1989 PLP 1548 (SCMR)
Mst. BASRI Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD YOUSAF Respondent
| Citation | 1989 PLP 1548 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Saad Saood Jan,JJ |
| Parties | Mst. BASRI Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD YOUSAF Respondent |
| Primary Law | Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 1548 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 1548 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Saad Saood Jan,JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 1548 (SCMR) (Mst. BASRI Petitioner Versus MUHAMMAD YOUSAF Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Masood Javaid, Advocate Supreme Court and M Aslam Chaudhry. Advocate‑on‑Record. for Petitioner.
- Masood Zakirya, Advocate Supreme Court and Walayat Umar Ch. Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 31st August, 1988.
Headnotes / Summary
(Against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore. dated 5‑12‑1983 in R.SA. No.168/74). ‑‑‑S.12‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)‑‑Agreement of sale‑‑Suit for spec performance‑‑Contention that respondent after completing the sale agreement had applied even to Income‑tax Authorities for a clearance certificate so as to produce the same before Registration Authorities‑‑Some such application was made but it would not be possible to give a definite finding that the application was signed by the respondent‑‑High Court found disputed signatures on the said application as overwritten though no such finding was given by the lower Courts‑‑Observation of High Court without the finding of lower Courts made no difference particularly when none of the counsel was able to make a statement that document was not in fact examined by High Court‑‑Leave to appeal refused.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by a plaintiff against the acceptance of respondent's Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. The petitioner's suit for specific performance was dismissed, but the first appellate Court had decreed it. The findings of fact by the learned trial Court and the High Court which go against the petitioner's case, are that an agreement for sale was being negotiated between the parties but it was never completed. Although the reference to and reliance by the High Court on relevant evidence for restoring the findings of fact against the petitioner rendered by the trial Court, do not suffer from any infirmity; yet we thought it proper to examine in some detail another aspect of the matter. The respondent allegedly, as contended from the petitioner's side, after completing the sale agreement, had applied even to the income‑tax authorities for a clearance certificate so as to produce it before the Registration authorities they do not register a sale‑deed without a clearance certificate from those authorities. After hearing the learned counsel from both the sides on this issue, it seems that some such application was made to the income‑tax authorities but it would not be possible now to give a definite finding in favour of the petitioner that the application made to the income‑tax authorities, was actually signed by the respondent himself. The learned Judge in the High Court examined the disputed signatures on the application and found that they were over‑written. The contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that no such observation was made by the lower Courts regarding the signatures, will not make any difference insofar as the observation made by the learned Judge in the High Court is concerned; particularly when none of the learned counsel is able to make a statement that the document was not in fact examined by the learned Judge. In these circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by granting leave to appeal. The same, therefore, is refused. M.A.K/B‑97/S Leave refused.