2006 PLP 1655 (MLD)
Mst. SURRIYA BEGUM and 8 others — Appellants Versus Mst. HAMIDA BEGUM and 2 others — Respondents
| Citation | 2006 PLP 1655 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | Mst. SURRIYA BEGUM and 8 others — Appellants Versus Mst. HAMIDA BEGUM and 2 others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2006 PLP 1655 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2006 PLP 1655 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2006 PLP 1655 (MLD) (Mst. SURRIYA BEGUM and 8 others — Appellants Versus Mst. HAMIDA BEGUM and 2 others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Idrees Khan for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss.6 & 13
Superior right of pre-emption and making of Talbs
Both the Courts below had concurrently concluded that notices of Talb-e-Ishhad were not sent to vendee
Said conclusion had been arrived at on the basis; firstly, that as original notices were produced in the Court by pre-emptors that was sufficient for the purpose of showing that same had not been sent and secondly that no functionary of postal department had been produced to prove the sending of said notices
Reasons of Courts below for holding that pre-emptors had failed to prove Talb-e-Ishhad, were proper and could not be rebutted
Courts below for valid reasons had found that pre-emptors had failed to prove that they had a superior right of pre-emption
Impugned decrees of Courts below were unexceptionable being consistent with record
In absence of any jurisdictional error or other legal infirmity in the impugned judgments and decrees, same could not be interfered with by High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Judgment & Decree
JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.
This regular second appeal impugns the concurrent findings of the learned trial Court, dated 19-11-1999 and of the learned lower appellate Court, dated 20-11-2001 whereby a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by the appellants-plaintiffs was dismissed.
2. The facts of the case have been set out in the impugned judgments and need not therefore, be reproduced in extenso.
3. Both Courts below have rightly concluded that notices of Talb-i-Ishhad were not sent to the vendee. This conclusion has been arrived at on the bases, firstly, that the original notices were produced in Court by the appellants-plaintiffs. This was held to be sufficient for the purpose of showing that the same had not been sent. Secondly, it was noted that no functionary of the postal department had been produced to prove the sending of these notices of Talb-i-Ishhad. The reasons of the learned Courts below for holding that the appellants-plaintiffs have failed to prove Talb-i-Ishhad are proper and cannot be faulted.
4. In addition to the above, the learned Courts below for valid reasons have held that the appellants-pre-emptors had failed to prove that they had a superior right of pre-emption. Their claim that they were co-sharers was belied by the revenue record, which showed that the suit-land was comprised in khewat No.47 while the appellants-pre-emptors owned land in khewat No.142. As to the claim of the appellants based on a shared common passage, the learned Courts below were justified in holding that a public thoroughfare used by both sides could not be termed as a common passage conferring a superior right of pre-emption on the pre-emptor.
5. In view of the above discussion, I find the impugned decrees to be unexceptionable being consistent with 'the record. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellants was unable to advert to any such jurisdictional error or other legal infirmity in the impugned judgments, which would justify interference therein while exercising appellate jurisdiction. In these circumstances, I find no merit in this appeal which is, therefore, dismissed. H.B.T./S-123/L Appeal dismissed.