1982 PLP 2632 (CLC)

‑‑S. 13‑Bona fide personal use‑Contention that respondent's plea regarding default in payment of rent having been disbelieved as such plea of bona fide personal need be also disbelieved‑Respondent's plea in respect of default having simply failed as Rent Controller allowed adjustment of expenses contention, held, had no force in circum stances of case. Malik Muhammad Saeed for Appellant. S. Inayat Ali for Respondent. Date of hearing : 24th September, 1981. The appellant is the tenant of the respondent in house No. R‑232, Block 19, AI‑Noor Society, Karachi, on a monthly rent of Rs. 225 since 1‑1‑1972. The respondent filed a rent application No. 1396/78 against the appellant for his eviction under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fides personal need, on 22‑3‑1978. During the pendency of the proceedings the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was promulgated, and the application proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the new Ordinance. The learned Rent Controller framed and recorded evidence of the parties. The respondent examined himself, whereas the appellant also examined himself only and the learned Rent Controller vide his judgment dated 23‑9‑1980 decided the issue framed with regard to the ground of default in payment of rent in favour of the appellant, whereas that of the personal bona fide need, he decided in favour of the respondent and directed the appellant to put the respondent in possession of the premises in question within 119 days, from the date of his order. No appeal was filed by the respondent against the finding on the issue of default in payment of rent, whereas the appellant has preferred this appeal against the finding on the issue of the bona fide personal need. 2. 1 have heard Mr. Malik Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the appellate and Syed Inayatali, the learned counsel for the respondent in .support of their respective contentions. Mr. Malik Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended firstly that the plea raised with regard to the bona. fide personal need of the respondent on the ground of the illness of his wife and son has not been specifically pleaded in his application filed under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and secondly, that sine respondent has been disbelieved in respect of his plea with regard to the default in payment of rent he should not be believed with regard to the ground of bona fide personal need.

3. So far the first contention is concerned, I find in the application that the requirement of the respondent is pleaded on the ground of his bona fide personal use, though the ground of the illness of his wife and his son on the basis of which the personal need is claimed has not been speci fically mentioned therein. The parties are not obliged to disclose their entire evidence in their pleadings and I do not think the respondent was under legal obligation to disclose the entire basis of his personal require ment in the application itself. What is clear in the evidence of the respondent that he has claimed the vacant possession of his house on the ground that his wife was recently operated for Gal‑blader and was not able to climb up 80 to 85 stairs to reach the upper storey where their present residence is situated. She was medically advised to do so. What is further clear that his son who is mental case and was admitted in Asgharjee Mental Hospital was advised to live in an open and big house, The medical certificates with regard to the illness of his wife and son in that respect have been produced and are available on the record. The respondent has further claimed that his family has increased and he has as many as six children by now and the premises in his occupation consists of only two rooms which are not sufficient to accommodate his large family. The version of the respondent in support of the above‑mentioned facts was not challenged by the appellant in his cross‑examination. What I further find that in his affidavit filed much after the evidence of the respondent was recorded, the appellant has not specifically denied the illness of the wife and the son of the respondent, and insufficient accommodation for his large family. When confronted wit such questions in the cross‑examination he has claimed ignorance about the illness of wife and son of the respondent and the difficulties he confronted with it on account of it and insufficient accommodation presently available with him. With this evidence on the record, in my view, the contention raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that the respondent's plea has no force for the reason that it was not extensively pleaded in the pleadings has no substance. On the contrary, I find that the plea of the respondent to the effect that he needs his house for his bona fide personal use is proved by sufficient and satisfactory evidence on the record.

4. As regards the second contention raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that since the respondent's plea with regard to the default in payment of rent has been disbelieved, he should also not be believed with regard to his plea of bona fide personal use, I find it equally without force. The evidence on the record is clear to the effect that the respondent's plea in respect of default in payment of rent failed simply for the reason that the learned Rent Controller allowed the adjustment of the expenses incurred by the appellant on installation of the Sui Gas and water connection in the house to be adjusted towards rent and,. therefore, the appellant was not found to be a wilful defaulter in payment of rent. In such a situation, I do not consider that the respondent was considered liar by the Rent Controller to the extent that he should also not be believed with regard to his plea of personal bona fide need. I, therefore find no force in this contention raised on behalf of the appellant as well.

5. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find force in this appeal.' It is, accordingly dismissed with costs. The appellant is directed to put the respondent in possession of the premises in question within a period of one month from the date of this judgment. M. Y. M. Appeal dismissed .