1988 PLP 1271 (MLD)

This petition is directed against the order of Additional District Judge, Multan dated 18‑1C‑1982, disposing of family cases between the parties on compromise.

2. To put it succinctly, petitioner and respondent No.1, were wedded on 28‑4‑1973, and a sum of Rs.1,000 was fixed as dower amount. Subsequently, the parties experienced certain matrimonial difficulties as a result whereof petitioner instituted as suit for maintenance before Family Court at Multan, on 30‑9‑1979, which was followed by a suit for dower on 9‑2‑1980. These were responded by the respondent with a suit for restitution of conjugal rights on 3‑1.‑1980. The three suits were consolidated on 26‑2‑1980, and were disposed of vide judgment dated 6‑12‑1981; as a consequence whereof, petitioner's suits for maintenance and dower were decreed awarding her maintenance at the rate of Rs.30 p.m. and Rs.1,000 as dower; and the respondent's suit for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed. Both the parties preferred appeals. Petitioner sought enhancement of the quantum of maintenance, while the respondent questioned the dower decree, as well as dismissal of his suit for restitution of conjugal rights.

3. During pendency of the appeals, petitioner multiplied the litigation, by instituting two more suits, one for dissolution of marriage and the other for return of dowry. Nevertheless, better sense prevailed upon the parties and they resolved to compromise their differences. Pursuance to which, on 18‑10‑1982, they recorded their statements before the Additional District Judge, Multan, to the following effect:‑ The respondent conceded petitioner's suit for dissolution of marriage, withdrew his appeal of restitution of conjugal rights, while petitioner agreed to withdraw the suit for dowry and settled suit for dower at Rs.500. In view of the compromise, the learned Additional District Judge, vide the impugned order, disposed of the appeals, and likewise all other matters were accordingly adjudged.

4. However, later on, petitioner chose to institute this constitutional petition. The solitary contention urged by her learned counsel is that the decree of maintenance was not appealable as envisaged by section 14(2)(B) of the Muslims maintenance was not appealable as envisaged by section 14(2)(B) of the Muslims Family Courts Act, 1964. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that since the petitioner did not raise any jurisdictional objection before the Appellate Court, therefore, she is now barred from questioning the same.

5. Admittedly, the petitioner was a party to the compromise, which precipitated in the impugned order, whereby the entire litigation pending between the parties was brought to rest. It was acted upon, as a result whereof the petitioner received certain obvious benefits. Now she cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate the same transaction. Consequently, this petition has no force and is accordingly hereby dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their respective costs. M.Y.H./G‑146/L Petition dismissed.