectively‑‑Petitioner prima facie entitled to grant of stay order‑‑Injunction granted.

Judgment & Decree

AJMAL MIAN, C.J.‑‑This is a stay application filed by the present petitioner; who has filed the above petition for impugning the demand of the respondents for a sum of Rs.31,01‑4 in respect 'of the alleged occupancy charges for plot of land, bearing No.B‑III, Block‑3, Gulshan‑e‑Iqbal, Karachi, measuring 491 Sq. yards, in respect of which, the lease was executed and registered on 3‑6‑1977, and it was shown in the leasedeed that the occupancy charges were recovered. However, Mr. Sabir Hussain Kizilbash, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that by virtue of clause (2) in the leasedeed, the respondents are entitled to claim additional occupancy charges, which came into force w.e.f. 1‑1‑1976 by virtue of Notification dated _‑43‑6‑1977, issued by Housing Town Planning Local Government and ' Rural Development Department. Prima Facie, it seems that a notification cannot by made applicable retrospectively .‑ as has been ‑ held repeatedly by .the superior Courts in a number of cases, and therefore, the question, whether the respondents can claim additional occupancy charges in respect of lease which was executed prior to the notification, requires consideration. Then it was contended by Mr. Kizilbash, since the notification was issued by the Government and as the Government has not been made a party, the petition itself is incompetent and no injunction can be granted as the respondents are acting under the above notification and the instructions received from the Government. Since the respondents are making demand for the recovery, the petitioner is prima facie entitled to maintain the petition against the respondents. No relief has been claimed as to the declaration of the above notification of its being void. The question before the B Court would be whether the above notification can be enforced retrospectively or prospectively. The vires of. the notification has not been 'impugned. For the time being in our view the petitioner has prima facie casa for the grant of stay order, which we grant. M.Y.H./R‑63/K Injunction granted.