1983 PLP 677 (PLC(CS))
RIAZ HUSSAIN Versus KAKAKHEL INDUSTRIES LTD.
| Citation | 1983 PLP 677 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | RIAZ HUSSAIN Versus KAKAKHEL INDUSTRIES LTD. |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1983 PLP 677 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1983 PLP 677 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab bench comprising: Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1983 PLP 677 (PLC(CS)) (RIAZ HUSSAIN Versus KAKAKHEL INDUSTRIES LTD.). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ch. Nabi Ahmad Cheema for Appellant.
- Date of hearing : 19th December, 1981.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 37‑Promotion‑Not a guaranteed right but always. subject to seniority‑cum‑fitness, Fitness, determination of‑Func tion of employer‑Workman posted against higher post but in his own pay s9sle‑.Claim for higher pay scale refused‑High pay scale, in circumstances, held, could not be claimed unless promoted temporarily or regularly‑Grievance petition claiming higher pay scale, held, rightly dismissed by Labour Court.
Judgment & Decree
The appellant has preferred this appeal against the decision dated 15th October, 1981 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 5, Faisalabad, whereby his grievance petition was dismissed.
2. The appellant was a Gate Clerk, Vide order dated 23rd January, 1980 he was designated as an acting Gate Office Incharge for six months in his existing pay scale and grade with effect from 1st February, 1980. Thereafter vide order dated 15th October, 1980 he was designated as Gate Office Incharge in his present .pay scale and grade with effect from 1st October, 1980. The appellant claims pay scale of the post of Gate Office Incharge for the reason that he had been working on the said post for more than nine months. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since the appellant is working on the post mentioned above; he has become entitled to get the pay scale of that post. I do not find any force in this argument of the learned counsel. For the mere fact that the appellant has been made to work on the post of Gate Office Incharge is not sufficient to claim the pay scale of the said post. By the previous order, copy of which is Exh. P‑1, he was appointed only in acting capacity sad thus the said posting did not give him any right to claim the pay scale. Even the second order does not give any right because although he was made to work as Gate Office Incharge but the direction was that he would get the pay and scale in which he was already serving. Neither the previous order nor the latter one amounts to promotion of the appellant to the post of Gate Office Incharge. It appears that he. is work ing on the said post in officiating capacity. His substantive post being of the Gate Clerk, he is entitled to get that pay. He will become entitled to the pay scale and grade of the post of Gate Office Incharge when he would be temporarily or regularly promoted to the said post. If he is not willing to work in the post of Gate Office Incharge without getting the scale and grade of that post, he may ask the management to post him on his substantive post. the promotion is always subject to seniority and fitness. This is not the case of the appellant that he is the senior most and that the Management has found him fit to be promoted. Promotion not being a right, no one can ask for it. It is the function of the employer to see whether an incumbent is fit for a particular post for being promoted. The second condition i.e. fitness is subject to seniority. There being no right guaranteed, the petition of the appellant was rightly, dismissed by the learned lower Court. There is no force in the appeal, which is dismissed) in limine. Appeal dismissed.