1989 P Cr (PLP)

A similar application was presented before the learned trial Court who has without disputing the fact that the applicant had been under detention for over one year, rejected the application on the ground that he is a desperate and dangerous person and as such is not entitled to the concession of bail. Mr. G.M. Soomro while making his submissions before me candidly admitted that there were following cases pending against the applicant: (1) Crime No. 29/88, under section 17(3), Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. (2) Crime No. 31/86 under section 17(3), Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. (3) Crime No. 41/86 under section 17(3), Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Huddood) Ordinance, 1979. All these crimes are of the Police Station Tando Masti, District Khairpur. (4) Crime No.100/86 of P.S. Gambat under section 17(3), Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, read with sections 364, 365 and 342,13‑D, Arms Ordinance (this is the case in hand). The learned counsel, however, invited my attention to an order passed by Saeeduzzaman Siddiqi, J, in Cr. B. No.278/88 to contend that in that case also notwithstanding the pendency of four cases against the accused‑applicant, his lordship was pleased to grant bail. From the admitted cases pending against the applicant as mentioned above there cannot be any hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that the learned trial Court has rightly held the applicant to be a desperate and dangerous criminal. The case of the applicant thus falls under proviso four to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. which, in clear terms, excludes the application of proviso three to the said section. The applicant is thus not entitled to be released on bail for having been detained for a period of over one year. I do not find any good reason to disagree with the trial Court. Consequently the application is found to be devoid of force and as such it is dismissed accordingly. Before parting with the case I would also like to make a mention that the above‑noted order relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant has no bearing on the facts of the instant case inasmuch as in that case no details of cases which were pending against the applicant were mentioned. The bare statement of the A.A.‑G. to that effect that in that case the accused was a dangerous, desperate and hardened criminal was not supported by any piece of evidence. In this view of the matter, his Lordship, if I may say so with due respect, was justified in repelling the contention of the learned A.A: G. raised before him. S.A./B‑87/K Bail refused.