P L D 1966 W (PLP)
Mst. ALLAH JAWAI‑Petitioner Versus BAHAWAL‑Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1966 W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | I. U. Khan, Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan |
| Parties | Mst. ALLAH JAWAI‑Petitioner Versus BAHAWAL‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1966 W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1966 W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: I. U. Khan, Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1966 W (PLP) (Mst. ALLAH JAWAI‑Petitioner Versus BAHAWAL‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Miss Qari for Petitioner. .
- Iqbal Ahmad Siddiqi for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Lambardar‑Appointment--"Female candidate‑Appointment is regulated by Punjab Land Revenue Rules, r. 17 (ii) (d)‑Female can be appointed when she is sole owner or special reasons for giving her preference exist. (b) Revision‑Concurrent findings of fact by Collector and Commissioner‑Not interfered with.
Judgment & Decree
The facts of the case are that Wali Dad Lambardar of the village died and eight candidates including the parties and the sister of the petitioner applied for the post. Ultimately the Collector appointed the respondent. The petitioner and her sister went in appeal but both the appeals , were rejected. Only the petitioner has come up in revision. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at great length. The law on the point is quite clear. The case is governed by rule 17 (ii) (d) of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules. A female can be appointed only when one of the two conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. Either she should be a sole owner or there should be special reasons for giving her preference over other candidates. In this case, it is established that she is not sole owner and, therefore, she cannot claim appointment on this consideration. The learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to show that there are special reasons and, in this connection, she has mentioned the hereditary claim and the age of the petitioner and the fact that she is the biggest landholder. They may be qualifications but they cannot be considered as special reasons. On the last hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the father of the petitioner had applied for the appointment of the petitioner as Sarbrah Lambardar and I post poned the case for making enquiries as to what orders were passed on this alleged application. A report has been received from the Collector that the petitioner was never ‑ appointed as a Sarbrah. No preference can, therefore, be given on this ground. The learned counsel for the petitioners has referred me to the following rulings:‑
(i) P L D 1950 (Rev.) 980. (ii) P L D 1950 (Rev.) 1003. (iii) P L D 1950 (Rev.) 1025. (iv) P L D 1958 (Rev.)
138. In the first three rulings, there were special reasons for which the female candidate was given preference and this was in accordance with the rule 17 (ii) (d). In the last mentioned ruling, one of my learned predecessors did not interfere with the appointment of a lady as a lambardar. In this particular case, I find that the petitioner is neither the sole owner nor there are special reasons on account of which she can claim preference for appointment as Lambardar. I, therefore, see no justification for interfering with the concurrent findings of the learned Collector and the learned Commissioner. The revision fails and is dismissed hereby. K. M. A. Revision dismissed.