2005 PLP 1246 (YLR)
Mst. GHAZALA SAEED — Appellant Versus Mst. SHAKARA ZAFAR and others — Respondents
| Citation | 2005 PLP 1246 (YLR) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Mujeebullah Siddiqui, J |
| Parties | Mst. GHAZALA SAEED — Appellant Versus Mst. SHAKARA ZAFAR and others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Penal Code (XLV of 1860) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2005 PLP 1246 (YLR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Penal Code (XLV of 1860) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2005 PLP 1246 (YLR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Muhammad Mujeebullah Siddiqui, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2005 PLP 1246 (YLR) (Mst. GHAZALA SAEED — Appellant Versus Mst. SHAKARA ZAFAR and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Nemo for Appellant.
- Mumtaz Ali Deshmukh for Respondent.
- After perusal of the impugned judgment and the hearing the learned Advocates for the respondent and State, I am persuaded to agree with their submissions. It is held that the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent No.1 and the impugned judgment is not open to any exception. The acquittal appeal stands dismissed accordingly.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss.406, 420 & 489-F
Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417(2-A)
Cheque issued by the accused to the complainant had been dishonoured
Magistrate vide impugned judgment had acquitted the accused of the charge under Ss.406/420, P.P.C.
Bouncing of cheque had become an offence after insertion of S.489-F, P.P.C. with effect from 25th October, 2002, but for that purpose also dishonest issuance of cheque towards repayment of loan or fulfilment of an obligation which was dishonoured on presentation, had to be established
Offence was allegedly committed in the year 2001 when S.489-F was not on the Statute book
Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused and the impugned judgment was not open to any exception
Appeal was dismissed accordingly. Khlid Mehmood Siddiqui, State Counsel.
Judgment & Decree
This acquittal appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31-1-2003, in Criminal Case No.69 of 2002, whereby the learned VIIIth Judicial Magistrate East Karachi, acquitted the respondent No.1 of the charge under sections 406/420, P.P.C. The prosecution case is that the respondent issued cheque, which was dishonoured. After appreciation of the evidence brought on record, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that it was simple case of loan transaction and there was no inducement by way of misrepresentation. No fraud was committed and there was no mens rea. After arriving at the above conclusion, the learned trial Court held that mere dishonouring of the cheque does not constitute an offence under sections 406/420, P.P.C. The matter was of civil nature and consequently, the respondent was acquitted. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1, has submitted that it was a civil transaction and an amount of Rs.21,000 has been paid to the appellant. He has submitted that no criminal offence has been made out and the judgment of acquittal is not open to any exception. The learned State counsel, has also supported the impugned judgment of acquittal and contended that after insertion of section 489-F, P.P.C., by Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance No.LXXXVI of 2002, with effect from 25th October 2002, the bouncing of cheque has become an offence but for that purpose also dishonest issuance of cheque towards repayment of loan or fulfilment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, is to be established. In this case the offence is alleged to have been committed in the year 2001 when section 489-F was not on the statute book. He has submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and has correctly held that no offence under sections 406/420, P.P.C., was made out. After perusal of the impugned judgment and the hearing the learned Advocates for the respondent and State, I am persuaded to agree with their submissions. It is held that the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent No.1 and the impugned judgment is not open to any exception. The acquittal appeal stands dismissed accordingly. N.H.Q./G-47/K Appeal dismissed.