P L D (Rev (PLP)
MUHAMMAD ASLAM‑Petitioner Versus R. T. A. MULTAN‑Respondent
| Citation | P L D (Rev (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD ASLAM‑Petitioner Versus R. T. A. MULTAN‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D (Rev (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D (Rev (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.
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Cite this legal precedent as: P L D (Rev (PLP) (MUHAMMAD ASLAM‑Petitioner Versus R. T. A. MULTAN‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Headnotes / Summary
Rule 422‑A (b) Regional Authority may impose condition prohibiting carriage of goods notified by Food Department.
Judgment & Decree
NASIR AHMAD, F. C.‑The appellant holds a public carrier permit No.313/52 covering vehicle No PBM‑1549. The R. T. A. Multan has suspended this permit for a period of two years on the ground that there had been a breach of the condition which prohibits the carrying of such goods as are A notified from time to time by the Department of Food. The fact that the vehicle was found on 25th February 1954, carrying 60 bags of rice has not been contested before me, but it is argued that the condition under discussion was not properly imposed and, in any case, the Regional Transport Authority was not competent to impose a condition of this kind. My attention has been invited to Rule 4.22‑A (b), which gives power to a Regional Transport Authority to attach to a public carrier's permit "a condition restricting the type and the ownership of the goods which may be carried". The contention is that a general condition of this kind, which merely enforces a prohibition imposed by any other depart ment, is not within the competence of the Regional Transport Authority and could only 'be imposed by Government in the exercise of its rule‑making powers under section 68, read with section 33, of the Act. I am not inclined to accept this interpretation, as a condition if it is clear and specific, is within the powers of a Regional Transport Authority to impose under rule 4.22‑A (b). The other argument which has been advanced is that the punishment awarded is excessive in view of the vicarious nature of the liability which the permit‑holder incurred on account of an act performed by his employee. This argument is quite forceful and, in my opinion, the punishment that has been awarded is definitely excessive. I would, therefore, reduce the period of suspension to that already undergone, and accept the appeal to that extent. A. H. Order accordingly.