1989 PLP 1162 (CLC)
USMAN GHANI‑‑Appellant Versus MUHAMMAD RAFIQ‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 1989 PLP 1162 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Mamoon Kazi, J |
| Parties | USMAN GHANI‑‑Appellant Versus MUHAMMAD RAFIQ‑‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 1162 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 1162 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Mamoon Kazi, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 1162 (CLC) (USMAN GHANI‑‑Appellant Versus MUHAMMAD RAFIQ‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Mehar Hussain A. Mesawa for Appellant.
Headnotes / Summary
10th August, 1987. Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑ ‑‑‑S.15‑‑Default‑‑Rent was first tendered by money orders and after the same had been refused it was deposited in Court‑‑Held, there being no contest on this point Rent Controller, held, had rightly dismissed the eviction petitions.
Judgment & Decree
10th August, 1987. Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑ ‑‑‑S.15‑‑Default‑‑Rent was first tendered by money orders and after the same had been refused it was deposited in Court‑‑Held, there being no contest on this point Rent Controller, held, had rightly dismissed the eviction petitions. Mehar Hussain A. Mesawa for Appellant. This order disposes of F.R.As. No.669/1987 to 675/1987 and 677/1987 to 682/1987 as they arise out of the same order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Karachi (South), dated 24‑5‑1987. The appellant is a landlord of the building situated on Plot No.LY‑28/11, Usmanabad, Lyari Quarters, Karachi, whereas the respondent in this case is a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.16. Admittedly, there is no written agreement fixing the period within which rent of the premises was payable. According to the appellant, the respondent in each of these cases had committed default in payment of rent due for February and March, 1981. However, according to the respondents, the appellant had refused to accept rent from them after January, 1981 and consequently, rent for the months of February and March, 1981 was remitted by them to the appellant on 1‑4‑1981 through money orders. However, the appellant refused to accept the money orders as well, with the result that the respondents started depositing the rent in Court from 12‑5‑1981 and continued to do the same till the filing of the eviction application. Such factual position being not in dispute, the learned Controller found that the respondents had not committed any default and, therefore, the applications filed by the appellant for eviction of the respondents from the premises were dismissed. I have heard Mr. Mehar Hussain Mesawa learned counsel for the appellant in all these cases. His only contention is that since according to section 10 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, rent was payable by 10th of next following month for which the same became due and admittedly, rent was not paid by the respondents by such time, therefore, default A was committed by them. The argument raised by the learned counsel is completely misconceived. The question of default in respect of payment of rent by the tenants is governed by section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance and not by section
10. The learned counsel concedes that if the matter is governed by section 15(2)(ii), no default was committed by the respondents. In view of such circumstances, I find the impugned order not open to exception. Admittedly, rent was first. tendered by the respondents by money orders on 1‑4‑1981 and after the same had been‑ refused by the appellant, it was deposited in Court by the respondents. There being no contest on this point, the learned Controller has rightly held that no default was committed by the respondents. Since tender of rent by money order and its subsequent deposit in Court was within 60 days' period as contemplated by section 15(2)(ii) of the Rent Ordinance of 1979, the respondents cannot be said to have committed default. For the aforesaid reasons these appeals are dismissed in limine, M.Z.S./U‑47/K Appeals dismissed.