2001 PLP 1879 (PTD)
INCOME-TAX OFFICER Versus SARADBHAI M.LAK)-IANI and another
| Citation | 2001 PLP 1879 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | 243 I T R 1 |
| Bench Members | B.N. Kirpal and S. Rajendra Babu, JJ |
| Parties | INCOME-TAX OFFICER Versus SARADBHAI M.LAK)-IANI and another |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2001 PLP 1879 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2001 PLP 1879 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the 243 I T R 1 bench comprising: B.N. Kirpal and S. Rajendra Babu, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2001 PLP 1879 (PTD) (INCOME-TAX OFFICER Versus SARADBHAI M.LAK)-IANI and another). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney‑General (B.K. Prasad, S. Rajappa and D.S. Mehra (NP),. Advocates) with him of Appellant.
Headnotes / Summary
(Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order, dated December 5, 1997 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.As. Nos.3827 and 3829 of 1997).
Reassessment
Information that income has escaped assessment-- Decision of High Court would constitute information
Initiation of reassessment proceedings on basis of such decision is valid
Indian Income Tax Act, 1961. S.147(b)
[Saradbhai M. Lakhani v. ITO (1998) 231 ITR 779 reversed]. Held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that the information which was received by the Income-tax Officer was the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Banyan & Berry v. CIT (1996) 222 ITR 831 (Guj.). When the Income-tax Officer became aware of this decision, he could initiate the proceedings under section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act,']
961. A.L.A. Firm v. CIT (1991).189 ITR 285 (SC) fol. Saradbhai M. Lakhani v. ITO (1998) 231 ITR 779 reversed. Banyan & Berry v. CIT (1996) 222 ITR 831 (Guj.) ref. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney-General (B.K. Prasad, S. Rajappa and D.S. Mehra (NP),. Advocates) with him of Appellant.
Judgment & Decree
Saradbhai M. Lakhani v. ITO (1998) 231 ITR 779 reversed. Banyan & Berry v. CIT (1996) 222 ITR 831 (Guj.) ref. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney‑General (B.K. Prasad, S. Rajappa and D.S. Mehra (NP),. Advocates) with him of Appellant. Special leave granted. Heard the learned Attorney‑General for the appellant. This is an appeal against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondent who had challenged the notice issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, whereby the respondent's assessment in respect of year 1988‑89 was sought to be recorded. The reason for re‑opening of the assessment was that the Gujarat High Court in Banyan & Berry v. .CIT (1996) 222 ITR 831, had held that after dissolution of ‑the partnership firm, the assessment could be only in the hands of the erstwhile partners. The income was computed on the basis of the award of the arbitrator in favour of the firm. The amount received was apportioned amongst the partners and it is on this basis that the income was sought to be assessed in the hands of the partners. The High Court quashed the notice under section .148 by observing that in the absence of mention of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Banyan & Berry's case (1996) 222 ITR 831, it was not open to the Income -tax Officer to justify the order by reference to the said decision. It is evident that the aforesaid view of the High Court is not correct. This Court has held that on the basis of the information which is received by the Income‑tax Officer, reassessment proceedings can be initiated. The information which was received by the Income‑tax Officer was the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Banyan & Berry's case (1996) 222 ITR
831. When the Income‑tax Officer became aware of this decision, he could initiate the proceedings under section 147(b) as has been held by this Court in A.L.A. Firm v. CIT (1991) 189 ITR
285. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the High Court was not right in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside the effect of which would be that the writ petition filed by the respondent would stand dismissed. No order as to costs. M.B.A./446/FC Appeals accepted.