1988 PLP 73 (MLD)
Malik MUHAMMAD AMIN — Petitioner Versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GUJRANWALA Respondent
| Citation | 1988 PLP 73 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Lehrasap Khan, J |
| Parties | Malik MUHAMMAD AMIN — Petitioner Versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GUJRANWALA Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 73 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 73 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Lehrasap Khan, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 73 (MLD) (Malik MUHAMMAD AMIN — Petitioner Versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GUJRANWALA Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- M.D.Tahir for Petitioner.
- S.M.Zubair, AA.G. for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 7th May, 1884.
Headnotes / Summary
West Pakistan Bus Stand and Traffic Control (Gujranwala) Ordinance (XX of 1963).
S.6--District Magistrate banning plying of private buses, trucks and trollers from dawn to dusk on certain roads--No legal infirmity, held, existed calling for interference in regard to said older.
Judgment & Decree
On 12th December, 1981, the District Magistrate, Gujranwala, in exercise of his powers under Section 6 of the West Pakistan Bus Stand Traffic Control (Gujranwala) Odinance, 1963 (XX of 1963), made an order whereby he banned plying of private buses, trucks and trollers from dawn to dusk, Sheikhupura crossing to General Bus Stand. It was directed that the heavy chides should henceforth ply on Bye-pass roads around Gujranwala City and Sheikhupura Road. However, the private buses coming from outside were directed to halt at General Bus Stand and after unloading the passenger to go back to railway bye pass and from there to proceed to their respective destinations through bye-pass.
2. The petitioner who is resident of Mohallah Kakey Zaian, Mandi Aimanabad, District Gujranwala, has assailed the aforesaid order by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
3. The validity of the impugned order has been challenged mainly on the following grounds: (a) That earlier an order was made under Section 33-A of the Police (Amendment) Act, 1956, banning the plying of buses from Theri Sansi bye-pass to General Bus Stand, Gujranwala, which order impugned through a Writ Petition before this Court and the said order was set aside on 24-3-1981. The order impugned through the present Constitutional petition has been made to frustrate the :.s-Oresaid judgment of the High Court. (b) That the petitioner is resident of Aimanabad, a suburban town of Gujranwala, having a population of about 20,000 people. Gujranwala being only 11 miles from Aimanabad, local buses plied; between Gujranwala and Aimanabad, in which mostly students, factory workers, local lawyers and litigants travelled but on account of the impugned order these persons were compelled to undertake journey of about 28 miles and were obliged to pay much more fair than what they earlier used to pay. (c) That the impugned order has been made with undue haste without inviting objections from the members of the public. (d) That the impugned order was discriminatory in nature, inasmuch as, Government Transport Buses, wagons and mini-buses which were 36 try 42 seaters were permitted to ply through Gujranwala City.
4. As regards the first objection, it has been submitted on behalf of respondent No. 1 that while passing the impugned order, he duly considered the grounds on which the earlier order passed by his predecessor under Section 33 of the Police Act, was set aside and after obtaining view from the transporters and other concerned authorities including local councillors, he passed the impugned order to prevent traffic congestion within the municipal limits of the interest of the public in general. It has also been argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was neither a transporter nor student or and, therefore, had no locus standi to file this Petition. It has been explained ehalf of the respondents that as a matter of fact there was no route permit holder in respect of the route between Aimanabad and Gujranwala as alleged by the petitioner. The students, workers and other people of Aimanabad, who wanted to come to Gujranwala City, could do so by travelling in Government Transport Buses and were not required to travel in such buses which were to ply via Bye-pass roads. Regarding discrimination, it has been explained that so far as the private buses are concerned their entry through the city road has been banned indiscriminately but the ban was not applied to Government Transport Buses. it has also been claimed that under Section 11 of the West Pakistan Bus Stand and Traffic Control (Gujranwala) Ordinance, 1963, the District Magistrate could competently exempt any person, vehicle or class of vehicles from operation of all or any of the provisions of the Ordinance. Regarding inviting of objections from the public, it has been explained on behalf of the respondents that besides the transporters and functionaries of different departments, as detailed in the comments, objections were invited from the members of the public as well, through news item dated 18th October, 1981, in Daily 'Mashriq', Lahore. No objection was received from any member of the public till 12th December, 1981, when the impugned order was made.
5. It is noteworthy that through Writ Petition No. 3945 of 1983 one Malik Ejaz Ahmad, and Wagon Owners Association, Gujranwala, challenged the validity of the order passed by the District Magistrate, Gujranwala, on 15-6-1983, under section 2 of the West Pakistan Bus Stand and Trafic Control (Gujranwala) Ordinance, 1963, but the Writ Petition was dismissed in limine by this Court on 8 10-1983, as it was found that the suspension/cancellation of the impugned order was likely to create traffic congestion within the municipal limits of Gujranwala.
6. In the light of what has been said above, it is concluded that no legal infirmity calling for interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court in regard to the impugned order has been noticed. The contentions raised B on behalf of the petitioner, when assessed in the light of the explanations furnished by the respondents turn out to be fallacious and without any substance, The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. MA.K./3436/L Writ refused.