1994 P Cr (PLP)

4. On 12-7-1988 the respondent was formally charged. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

5. The prosecution could not produce any evidence on the nine dates of hearing i.e. 30-7-1988, 15-8-1988, 27-8-1988, 12-9-1988, 26-9-1988, 15-10-1988, 29-10-1988, 26-11-1988 and 29-11-1988. On the last date of hearing i.e. 29-11-1988 the respondent moved an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. for his acquittal. After hearing the parties on the said application the learned Magistrate vide the impugned order acquitted the respondent.

6. Feeling aggrieved the State has come up in appeal.

7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the record.

8. It is clear from the above narration of facts that a number of opportunities had been afforded to the prosecution for the production of its evidence against the respondent which it failed to produce without any cogent reason. Of course the respondent could not be dragged on for any indefinite period in a Court of law to enable the indolent prosecution agency to produce its witnesses. Learned trial Court was justified in holding that this failure on the part of the prosecution could be one of the grounds for the acquittal of the respondent.

9. Section 182, P.P.C. reads as follows:-- "Whoever, gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant:-- (a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him or (b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person,. shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."

10. The most essential ingredient of the above provision of law is that the person, who gives information to any public servant, knows or believes that the said information is false. The second essential ingredient is that by giving such false information he intends to cause any injury or annoyance to the person or persons against whom such information is given. In the present case there was no material whatsoever on record to establish that the respondent knew that the information which he had imparted to the police through his supplementary statement, dated 8-11-1987 was false or by the said statement he intended to cause any annoyance or injury to Muhammad Akram and Muhammad Jamil aforementioned. It was a fact that the minor son of the respondent was missing. The state of his mind could very well be imagined. He had been receiving all sorts of information from different quarters, which he conveyed to the concerned police Authorities with the purpose that his son was recovered. The information that the boy was being kept by the aforesaid two persons was conveyed to him by a man named Aslam on telephone. After confirming from the informer that the information was true he further conveyed it to the police Authorities verbatim. His conduct was not only natural but cautious also. He did what a father would do in such circumstances, It is an admitted fact that his son was recovered much after the said information from Faisalabad. It, therefore, could not be said with certainty that the respondent knew or believed that the information contained in his supplementary statement was false and was intended to cause injury and annoyance to Muhammad Akram and Muhammad Jamil aforesaid. In these circumstances the learned trial Court was justified in holding that there was no possibility of the conviction of the respondent in the present case. The respondent, therefore, was rightly acquitted in exercise of the powers under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed in limine. N.H.Q./S-433/L Appeal dismissed.