1986 PLP 1814 (MLD)

This First Rent Appeal was filed in this Court on 13‑2‑1986 against the order of learned Rent Controller, Jacobabad, dated 11‑1‑1986 in Rent Application No.20 of 1985, whereby he struck off the defence of the appellant and ordered his eviction. The appeal was admitted by this Court on 20‑2‑1986 and the notices were issued to respondents. The respondents filed an application praying that the appeal may be dismissed as time‑barred. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the Record and Proceedings of the Lower Court. The admitted position appears to be as under:‑ The impugned order was passed on 11‑1‑1986. Application for copies was filed by the appellant on 8‑2‑1986. The costs were paid on 9‑2‑1986 and copies were also delivered on the same day. This appeal Subsection (1) of section 21 of Ordinance 1979 provides as under:‑ "Subsection (1).‑‑Any party aggrieved by an order, not being an interim order, made by the controller may, within thirty days of such order, prefer an appeal to the High Court." Under section 12 of Limitation Act the day on which the impugned order was passed and the time taken in obtaining the copies would have to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Thus, 11‑1‑1986, when the impugned order was passed and two days, viz. 8th and 9th .of February, which were taken in obtaining the copies would have to be excluded. After excluding three days, on calculation it appears, that the appeal has been filed on 31st day 'and not within 30 days as required by section 21(1) of Ordinance. This appeal would, therefore, be barred by limitation, unless the delay of one day is condoned. This question was considered by their Lordships of Supreme Court in case of Abdul Ghafoor v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1982 S C

88. Their Lordships observed as under:‑ "Subsection (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 relates to special and local laws. The Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, it has been admitted, is such a law. The period of limitation for filing the appeal under this law (thirty days) is different from the period prescribed by Article 156 of the Limitation Act; therefore as provided in section 29 (2) the provisions of section 3 thereof would apply to such a situation, but subject to the exclusions contained in section 29 itself. When section 3of the Limitation Act is applied, the provisions of sections 4 to 25 of that Act would get (normally) attracted by virtue of section

3. But if it is a case covered by section 29, the provisions of sections 4 to 25 would apply only to the extent that any of them have not been excluded by the combined reading of clauses (a) and (b) of section 29( 2) And, . it is not denied that the said two clauses when read together in the context of Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 do exclude section 5 of. ‑the limitation Act." In view of this legal position, Mr. Mangi, learned counsel for the appellant, candidly conceded that section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be invoked and in fact he has made no such application under section

5. I have already come to the conclusion; that this appeal has been filed beyond the period of limitation and there is no 'provision of law which empowers Court to condone the delay. As such the appeal is liable to be dismissed as time‑barred with no orders as to costs. The appeal was dismissed by short order dated 25‑8‑1986. ‑Above are the reasons in support of said order. H.B.T Appeal dismissed