1999 PLP 454 (PLC)

2. The appellant filed an application under section 25‑A, of the I.R.O., 1969, wherein it was, inter alia, stated that the appellant was working in the respondent establishment as a Helper since last one year. The respondent terminated the appellant's service on 18‑2‑1997 without issuing any letter of termination. Grievance notice was sent on 7‑3‑1997 by registered post which was refused by the respondent, as such, returned un-served. It was, therefore, prayed that the appellant may be ordered to be reinstated in service with full back benefits. On the other hand, the respondent 'in its reply statement, pleaded that the appellant was employed as temporary worker on daily‑paid basis (with gaps) till 15‑10‑1996 and that the appellant's wage employment came to an end on 15‑10‑1996 according to daily wage sheet Annexure 'A' and not 18‑2‑1997, as alleged. It was further alleged in the said reply statement that the grievance notice was belated and time barred; as such, the grievance petition, filed by the appellant, was not maintainable.

3. The appellant examined himself as his own witness. Although he also filed affidavit‑in‑evidence of Ghulam Rasool witness, who, however, declined to appear for cross‑examination. The learned Presiding Officer, in fact, recorded his statement on 14‑3‑1998 declining to give evidence and withdrawing his affidavit‑in‑evidence, filed in the Court on behalf of the appellant. .

4. The appellant failed to produce airy documentary evidence in support of his application that he was a permanent worker and that his employment came to an end on 18‑2‑1997. The respondent, in support of the plea that the appellant was only daily wage worker, produced pay sheet of daily wages of temporary workers of the last daily wage employment, dated 15‑10‑1996 which, among others, was duly signed by the appellant in token of receipt of Rs.50 as his daily wage for 15‑10‑1996. The said sheet is duly stamped .and initialed by the respondent company.

5. I have heard Mr. Shamsher Khan, Representative of the appellant and Syed Qamaruddin Hasan, Advocate for the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant, being a daily wage worker, was not entitled to any notice for termination of employment. He referred to sub‑clause (2) of Standing Order 12 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, which reads as under:‑‑ "(2) No temporary workman, whether monthly‑rated, weekly‑rated, daily‑rated or piece‑rated and no probationary or Badli, shall be entitled to any notice, if his services are terminated by the employer, nor shall any such workman be required to give any notice or pay any wages in lieu thereof to the employer if he leaves employment of his own accord." In support of his contention, reliance was placed by him on the case of Muhammad Yaqub v. Punjab Labour Court and 5 others 1990 SCMR 1.539 wherein it was observed that a person, who served as a work‑charge employee on daily wages and was not paid wages for Fridays, cannot claim to be a permanent workman even if he served for 8 years.

6. In the instant case, the appellant was employed on daily wage basis with gaps, of Saturdays, and Sundays, cannot be taken to be a permanent worker and is not entitled to the protection under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The learned Labour Court has, therefore, rightly held that the appellant was a daily‑paid worker and that the relationship of employee and employer, as contemplated by law, does not exist.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent next contended that the grievance notice was time‑barred. In the instant case daily wage employment of the appellant came to an end on 15‑10‑1996. The grievance notice should have been delivered to the respondent within three months whereas the same was sent on 7‑3‑1997. It, therefore, appears that the grievance notice was given by the appellant to the respondent much after the stipulated time of three months from the date of the accrual of cause of action i.e. 15‑10‑1996, as provided in subsection (1) of section 25‑A, of the I. R.O., 1969. Consequently, the very application under section 25‑A, of the I.R.O., 1969, was not maintainable.

8. It is pertinent to note that the learned Presiding Officer did not decide this point, though it was taken not only in the reply statement to grievance petition, but also in the written arguments, submitted by the respondent. In result, I find no substance in the appeal, which is dismissed. Announced in open Court this the 16th day of April, 1999. H.B.T./266/K/Lab. (Trib.) ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Appeal dismissed.