1993 PLP 432 (PLC)

This appeal calls in question the order of the Labour Court dismissing the application of the petitioner (appellant‑Union herein) under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969.

2. The circumstances forming the background of the case in short are as follows:‑

3. The petitioner professing it) be the `Collective Bargaining Agent' of the respondent's establishment submitted a "Charter of Demands", alongwith a notice under section 26(1) of the I.R.O. on 19‑8‑1988. Later a notice under section 26(3) of the I.R.O. was given, as a result of which a Joint Meeting was called by the Conciliator on 12‑10‑1988. No accord having been reached, the workers actually proceeded on strike with effect from 10‑4‑1989. It was however called off on 13-4‑1989 and after protracted negotiations, a Deed of Settlement was duly executed between the parties, on 31‑7‑1989.

4. It appears that the respondents deducted the wages office four days of strike from the pay of their workmen, for which they gave grievance notices and filed a petition before the Labour Court. The petition came to be resisted on the ground that it was not maintainable as presented, and that the dispute having been settled as a package of deal, no further demands were open to the petitioners during the subsistence of the settlement.

5. The Labour Court found that the Union could espouse cause of individual grievance under section 25‑A as permitted under clause (4) of the Ordinance but not through a petition under section 34 of I.R.O., and therefore dismissed it.

6. Mr. Rafiq Malik, learned counsel for the appellant‑Union in support of his contention that the petition was competent, has referred to the case of M/s. A.E.G. Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and another 1990 PLC 806, Mohammad Aqil v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and another PLD 1978 Karachi

649. M/s. ARAG Industries Ltd. v. Habib Textile Mills v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and another 1987 PLC 274 and also Karachi Pipe Mills Employees Union v. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd. 1992 SCMR 3.

7. The respondent also sought reliance from this very last case which is from the Supreme Court. As the law is laid down by the Supreme Court and since both the parties are basing their claim on the aforesaid Supreme Court Judgment, it remains to examine what principle had been laid down therein. But before adverting to the same, it will be in the fitness of things to see as to what was the demand of the Union in the grievance notice and I reproduce the same. In view of the above we request you make payment of the above‑said four days wages to the workers within seven days of this notice, failing which appropriate legal proceedings will be taken against, which you may please note. The prayer in the petition was: "It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to declare the strike commenced on 10‑4‑1989 in pursuance of Charter of Demands dated 19‑9‑1988 was legal and workers are entitled to receive wages for the said period."

8. The appellants, in my humble view had gone to the Labour Court for the recovery of the dues of the workers as Collective Bargaining Agents and this was over stepping the mark. This could not be done by the appellants.

9. Under the circumstances the appeal is not sustainable and I will uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2126/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.