2005 PLP 1847 (CLD)
Messrs MUDASSAR WEAVING FACTORY through Sole Proprietor and another — Appellants Versus BANK OF PUNJAB through General Manager — Respondent
| Citation | 2005 PLP 1847 (CLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | Messrs MUDASSAR WEAVING FACTORY through Sole Proprietor and another — Appellants Versus BANK OF PUNJAB through General Manager — Respondent |
| Primary Law | (a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), (c) Limitation, (b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2005 PLP 1847 (CLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), (c) Limitation, (b) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2005 PLP 1847 (CLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2005 PLP 1847 (CLD) (Messrs MUDASSAR WEAVING FACTORY through Sole Proprietor and another — Appellants Versus BANK OF PUNJAB through General Manager — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Shujah Baba for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 21
Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.5 & 29(2)
Provision of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 not applicable to an appeal under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997.
S. 21
Judgment/decree were passed on 25-6-1998
Application for certified copies was made on 16-9-1998, which were supplied on 21-9-1998
Appeal was filed on 26-9-1998
Plea of appellant was that he met with an accident on 2-6-1998 and was advised bed rest from 21-6-1998 for six weeks and then from 2-8-1998 for another seven weeks; and that bar oj' limitation would not operate as impugned judgment/ decree were void
Had appellant met with an accident on 2-6-1998 resulting into fracture of his three ribs, then he should have been in hospital on 2-6-1998
Two certificates of private medical practitioners did not show hospitalization of appellant and if so, for what period
Copies of judgment/decree were made available on 21-9-1998, but there was no explanation of period from 21-9-1998 to 26-9-1998
Judgment1decree passed by a Court of law could not be ignored by raising a plea that same being void, thus, bar of limitation would not apply
High Court dismissed appeal as barred by time.
Judgment/decree passed by a Court of law could not be ignored by raising a plea that same being void, bar of limitation would not operate.
Judgment & Decree
SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25-6-1988 of the Judge Banking Court No. 2, Faisalabad. It was filed on 26-9-1998 while limitation for filing an appeal under section 21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) is thirty days. This appeal is, therefore, barred by time. An application for condonation of delay has also been filed. The ground urged therein is that on 2-6-1998, appellant No.2 met with an accident and he was advised bed rest from 21-6-1998 for six weeks and then from 2-8-1998 for another seven weeks. Two medical certificates of a private medical practitioner are being relied upon.
2. The learned counsel for the decree-holder/Bank submits that the limitation for filing an appeal being governed by a special statute, section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable and the delay cannot be condoned. Reliance is placed on Siddiq M. Malik and others v. Al-Baraka Islamic Investment Bank, B.S.C. and another 2002 CLD 1694 and Majeed Akbar Farooqi v. Bank of Punjab 2002 CLD 778.
3. The copy of' the impugned judgment and decree appended to this application did not indicate the date of application for supplying the certified copies thereof. Accordingly, the learned Banking Court was directed to submit a report, which has been submitted. It is stated therein that certified copies were applied for on 16-9-1998. Certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree were delivered on 21-9-1998.
4. The learned counsel for the appellants has pressed the ground urged in the application for condonation of delay. He further submits that the suit filed by the respondent/ decree-holder was frivolous and barred by time, therefore, the judgment and decree being void and nullity bar of limitation does not operate.
5. We have considered the submissions made- by the learned counsel for the parties. As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the decree-holder/Bank as to non-applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, (XV of 1997) is concerned, the two judgments aforesaid, both by a learned Division Bench of this Court, clearly support his contention. Even otherwise, the two medical certificates being relied upon are not even dated. If appellant No.2 had met with an accident on 2-6-1998 resulting in to fracture of' his three ribs, he should have been in the hospital on 2-6-1998. The two certificates aforesaid being relied upon do not show that the appellant No.2 was hospitalized and, if so, for what period.
6. We have also noticed that copies of the judgment and decree were made available on 21-9-1998. There is no explanation whatsoever of' the period from 21-9-1998 to 26-9-1998. The contention that the judgment and decree being void, the bar of limitation does not operate has no merit. Judgment and decree passed by a Court of law cannot be ignored by raising such a plea. Reference may be made to Messrs Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali Shah and others PLD 1977 SC
599. Accordingly, C.M. 2-C of 1998 for condonation of delay in filing this appeal is dismissed with the result that this appeal is dismissed as barred by time. No order as to costs. S.A.K./M-264/L Appeal dismissed.