1986 PLP 1400 (SCMR)
Mst. MEHRUNNISA BEGUM — Petitioner Versus Syed MUHAMMAD SHAH and others — Respondents
| Citation | 1986 PLP 1400 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Karam Elahee Chauhan and Mushtaq Hussain, JJ |
| Parties | Mst. MEHRUNNISA BEGUM — Petitioner Versus Syed MUHAMMAD SHAH and others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Constitution of Pakistan (1973) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1986 PLP 1400 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1986 PLP 1400 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Karam Elahee Chauhan and Mushtaq Hussain, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1986 PLP 1400 (SCMR) (Mst. MEHRUNNISA BEGUM — Petitioner Versus Syed MUHAMMAD SHAH and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Sh. Abdul Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Masud Akhtar for Petitioner.
- Nemo for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 18th February, 1981.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from Judgment and order of Lahore High Court, dated 30-6-1975 in R.F.A No. 15 of 1962).
Arts. 185(3) & 199--Petition for leave to appeal barred by time- Contention of petitioner that her Mukhtar had died and for that reason she was not in a position to keep a watch over case--Mukhtar died during pendency of appeal in High Court and, therefore, plea that case could not be attended to not correct inasmuch as it was after his death that appeal was taken up by High Court and was duly pursued and attended to by her counsel--No sufficient cause made out--Petition dismissed as time-barred.
Judgment & Decree
KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J. This petition is barred by 33 days according to the office note but 20 days according to the learned, counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel has prayed for condonation of delay because according to his instructions, the Mukhtar of his client had died and for this reason she was not in a position to keep a watch over this case. It is not disputed that the Mukhtar died during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, and, therefore, the plea that the case could not be attended to is not correct inasmuch as it was after his death that the appeal was taken up by the High Court and was duly pursued and attended to by her counsel. Finding no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The petition is dismissed as time‑barred. M. Y. H. Leave petition dismissed.