PLC 1978

1978 PLP 75 (PLC)

MUHAMMAD IQBAL Versus P. I. A. CORPORATION, KARACHI

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
Appeal No. KAR‑131 of 1976, decided on 15th October 1976.
Honorable Judges
Ghulam Rasool Shaikh, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1978 PLP 75 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members Ghulam Rasool Shaikh, Appellate Tribunal
Parties MUHAMMAD IQBAL Versus P. I. A. CORPORATION, KARACHI
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1978 PLP 75 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1978 PLP 75 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Ghulam Rasool Shaikh, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1978 PLP 75 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD IQBAL Versus P. I. A. CORPORATION, KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Raja Shams‑uz‑Zaman for Appellants

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

S. 51 read with S. 25‑A‑‑Enforcement of relief with regard to salary for period of unemployment granted under S. 25‑A‑Proper course to make application under S. 51. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

S. 25‑A‑Demands not enjoyed by workers prior to termination of their services‑‑Cannot be agitated under S. 25‑A‑Such demands could only be agitated by raising an industrial dispute.

Judgment & Decree

S. 25‑A‑Demands not enjoyed by workers prior to termination of their services‑‑Cannot be agitated under S. 25‑A‑Such demands could only be agitated by raising an industrial dispute. Raja Shams‑uz‑Zaman for Appellants These are eight appeals filed against the single order passed by the Labour Court on the application made by the appellants under section 25‑A, 1. R. O. There are seven appellants. Originally one appeal was filed by all these seven appellant. Consequently, I directed them to file separate appeals. In compliance with that order separate appeals were filed. All these appeals have been consolidated as common points of law are involved. 2. The appellants were in the service of respondent and they were removed from service. They served grievance notice and made application under section 25‑A of I. R. O. to the Junior Labour Court. The applications were resisted. 3. On the assessment of the evidence the Junior Labour Court ordered re‑instatement with full pay for the period during which they remained unemployed. Against this order the respondent tiled appeals, which were dismissed. 4. In pursuance of the aforesaid decisions the appellants were re‑instated but their salaries for the period of unemployment were not paid to them. Consequently, they again made applications under section 25‑A to the Labour Court for the recovery of the salary for the aforesaid period but they added certain additional demands. The applications were resisted on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the master having been already decided the present applications were barred by principle of resjudicata. 5. The Labour Court agreed with the respondent that the applications were barred by principle of res judicata, and therefore, dismissed them. Aggrieved by this, the present appeals bad been filed. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and I am of the view that the applications under section 25‑A were misconceived as the matter bad already been decided under the previous application and the applicants had been granted the relief with regard to the salary for the period of unemployment. The proper course for the appellants would have been to make applications under section 51, I. R. O. for the enforcement of the relief previously granted. 7. So far the remaining demands are concerned these could not agitated under section 25‑A as it was admitted by the learned counsel that prior to the termination of service these benefits were not enjoyed by the R appellants and were in fact fresh demands. Thus those demands could only be agitated by raising an industrial dispute and not by way of application under section 25‑A, I. R. O. 8. In the result the appeals are summarily dismissed.