2000 PLP 2875 (YLR)

On 14‑4‑1999, the respondents filed a suit against the petitioner, under the provision of Order 37, C.P.C. for the recovery of a sum of Rs.1,42,000, on the basis of a pronote, dated 27‑10‑1998. Notice was issued to the petitioner, who, applied for leave to appear and defend on 1‑5‑1999. However though, required under the law to tile his affidavit, alongwith the application but, no such affidavit was tiled. Consequently after a lapse of about 11 months an application was moved that the affidavit could not be filed because of having been misplaced by the counsel for the petitioner. Anyhow, the Additional District Judge, allowed this application. The ground in the application for leave to appear and defend, moved by the petitioner, is that the pronote is forged. However, a plea has been propounded that some amount was as due from the uncle of the petitioner and that under the threat and coercion the petitioner had executed some blank documents. In any case, it does not seem that the petitioner has confidently and specifically denied his signature on the said pronote. I have been shown the original pronote by the learned counsel for the respondent; this contains thumb‑impression of the petitioner as well which were not disputed in the leave application.

2. The learned Additional District Judge allowed application for leave to defend, subject to the condition of furnishing of bank guarantee to the tune of suit amount. It is, this order, which has been challenged before this Court, through the present petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the order imposing condition of bank guarantee is harsh and in fact it tantamount to refusing the leave.

4. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent by relying upon 1997 SCMR 943; 1984 SCMR 568, 1988 MLD 924, contends that the bank guarantee has validly been required by the Court at the time of granting leave keeping in view the facts of the case.

5. I have considered the contention of both the parties. In the leave application, it is vaguely denied by the petitioner that he did not sign the pronote. However, there is no specific denial of thumb‑impression. Besides, the petitioner did not file an affidavit, which was a condition for the competency of the leave application. Anyhow, as the Court below has exercised discretion by allowing the tiling of the affidavit, at a subsequent stage, I do not intend to go into this question but, find that in view of the contents of the leave application, the learned counsel has rightly imposed the condition of furnishing the bank guarantee. This is a discretionary order and it is not shown that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, whimsically or against the settled judicial criteria, calling for interference in the revisional jurisdiction. This petition, thus, has no force and is hereby dismissed. However, the petitioner is granted one month time from today to furnish the bank guarantee before the Court below. H.B.T./A‑107/L Petition dismissed.