1999 P Cr (PLP)

‑‑‑‑S. 497(1)‑‑‑Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S.17(3)‑‑‑Bail, grant of‑‑‑Statutory delay ‑‑‑Accsued was not named in F.I.R.‑‑‑More than one year had passed and even charge had not been framed‑‑‑Delay caused in trial was not on account of accused‑‑‑Accused was either acquitted or was granted bail in other cases against him‑‑‑Bail was granted to accused in circumstances. Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934 ref. S. Mahmood Alam Rizvi and Ms. Akhtar Rehana for Applicant. Ashiq Hussain Mehar for the State. The applicant is charged with an offence under section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. According to the F.I.R. lodged by one Major Irfan Ahmad Khan on 12‑8‑1996 at about 4‑30 a.m., four unknown youngsters entered into his house locked him and his family members on one room and robbed them of substantial amount of cash (local and foreign currency), substantial quantity of jewellery, household goods and other expensive things. The applicants were arrested on 26‑11‑1996 under F.I.R. No. 100 of 1996 of Police Station Shahrah‑e‑Faisal, Karachi East. Learned counsel for the applicant has pressed this application on the ground of statutory delay alone and has contended that having remained in custody for more than a year the applicant is entitled to grant of bail as of right in terms of third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C., and the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934 and subsequent cases. The principles relating to grant of bail under the third proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. appear to be clearly settled through several precedents. After the expiry of one year in the case of offences not punishable with death and two years in those so punishable, an accused person is entitled to grant of bail as of right on the ground of delay in the trial of the case against him. Such bail, however, can be refused only if it is shown that the delay has been caused by the conduct of the accused himself or somebody acting on his behalf or that he is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or involved in acts of terrorism. Learned counsel for the applicant contended, on the basis of the diary sheet of the trial Court, that but for a few adjournments for very short intervals obtained by the applicants for arguing his application for bail, delay in the prosecution of the case has been occasioned by the prosecution itself. He stated that despite the expiry of more than one year even charge has not been‑framed by the trial Court. Learned counsel for the State has not seriously disputed this position. He has, however, contended that the applicant is charged with 15 other offences and is as such a desperate, dangerous or hardened criminal. I am afraid the mere fact of the applicant's involvement in other cases would not render him to be treated as a desperate, dangerous or a hardened criminal. It is no doubt correct that if it could be shown by the prosecution that the allegations against him in the other cases are of such nature which may primal facie show that he is a desperate, dangerous and a hardened criminal, the Court might be inclined to refuse him bail. However, neither the F.I.R., in those 15 cases nor any other material indicating that there are reasonable grounds to infer that the accused is a desperate, dangerous or a hardened criminal have been placed on record. In the absence of any such material it is not possible to hold that the applicant falls within those exceptional categories of persons to might not be entitled to grant of bail by way of statutory rights. Learned counsel for applicant has also contended that in none of the F.I.Rs. in the other cases he has been named personally and has in fact been granted bail or acquitted in most of these cases. However, in the circumstances I would direct that the applicant be released on bail subject to furnishing security in the sum of Rs.2,00,000 (Rupees two lacs) with one surety and P.R. Bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court unless required in any other case. Q.M.H./M.A.K./S‑192/K??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Bail granted.