1968 SCMR 355 (PLP)
STEEL CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD — Petitioner Versus SHERZAMIN AND OTHERS-Respondents
| Citation | 1968 SCMR 355 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | A. R. Cornelius. C. J. and Fazle-Akbar, J |
| Parties | STEEL CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD — Petitioner Versus SHERZAMIN AND OTHERS-Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1968 SCMR 355 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1968 SCMR 355 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: A. R. Cornelius. C. J. and Fazle-Akbar, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1968 SCMR 355 (PLP) (STEEL CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD — Petitioner Versus SHERZAMIN AND OTHERS-Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Salahuddin, Attorney for Petitioner: (in all Petitions).
- Nemo for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi, dated the 9th March 1967, in Petitions Nos, 57 to 70 of 1967). Industrial Disputes Ordinance (LY I of 1959), S. 30-Permission to die miss workers refused-.Petition for Special Leave to Appeal declined by Supreme Court.
Judgment & Decree
CORNELIUS, C. J,-This order relates to four Civil Petitions special leave to appeal against the same judgment of the High Court, namely:- C. P. No. K-61 of 1967 The Steel Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., Karachi v. Sherzamin and another. C. P. No. K-62 of 1967 The Steel Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., Karachi v. Fakir Muhammad and another. C. P. No. K-63 of 1967 The Steel Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., Karachi v. Sher Badshah and another. C. P. No. K-64 of 1967 The Steel Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., Karachi v. Nuruddin and another. The four respondents are employees of the petitioner- Corporation, and were office-bearers of the Union of the Corporation's workers. The Corporation had charged them with inciting a strike, and after an ex parte enquiry, at which they were adjudged guilty, had sought the permission of the Industrial Court under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, to dkraias them. The Industrial Court purported to hold a further enquiry. The respondents went into the witness-box, and swore that so far from inciting the strike, they were doing their best to pacify the workers and avert the strike. The Corporation only examined the Enquiry Officer. The respondents also said in explanation of their failure to attend at the enquiry, that (a) it was held a day earlier than had been communicated to them ; and (b) they were prevented from attending because at the same time, a conciliation proceeding was in progress, and after punching their cards; they had to go before the Conciliation Officer, and spend the rest of the day there. The Industrial Court held that the "domestic enquiry was perverse and against the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience", but the only reason given in support of this drastic conclusion is that before himself, i.e., the Industrial Court, the Corporation should have examined "at least one witness ..to controvert the statement of the respondents that they did not go on strike .or their contention that they tried to pacify the workers .. .." Permission to dismiss the workers was refused. In dealing with a writ petition moved by the Corporation, the High Court corrected other errors from which the Industrial Court's order suffered, but not the patent error indicated above. A failure to produce evidence before the industrial Court could not conceivably vitiate the domestic enquiry, for perversity or any other reason. On the other hand, the High Court thought that the Industrial Court had attempted to satisfy itself whether an order of dismissal was justified in the circumstances, and it had committed no error in not confining its examination to the papers of the domestic enquiry. The writ was refused, and leave to appeal is now sought. There is a ground on which the refusal of permission under section 30 aforesaid could be justified, apparent from the order of the Industrial Court, namely, that the respondents did not have a proper opportunity of meeting the case against them, in that the domestic enquiry was held at a time when the Conciliation proceedings were in progress, which as office-bearers of the Union they were bound to attend. They were thus prevented from attending the domestic enquiry for reasons beyond their control. The Industrial Court would on that ground be justified in refusing to accept the finding reached at that enquiry, To that extent the facts elicited by the Industrial Court by examination of witnesses could be thought relevant to its function, under section 30 aforesaid. It should, however, be made clear that that function does not include the power to repeat the enquiry conducted by the Corporation, or to supplement it by production of fresh evidence. If the Industrial Court finds fault with the enquiry or the procedure thereof, its duty would be, while refusing permission to dismiss, to indicate where the fault or error lay, which vitiated the enquiry. In these cases, the holding of the domestic enquiry ex parse, was apparently unjustified, and in refusing permission to dismiss, the Industrial Court should have directed that the enquiry be held afresh after due opportunity to appear and defend had been given to the respondents. These petitions are dismissed with that observations. Petitions dismissed.