P L D 1975 Karachi 811 (PLP)
EMPLOYEES' UNION-Petitioner Versus MONNOO MOTORS AND ANOTHER-Respondents
| Citation | P L D 1975 Karachi 811 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Tufail Ali A. Rahman, C. J. and Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, J |
| Parties | EMPLOYEES' UNION-Petitioner Versus MONNOO MOTORS AND ANOTHER-Respondents |
| Primary Law | (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), (a) Companies Profits (Workers' Participation) Act (XII of 1968) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1975 Karachi 811 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), (a) Companies Profits (Workers' Participation) Act (XII of 1968) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1975 Karachi 811 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Tufail Ali A. Rahman, C. J. and Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1975 Karachi 811 (PLP) (EMPLOYEES' UNION-Petitioner Versus MONNOO MOTORS AND ANOTHER-Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ali Amjad-for Petitioner.
- A. A. Fazeel.for Respondent No. 1.
- Nemo for Respondent No. 2.
- Date of hearing: 3rd December 1974.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 5-Industrial dispute-Dispute relating to establishment of a workers' participation fund-An industrial dispute-Workers' Union entitled to seek remedy either by way of adjudication and/or enforcement by Labour Court. -- S. 32(1-A)-Subsection (1-A) refers to period subsequent to expiry of notice of strike period, but before actual commencement of strike, and at any time thereafter during continuance of strike - Application under S. 32(1-A)-Cannot be made during pendency of conciliation proceedings. The words of subsection (1-A) of section 32 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 have to be read in the context of the preceding sections commencing from the raising of the dispute under section 26. The law quite clearly visualises; firstly bilateral negotiations; secondly, conciliation proceedings through Conciliator, thirdly, an attempt at arbitration and thereafter the liberty to go on strike on the expiry of the strike notice. If it was the intention of the Legislature to give a party liberty of moving an application under subsection (1-A) of section 32 at any time of the choosing of the party it was not necessary either to add subsection (1-A) to section 32 or confine this right to "party raising the dispute" or to add restrictive words "either before or after the commencement of a strike". The dispute has to be raised in a particular manner, it is the party raising the dispute who can move an application .under this subsection either before going on strike or during its continuance. Subsection (1-A) of section 32, therefore, refers to the period after the expiry of the notice of strike period but before the actual commencement of the strike and at any time thereafter while the strike continues. So understood there would be no occasion to make an application under section 32(t-A) during the pendency of a conciliation proceedings.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑ S. 32(1‑A)‑Subsection (1‑A) refers to period subsequent to expiry of notice of strike period, but before actual commencement of strike, and at any time thereafter during continuance of strike ‑ Application under S. 32(1‑A)‑Cannot be made during pendency of conciliation proceedings. The words of subsection (1‑A) of section 32 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 have to be read in the context of the preceding sections com mencing from the raising of the dispute under section
26. The law quite clearly visualises; firstly bilateral negotiations; secondly, conciliation proceed ings through Conciliator, thirdly, an attempt at arbitration and thereafter the liberty to go on strike on the expiry of the strike notice. If it was the intention of the Legislature to give a party liberty of moving an application under sub section (1‑A) of section 32 at any time of the choosing of the party it was not necessary either to add subsection (1‑A) to section 32 or confine this right to "party raising the dispute" or to add restrictive words "either before or after the commencement of a strike". The dispute has to be raised in a particular manner, it is the party raising the dispute who can move an application .under this subsection either before going on strike or during its continuance. Sub section (1‑A) of section 32, therefore, refers to the period after the expiry of the notice of strike period but before the actual commencement of the strike and at any time thereafter while the strike continues. So understood there would be no occasion to make an application under section 32(t‑A) during the pendency of a conciliation proceedings. Ali Amjad‑for Petitioner. A. A. Fazeel.for Respondent No.
1. Nemo for Respondent No.