1981 PLP 713 (PLC(CS))
ZAHOOR AHMED Versus TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS
| Citation | 1981 PLP 713 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | ZAHOOR AHMED Versus TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1981 PLP 713 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1981 PLP 713 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1981 PLP 713 (PLC(CS)) (ZAHOOR AHMED Versus TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Qamar Abbass for Respondents.
Judgment & Decree
Imam Bux Qazi v. Trustees of Port of Karachi 1980 P L C 495 and Johnson & Johnson v. Zubair Ahmed 1980 P L C 622 rel. Zahid Hamid for Appellant. Qamar Abbass for Respondents. Date of hearing : 30th November, 1980. The services of the appellant, who was employed as a peon in the K.P.T., the first respondent herein, were terminated with effect from 22nd April, 1976, by an order which appears to bear no date. The order was based upon the report of the Enquiry Officer, who found that the charge of stealing two mercury bulbs had been established against the appellant, The appellant challenged the order of termination of his services before the learned first Labour Court which has dismissed his grievance petition on the ground that the evidence before the Enquiry Officer substantiates the charge of theft. The appellant has accordingly preferred an appeal to this Tribunal against the decision of the learned Labour Court.
2. I have heard Mr. Zahid Hamid, who appeared for the appellant, and Mr. Qamar Abbass, who appears for the first respondent. The fatal flaw in the case of the appellant is that his grievance petition is not maintainable. Since the services of the appellant were terminated for reasons unconnected with an industrial dispute, he does not fair within the definition of worker as given in the I. R. O. and, thus, cannot file grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R.O. He also cannot file grievance petition under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25‑A, I.R.O. since the Standing Orders are not applicable to the K.P.T.. which is admittedly run by Government and has Statutory Rules of service, conduct and discipline in respect of its employees, as held by this Tribunal in the case of Imam Bux Qazi v. Trustees of Port of Karachi. (1980 P L C 495) In that case it was observed by this Tribunal as follows :‑ Since the Standing Orders are not applicable the respondent establishment, the appellant cannot invoke the provisions of clause (3) of Standing Order 12 and bring his grievance in respect of his dismissal under that clause before the learned Labour Court. Furthermore, he also cannot file: a grievance application before a Labour Court under section 25‑A, I.R.O., as such an application can only be made by a worker as defined in the I. R. O., but the appellant, by reason of his dismissal from service, which is unconnected with an industrial dispute, has ceased to fall within the said definition, as was pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson 8c Johnson v. Zubair Ahmed , decided on 10th October, 1979. A similar view was taken by this Tribunal in the case of Liberty Mills Ltd. v. Mohammad Zaman, decided on 7th November, 1979."
3. Mr. Zahid Hamid, however, sought to argue that since the case of the appellant is that the termination of his services is unlawful, there fore, he continues to be a worker for the purposes of the I. R. O. This pro position was considered by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johnson v. Zubeir Ahmed (1980 P L C 622) wherein it was held that the definition of worker as given in the I.R.O. excludes persons whose services have been terminated, unless the termination of services is in consequence of an industrial dis pute or had led to an industrial dispute, which admittedly not the case here.
4. For the foregoing reasons I see no force in this appeal and would, accordingly, dismiss the same.